(1) This is an application under article 226 of the constitution to quash the order of the government of andhra pradesh in g. O. Ms. No. 1281,. Education, dated 14th october, 1954 and the order of the district educational officer, chittoor, in r. C. No. 292/52, dated 3rd november, 1954, withdrawing recognition and aid to aided non - mission jothi ramalingam amalgamated higher elementary school, chittoor, herein - after referred to as ' the school'.
(2) In order to appreciate the contentions of the parties, it is necessary to set out the following facts. The school was established in the eighth ward of chittoor municipality to impart elementary education to children in january, 1940. By dis. No. 342/45, dated 26th june, 1945, the school was granted temporary recognition for standards i to v and in dis. No. 69 of 1947, dated 3rd march, 1947, recognition was made permanent and the school was admitted to government aid. The number of pupils studying in the school in 1952 was 651. There were 28 teachers including a pre - vocal instructor working in the school. On the report submitted by the deputy inspector of schools as regards various irregularities noticed in the management, the district educational officer, in his registered notice r. O. C. No. 292 - c/52, dated 28th april, 1953, called upon the petitioner to show cause why recognition and aid to the school should not be withdrawn with effect from 1st june, 1953. The manager, thereupon, submitted his explanation in j. R. S. 30/53, dated 16th june, 1953. He requested that an open enquiry might be held by an inspecting officer from outside the district giving him an opportunity to prove that the allegations set out in the notice, dated 28th april, 1953, were without any substance.
(3) On 31st august, 1953, the personal assistant in charge of the office of the district educational officer, chittoor, passed an order stating that as most of the irregularities were proved with reference to the recorded evidence, it was not necessary to hold an open enquiry and he ordered the withdrawal of recognition and aid to the school. The manager preferred an appeal to the divisional inspector of schools, anantapur, on 5th september, 1953. On the representations, made by the manager to the director of public instruction, an order was passed on 28th october, 1953, in the following terms :
"the dregrets to observe that the district educational officer, chittoor, had not implemented the order contained in the d. 's pros, cited in regard to the restoration of the recognition or the school under reference ; and therefore directs now that he should immediately restore r and a to the school for this year. It is not considered desirable to deprive the children of the educational facilities in the middle of the year for the irregularities on the part of the management. If necessary, the district educational officer, chittoor may proceed against the manager and take - action under
rule 14 of the rules for recognition. 3. The personal assistant to the district educational officer should not have taken this drastic step on his own initiative as he was only in charge of the office."
(4) On and november, 1953, the district educational officer, chittoor, communicated to the petitioner as follows : -
"in supersession of this office orders cited above, the district educational officer, chittoor, is pleased to restore the recognition and aid of the a, n. M. Jothi ramalingam higher elementary school, chittoor, with effect from 1st september, 1953."
No action was taken as against the manager under rule 14 of the rules relating to elementary schools, hereinafter referred to as ' the rules' in pursuance of the directions contained in the order of the director of public instruction, dated 28th october, 1953.
(5) On 14th june, 1954, the district educational officer informed the petitioner that the recognition and aid to the school under his management would be withdrawn within one month from the date of the receipt of the order. It appears that this notice was given to the manager in pursuance of the proceedings of the director of public instruction, andhra, in r. O. G. No. 134 - 31/53, dated and june,. 1954, by which he informed the district educational officer that he was competent to take action in the matter of withdrawal of recognition and aid to the school and that he might take such action if there was a suitable person or committee to start a school immediately in the locality. On the representations made by the manager to the director of public instruction, the orders issued in r. O. G. 292 - c/53, dated 14th june, 1954 were held in abeyance until further orders. On 14th october,. 1954, the following government order was issued : -
"government of andhra. Education, health and local administration department. G. O. Ms. No. 1281, education, dated 14th october, 1954. Abstract. Elementary education - aided schools - chittoor district - jothi ramalingam amalgamated higher elemen - tary school, chittoor - withdrawal of recognition and aid - orders passed. Read the following : - - from the (othi ramalingam amalgamated higher elementary school development com mittee, chittoor, petition dated 10th october, 1953. From the director of public instruction, re. No. 134 - 81/53, dated 23rd june, 1954 and 3rd august, 1954. Order - in the circumstances stated, government agree with the recommendation of the direc - tor of public instruction that the recognition and aid to the jothi ramalingam amalgamated higher elementary school, chittoor, should be withdrawn and permission given for the opening of a new school in the locality by a committee of the local people. (by order of the governor.) (signed) a. Krishnaswami, deputy secretary to government."
Subsequently, that is on 3rd november, 1954, the district educational officer - communicated the following order : - "re. No. 292 - c/52. Office of the district educational officer, chittoor, dated 3rd november, 1954. Memo. Subject - elementary education - aided jothi ramalingam higher elementary school, chittoor, withdrawal of recognition and aid orders issued. Read. - (1) this office roc. No. 292 - c/52, dated 31st august, 1953 withdrawing recognition and aid of the jothi ramalingam higher elementary school, chittoor, with due notice ; (2) pros. Roc. No. 134 - 8 - 1/53, dated 28th october, 1953 of the director of public instruction, andhra, madras,, permitting the school to continue till the end of school year i. E. , till 31st may, 1954 ; (3) , pros. Roc. No. 134 - 8 - 1/53, dated 16th july, 1954 of the director of public instruction, andhra madras, stopping further proceedings with regard to recognition and aid of the school ; (4) pros. Re. No. 134 - b - 1/53, dated 3oth october, 1954 of the director of public instruction, andhra, madras, communicating g. O. Ms. No. 1281, education, dated i4th october, 1954 ordering withdrawal of recognition and aid of the jothi ramalingam higher elementary school, chittoor. The orders withdrawing the recognition and aid of the jothi ramalingam higher elementary school, chittoor, issued in this office reference first cited above are given effect to with effect from. Today, i. E. , 3rd november, 1954. (signed) d. David, district educational officer, chittoor.
(6) Aggrieved by the order withdrawing recognition and aid, the petitioner filed w. P. No. 729 of 1954 in the high court of madras for quashing the proceedings of the director of public instruction in re. No. 134 - 61/53, dated 30th october, 1954 as his office was situate within the jurisdiction of that court. As it was contended that the high court of madras had no jurisdiction to quash the orders passed by the district educational officer, chittoor, and the government of andhra, the writ was dismissed on 14th february, 1956. Thereupon, the petitioner filed this writ on 12th march, 1956 for the reliefs already set out. Sri a. Bhujanga rao, the learned advocate for the petitioner, raised the following contentions : (1) that under the rules relating to the elementary schools framed under the madras elementary education act (viii of 1920) , the government of andhra had no residuary power to withdraw recognition and aid ; (2) that even assuming that the government had such power, it could not withdraw recognition and aid before the appeal filed by the petitioner to the divisional inspector as against the order, dated 31st august, 1953 was decided : (3) that the order of the government of andhra pradesh, dated 14th october, 1954, and the order of the district educational officer, dated 3rd november, 1954, were not speaking orders: and (4) that the order, dated 31st august, 1953 was not capable of implementation in 1954 in view of the several intermediary orders. The learned government pleader, sri p. Ramachandra reddy, not only supported the orders on the merits but also raised two preliminary objections, viz. , that the writ application was liable to be dismissed on account of delay and laches, and (2) that the orders sought to be quashed were only administrative orders. Before dealing with the merits, i shall dispose of the two preliminary objections.
(7) There is no substance in the first objection that the writ is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. From the facts already narrated, it is clear that the petitioner moved the high court of madras on 22nd november, 1954 for the same relief. It was only on i4th february, 1956 that the high court of madras held that it had no jurisdiction to issue a writ as against the government of andhra pradesh and the district educational officer. Thereafter, i. E. , on 12th march, 1956. , the writ application was filed before this court. I am unable to hold that there was any undue delay or laches on the part of the petitioner in filing the writ. In annamalal v. State of madras (now andhra) , (1956) an. W. R. 652. I discussed the identical question, and pointed out that there is no period of limitation fixed by the limitation act for filing writs. I referred to the law obtaining in england, viz. , that the period fixed for filing a writ of certiorari is six months and that under order 64, rule 7, r. S. C. , there is a power vested in the court to extend the time and excuse the delay in filing a writ of certiorari in appropriate cases. Following the decisions of the madras high court and other high courts, i allowed the writ even though it was filed eleven months after the passing of the order. Sri p. Ramachandra reddy, the learned government pleader strongly relied on the observations of a division bench of this court in eluru venkata subba rao v. D. T. S. (traffic) , vijayawada, (1957) 2 an. W. R. 233 as supporting his contention.
(8) The observations relied on are at page 235 and are in the following terms :
"in our view, applications under article 226 of the constitution will be entertained only if they are filed within a reasonable time from the date of the making of the order. Ordinarily, a period of six months may be considered reasonable, but, in extraordinary circumstances, this court may, in its discretion, excuse the delay. Otherwise, while periods of limitation are fixed for every form of remedy available to a party, there will not be any time limit for the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this court. The exercise of power under article 226 by a court irrespective of any time lag will introduce complications and unsettle rights finally decided by authorities empowered to do so."
(9) The learned judges have merely laid down that the rule obtaining in england might be followed by this court as a matter of practice. They recognised that in appropriate cases the high court has power to excuse the delay. On the facts of the case, i am satisfied with the explanation given by the petitioner for not filing the writ before this court within six months from the passing of the orders. The petitioner was bona fide prosecuting his writ in the madras high court for the same relief. I therefore overrule the first objection of the respondent. For the purpose of deciding the second objection raised by the learned government pleader, it is necessary to deal with the rules relating to elementary schools, under section 56, clause (h) of the madras elementary eduction act (viii of 1920) the state government is empowered to make rules declaring the conditions subject to which schools may be admitted to recognition or aid. Under rule 1, the power to grant permission to open new schools and additional classes in the existing schools and to grant or withdraw recognition and aid to or from elementary schools vests in the officers of the education department. Rule 5 (a) provides that applications lor recognition of schools or of additional standards shall be made to the district educational officer through the deputy inspector of schools. It is important to note that rule 5 enacts that an appeal shall lie against all orders of the district educational officers to the divisional inspectors. Rule 14 empowers the director of public instruction to declare a teacher to be unfit for employment in a recognised school after due enquiry. Similarly, after due enquiry, he is entitled to declare a person in to be unfit to be the manager or correspondent of a recognised school. Under rule 14 - a, the director of public instruction may also refuse or withdraw recognition if the school is under the management of a person who has been declared by him to be unfit to be the manager or correspondent of a recognised school. rules 26 to 28 - b lay down the conditions when recognition may be withdrawn. Under rule 26, it is provided that before recognition is withdrawn from any school, the district educational officer shall give the management of the school at least one month's notice of his intention to do so. It is stated by the learned advocates on both sides that there is no specific provision in the act or in the rules empowering the government to grant or withdraw recognition and aid. Sri bhujanga rao, the learned advocate for the petitioner, strongly contended that inasmuch as statutory rules have been made delegating the powers to the district educational officer and the director of public instruction, the government of andhra pradesh had no residuary jurisdiction. In support of this contention, he strongly relied on the full bench decision of the madras high court in nagaratnammal v. Ibrahim saheb, (1955) 2 m. L. J. 49 (f. B.) 1. Balakrishna ayyar, j. , delivering the judgment of the full bench, held that where a statute or rules framed thereunder vest a discretion in an officer subordinate to the government, then that discretion must be exercised by the officer and cannot be exercised by the government. It was pointed out that the power of superintendence which the government may claim cannot be invoked to justify interference with the statutory discretion of its subordinate officers. At page 63, the learned judge repelled the contention that the government had the power to interfere when the order passed by the subordinate authority was purely administrative in character. This decision was followed by me in gangappa v. State of madras (now andhra) , a. I. R. 1957 a. P. 447. I held that the government having delegated its powers to the several authorities in respect of the grant of darkhast as provided in board's standing order no. 15, has no further light to interfere with an assignment of assessed waste land duly made by the subordnate authorities within the scope of their authority and in accordance with the provisions of the said order, and this view was upheld on appeal in state of andhra v. Gangappa, (1957) 2 an. W. R. 123. Applying the reasoning of those decisions, it follows that in the absence of any reservation of power in the rules, the order passed by the government of andhra pradesh in g. O. Ms. No. 1281, education, dated 14th october, 1954, is without jurisdiction and is liable to be quashed.
(10) Sri p. Ramachandra reddy, the learned government pleader, contended that the orders passed by the district educational officer and the government of andhra pradesh are not quasi - judicial orders but are only administrative orders and that a writ of certiorari cannot therefore be issued. He relied on the decision of the supreme court in province of bombay v. Khushaldas s. Advani, (1950) s. C. J. 451 and nakkuda ali v. M. F. De s, jayaratne, l. R. (1951) a. C. 66 for pointing out the distinction between administrative orders and quasi - judicial orders. In gangappa v. State of madras (now andhra) i discussed this question at page 450 and pointed out that a lis is not always necessary to hold that an order is a quasi - judicial order. As pointed out in the latest decision of the supreme court in nagendra nath v. Commissioner of hills division, (1958) s. G. J. 798 : a. I. R. 1958 s. C. 398, the question whether or not an adminstrative body or authority functions as a purely administrative one or in a quasi - judicial capacity must be determined in each case on an examination of the relevant statute and the rules framed thereunder. It was pointed out at page 406 that
"where there is a right vested in an authority created by statute, be it administrative or quasi - judicial, to hear appeals and revisions, it becomes its duty to hear judicially, that is to say, in an objective manner, impartially and after giving reasonable opportunity to the parties concerned in the dispute to place their respective cases before it."
(11) Reference was made to the observations of lord haldane at page 132 and of lord moulton at page 150 in local government board v. Arlidge, l. R. (1915) a. C. 120 and to the legal position as succinctly put in halsbury's laws of england, volume ii, third edition, at pages 56 and 57. Though the sections of the particular act which they were dealing with did not make any reference to the recording of evidence or hearing of parties or even recording reasons for orders passed by the authorities aforesaid, the supreme court held that the authorities were amenable to the supervisory jurisdiction of the high court under articles 226 and 227 of the constitution, applying the test laid down by several decisions of the english courts, the privy council and the supreme court, i am inclined to hold that the powers exercised by the district educational officer under the rules relating to elementary schools are quasi - judicial and not administrative in character. Rule 5 provides that an appeal shall lie against all orders of the district educational officers to the divisional inspectors. I am not inclined to agree with the contention of the learned government pleader that the appeal provided under rule 5 applies only in regard to orders - passed on applications for recognition of schools and not in regard to orders passed by the district educational officers withdrawing recognition. The words providing for an appeal are very wide and are not restricted as contended for by the learned government pleader. The recognition can be withdrawn by the district educational officer from any school only when the conditions laid down in rules 16 to 28 - b are complied with. I am unable to accept the extreme argument put forward by the learned government pleader that the recognition may be withdrawn without any evidence or any enquiry. The observations of bose, j. , in sangram singh v. Election tribunal, (1955) s. C. J. 431 at page 435 are very apt and may be quoted :
"next, there must be ever present to the mind the fact that our laws of procedure are grounded on a principle of natural justice which requires that men should not be condemned unheard, that decisions should not be reached behind their backs, that proceedings that affect their lives and property should not continue in their absence and that they should not be precluded from participating in them. Of course, there must be exceptions and where they are clearly defined they must be given, effect to. But taken by and large, and subject to that proviso, our laws of procedure should be construed wherever that is reasonably possible, in the light of that principle."
(12) My attention has not been drawn to any rule precluding the district educational officer from holding an enquiry. I am clearly of opinion that an opportunity should always be given to the manager of the institution before recognition is withdrawn in terms of rule 14 or rules 26 to 28 - b as they affect the interests of the institution vitally. Moreover, if an opportunity is not given, evidence not taken and reasons are not recorded, the right of appeal provided under rule 5 to the divisional inspectors would become illusory.
(13) The decision in nakkuda ali v. M. F. De s. Jayaratne, l. R. (1951) a. C. 66 does not apply to the facts, of the present case. Construing the terms of the ceylon ordinance, lord radcliffe observed that the controller had no duty to act judicially under regulation lxii. The learned law lord held that in cancelling the licence, the authority was taking executive action
" to withdraw a privilege which he believes and has reasonable grounds to believe that the holder is unfit to retain it."
stress was also laid on the fact that the licence - holder had no right to appeal to the controller or from the controller. In my opinion, the right of appeal conferred upon the manager to prefer an appeal as against the order of the district educational officer withdrawing recognition to the divisional inspector clearly suggests that the order is a quasi - judicial one and not a purely administrative one. As pointed out in the latest decision of the supreme court, when an appeal is preferred, the appellate authority is bound under a duty to hear judicially. The decision in province of bomby v. Khushaldas s. Advani, (1950) s. C. J. 451 has also no application to the facts of this case. What was held in that decision was that the requisitioning of property for a public purpose was not a judicial or quasi - judicial decision and that an application for a writ of certiorari would not lie. The majority view was that there was nothing in the bombay land acquisition ordinance to show that in arriving at its decision about a public purpose the provincial government had to act judicially. In the instant case, in withdrawing the recognition the authorities have to decide judicially as to whether the requirements of
rules 26 to 28 - b are satisfied or not. There is no question of policy or expediency involved in passing the order of withdrawal of recognition and aid. It may be that in some cases the preliminary inquiry has to be done in a quasi - judicial manner though the ultimate act may be an administrative one. Vide observations of chandra reddy, o. C. J. , in gopala krishnayya v. State transport corporation, (1958) 2 an. W. R. 211. Similarly, an order may be an administrative one in its inception though it may become a quasi - judicial proceeding in its appellate or revisional stage. Vide judgment of balakrishna ayyar, j. , in mani pillai v. State, 1958) 2 m. L. J. (n. R. C.) 14. I am clear that it is not in the absolute discretion of the district educational officer to grant recognition or withdraw recognition but is governed by statutory rules framed under the madras elementary education act (viii of 1920) and is therefore a quasi - judicial act. The principle laid down by rajagopalan, j. , in abdul mazid v. State of madras, (1957) 2 m. L. J. 1 that where statutory rules prescribe the taking out of a licence as a condition precedent to a person engaging himself in a business of his choice, the grant or refusal of the licence by the authorities cannot be viewed merely as an administrative order, and the nature of the order has to be determined by the nature of the statutory function and not from the standpoint of any particular party to the proceedings, governs this case.
(14) The matter may also be looked at from a different point of view. The rules which provide for the withdrawal of recognition are in the nature of imposing a punishment upon the management. As pointed out by rajagopalan, j. , in srinivasan v. President, district board, coimbatore, (1957) 2 m. L. J. 406 such a decision imposing penalty would partake of the character of judicial or quasi - judicial act. The observations of romer, l. J. , in barnard v. National dock labour board, l. R. (1953) 2 q. B. 18 at 45 are apt and are as follows : -
"the decision whether or not to impose penalties (amounting in serious cases to dismissal) for alleged offences if those offences are proved, is a judicial decision, or at all events, a quasi - judicial decision, and cannot from any reasonable point of view be regarded as merely administrative."
(15) In quashing the order of the district educational officer, coimbatore withdrawing recognition and aid in w. P. No. 553 of 1956, dated 4th september, 1956, the same learned judge applied the above principle and made the following observations : -
"all i say is that in the circumstances of this case, where punitive action was proposed to be taken, an opportunity was given to the petitioner to show cause against that action being taken and punitive action was eventually taken, the failure to disclose the reasons for imposing the punishment would by itself be sufficient to vitiate the exercise of the jurisdiction, if any, the public authority had to punish the petitioner."
It was next contended that even assuming that the orders passed by the government of andhra pradesh and the district educational officer are administrative in character and that no writ of certiorari can be issued, there is ample jurisdiction in the high court under article 226 of the constitution to issue directions, orders or writs other than prerogative writs and quash the illegal administrative orders. Reliance was placed on the following observations of mukherjee, j. In basappa v. Nagappa, (1954) s. C. J. 695 at page 699 :
"the language used in articles 32 and 226 of our constitution is very wide and the powers of the supreme court as well as of all the high courts in india extend to issuing of orders, writs or directions, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus mandamus, quo warranto, prohibition, and certiorari as may be considered necessary for enforcement of the fundamental rights and in the case of the high gour ts for other purposes as well. In view of the express provisions in our constitution, we need not now look back to the early history or the procedural technicalities of these writs in english law, nor feel oppressed by any difference or change of opinion expressed in particular cases by english. Judges. We can make an order or issue a writ in the nature of certiorari in all appropriate cases and in appropriate manner, so long as we keep to the broad and fundamental principles that regulate the exercise of jurisdiction in the matter of granting such writs in english law."
It was pointed out that under the terms of article 226, the high courts have also power to issue directions, orders or writs to any person or authority including in appropriate cases to any government within those territories in relation to which, they exercise jurisdiction other than habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari. Emphasis was laid on the word ' including ' in article 226 as clearly indicating that orders, directions and writs other than the writs specified in the article may be issued in proper cases to mould the ends of justice. It was further contended that the article provides that such writs may be issued not only for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by part iii but also for any other purposes and that if directions, orders or writs may be issued in respect of administrative orders affecting fundamental rights under chapter iii of the constitution, they may similarly be issued under article 226 for any other purpose and that no distinction should be drawn under the article in regard to the issue of directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by part iii or for any other purpose. Reference was made to the observations of the supreme court in rashid ahmed v. Municipal board, kairana, (1950) s. C. J. 324 viz. , that the powers of indian courts under the constitution "are much wider and are not confined to issuing prerogative writs only ", and to a bench decision of the allahabad high court which followed those observations and held in ram charan lal v. State of uttar pradesh, a. I. R. 1952 all. 752 that the high court has power under article 226 to interfere even in the case of administrative orders if they were made in defiance of mandatory provisions of law or without any jurisdiction. Lastly, my attention was invited to a similar view expressed by mehrotra, j. , in j. R. Bhatia v. Smt. Victoria rani saheba, a. I. R. 1957 all. 359.
(16) There is considerable force in the petitioner's contention, but having regard to my view that the orders in question are quasi - judicial in character and that a writ of certiorari lies, it is unnecessary for me to express my final opinion as to whether the high courts might not interfere in appropriate cases under article 226 of the constitution, with administrative orders and issue directions, orders or writs (other than the high prerogative writs) where mandatory provisions are flagrantly violated or grave injustice is done. The next question that arises for consideration is whether the order of the district educational officer, dated 3rd november, 1954 is liable to be set aside.
(17) A perusal of the order makes it clear that the district educational officer withdrew the recognition and aid to the school only by reason of the director of public instruction communicating g. O. Ms. No. 1281, education, dated 14th october, 1954. It was not in exercise of his individual judgment that he withdrew the recognition and aid under rules 26 to 28 - b. In paragraph 15 of the counter - affidavit it is stated that
" the district educational officer took different proceedings for withdrawing of the recognition by his registered notice, dated 23rd june, 1954"
. If really he acted on his own responsibility and issued the notice, he ought to have complied with
rules 26 to 28 - b and called upon the manager to explain the irregularities he committed subsequent to 31st august, 1953. No fresh charges were framed as against the manager. The truth appears to be what is contained in 1 he counter - affidavit filed by the director of public instruction, andhra, in w. P. No. 729 of 1954. In paragraph 16 it is stated as follows : -
"the petitioner was given all opportunities for explanation and his case was fully and properly considered. The order, dated 3rd november, 1954 was not made jn new proceedings but it was made in the proceedings originally started in which the petitioner had been given full opportunity to put forth his explanations and the said orders were made only after considering the explanations tendered by the petitioner."
The question whether in respect of the old charges contained in the notice, dated 31st august, 1953, the recognition and aid to the school could be withdrawn by the district educational officer on 3rd november, 1954 has also to be considered. I am quite clear that under the rules, the district educational officer must exercise his mind and proceed under rules 26 to 28 - b before recognition can be withdrawn. As stated supra, the order passed by the district educational officer is a quasi - judicial order. If he merely carried out the behests of the government, the order is not in compliance with rules 26 to 28 - b and the order would be liable to be set aside as held by bose, j. , in commissioner of police v. Gordhandas, (1951) s. C. J. 803 : a. I. R. 1952 s. C. 16. Bose, j. Held at page 21 that as the commissioner, who was bound to exercise his discretion and bring to bear on the matter his own independent and unfettered judgment and decide for himself whether to cancel the licence or reject the objections, merely acted under the orders of the government as merely a post - office, the order was liable to be set aside. Following that decision i hold that the order of the district educational officer, dated 3rd november, 1954 is liable to be quashed.
(18) If the district educational officer withdrew recognition and aid to the school on the basis of the charges specified in the notice, dated 31st august, 1953, it is also liable to be set aside in view of the order passed by the divisional inspector of schools, anantapur, in re. No. 191 - c/53, dated 19th november, 1953. In the affidavit filed in support of the writ application, the petitioner complained that in respect of the appeal filed by him as against the order of the district educational officer in respect of the charges, dated 31st august, 1953, no orders were communicated to him. In paragraph 10 of the counter - affidavit filed by sri gopala rao, assistant secretary, education department of the government of andhra pradesh, he did not state that the appeal had been disposed of and that the orders were communicated to the petitioner. But among the records sent by the government the learned government pleader found an order passed by the divisional inspector of schools, anantapur, in the following terms : -
"the district educational officer is informed that since the recognition and aid to the school have been restored, the question of appeal does not arise. He is therefore requested to retain the file sent in this office confdl. D. O. No. 191 - d/52, dated 23rd october, 1953, in his office and if necessary he may proceed against the manager and take action under
rule 14 of the rules for recognition. 2. He (district educational officer) is further requested to report in regard to the direct payment to the teachers as ordered in paragraph 2 of the director's proceedings referred to above. 3. This may be treated as urgent since a report is due to the director of public instruction oa the subject."
It is clear from this order that the divisional inspector of schools, anantapur, did not decide the appeal on the merits and find the petitioner guilty of the charges. He proceeded on the footing that since the recognition and aid to the school had been restored, the question of appeal did not arise, i. E. , it was not necessary to decide the appeal. Without the appeal being decided and the petitioner being found guilty of the charges contained in the notice, dated 31st august, 1953 it was not open to the district educational officer to withdraw recognition and aid on the very same charges on a later date by his order, dated 3rd november, 1954. Even in this view the order of the district educational officer is liable to be set aside.
(19) Another contention was raised by sri bhujanga rao, based on the order of the district educational officer, dated 2nd november, 1953. It is stated in that order that in supersession of the order, dated 31st august, 1953 in r. O. C. No. 292/53 - c, the district educational officer was pleased to restore the recognition and aid to the school. Sri bhujanga rao contended that though the director of public instruction kept the order, dated 31st august, 1953 in abeyance for a period of only one year, the district educational officer who is the competent authority restored the recognition and aid by his order, dated and november 1953 unconditionally. He further argued that the order of the divisional inspector of schools, dated 19th november, 1953 also proceeded on that footing. There is considerable force in this argument. According to the order of the divisional inspector of schools, action was contemplated to be taken against the manager under rule 14. Rule 14 empowers the director of public instruction to declare a person to be unfit to be the manager of a recognised school. Instead of taking such proceedings under rule 14 against the manager and removing him and deciding the appeal preferred to the divisional inspector of schools, a fresh order withdrawing recognition is stated to have been passed on 3rd november, 1954 on the basis of the old charges contained in the notice, dated 31st august, 1953. Such a procedure, in my opinion, is wholly illegal and unwarranted.
(20) I also agree with the contention of sri a. Bhujanga rao that the order of the government of andhra pradesh, dated 14th october, 1954 and the order of the district educational officer, dated 3rd november, 1954 are not speaking orders inasmuch as they contain no reasons whatsoever for withdrawing recognition and aid to the school. To sum up : i find (1) that the government of andhra had no residuary power under the rules to withdraw recognition and aid ; (2) that even assuming that the government had such power, it could not withdraw recognition and aid without the appeal filed by the petitioner to the divisional inspector of schools as against the order, dated 31st august, 1953 being decided; (3) that the order of the government of andhra pradesh, dated 14th october, 1954 and the order of the district educational officer, dated 3rd november, 1954 are not speaking orders ; and (4) that the order, dated 31st august, 1953 is not capable of implementation without the appeal filed by the petitioner to the divisional inspector of schools being decided.
(21) In the result i quash the order passed by the government of andhra pradesh in g. O. Ms. No. 1281, education, dated 14th october, 1954 as also the order of the district educational officer in re. No. 292 - c/52, dated 3rd november, 1954. The writ is consequently allowed with costs. Advocate's fee rs. 100. Writ petition allowed.