(1) The tenant is the petitioner before me. An eviction petition was filed against him by the landlord for eviction of the suit premises on two grounds, namely, that the tenant is a wilful defaulter as he failed to pay the rent for the months of march, april and may 1972 which was fixed at rs. 250/ - per mensem. The second ground for eviction was that the premises are bona fide required by the landlord. The plea of the tenant was that the rent was not rs. 250/ - per month but only rs. 40/ - per month. He also denied the bona fides of the landlord for personal occupation.
(2) The rent controller, who is the primary authority under the andhra pradesh buildings (lease, rent and eviction) control act, 1960, hereinafter referred to as "the act", enquired into the matter and found that the rent of rs. 250/ - per month was not paid by the tenant for the months of march, april and may 1972; and as such he was a wilful defaulter. So far as the question of bona fides are concerned, that was also accepted by the rent controller. The appellate authority confirmed both the findings of the rent controller and dismissed the appeal filed by the tenant and ordered eviction. Hence this revision.
(3) Mr. Y. G. Krishhamurthy, the learned advocate for the petitioner - tenant, has raised the following contentions. His first contention is that both the lower courts were incorrect in giving a finding that the rent of the suit premises was rs. 250/ - per month. Submits the learned advocate that exs. A - 1 and a - 2 are the two account books. Ex. A - 1 is a book maintained by the tenant and ex. A - 2 maintained by the landlordand these account books were submitted in which the conditions of lease were incorporated. Therefore, that would amount to a lease and since that lease deed has not been registered, they were not admissible in evidence. The second contention is that, before the filing of the eviction petition, there was a partition in the family of the landlord and the suit property fell to the share of p. W. 2 who is one of the sons; and therefore having regard to the provisions of section 10 sub - section (8) of the act, the father who had initially filed the eviction petition was not entitled to do so as he had not been given a written permission by the principal viz. , p. W. 2 and therefore the eviction petition itself was not maintainable. So far as the third contention regarding the bona fide requirement of the landlord is concerned, mr. Krishnamurthy does not seriously challenge in his argument.
(4) I am of the opinion that the three contentions advanced by the learned advocate for the petitioner cannot be acceded to. So far as the first contention with regard to the admissibility of exs. A - 1 and a - 2 is concerned, it is to be noted that it was not the plea of the tenant that the conditions recorded in exs. A - 1 and a - 2 were for a period of one year; and therefore that being a lease for one fear was compulsorily registerable. Moreover, exs. A - 1 and a - 2 have already been admitted by the rent controller without any such objection raised by the tenant. In these circumstances, to my mind, such a contention cannot now be raised.
(5) So far as the rent at the rate of rs. 250/ - per month is concerned, it is to be noted that both the courts have given a finding that the rent of the suit premises was rs. 250/ - per month and that the tenant had not paid the rent for the months of march. April and may 1972; and as such, he was a wilful defaulter. The supreme court in sri raja lakshmi dyeing works and others vs. Rangaswamy chettiar (1) air 1980 sc 1253, has held that the powers of the high court in revision under the act do not mean that the high court can unnecessarily go into questions of evidence and facts when both the courts have given a concurrent finding. Therefore, to my mind, in the light of the judgment of the supreme court when the courts below have given a finding that the rent of the premises was rs. 250/ - per month, it would not be proper on my part to once again scan the evidence produced by the parties.
(6) So far as the second contention with regard to the maintainability of the eviction petition is concerned, mr. Krishnamurthy lays stress on the wording of sub - section (8) of section 10 of the act. His contention is that before the filing of the eviction petition, there was a partition in the family and the suit property fell to the share of p. W. 2; and as such, the father was collecting the rents as an agent of p. W. 2 and hence unless and until p. W. 2 has given him permission in writing to file the eviction petition, he was not entitled to do so. This contention also cannot be acceded to because section 2 clause (vi) of the act defines a "landlord" to mean
"the owner of a building and includes a person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building whether on his own account or on behalf of another person or on behalf of himself and others or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver or guardian or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if the building were let to a tenant."
(7) A close reading of this clause would show that a landlord will be considered to include not only the owner of a building but also a person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building either on his own account or on behalf of another person; or jointly on behalf of himself and others or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator etc. It would thus be seen that the word "landlord" will include a person who is receiving the rent on behalf of another person. What mr. Krishnamurty contends is that sub - section (8) of section 10 of the act specifically provides for the nonmaintainability of an eviction petition by a person who is an agent of the landlord unless and until the principal gives written permission to the agent to file such a petition. But the learned advocate appear to have missed the provisions of clause (vi) of section 2 of the act because if a person who receives the rent on behalf of another person cannot be considered to be an agent and if the legislature had intended that where a person who receives rent on behalf of another person should be considered to be an agent, then the legislature would not have specifically used the words "as an agent" also. Therefore, the fact that the legislature had specifically incorporated the words "as an agent" in spite of the fact that it had also incorporated the words "whether on his own account or on behalf of another person" would go to show that the legislature was treating an agent as a different person who was receiving the rent on behalf of another person. What sub - section (8) of section 10 provides is that notwithstanding anything contained in section 10, no person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building merely as an agent of the landlord shall, except with the previous written consent of the landlord, be entitled to apply for the eviction of a tenant. It would thus mean that it is only when a person is merely receiving the rent as an agent of the landlord, then subsection (8) of section 10 would apply. But where a person who is receiving the rent on behalf of another person as pointed out in clause (vi) of section 2, he comes within the ambit of the definition "landlord"; and as such, he is entitled to file an eviction petition without obtaining any written permission of the principal, or the person who is the owner of the property, i, therefore, cannot accept the second contention of mr. Krishnamurti, the learned advocate for the petitioner.
(8) So far as the third contention is concerned, it was faintly argued that the landlord does not bona fide require the premises for personal occupation. But, as i have pointed out earlier, both the courts below have given a concurrent finding that the landlord does require the suit premises for the personal occupation of his son who is p. W. 2 in the case.
(9) Hence, i see no substance in this revision. It is, therefore, dismissed. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
(10) The tenant is given two months' time from to - day to vacate the suit premises on condition that the petitioner - tenant deposits the entire arrears of rent due by him before the rent controller within one month from today; and similarly deposits the rent for the two months of february and march 1981 by the 10th of each succeeding month. In case of default of either of these conditions, the grace period will not be applicable to him and he will be evicted forthwith.