Pabpathi Rathnamaiah Chetty v. Yalavaluri Ramalingaiah Chetty ., Andhra Pradesh High Court, Judgment, Law, casemine.com

Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

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Case Number

C.R.P No. 2893 of 1981

Advocates

R.Prasad Rao
S.V.Sundara Rajan
R.V.Subba Rao

Judges

Jeevan Reddy
M.N Rao, JJ.

Acts

sections 12 and 13 of the madhya pradesh accommodation control act. Section 12
section 10. Sub - section (1) of section 11 entitles
section 2 (ix) and 8 (5) of the a. P. Buildings
clause (1) of sub - section (2) of section
sub - sections (2) or (3) of section 10
sub - section (1) of section 11
sub - section (2) of section 10
sub - section (4) of section 11
sub - section (1) of sec. 11
section (7) of section 15

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is the tenant of a residential premises (door no. 11/254, Apparao Street, Madanapalle) owned by the respondent landlord. The landlord initially filed RCC No. 2/75 before the Rent Controller, Madanapalle, seeking eviction on grounds of wilful default in payment of rent for the period 30-3-1973 to 27-2-1975 and on the ground of personal requirement. That application was dismissed by the Rent Controller on 1-8-1977; the appellate court and the High Court in revision (C.R.P. No. 3959/79) confirmed the dismissal.

During the pendency of the earlier application the tenant did not regularly deposit monthly rents into court, but did make a lumpsum deposit of Rs. 800 towards rent for February 1975 to November 1975. After dismissal of the first application, the landlord filed RCC No. 10/78 (the subject of the present revision) alleging that the tenant wilfully defaulted in paying rent during the pendency of the earlier proceedings. The tenant opposed the second application, contending (a) that the earlier order constituted res judicata and (b) that deposits into court were made in accordance with court orders or when challans were issued. The Rent Controller found for the landlord, disbelieving the tenant's explanation about sending money orders and lump-sum deposit on advice of his advocate, and held there was wilful default for the subsequent period. The Subordinate Judge (on appeal) confirmed this order. The tenant filed the present civil revision petition.

The matter was referred to a Division Bench by a single Judge (Rumanjulu Naidu, J.) on the ground that the question was of considerable importance: specifically whether a landlord could seek eviction for subsequent defaults after the tenant had availed himself of the benefit of an order under section 11(1) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act by depositing rent into court in earlier proceedings.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether a landlord may seek eviction of a tenant for subsequent defaults in payment of rent which occur after the tenant has deposited rent into court under section 11(1) in earlier eviction proceedings.
Whether the deposit of rent into court under section 11(1) automatically entitles the tenant to the protection in the proviso to section 10(2) (i.e., dismissal of eviction application) without any enquiry into whether the default was wilful.
Whether the dismissal of an earlier eviction application on the ground of wilful default (or otherwise) operates as res judicata to bar a later application by the landlord for defaults arising in a subsequent period.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Tenant's) Arguments

Deposit of rent into court under section 11(1) must necessarily lead to an order in favour of the tenant under the proviso to section 10(2) without any enquiry into the allegation of wilful default by the landlord.
When the Rent Controller had already held in the earlier proceedings that there was no wilful default by the tenant, the landlord has no right to move a second application seeking eviction on the ground of wilful default for a different subsequent period that arose during the pendency of the prior application (res judicata argument / protection under subsection (7) of section 10).
The deposits made into court (for example, the lumpsum of Rs. 800) were made in accordance with court orders and because the landlord refused to receive money orders — the tenant relied on that explanation.

Respondent's (Landlord's) Contentions (as presented in the opinion)

The landlord filed the subsequent RCC No. 10/78 contending that the tenant wilfully defaulted in payment of rent during the pendency of the earlier proceedings (i.e., that defaults arose after the earlier application and justified a fresh eviction application).
Implicitly, the landlord's position (adopted by the Rent Controller and subordinate judge) was that deposit in earlier proceedings does not preclude enquiry into subsequent wilful defaults and does not bar the landlord from instituting a later eviction application for defaults accruing later.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Shyamacharan vs. Dharamdas	Interpretation of sections 12 and 13 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act — notably that deposit under that Act (sec.13(5)) could prevent decree for recovery of possession and that the court had discretion to strike out defence or condone default.	The court held this precedent inapplicable to the Andhra Pradesh Act because the AP Act lacks analogous provisions; therefore the reasoning does not assist the petitioner.
S. Sundaram vs. V. R. Pattabhiraman	Interpretation of proviso and explanation to section 10(2) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (the proviso is identical to AP Act, but Madras Act included an explanation regarding two months' notice).	The court noted the Madras explanation is absent in the AP Act; the Supreme Court's observation about presumption after two months' notice was of no assistance to the petitioner in the AP Act context.
Jeetth Kaur vs. Kondalamma	Interpretation of section 2(ix) and 8(5) of the AP Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act and section 11 CPC — concerned with tenant depositing rents when landlord refused receipt and whether Rent Controller's finding bars civil court jurisdiction.	The court held this decision irrelevant to the present question; it did not affect the present issue of whether deposit preempts enquiry or bars subsequent eviction applications.
P. N. Rao vs. K. Radhakrishnamacharyulu	Interpretation of section 10(2)(i) — the controller must see whether the rent due was not paid/tendered within prescribed time and, if so, must direct eviction unless the proviso applies after enquiry.	The court relied on this authority to support the proposition that the controller's duty is to enquire into default and determine wilfulness; default per se gives landlord a right to eviction subject to proviso.
Sitaramanjaneyulu vs. Krishnaiah (Madras Division Bench)	Held under subsection (6) of section 7 (Madras Act) that "the landlord can only rely upon default or other grounds committed or available after the date of the rejection of first application" (i.e., a more restrictive view).	Court noted this was a division bench decision rendered prior to July 1954 and that it was followed in a single-judge Andhra decision (Apparao vs. Salimunnisa) but later overruled by a Madras Full Bench.
Apparao vs. Salimunnisa	Followed the Madras division bench (Sitaramanjaneyulu) — presented as supportive of the restrictive view.	Court observed it followed the Madras division bench but that that earlier division-bench view was subsequently overruled and therefore not authoritative for the present question.
Perumal Chettiar vs. Muthuswamy (Full Bench, Madras)	Full Bench overruled the earlier Madras Division Bench and held that a landlord may file a fresh application on grounds arising subsequently even during pendency of an earlier application.	The court treated this Full Bench ruling as the correct legal position and as persuasive authority for permitting subsequent applications based on grounds accruing later.
Siddiah vs. Kamath (Full Bench)	Interpretation of sub-section (7) of section 15 of the Hyderabad Act (in pari materia with Madras section 7(6)): held landlord entitled to file a second application relying on grounds accruing during pendency of earlier application.	The Andhra Full Bench agreed with the Madras Full Bench and the court relied on Siddiah to answer the referred question in favour of the landlord.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court’s analysis proceeds from a textual and functional reading of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (the "Act"), particularly sections 10 and 11:

Statutory framework: Section 10(2)(i) provides a ground for eviction when a tenant has not paid or tendered rent within the specified time. The proviso to section 10(2) permits the Rent Controller, if satisfied that the default was not wilful, to give reasonable time (not exceeding 15 days) to pay or tender rent and to dismiss the eviction application on such payment — expressly "notwithstanding anything in section 11".
Section 11(1) entitles the tenant to contest an eviction application if he has paid to the landlord or deposited with the Rent Controller "all arrears of rent" up to date and continues to pay subsequent rent until termination of proceedings. Subsections 2–5 prescribe manner, summary enquiry for disputes, power to stop proceedings and direct possession if tenant fails to comply, and landlord's right to withdraw deposited amounts.
The court rejected the petitioner’s central contention that deposit under section 11(1) automatically yields the benefit of the proviso to section 10(2) without any enquiry into wilfulness. The court emphasized that the tenant's deposit under section 11(1) is a necessary pre-condition to contest the eviction application, but it does not preempt the Rent Controller from investigating whether the tenant's default was wilful.
The core legal link, the court explained, is the enquiry by the Rent Controller: the proviso to section 10(2) operates only after the Controller has conducted the requisite enquiry and found that the default was "not wilful". The proviso itself contemplates an exercise of judgment by the Controller — it is "notwithstanding anything in section 11" and therefore cannot be invoked mechanically by mere deposit.
The court further reasoned that if deposit alone entitled the tenant to the proviso’s protection without enquiry, that would run contrary to the legislative scheme and produce results at variance with the Act’s intent. The Act, while tenant-favouring in some respects, does not place the landlord in a helpless position where wilful defaults can be insulated by deposits.
On the res judicata point, the court examined subsection (7) of section 10 (which provides that where an application under subsection (2) or (3) is rejected tenancy shall continue on same terms) and concluded that this provision does not bar the landlord from bringing a subsequent eviction action on grounds which arise after the earlier period. Subsection (7) preserves the tenancy but "subject to the provisions of this Act", thereby preserving the landlord’s rights to act on subsequent causes of action.
The court surveyed authorities from other jurisdictions and earlier decisions: it explained why some rulings cited by the petitioner (relating to different statutory schemes or different textual provisions) were not applicable to the AP Act, and relied upon Full Bench decisions (Madras Full Bench and the Andhra Full Bench in Siddiah v. Kamath) holding that a landlord may file a fresh application for grounds accruing subsequently, even during the pendency of an earlier application.
Synthesizing the statutory text and the precedents, the court concluded that deposit under section 11(1) does not preclude enquiry into wilfulness nor bar the landlord from suing on subsequent defaults; consequently, a second eviction application based on defaults arising later is maintainable either during the pendency of the first application or after its disposal.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Division Bench answered the referred question in favour of the landlord and against the tenant: a landlord is entitled to seek eviction of a tenant for any subsequent default in payment of rent committed by the tenant even though the tenant had deposited rent into court under section 11(1) in earlier proceedings; the dismissal of the earlier application does not constitute res judicata to bar a later application for a subsequent period.

Direct consequences in this case:

The civil revision petition filed by the tenant failed and was dismissed.
The dismissal was made without costs.
Time for eviction was fixed at three months from the date of the order.

Broader implications: The court clarifies that deposit under section 11(1) is a procedural condition to contest an eviction application but does not obviate the Rent Controller's enquiry into wilfulness under section 10(2); nor does dismissal of an earlier application prevent the landlord from filing a fresh application for defaults accruing subsequently. The decision relies upon and follows Full Bench authority favoring the landlord's right to invoke subsequent causes of action.

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Pabpathi Rathnamaiah Chetty v. Yalavaluri Ramalingaiah Chetty .

M.N.Rao, J.:-

(1) The petitioner is the tenant of a residential premises bearing door no. 11/254 situated in apparao street, madanapalle, owned by the respondent. The respondent - landlord filed an application rcc. No. 2/75 before the rent controller madanapalle seeking eviction of the petitioner - tenant on the ground of wilful default in the payment of rent for the period from 30 - 3 - 1973 to 27 - 2 - 75 and also on the ground of personal requirement. That application was dismissed by the rent controller on 1 - 8 - 1977 negativing both the pleas raised by the landlord. The appellate court as well as the high court in revision c. R p no. 3959/79 confirmed the view taken by the rent controller. During the pendency of that application the tenant did not deposit into the court regularly the monthly rents due for the period subsequent to the application. However, a lumpsum amount of rs. 800/ - was deposited by him into court towards the rent for the period from february 1975, to november 1975. After the dismissal of that application the landlord filed rcc. No. 10/78 (from out of which the present revision petition arises) before the rent controller, madanapalle contending that there was wilful default on the part of the tenant in the payment of rent during the pendency of the earlier proceedings. That application was opposed by the tenant contending that the order of the rent controller dismissing the earlier application constituted resjudicata and the deposit of rents made by him into the court was in accordance with the orders of the court as and when challans were issued by the court deposits were made. The learned rent controller considered the question whether or not there was wilful default on the part of the tenant and answered it in favour of the landlord. He took the view that an application for eviction for wilful default in the payment of rent for a period different from the one covered by the earlier application was maintainable. The evidence of the tenant that he sent the monthly rents by money order to the landlord and as the latter refused to receive the money orders, he deposited the entire money in lumpsum into the court on the advice of his advocate, was disbelieved by the learned rent controller. On appeal the learned subordinate judge, madanapalle, confimred the order of the rent controller. The aggrieved tenant has preferred the present revision petition.

(2) When the civil revision petition came for hearing before our learned brother rumanujulu naidu, j. , on 9 - 8 - 1982, he referred the matter for a division bench taking the view ;

"the question raised in the revision petition is of considerable importance and in my opinion requires an authoritative pronouncement from a division bench of this court, the question being as to whether it is open to a landlord to seek eviction of a tenant for the subsequent default in payment of rent committed by him, after availing himself of the benefit *of an order passed under section 11 (4) obviously a mistake for section 11 (1) of the andhra pradesh buildings (lease, rent and eviction) control act as no order was made in the previous appln. Under sec. 11 (4) by the court of rent controller in the earlier proceeding for eviction instituted by him"

(3) The a. P. Buildings (lease, rent and eviction) control act, 1960, for short the 'act' was enacted with the object of regulating leasing of buildings, the control of rent, and the prevention of unreasonable eviction of tenants. By section 10 (2) (i) of the act the landlord can seek eviction of the tenant if the latter has not paid or tendered the rent due by him in respect of the building within fifteen days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy or in the absence of any such agreement, by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable. The proviso to sub - section 2 of the section 10 of the act says that in respect of the matters falling under clause (i) , if the rent controller is satisfied that the default on the part of the tenant either to pay or tender rent was not wilful, he may give the tenant a reasonable time, not exceeding fifteen days, to pay or tender the rent and on such payment or tender, the application for eviction must be dismissed, notwithstanding the provisions of section 11. Section 11 of the act deals with payment or deposit of rent during the pendency of proceedings for eviction when an application has been made by the landlord under section 10. sub - section (1) of section 11 entitles the tenant to contest the application before the rent controller or prefer an appeal against the order of the rent controller under sec. 20 if he has paid to the landlord, or deposited with the rent controller or before the appellate authority, as the case may be, "all arrears of rent" due in respect of the building upto the date of payment or deposit and continues to pay or deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building until the termination of the proceedings before the controller or the appellate authority, as the case may be. Sub - section (2) of sec. 11 says that the deposit of rent shall be made within the time and in the manner prescribed. If there is say dispute as regards the amount of rent to be paid or deposited under sub - sec. (1) , the controller or the appellate authority, is empowered by sub - section (3) to make summary enquiry for the purpose of determining the question. If the tenant fails to pay or deposit the rent, the rent controller or the appellate authority as the case may be, by sub - section (4) of section 11 is empowered, unless the tenant shows sufficient cause to the contrary, to stop all further proceedings and make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. Sub - section (5) of sec. 11 empowers the landlord to withdraw the amount so deposited subject to the condition prescribed.

(4) The only contention urged before us by sri. Sundararajan. Learned counsel for the petitioner is that the deposit of rent into court by the tenant in compliance with an order made under sub - section (1) of section 11 must necessarily lead to an order in favour of the tenant under the proviso to sub - section (2) of section 10 without any enquiry into the allegation of wilful default levelled by the landlord under clause (1) of sub - section (2) of section 10. Another fact of his contention is that when the rent controller had held in the earlier proceedings that there was no wilful default on the part of the tenant, the landlord has no right to move a second application seeking eviction on the ground of wilful default in respect of a different period but during the pendency of the prior application.

(5) We are unable to agree with sri - sundararajan. Payment or deposit of rent by the tenant during the pendency of the proceedings for eviction is a necessary pre - condition under section 11 which entitles the tenant to contest the application brought by the land lord seeking eviction under section 10. If the tenant does not deposit the arrears of rent or continue to deposit the rent for the period subsequent to the filing of the application for eviction as directed under sub - section (1) of sec. 11 the tenant will lose the right to contest the application. In such an event sub - sec. (4) of sec. 11 comes into play. There is no warrant for the inference that deposit of money under sub - sec. (1) preempts the rent controller from making an enquiry into the allegation of the tenant's default. Under sub - sec. (2) of sec. 10 the rent controller is enjoined to conduct an enquiry into the allegation of the landlord seeking eviction of the tenant on any of the grounds specified therein; one such ground is failure to pay or tender the rent by the tenant in accordance with the agreement of tenancy with the landlord or in the absence of any such agreement, by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable. In the enquiry to be conducted by the rent controller in this behalf the tenant is entitled to a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against what was alleged by the landlord. If after the enquiry the rent controller is satisfied that the tenant's default was wilful, he should direct the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building, but if he is not so satisfied he should reject the landlord's application. The granting of time under the provisio to seb - section (2) of sec. 10 is only a consequence of the finding recorded by the rent controller after the enquiry that the tenant's default was 'not wilful' but not a result flowing automatically due to deposit of rent by the tenant under sub - section (t) ot section 11. The intervening link is the most important namely enquiry by the rent controller. That this is the legislative intendment is made explicit by the proviso itself; it says that the power of the rent controller to be exercised in that behalf is "notwithstanding anything in section. 11". The acceptance of the contention of sri sundararajan would lead to startling results totally at variance with the legislative intendment and the language employed in the act. Although the act is tilted in favour of the tenant, it does not reduce the landlord to an utterly helpless position even if the tenant has committed acts of wilful default in the payment of rent. The tenant is not clothed with any right to preempt enquiry into the allegations of wilful default by merely depositing into the court the alleged arrears of rent.

(6) The rulings cited for the petitioner are of no assistance to him. The decision in shyamacharan vs. Dharamdas concerns with the interpretation of sections 12 and 13 of the madhya pradesh accommodation control act. Section 12 of the madhya pradesh act contains the grounds on which an action can be brought for eviction of the tenant. Sub - section (1) of sec. 13 enables the tenant to deposit the arrears of rent prior to the filing of the application and also for this subsequent periods. Sub - section (5) enjoins that on such deposit being made "no decree or order shall be made by the court for the recovery of possession of the accommodation on the ground of default in the payment of rent by the tenant". If the tenant fails to deposit the rentor pay the amount, the court may be sub - section (a) , "order the defence against the eviction to be struck out and shall proceed with the hearing of suit". In the context of these statutory provisions ,the supreme court held that the court has discretion to strike out or not to strike out the defence of the tenant if default is made in payment of rent as required by section 13 (1). "if the court has the discretion", observed the supreme court, "not to strike out the defence of a tenant committing default in payment or deposit as required by sec 13 (1) , the court surely has the further discretion to condone the default and extend the time for payment or deposit". This ruling has no application to cases arising under the a. P. Act since the latter does not have analogous - provisions. In 5. Sundaram vs. V. R. Pattabhiraman one of the questions considered was the scope of the proviso and explanation to section 10 (2) of the tamil :nadu buildings (lease and rent control) act, 1960. The proviso to section 10 (2) of the madras act is identical to the proviso to sec. 10 (2) of the a. P. Act. The explanation to section 10 (2) of the madras act provided that default to pay or tender rent would be construed as wilful jf the default by the tenant continues "after the issue of two months notice by the landlord clearingi the rent". The a. P. Act does not contain any explanation to that effect. Interpreting the explanation, the supreme court held :

"as we read the explanation, it does not at all take away the mandatory duty cast on the controller in the proviso to decide if a default is wilful or not. Indeed, if the landlord chooses to give two months' notice to his tenant and he does not pay the rent, then, in the absence of substantial and compelling reasons, the controller or the court can certainly presume that the default is wilful, and order his eviction straightway"

. We are unable to comprehend how these observations are of any help to. The present petitioner. The decision of this court in jeetth kaur vs. Kondalamma concerns with the interpretation of section 2 (ix) and 8 (5) of the a. P. Buildings (lease, rent and eviction) control act and sac. 11 of the civil procedure code. The tenants sought the permission of the court to deposit the rents on the ground that the landlord refused to receive the same. The question of jural relationship between the landlord and the tenant which was incidentially decided by the rent controller and it was held by this court that the finding does not operate as res - judicata ousting the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain a suit raising such question. Any question decided by the rent controller would not bs final so as to, oust the jurisdiction of the civil court. This decision has absolutely no relevancy to the question under consideration. Equally inapplicable is the ruling of the full bench of our court in p. N. Rao vs. K. Radhakrishnamacharyulu in which interpreting section 10 (2) (i) it was held :

"on a plain reading of this section it is clear that all the controller has to see is whether the rent due was not paid or tendered within 15 days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement. It' there is no such agreement he has to see whether the rent was not paid before the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable. If that condition is satisfied the controller has no option but to direct the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building unless the matter is one which falls within the proviso. Under the proviso, if the tenant's default was not wilful, the controller may give the tenant a reasonable time not exceeding 15 days to pay or tender the rent due by him to the landlord upto the date of such payment or tender and on such payment or tender, the application shall be rejected. The moment the tenant fails to pay the rent within 15 days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement or if there is no such agreement before the last day of the month next following that for which rent is payable there is a default and a right on the part of the landlord to have the tenant evicted arises subject only to the proviso. There is nothing in this section which enables the tenant to contend that the right is lost merely because he pays or tenders the rent due by him subsequently"

(7) The contention that the dismissal of the earlier application seeking eviction on the ground of wilful default disentitles the landlord from tiling a second application in respect of default for the subsequent period is wholly misconceived. It is true that sub - section (7) of section 10 of the act says that where an application for eviction under sub - section (2) or (3) has been rejected by the controller, the tenancy shall, subject to the provisions of this act, be deemed to continue on the same terms and conditions as before and shall not be terminable by the landlord except on one or more of the grounds mentioned in sub - section (2) or sub - section (3). This does not disable the landlord from bringing an action for eviction on any of the grounds specified in sub - sections (2) or (3) of section 10 of the act. The only right conferred under sub - section (7) on the tenant is that after the dismissal of an application by the rent controller under sub - sections (2) or (3) the tenancy shall continue but the continuation shall be subject to the provisions of the act.

(8) Sub - section (7) of section 10 of the act is in pari materia with subsection (6) of section 7 of the madras buildings (lease and rent control) act. A division bench of the madras high court in sitaramanjaneyulu vs. Krishnaiah, following a judgment in an earlier decision, held that under subsection (6) of section 7 "the landlord can only rely upon default or other grounds con mitted or available after the date of the rejection of first application". (emphasis supplied). It must also be mentioned that the madras division bench case was followed by a single judge of the andhra high court in apparao vs. Salimunnisa. The division bench ruling was upset by a full bench of the madras high court in perumal chettiar vs. Muthuswamy (f. B.) , the ratio decidendi being : "the act no doubt gives protection against eviction to tenants notwithstanding the fact that the landlord had terminated the tenancy; but such protection is given only to a tenant who is regular in the payment of the rents and only when other circumstances specified in sub - sees. (2) and (3) do not exist. When therefore a fiction is created by section 7 (6) for the continuation of the tenancy on the dismissal of the landlord's application lor eviction, such continuance must be subject to the, same conditions. Therefore there can be no impediment to the landlord availing himself of his rights under the act even during the pendency of an earlier application by filing a fresh one on the basis of grounds arising subsequently. It should follow that the pendency ol an application for eviction under the act cannot prevent a fresh application being filed on the basis of subsequent defaults or necessities. Indeed there is nothing in the state to prevent it".

(9) As the division bench decision of the madras high court was rendered prior to july, 1954, it was felt that the same constituted a binding precedent on the andhra pradesh high court and so after the madras division bench's ruling was overruled by a full bench of that court when an identical question arose under the hyderabad house (rent, eviction and lease control act) the matter was referred for consideration to a full bench in siddiah vs. Kamath (f. B.) 8. Sub - section (7) of section 15 of the hyderabad act is in pari - materia with section 7 (6) of the madras act. Our full bench agreed with the view taken by the madras full bench and answered the question referred to it thus :

"notwithstanding the pendency of an application for eviction filed by a landlord against his tenant under the provisions of the said act (hyderabad act) the landlord is entitled to file a second application for eviction either during the pendency of the first application or after its disposal, relying upon a ground of eviction which has accrued to the landlord during the pendency of the earlier application for eviction"

. (emphasise supplied). Krishna rao, j. Speaking for our full bench stated the legal position thus :

"the provisions of secion 15 of the hyderabad act corresponding to section 7 of the old madras act which lay down the various grounds for eviction of a tenant are prima facie available to the landlord on all occasions which the cause of action arises as per the said provisions. We are not able to find any limitation or restriction in the provisions of the said section or in any other provision of the act, either expressly or by necessary implication, that the operation of this section is kept in abeyance during the pendency of an eviction petition in all its stages including and appeal an a revision. A party is always entitled under law to avail himself of any cause of action unless he is debarred from doing so. When a party is entitled under law to institute more than one proceeding, he cannot be debarred on the ground that it amount to multiplicity of proceedings. The object of the said provision is apparently to remove all doubts and merely to emphasise the fact that the tenancy continues under same old terms and conditions and subject to the provisions of this act. It gives protetion to the tenant from incurring any liability for damages for use and occupation and entitling him to pay only the agreed rent or the fair rent, as the case may be. The provision is intended to relieve the tenant of any onerous obligation entered into by him with the landlord during the pendency of any eviction petition. The words "subject to the provisions"

And "continues" clearly indicate on the other hand, that the rights of the landlord and the tenant under the act and the particular provision of law relating to eviction, are preserved intact. In this view of the matter, the only reasonable conclusion which emerges on a plain reading of the above provision is that a landlord, far from being precluded from relying upon any subsequent ground of eviction, is entitled to rely upon all such provisions of the act which enable him to obtain eviction, irrespective of the pendency of a prior application"

(10) In view of the foregoing we answer the question referred to us in favour of the landlord and against the tenant. The landlord is entitled to seek eviction of the tenant for any subsequent default in payment of rend committed by him although he deposited in the earlier proceedings rent into court under section 11 (1) of the act. The dismissal of the earlier application would not constitute resjudicata disentitling the landlord from filing a second application for the period subsequent to the one alleged in the earlier application. The landlord is entitled to file a second application during either the pendency of the first application or after disposal.

(11) In the result, the civil revision petition fails and it is accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances without costs. Time for eviction three months from today.

Pabpathi Rathnamaiah Chetty v. Yalavaluri Ramalingaiah Chetty .

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Tenant's) Arguments

Respondent's (Landlord's) Contentions (as presented in the opinion)

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Pabpathi Rathnamaiah Chetty v. Yalavaluri Ramalingaiah Chetty .

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