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  • clause (vi) of sub - section (2) of section 17
  • clauses (b) and (c) of sub - section (1)
  • 20, rule 12,
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  • clause (vi) of sub - section (2) of section 17
  • clauses (b) and (c) of sub - section (1)
  • 20, rule 12,
Smart Summary

Case Summary: Second Appeal — Bhimasankaram, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeal arises from a dispute between two brothers (the plaintiff and the 1st defendant) over property inherited from their paternal uncle's son, Pydithalli, who died without issue in 1942. Kannamma (the widow) inherited Pydithalli's properties and executed a sale deed in favour of Sanni. The plaintiff and the 1st defendant, as nearest reversioners, filed O.S. No. 166 of 1945 seeking a declaration that the alienation would not bind the estate of the late Pydithalli. That suit produced a compromise decree dated 3 October 1945 which, among other terms, cancelled the sale deed and apportioned items of the plaint schedule between the parties.

Despite the compromise, the brothers filed a second suit, O.S. No. 78 of 1946, for mesne profits. That suit was decreed at trial, but on appeal the widow was exonerated. While that appeal was pending, the 1st defendant obtained a sale deed from Kannamma to lands which the brothers contended they were entitled to under the earlier compromise decree; the present second defendant is an alienee from the 1st defendant. The plaintiff seeks recovery of his half share of the suit lands relying on the earlier compromise decree.

Several defences were raised; the surviving defence before the court was that the compromise decree is inadmissible in evidence under section 49 of the Indian Registration Act because it required registration under clause (vi) of sub-section (2) of section 17 and was not registered.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the compromise decree is a decree "expressed to be made on a compromise and compromising immoveable property other than that which is the subject-matter of the suit" within the meaning of clause (vi) of sub-section (2) of section 17 of the Indian Registration Act (such that it would require registration and thus be inadmissible under section 49 if unregistered).
  2. If the question above is posed differently: whether the immovable property divided by the compromise can be regarded as "the subject-matter of the suit" even though the suit sought only a declaratory relief that the sale deed did not bind the reversioners.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's / Appellant's Position

  • The plaintiff seeks to recover his half share of the suit lands on the basis of the compromise decree dated 3 October 1945; implicitly, the decree is relied upon as establishing entitlement and title of the plaintiff to his share.

Defendants' Position (Surviving Defence)

  • The primary surviving defence contends that the compromise decree is inadmissible in evidence under section 49 of the Indian Registration Act because it purported to compromise immovable property other than that which was the subject-matter of the suit, thus attracting clause (vi) of sub-section (2) of section 17 and requiring registration; since it was not registered, it cannot be used to effect title to the suit property.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Singa Reddi v. Subba Reddi, (1916) 31 M.L.J. 48 : I.L.R. 39 Mad. 987 (Full Bench) Principle that where cause of action and relief in a second suit differ from those in the first suit, the second suit cannot be treated as in respect of the same "subject-matter" as the first suit; court disclaimed exhaustive definition of "subject-matter." The court cited this decision to show previous judicial treatment of "subject-matter" and to note that a wide or exhaustive definition was not asserted by that Full Bench; used as background authority in assessing what may constitute the subject-matter of a suit.
Ramayya v. Rangaraju, A.I.R. 1937 Mad. 504 (Single Judge, Madras High Court) Held that "subject-matter of the suit" contemplates specific immovable property being directly and specifically in question — there must be a claim or right in or to the specific immovable property asserted in the litigation and relief sought in respect thereof. The court expressed respectful concurrence with this reasoning and adopted its test as a useful guide for determining whether immovable property is the subject-matter of a suit (aligning it with section 52, Transfer of Property Act).
Bhola Naih Seal v. Bhuthanlalh Sen, A.I.R. 1925 Cal. 239 Applied section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act to a deed of trust sought to be set aside in a suit — treating the property as directly and specifically in question. Referenced to support the proposition that section 52 can apply where a deed/alienation is sought to be set aside and therefore the property is the subject-matter of the suit.
Thakar Das v. Jai Kishen Das, A.I.R. 1938 Lah. 448 (Single Judge) Applied the doctrine of section 52 (Transfer of Property Act) to a suit involving a declaration of title to immovable property. Used as supporting authority for the view that suits seeking declaratory relief about alienations or title may directly and specifically involve rights in immovable property (thus making that property the subject-matter of the suit).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court framed the core question as whether the compromise decree was a decree "expressed to be made on a compromise and compromising immoveable property other than that which is the subject-matter of the suit" under clause (vi) of sub-section (2) of section 17 of the Indian Registration Act. If the compromise compromised immovable property that was not the subject-matter of the suit, then registration would be required and the unregistered decree would be inadmissible under section 49.

The court examined relevant procedural law (Order 23 Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code) setting out the requirement that where a suit is adjusted wholly or in part by agreement or compromise, the court shall record the compromise and pass a decree in accordance with it "so far as it relates to the suit." The court reasoned that if the immovable property in question could be said to be the subject-matter of the suit, then the terms of the compromise plainly related to the suit and the decree conformed to Order 23 Rule 3.

To decide whether the property was the "subject-matter" of the suit, the court adopted the test articulated in Ramayya v. Rangaraju: the subject-matter phrase contemplates specific immovable property being directly and specifically in question — there must be a claim or right in or to that specific immovable property asserted in the litigation and relief sought in respect thereof. The court equated this test with the scope of section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act (doctrine of lis pendens) which applies to suits where rights to immovable property are directly and specifically in question.

The court considered analogous authorities (Bhola Naih Seal and Thakar Das) in which section 52 was applied to suits seeking to set aside deeds or declaring title — these decisions supported the proposition that a suit seeking to set aside an alienation or asserting a right that affects immovable property can directly and specifically involve that property as the subject-matter.

Applying these principles to the facts, the court observed that the present suit sought a declaration that the sale deed executed by Kannamma was not binding on the reversioners. The court found that a right to the immovable property, the alienation of which was sought to be set aside, was directly and specifically involved in the litigation. Consequently, the immovable property was the subject-matter of the suit for the purposes of clause (vi) of sub-section (2) of section 17 and for the operation of section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act.

Because the property was the subject-matter of the suit, the compromise decree did not fall within the exception in clause (vi) that would render it a decree "compromising immoveable property other than that which is the subject-matter of the suit." Therefore the decree did not require registration for the purpose of being admissible in evidence as affecting title; the compromise decree could be received in evidence and enforced against the defendants.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court held that the compromise decree (Exhibit D-3) could be received in evidence and enforced against the defendants, and accordingly allowed the second appeal. The judgment of the single judge was set aside and the decree of the district munsif was restored. The court directed an inquiry into future mesne profits under Order 20, Rule 12, Civil Procedure Code.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The plaintiff's reliance on the compromise decree was upheld; the decree is admissible and enforceable and the district munsif's decision in favour of the plaintiffs is restored. The matter is remitted for an inquiry as to future mesne profits under the cited CPC provision.
  • On precedent and legal principle: The court applied and reaffirmed established tests for determining whether immovable property is the "subject-matter of the suit" (notably the approach in Ramayya v. Rangaraju and the concept in section 52, Transfer of Property Act). The opinion reasons that suits seeking to set aside an alienation or declaring rights in immovable property can directly and specifically involve that property as subject-matter, making unregistered compromise decrees in such circumstances admissible to affect title.
  • No broader, novel rule was announced beyond the application of existing principles: the decision applies established authorities to the facts and restores the trial court's decree rather than purporting to set new legal doctrine.

Decision rendered by Bhimasankaram, J. (second appeal posted before a bench on account of the importance of interpreting clause (vi) of sub-section (2) of section 17 of the Indian Registration Act).

    Ankamreddi Konda v. Ankamreddi Pedademudu

    Bhimasankaram, J.:-

    (1) This second appeal has been directed to be posted before a bench by our learned brother umamaheswaram, j. , because he considered that it raised a question of importance involving the interpretation of clause (vi) of sub - section (2) of section 17 of the indian registration act.

    (2) The facts of the case are these : the plaintiff and the 1st defendant are brothers who become divided some time before suit. One pydithalli, the son of their paternal uncle, died issucless in the year 1942 and his properties were inherited by kannamma, his widow, who alienated the suit lands as well as some other properties in favour of one sanni. Thereupon the plaintiff and the 1st defendant in their capacity as the nearest reversioners to the estate of pydithalli filed o. S. No. 166 of 1945 on the file of the district munsif's court, chodavaram, against the widow and her alienee, who were impleaded as the 2nd the 1st defendants respectively, for a declaration that the alienation would not bind the estate of late pydithalli. The suit resulted in a compromise between the alienee and the brothers. The compromise decree passed therein which is dated 3rd october, 1945, contains these terms :

    " (1) that the sale deed dated 7th april, 1945, executed by the second defendant in favour of the first defendant do stand cancelled ; (2) that the second defendant do take only items 9 and 11 of the plaint schedule without any power of alienation during her life - time and the plaintiffs do enjoy them afterwards absolutely ; (3) that the plaintiffs do take possession of other items of the plaint schedule at the end of the telugu year and enjoy them absolutely ; (4) that the first defendant and plaintiffs do pay 5 putties of paddy for this year to the second defendant and the rest of the crops in the suit lands be shared in equal shares between the plaintiffs and the first defendant ; and (5) that each party do bear its own costs of this suit. Note. - the other terms of the compromise are recorded. Compromise petition is attached to this decree as schedule thereto. Plaint schedule attached to decree."

    (3) It may be noted that the preamble to this decree states -

    "the plaintiffs having proved their claim against the ex parte second defendant and having agreed to take a decree in terms of the compromise against the second defendant also, the court doth in pursuance of the said deed of compromise order and decree"
    . Despite this compromise, the brothers had to file a second suit o. S. No. 78 of 1946 against kannamma and sanni for mesne profits. It was decreed against both of them by the trial court ; but on appeal, the widow was exonerated from liability on the ground that she had no possession of the properties in respect of which the mesne profits were claimed. While that appeal was pending, the present 1st defendant obtained a sale deed for the lands from kannamma to which both he and plaintiff were entitled under the earlier compromise decree. The present second defendant is an alienee from the 1st defendant. The plaintiff now seeks to recover his half share of the suit lands from the defendants on the foot of the compromise decree.

    (4) Several defences were raised of which only one now survives, viz. , that the compromise decree is inadmissible in evidence under section 49 of the indian registration act for the purpose of effecting title to the suit properly, because it required to be registered and was not. The contention is that the suit which resulted in the compromise was filed only for a declaration by presumptive reversioners that the property covered by the sale deed executed by kannamma in favour of sanni did not bind the reversion the compromise whereby the properties in respect of which the declaration was sought were divided among the plaintiffs, the alienee and the widow, required registration because it could not be said that the immoveable property which was divided was " the subject - matter of the suit " within the meaning of clause (vi) of sub - section (2) of section 17 of the act. It is necessary to quote the relevant language of section 17 in order to appreciate the contention :

    "17. (1) the following documents shall be registered. (a) ******* (b) other non - testamentary instruments which purport or operate to create, declare, assign limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in immoveable property ; ********* (2) nothing in clauses (b) and (c) of sub - section (1) applies to - ********* (vi) any decree or order of a court except a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise and compromising immoveable property other than that which is the subject - matter of the suit or proceeding."

    (5) The point for consideration is whether the decree in question can be held to be a decree "expressed to be made on a compromise and compromising immoveable property other than that which is the subject - matter of the suit " ? to put it in other words, was the property agreed to be divided between the plaintiffs and the defendants as per the above terms, the subject - matter of the suit, though in respect of it only a declaratory relief was asked ? our attention has been drawn to a number of decisions explaining the meaning of the phrase " the subject - matter of the suit ". Now, order 23, civil procedure code, which provides for withdrawal and adjustment of suit contains the phrase " the subject - matter " of the suit and it may be useful to extract rule 3. Of this order ; -

    "rule 23. - (3) where it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, or where the defendant satisfied the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject - matter of the suit, the court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the suit."

    (6) In the present case if the immoveable property in question can be said to be the subject - matter of the suit, it is clear that all the above terms related to the suit and the decree is in accordance therewith. Our attention has been drawn to a full bench decision reported in singa reddi v. Subba reddi, (1916) 31 m. L. J. 48 : i. L. R. 39 mad. 987 (f. B.) , in which it was held that where the cause of action and the relief claimed in a second suit are not the same as the cause of action and the relief claimed in the first suit, the second suit cannot be considered to have been brought in respect of the same subject - matter as the first suit. Thr learned judges, however, disclaimed an attempt to give an exhaustive definition of all that may be included in the term "subject - matter. " reference may, however, be usefully made to the decision of a single judge of the madras high court reported in ramayya v. Rangaraju, a. I. R. 1937 mad. 504. The question decided in that case arose on the following facts : the petitioner in that case filed a suit against a father and his sons to recover a sum of money due under a promissory note executed by the father alone, it being alleged that as the debt for which the pronote was executed was for a necessary purpose, the sons also were liable thereunder.

    (7) The plaint sought a decree against the father personally and against the joint family properties in the hands of the sons. The suit was compromised and a decree was passed in terms of the compromise whereby the defendants were directed to pay the amount of the note in two instalments, it being secured by a charge created on two items of immoveable property specified in the schedule to the decree. The property so secured was subsequently brought to sale and the sale proceeds were deposited in court. There were claims made for rateable distribution of that sum by holders of other decrees. The petitioner's contention was that there could be no rateable distribution because he had a charge under his decree. The trial court had negatived the contention on the ground that as the decres was not registered, it could not be put in evidence to establish the charge. Venkataramana rao, j. , discussed the matter in the following passage :

    "the question therefore is whether the two items of immoveable property which have been charged by the compromise decree. Can be said to be the subject - matter of the said suit. The expression 'subject - matter of the suit' is not defined in the registration act. It seems to me that what the clause contemplates is that specific immoveable property must be subject - matter of litigation. There must be a claim or right in or to the specific immoveable property asserted in the litigation and relief sought in respect thereof in order to make the said property the subject matter of the suit."

    (8) We express our respectful concurrence with the line of reasoning adopted in this passage. It is to be noted that the learned judge used language which is substantially the same as that employed in section 52 of the transfer of property act. That section refers to "any suit or proceeding in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question" and subjects it to the doctrine of lis pendens. There can be little doubt that property to which the doctrine applies is property which is " the subject - matter of the suit ". One test therefore in order to ascertain whether any immoveable property is the subject - matter of a suit is whether a transfer of the property involved in it would be hit at by this provision.

    (9) In the present case, the suit is for a declaration that the sale deed executed by the widow in respect of the property is not binding upon the reversioners. We shall have therefore to consider whether section 52 of the transfer of property act would apply to such a case. No case directly in point has been brought to our notice. But, we may refer to two cases, one of the calcutta high court and the other of the lahore high court. In bhola naih seal v. Bhuthanalh sen, a. I. R. 1925 cal. 239, the learned judges held that section 52 of the transfer of property act applied to a property covered by a deed of trust which was sought to be set aside in that suit. In thakar das v. Jai kishen das, a. I. R. 1938 lah. 448, a single judge of the lahore high court applied the doctrine to a suit which involved a declaration of title to immoveable property. We think that in a case like the present one also it could very well be said that a right to the immoveable property, the alienation of which is sought to be set aside, is involved directly and specifically in the suit.

    (10) Hence, we hold that the compromise decree exhibit d - 3 could be received in evidence and that it could be enforced against the defendants. We therefore allow the specond appeal, set aside the judgment of the learned judge and restore that of the learned district munsif with costs here and in the court below. There shall be an equiry into future mesne profits under order 20, rule 12, civil procedure code. Appeal allowed.

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    Ankamreddi Konda v. Ankamreddi Pedademudu
    (Dec 9, 1955)