(1) This revision filed by the land lady under sec. 22 of the a. P. Buildings (lease, rent and eviction) control act, 1960 (hereinafter called 'the act') arises on the following material facis.
(2) The revision - petitioner is the owner of h. No. 5 - 9 - 311 situated at gunfoundry, hyderabad, having purchased the same under a registered sale deed dated 5 - 7 - 1974 from its previous owner smt santhosh kunwar. The said building which is in two floors consisted of a total of 14 rooms, 3 bath rooms - cum - latrines, one verandah and a garage. When the building was owned by smt. Santosh kunwar, it was originally let out in favour of one dr. Kamle towards his residence dr. Kamle was also using the premises for his genera] practice as a medical practitioner. After dr. Kamle vacated the premises, the respondent dr a. K. Shah became the tenant of smt. Santosh kunwar on payment of a monthly rent of rs. 250/ -. The respondent was residing in the upstair portion of the house and was using the ground floor as a nursing home which he was running under the style of "pradeep nursing and maternity home". Smt. Santosh kunwar had earlier filed r. C. No. 1498/68 on the file of the rent controller for evicting the respondent on various grounds stated in ex. R - 4, but subsequently that petition was dismissed on 27 - 10 - 1967 for default. After smt. Santosh kunwar sold the property to the revision - petitioner, the revision - petitioner filed r. C. No. 418/74 which has given raise to this revision. Though eviction was sought also on the ground that the respondent committed wilful default in the payment of rents for the period 1st july 1974 till the end of october 1974. The concurrent finding of both the courts below is that there was no such wilful default. Mr. Ramachandra reddy, learned counsel appearing for the revision - petitioner has rightly not canvassed the correctness of that finding in this revision.
(3) The revision - petitioner, however, has been living as a tenant of one narsamma in premises no. 4 - 1 - 165, hanuman tekdi, hyderabad. The revision - petitioner has no house of her own. Her family consisted besides herself, her husband, her mother - in - law and 10 children. The revision - petitioner sought the eviction of the respondent mainly on the ground that she bonafide required the premises in question for her own occupation. The concurrent finding of both the courts below is that her requirement is bona fide. None - the - less, both the rent controller and the appellate authority refused to direct the eviction of the respondent being of the view that the facts of the case stand governed by motllal and another v. Nanak chand and others the finding recorded is that the suit premises was taken on rentby the tenant from the original landlady not only for residential purpose but also for non - residential purpose and the lease being a composite lease, the landlady cannot apply for eviction on the ground that she requires the suit premises for her personal occupation. Mr. Ramachandra reddy questioned the correctness of this conclusion. According to him, the premises which was a residential building, had never lost its character of a residential building despite the fact that the respondent, a doctor by profession, used part of the prtmises as a nursing home to suit his professional requirements. Mr. Venkatarami reddy, appearing for the tenant maintained that the supreme court's decision in motila's case governs the facts of the case and he also relied upon the decision of the supreme court in miss. S. Sanyal v. Gian chand. A before appreciating these rival submissions, the relevant provisions of the act may be noticed.
(4) Sec. 2 (iii) of the act described a building as any house let separately for residential or non - residential purposes (only material portions extracted). Sec. 3 provided for the notice of vacancy to be given to the authorised officer by every landlord. The authorised officer has got the discretion to allot the - building for occupation for any of the purposes mentioned therein. Proviso (v) to sub - section (6) provided, however, that if the building is a residential building, it shall not be converted into a non - residential buildtng unless permission in writing of the controller is obtained under sec. 18 of the act. Sec. 18 also provided that no residential building shall be converted into a non - residential building except with the permission in writing of the controller. The act has repealed the earlier acts governing the andhra and telangana areas of the state. Under sec. 10 (3) (a) (i) a landlord may apply ro the controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building (i) in case it is a residential building (a) if the landlord is not occupying a residential building of his own in the city, town or village concerned and he requires it for his own occupation ; (iii) in case it is any other non - residential building the landlord is not occupying a non - residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own or to the possession of wihch he is entitled whether under this act or otherwise (a) for tke purpose of a business which he is carrying on on the date of the application, or (b) for the purpose of a business which in the opinion of the controller, the landlord bonafide proposes to commence, (c) a landlord who is occupying only a part of the building, whether residential or non - residential, may, notwithstanding anything in clause (a) apply to the controller for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for residential purposes or for the purpose of a business which he is carrying on, as the case may be. Provided that the controller shall reject the application if he is satisfied that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by granting it will outweigh the advantage of the landlord, (e) the controller shall, if he is satisified that the claim of the landlord is bonafide make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building, (only material portions extracted)
(5) There is not muct of dispute that the building was a residential building and was used as such till the year 1954 even when dr. Kamle was residing in the premises as a tenant exercising his general practice of medicine. After the respondent became a tenant of the premises, he started using it for his residence as well as for the purpose of running a nursing and maternity home. At the time the respondent became a tenant, the tenancy was reduced to writing. The respondent, howevar, stated that he is not in possession of any copy of the said rental agreement he entered into with smt. Santosh kunwar. The present revision petitioner who purchasased the property in the year 1974 cannot be expected to have come into possession of any such rental agreement entered into between smt. Santosh kunwar and the respondent in the year 1954. The husband of the revision petitioner gave evidence as pw - 1. No question was put to him about the availability of the copy of the rental agreement in his custody. When the building which was a residential building till 1954 was being rented out to the respondent, it is improbable that the parties would have entered into an agreement demarcating any specified portion thereof as having been let out for a residential purpose or for any other specified portion thereof having been let out for a non - residential purpose. Having regard to the normal course of human conduct, the premises would have been let out to the respondent without making any such demarcation of areas, a part to be used for a residential purpose and the rest to be used for a non - residential purpose. In krishna nair v. Valiammal panchapakesa ayyar, j. Held that in determining whether certain premises are residential or non - residential, the main or primary purpose for which they are let out or taken or used must be considered. The tenant in that case has taken the house for a residential purpose but was using a portion thereof for making appalams daring the period when people were not sleeping there and was used for sleeping purpose when appalams were not made there. With his characteristic humour, panchapakesa ayyar, j. Observed in that decision :
"i consider that, in such case, the primary purpose for which the building is let out or used should be the determining factor. A lawyer may use a room of his house for giving legal advice to his clients; an astrologer may use a room of his house for giving predictions; a barber may use ; a room of his house for shaving his clients ; but such use of room will never make the house itself one used for non - residential purposes."
One can give various other illustrations, like an architect or civil engineer or any other technically qualified person using a portion of their premises for the profession whish they have been carrying on. A full bench of the madras high court in dakshinamoorthy v. Tulja rai approved the test laid down by panchapakesa ayyar, j, as sound.
(6) In dakshinamoorthy's case the full bench was determining the issue whether the building in question was answering the description of a residential or non - residential building. The findings were that for several years, the building was being used for the residence of the landlord and that of pw - 2, when it was let to a tenant who was carrying on business in chappals and thereafter to the present tenant for his business in hides and skins. Structurally the building appears to have been meant for residence rather than for carrying on business. The locality in which the building was situate was predominantly a business locality. The full bench has evolved a few salient considerations which are to be kept in view in determining whether the building answers the description of residential or non - residential building. Those considerations are (1) where there is an instrument of tenancy specifically and explicitly declaring the purpose of the letting as residential or non - residential, no difficulty generally arises, (in this case, the instrument of tenancy is not produced.) no adverse inference can be drawn against the revision petitioner because she purchased the building in the year 1974 and cannot be expected to produce a rental agreement executed some time in the year 1954 between smt. Santosh kunwar and the respondent. The respondent on the other hand would normally be having a copy of the rental agreement and aay adverse inference to be drawn is to be drawn against the respondent for such non - production. (2) where there is no such instrument of tenancy the question will have to be considered on the basis of direct evidence aliunde concerning the purpose of the letting which may be adduced in a case. The purpose of the letting having regard to the normal course of human conduct is to enable the respondent to occupy the premises as a tenant of the landlady. (no inference can be made that the building was let out only for the purpose of enabling the respondent to run a nursing and maternity home). (3) if no such evidence too is forthcoming, the court can only look at the evidence concerning the user of the premises by the tenant down to the date of the application for eviction as acquiesced in by the landlord. For such uses and such acquiescence afford a safe basis for an inference of agreement between the parties as to the purpose of the letting. (there is evidence in this case that a part of the premises was used by the respondent for his nursing and maternity home.) such running of the nursing home is to the knowledge of smt. Santosh kunwar. (4) where there is evidence of such user, but there is no evidence of such acquiescence, the structural design, the antecedent user of the building by the landlord as known to the tenant and other surrounding circumstances, if any, will also have to enter into the determination of the question whether the building is or is not reidential. (this consideration does not arise in this case). (s) difficulty may sometimes still remain, i. E. , after applying the tests above indicated, if the building is found let for both kinds of purposes, residential and non - residential, no distinction being made between one part as let for one purpose and the other for the other purpose. In such a case it seems to us that what has to be determined as a question of fact is, what was the real, main and substantial purpose of the letting. (though the premises was let out for a mixed purpose, there cannot bo any doubt that the real and dominent purpose was that the building was rented out to the respondent as a residential building leaving the option to the respondent to make such use of the premises for his professional requirements as per his convenience). In the penultimate para of the judgment, the full bench made the further observation:
"it only remains to add that whore the court finds the letting to be equally for residential and non - residential purposes and not mainly or su bstantially for one or the other kind of purpose, the application by the landlord may well stand whether filed under s. 7 (3) (a) or s. 7 (3) (a) (ii) of the act."
They, however, rejected the application of the landlord because of the finding that the building in that case was let out for a non - residential purpose of carrying on business in hides and skins and the landlord cannot, therefore, seek eviction of the tenant on the ground of bonafide personal requirement.
(7) Ramaswami, j. In kuppuswami ayyangar, in re was dealing with an eviction petition filed by the landlady against a doctor, who was carrying on a dispensary in the premises let out to him. In dimissing the revision filed by the doctor at the stage of admission, ramaswami, j. Observed :
"the tenancy does not expressly provide for use of this house for the particular purpose of carrying on only a dispensary, when the dwelling place is not found to be let on one basis it cannot be assumed without evidence of a new contract or a variation of the existing contract or without its being made out by the circumstance of the letting."
In p. Varadarajam vs. State a division bench of this court was considering a claim for eviction made by the landlord in respect of a premises which was let out to the government for enabling it to locate its district panchayat office. The building prior to 1950 was used as a residential building. The previous owner had let out the residential building to the government without obtaining the necessary permission under sec. 18 of the act to convert the residential building into a non - residential building. The purchaser of the property wanted it bonafide for his personal occupation. Sambasiva rao, acting c. J. (as he then was) speaking for the bench in ordering eviction, observed;
"the facts and circumstances clearly show that it has always been a residential building, though for some time it has been put to non - residential use. Since there is no written permission from the controller, the building has not lost its character as a residential building. Even if there is an estoppel against the original owner, that does not bind the present landlord. It is not disputed that there is no other premises for him to live in. Since it is a residential building, his seeking to recover the building under sec. 10 (3) (a) (i) has to be accepted and upheld."
In miss 5. Sanyal's case the facts are : miss sanyal has since 1942 been a tenant of a house, part of it was used for a girls school and the rest for residential purpose. The respondent gian chand purchased the house from the owner by a sale deed dated september 19, 1956 and applied for eviction among other grounds that he required the house bonafide for his own residence. Both the trial court and on appeal, the first appellate court dismissed the appeal holding that the house being let for purposes non - residential as well as residential, a decree in ejectment could not be granted under sec. 13 (1) (e) of the delhi and ajmeer rent control act, 1952. The delhi bench of the high court of punjab had in revision directed ejectment limited to that portion of the house which was used for residential purposes by the tenant and remanded the case to the rent controller for demarcating those portions which were being used for residence and to pass a decree in ejectment from those specific portions of the house. The supreme court observed :
"in the absence of a specific provision incorporated in the statute, the court has no power to break up the unity of the contract of letting and attribute incidents and obligations to a part of the subject - matter of the contract which are not applicable to the rest."
This decision is authority only for the proposition that in a case where there was a letting for a composice purpose, the t enancy cannot be sub - divided and eviction ordered only in respect of the portion of the premises which was under use of the tenant for a residential purpose. This decision is not an authority to disable a landlord from claiming eviction of the tenant, even in cases where the tenant to suit his personal professional convenience has made use of part of the premises by running a nursing and maternity home while living in the rest of the premises leased out to him. The decision of the supreme court in motilal's case also stands to be distinguished on the same reasoning stated above. In maulavi abdur rub firoze v. Jay krishna arora the appellant - company was a firm carrying on business in calcutta. The respondent - plaintiff sought their eviction from the first and second floors of the building no. 86, purushotham rai street, calcutta, on the ground that he reasonably required the suit/premises for his own use and occupation and that he had no other house in and around calcutta where he could reside. The west bengal premises tenancy act enabled the landlord to apply for evrction where the premises are reasonably required for his own occupation. The supreme court observed:
"the law does not require that the landlord must need the premises for his own occupation only for the purpose to which they were being put by the tenant. It may well be that a tenant cannot put the demised premises to any other use. But there is no bar in law in the way of the landlord requiring the busiaess premises for his residential occupation and vice versa, provided the premises are capable of being put to different uses, as they seem to be in this case."
Having regard to the concurrent finding of the courts below that the requirement of the revision - petitioner is for her bone fide personal occupation, i have no hesitation in holding that the revision - petitioner is entitled to an order for eviction against the respondent notwithstanding the fact that the respondent has been using a protion of the pr mises for running a maternity and nursing home. The revision is accordingly allowed with costs throughout directing the eviction of the respondent. The respondent is, however, given time till 31 - 7 - 1983 for vacating the premises, subject to the condition that meanwhile he deposits rs. 250/ - every month before the rent controller on or before the 1 5th of each succeeding month. The land lady shall be entitled to withdraw the amounts, when deposited. Pnr appeal allowed