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Advocates
  • For the Appellant: E. Venkatesam, K.B. Krishna Murthy, M. Krishna Mohan Rao, M. Ramachandra Raju, V. Suryanarayana Rao, Advocates
Judges
  • Viswanatha Sastry
  • Krishna Rao, JJ.
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Advocates
  • For the Appellant: E. Venkatesam, K.B. Krishna Murthy, M. Krishna Mohan Rao, M. Ramachandra Raju, V. Suryanarayana Rao, Advocates
Judges
  • Viswanatha Sastry
  • Krishna Rao, JJ.
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Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Viswanatha Sastry, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal was filed by Rama Rao (plaintiff-appellant) challenging the decree in O.S. No. 108 of 1930 of the Subordinate Judge, Vijayawada, which dismissed his suit for a declaration that the Board of Revenue's order dated 6-4-1950 in V.O.S.A. No. 9 of 1949 was illegal, ultra vires and void. The court below held that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit.

The dispute concerns hereditary village offices in Rolupade, a proprietary village. Meduri Challayya (the plaintiff's father) had been headman and karnam until 1910 when the offices bifurcated: Challayya opted to remain karnam until he resigned in 1927. Nagabhushanam (a son of Challayya by his first wife) was appointed headman in 1910. Rama Rao (son by the second wife) was appointed karnam in 1927 upon his father's resignation and served as karnam until 1950.

In 1947 Gopalakrishnamurthy (son of Nagabhushanam) filed V.O.S. No. 1 of 1947 before the Revenue Divisional Officer seeking the karnam's office under section 13(1) of the Madras Hereditary Village-Offices Act (the Act). Rama Rao was impleaded as a defendant. The Revenue Divisional Officer dismissed the suit; the District Collector, on appeal (V.O.S.A. No. 1 of 1948), confirmed that dismissal on the ground that Nagabhushanam had relinquished any reversionary claim in favour of Rama Rao in 1910. Gopalakrishnamurthy appealed to the Board of Revenue (V.O.S.A. No. 9 of 1949). The Board held that Gopalakrishnamurthy, as a member of the senior line, was preferentially entitled to the karnam's office by lineal primogeniture and that Nagabhushanam's earlier relinquishment was not binding on his heirs, and by order dated 6-4-1950 set aside the Collector's order and appointed Gopalakrishnamurthy as karnam.

Rama Rao then filed the present civil suit seeking a declaration that the Board's order was illegal and void; the Subordinate Judge dismissed that suit for want of jurisdiction and this appeal followed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a civil court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit framed as a declaration that an order of the Board of Revenue (appointing a rival claimant to a hereditary village office) is illegal and void, where section 21 of the Madras Hereditary Village-Offices Act purports to bar civil courts from adjudicating claims to such offices.
  2. Whether the plaintiff's specific objections to the Board's order — namely (a) absence of a preliminary enquiry into the fitness of the appointee, (b) absence of a vacancy in the karnam's office in 1950, (c) improper reception by the Board of additional evidence on appeal, (d) that the suit and/or appeal were barred by limitation, and (e) that a prior relinquishment defeated the rival claimant's succession — provide a basis for civil-court relief despite the statutory bar.
  3. Whether orders of the tribunal (Collector/Board of Revenue) passed wholly without jurisdiction remain challengeable in the civil courts despite section 21.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Rama Rao) Arguments

  • The Board's order appointing Gopalakrishnamurthy was illegal, ultra vires and void.
  • No preliminary enquiry or finding was made about the fitness of Gopalakrishnamurthy, which the appellant contends was a condition precedent to appointment.
  • There was no vacancy in the karnam's office in 1950 because Rama Rao had functioned as karnam since 1927 and remained in office.
  • The Board had no power to admit additional evidence on appeal and thereby reverse the Collector's decision.
  • The original suit before the Revenue Divisional Officer, and the appeal to the Board of Revenue, were barred by limitation.
  • Nagabhushanam's relinquishment of any claim to the karnam's office in 1910 should bind his heirs, so Gopalakrishnamurthy (not yet born in 1910) had no right to the office.

Respondents' / Tribunal-Position as Recorded by the Court

  • The court records that most of the appellant's objections are untenable and explains why: a preliminary enquiry into fitness was unnecessary where appointment followed a decree after hearing rival claimants.
  • The court found there was a vacancy in 1927 when Challayya resigned; section 13 does not require that a suit for a hereditary office be filed only when the office is physically vacant at the time of suit.
  • The Board of Revenue had the power on appeal to receive evidence that the Revenue Divisional Officer had improperly rejected and to decide on the basis of such evidence.
  • Gopalakrishnamurthy's suit was within time under section 14 (three years after attaining majority) because he was a minor in 1927; any delay in appealing to the Board could be excused under section 25 of the Act, and the Board heard both parties.
  • The question of preferential entitlement (senior line by lineal primogeniture versus effect of the 1910 relinquishment) was one that the statutory revenue courts had jurisdiction to decide; whether the Board's decision was correct on merits was not a matter for the civil court under section 21 (subject to the exception where the tribunal acted wholly without jurisdiction).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sambayya v. Tirupatayya Example of a decision dealing with an order of the Collector passed wholly without jurisdiction (relied on by appellant). The court noted that decisions of this character establish that where the statutory tribunal acts wholly without jurisdiction, civil remedies remain available despite section 21; the case was distinguished from the present matter because the Board did not act wholly without jurisdiction.
Venkata Subba Rao v. Ananda Rao Authority collected on the proposition that orders passed without jurisdiction can be challenged in civil courts. The court treated this as supportive of the exception to section 21 where the tribunal acts without jurisdiction, but observed that the present case does not fall within that exception.
Kailasapathi v. Secretary of State Example of cases where the tribunal acted within its jurisdiction but reached an erroneous decision; section 21 bars civil suits to set aside such decisions. The court cited it as an example of the category of cases in which an erroneous decision by a tribunal acting within jurisdiction cannot be reviewed by civil courts under section 21.
Venkata Subbayya v. Secretary of State for India in Council Similar example of a tribunal acting within jurisdiction where civil-court challenge is barred. Used by the court as illustrative authority for the proposition that section 21 prevents civil adjudication of rival claims decided by the statutory tribunal when the tribunal acted within its powers.
Venkata Sastri v. Venkata Jagannadha Rao Another example of the same category (tribunal within jurisdiction; civil challenge barred). Cited as an example reinforcing the court's conclusion that the present case falls into the category where the Board acted within jurisdiction and its decision cannot be set aside in a civil suit under section 21.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis rests centrally on the statutory scheme created by the Madras Hereditary Village-Offices Act (the Act), in particular section 21 read together with the adjudicatory machinery set out in sections 13 and 23 of the Act.

The court quoted section 21 (omitting a proviso not relevant in the case) which peremptorily provides that "no civil court shall have authority to take into consideration or decide any claim to succeed to any of the offices specified in section 3..." and observed that the Act creates a special tribunal — the Collector (with a right of appeal to the District Collector and a further appeal to the Board of Revenue) — to try such claims.

The court applied several analytical steps:

  1. Characterisation of the suit: The court examined the substance of Rama Rao's pleading and concluded that although framed as a declaratory suit attacking the Board's order as ultra vires and void, in substance it was a suit to recover/contest the karnam's office — a subject matter expressly excluded from civil-court jurisdiction by section 21.
  2. Scope of section 21: The court emphasised that section 21 is express, explicit and peremptory and cannot be evaded by artful pleading; where the Act confers the right and the Act prescribes the forum and procedure, the statutory remedy is the exclusive route except in narrowly defined circumstances.
  3. Distinguishing lack of jurisdiction from error of decision: The court acknowledged established law that if the statutory tribunal (Collector/Board) acted wholly without jurisdiction, the aggrieved person retains a remedy in the civil courts despite a statutory bar. However, merely showing that the tribunal reached an erroneous conclusion of law or fact is not sufficient to invoke civil jurisdiction when the tribunal acted within its jurisdictional bounds.
  4. Application to the facts: The court reviewed the appellant's grounds (absence of preliminary enquiry, vacancy, admissibility of evidence, limitation, and effect of relinquishment) and explained why those objections did not show that the Board acted without jurisdiction. Specifically, the court held that: (a) a preliminary enquiry was unnecessary where appointment followed a decree after hearing rival claimants; (b) the karnam's office became vacant in 1927 on Challayya's resignation, and section 13 does not confine suits to times when the office is physically vacant; (c) the Board had power on appeal to receive evidence that the Revenue Divisional Officer improperly rejected; (d) Gopalakrishnamurthy's suit was within time under section 14 (three years after attaining majority) and any delay in appealing was excusable under section 25; and (e) the resolution of whether the relinquishment bound heirs was a question for the revenue courts and not for the civil court under section 21.
  5. Conclusion from legal structure and authorities: Given the statutory bar and the character of the dispute, and distinguishing authorities where the tribunal acted wholly without jurisdiction, the court concluded that the matter was not justiciable in a civil court: the Board acted within its jurisdiction and even if its decision was erroneous the civil court could not entertain a suit to set it aside under the Act.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Holding: The court upheld the decision of the Subordinate Judge that the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain Rama Rao's suit challenging the Board of Revenue's order. The appeal was dismissed with costs (one set to be shared by both respondents).

Direct consequences and implications (as stated in the opinion):

  • The suit framed as a declaratory action was in substance a claim to the karnam's office and thus barred by section 21 of the Act; the correct forum for such disputes is the statutory revenue machinery (Collector, District Collector on appeal, and Board of Revenue).
  • Where the statutory tribunal acts within its jurisdiction and merely reaches an erroneous decision in law or fact regarding rival claims to a hereditary office, section 21 prevents civil courts from setting aside that decision; an exception exists only where the tribunal has acted wholly without jurisdiction.
  • The plaintiff's appropriate remedy lay under the Act; the civil courts cannot be used as a device to circumvent the statutory bar.

The court did not grant civil relief to the appellant and did not find that the Board had acted wholly without jurisdiction; instead the statutory exclusion of civil jurisdiction under section 21 governed the outcome.

Show full summary ...

    Meduri Rama Rao v. Meduri Gopalakrishnamurthy And Another

    Viswanatha Sastry, J.:-

    (1) "this is an appeal by the plaintiff' against the decree in o. S. No. 108 of 1930 on the file of the subordinate judge, vijayawada dismissing his suit for a declaration that the resolution and decree of the board of revenue dated 6 - 4 - 1950 in v. O. S. A. No. 9 of 1949 was illegal, ultra vires and void. The court below decided that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, and this decision is challenged on appeal. The madras hereditary village - offices act (iii of 1895) will be referred to as " the act" in this judgment. The facts are not in dispute and may be shortly stated. Rolupade is a proprietory village forming part of nadim tiruvur estate. The plaintiff's father meduri challayya was holding the office of headman and karnam of this village till 1910 when there was a bifurcation of the two offices. Challayya opted for the karnam's office and continued to retain it till 1927. In 1910, nagabhushanam, a divided son of challayya by his first wife, applied for and was appointed to the post of village headman of rolupade, an office which he holds even now. When challayya became old, he resigned the office of karnam on 6 - 8 - 1927 and his son by his second wife rama rao, the present plaintiff, was appointed karnam in the place of his father. In 1947, gopala - krishnamurthy, a son of nagabhushanam filed a suit v. O. S. No. 1 of 1947 in the court of the revenue divisional officer, vijayawada for recovery of the office of karnam under section 13 (1) of the act. In that suit, rama rao was impleaded as a defendant along with the other members of the family. The revenue divisional officer dismissed the suit, and gopalakrishnamurthy filed an appeal v. O. S. A. No. 1 of 1948 to the district collector, who confirmed the decision of the revenue divisional officer. The ground on which the district collector upheld the dismissal of the suit was that when nagabhushanam was appointed as village headman in 1910, he had given up all claims of reversion to the karnam's post in favour of his step - brother rama rao at a time when gopalakrishnamurthy had not been born, and that nagabhushanam got himself appointed to the headman's post on the basis of such relinquishment. Gopalakrishnamurthy took up the matter in second appeal to the board of revenue in v. O. S. A. No. 9 of 1949. The board of revenue decided that gopalakrishnamurthi, who belonged to the senior line was preferentially entitled to the office of karnam by virtue of the rule of lineal primogeniture, and that the relinquishment of the office by his father nagabhushanam was not binding on his heirs. By its order dated 6 - 4 - 1950, the board set aside the order of the collector and appointed gopalakrishnamurthy as the karnam.

    (2) Aggrieved by this order of the board, rama rao brought the present suit for a declaration that the order of the board was ultra vires, illegal and void for several reasons which were set out in the plaint, and which may be summarised as follows: (1) there was no preliminary enquiry or finding about the fitness of gopalakrishnamurthy for the office, such an enquiry and finding being a condition precedent to the appointment. (2) there was no vacancy in the office of karnam in 1950 when the appointment of gopalakrihnamurthy was made, in as much as rama rao had functioned as karnam from 1927 to 1950 and still remained in that office. (3) the board had no power to admit additional evidence on appeal and reverse the decision of the collector. (4) the suit filed before the revenue divisional officer was barred by limitation, and the appeal to the board of revenue was also filed out of time. (5) nagabhushanam having relinquished his right to the office of karnam in 1910, gopalakrishnamurthy who had not been born in 1910, and who was not the next heir to the last office holder, had no right to the office. Most of these objections are untenable. A preliminary enquiry or finding about the fitness of the appointee is not necessary, where, as in this case, the appointment was made as the result of a decree passed after hearing the rival claimants to the office. There was a vacancy in the office of karanam in 1927 when challayya resigned owing to old age. There is nothing in section 13 of the act which requires that a suit for a hereditary office could be filed only when a vacancy existed in the office itself. Gopalakrishnamurthy sued for the office in 1947. He lost his case before the revenue divisional officer and the district collector and took the matter up on second appeal to the board of revenue. The board of revenue decided that he was in existence in 1927 on the strength of documentary evidence which the revenue divisional officer had declined to receive without adequate reason and which the collector, while willing to receive, did not consider necessary in the view he took of the rights of the parties. On further appeal, the board of revenue had power to receive evidence tendered before the revenue divisional officer but improperly rejected by him and arrive at a decision on the basis of such evidence. When the karnam's office became vacant in 1927, gopalakrishnamurthy was a minor and he had under section 14 of the act a period of 3 years after attaining majority for bringing a suit for the office. His suit before the revenue divisional officer was therefore in time, and so was his appeal. Even if there was any delay in filing the appeal before the board, it was excusable under section 25 of the act, and in view of the fact that both the parties were heard by the board, the delay, if there was any delay, should be deemed to have been excused by the board. The question whether gopalakrishnamurthy, the grandson of the last office - holder challayya was preferentially entitled to the office as being the descendant of the last holder in the senior male line or whether by reason of the relinquishment of his claim to the office in 1910 by gopalakrishnamurthy's father nagabhushanam, rama rao, as the son of the last holder, was entitled to the office, was one of which the revenue courts had jurisdiction to decide. It is unnecessary for us to consider whether the decision was correct on the merits, because, in our opinion, the correctness of the decision in law or fact cannot be decided in a civil court. The karnam's office is one of the offices included in section 3 of the act. Omitting the proviso which is not here relevant, section 21 of the act runs as follows:

    "no civil court shall have authority to take into consideration or decide any claim to succeed to any of the offices specified in section 3 or any question as to the rate or amount of the emoluments of any such office or except as provided in proviso (ii) to subsection (i) of section 13, any claim to recover the emoluments of any such office"
    .

    It was argued tor the plaintiff - appellant that the present suit for a declaration that the order of the board of revenue was ultra vires and void is not removed by section 21 from the cognizance of a civil court. Reliance was placed on two decisions of the madras high court to which reference will be made later. Where the right alleged to have been infringed is not a common law right but one created by special statute and that very statute provides a remedy for the violation of that right by resort to proceedings before a special tribunal constituted by the statute, the party aggrieved should pursue the remedy given by the statute. The special tribunal constituted by the statute must, of course, act within the powers conferred upon it by the statute and so long as it does so, its orders, whether right or wrong, cannot be challenged except in the manner and to the extent prescribed by the statute itself.

    (3) In the present case, the legislature has gone much further and enacted section 21 barring civil courts from entertaining or deciding claims to offices like the karnam's office now in question and making such claims triable by the" collector with a right of appeal to the district collector, and of a further appeal to the board of revenue. See sections 13 and 23 of the act. Section 21 of the act is express, explicit, and peremptory in its terms and cannot be circumvented by a mere trick or device of pleading by framing a suit as one tor declaration of the invalidity of the order of the board of revenue deciding that gopalakrishnamurthy had a preferential claim to the office of karnam over rama rao, and that he should be appointed to the office. It is the act that confers the right claimed by the plaintiff to the office of karnam, and if a person, whose claims were inferior to those of the plaintiff, had been appointed to the office by the collector or the board of revenue, he cannot ask the civil courts to try the merits of his claim. The suit would be barred by the express terms of section 21. The present suit, though framed as one for a declaration that the order of the board of revenue is illegal and ultra vires, is in substance and reality a suit for the office of karnam to which gopalakrishnamurthy was appointed as a result of the order of the board of revenue. Rama rao canrot reagitate in the civil court a claim to the karnam's office which was negatived by the board of revenue on appeal from the order of the collector. In effect what the plaintiff seeks is an adjudication by a civil court upon a claim which has been expressly excluded from its jurisdiction by section 21. 'assuming but not deciding that the decision of the board of revenue in the present case as regards the preferential right of gopalakrishnamurthi was erroneous in law, there is no right of appeal to the civil court given by the act from the decision of the board. Indeed, as already stated, section 21 take? away the jurisdiction of the civil court to try or adjudicate upon rival claims to the karnam's office. Section 42 of the specific relief act does not sanction any and every kind of declaratory suit. There is a danger of suits being couched in a declaratory form with a view to avoid a statutory bar and courts will therefore look at the substance of the plaintiff's suit, the right which he asserts and the relief to which he is really entitled. The plaintiff here really wants to recover the office of karnam from his rival claimant who was appointed by the board, and his remedy lies only under the act. The decisions in sambayya v. Tirupatayya ' and venkata subba rao v. Ananda rao' relied upon by the learned advocate for the plain tiff relate to orders of the collector passed wholly without jurisdiction. There is no doubt that if the tribunal created by section 13 (1) of the act for adjudicating upon claims to village offices specified in section 3, acted without jurisdiction there would, in spite of section 21, be available a right to the aggrieved person to seek his remedy in the civil court or in this court. It is needless to cite the cases which are found collected in the decision in venkata subba rao v. Ananda rao. Where, however, all that is proved is that the tribunal acting within its jurisdiction and exercising the powers conferred on it by the act has reached an erroneous decision in law or fact as regards the rights of rival claimants to the karnam's office, section 21 bars a suit in the civil court to set aside the decision of the tribunal. Examples of this type of cases will be found in kailasapathi v. Secretary of state , venkata subbayya v. Secretary of state for india in council, and venkata sastri v. Venkata jagannadha rao. The present case falls within the latter category as will be apparent from the facts that we have stated at the begining of this judgment. For these reasons, we are of the opinion that the decision of the court below is correct and that this appeal should be dismissed with costs, one set to be shared by both the respondents. T. A. B. Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Meduri Rama Rao v. Meduri Gopalakrishnamurthy And Another
    (Jul 29, 1955)