(1) This appeal mainly raises a question turning upon the application of section 14 (1) and (2) of the hindu succession act, 1956.
(2) One v. Subbaiah died in the year 1929 leaving behind him his widow ramamma and three daughters by name t. Kotamma (d - 1) k. China kotamma (mother of the plaintiff) and g. Bala kotamma (d - 3). The 2nd defendant in the case is the husband of the 1st defendant while the 4 th defendant in the case is the husband of the 3rd defendant. Defendants 5 and 60 are the sons of defendants 3 and 4. The 64th defendant is the daughter of defendants 1 and 2. The other defendants are the alienees either from the 1st defendant or the 3rd defendant or from defendants 5 and 60. The 66th defendant is the alienee of a portion of the suit property from the plaintiff.
(3) Late subbaiah executed a will, ex a - 1, on 19 - 3 - 1929 and made some further provisions under a codicil, ex. A - 2 on 9 - 4 - 1929. Under this will and codicil, he created a life estate in favour of his wife ramamma, in respect of an extent of about ac. 45 - 00 of land and created a vested remainder, in respect of the said property in favour of his three daughters, in respect of three separate portions of the said extent of ac. 45 - 00. Ramamma died in the year 1977. So far as the properties which were to devolve on the 1st defendant and 'the 3rd defendant after the life time of ramamma, there was a settlement and partition between those two daughters and late ramamma in 1952 under ex. A - 3 and in 1955 under ex. A - 4 respectively and we are not concerned in this suit with the extent of properties which were given as vested remainder to those two daughters viz. , defendants 1 and 3. We are, however concerned only with the share which was given as vested remainder, in favour of the plaintiff's mother. China kotamma who died in the year 1944 and on whose death her vested remainder devolved on the plaintiff: perhaps, when the settlement and partition took place between the two other daughters and ramamma, if the plaintiff's mother was alive or, if the plaintiff was a major there could have been a similar settlement whereby the widow could have taken some property absolutely instead of as a life estate and released the remaining properties from the burden of her life - estate, in favour of the plaintiff's mother or the plaintiff. But unfortunately as the plaintiff's mother died in 1944 and the plaintiff was a minor a't the time of the settlement in 1952 and the partition in 1955 such an arrangement could not be entered into. The net result was that while the other two daughters viz. , defendants 1 and 3 could secure before 1956 some properties absolutely by having the life estate of ramamrna released and in consideration conferring absolute rights on ramamma, in respect of some items covered by the vested remainder of those two daughters, such an arrangement could not be entered into either by the plaintiff's mother or by the plaintiff in respect of this vested remainder for the reasons mentioned above. Consequently while the other two daughters had the freedom to enter into a settlement with the widow ramamma before 1956 the plaintiff alone was confronted with the situation resulting from the provisions of section 14 of the hindu succession act (hereinafter referred to as the act).
(4) On the basis that the properties given to the plaintiff's mother as a vested remainder and in which late ramamma had a life estate had become the absolute property of ramamma during her life time by virtue of the provisions of section 14 (1) of the act, several alienations have been made by defendants 5 to 60 who are the sons of defendants 1 and 3. In fact, these alienees are mainly contesting this appeal preferred by the'plaintiff. The plaintiff's alienee viz. , the 66th defendant is supporting the plaintiff. The branch of the 1st defendant is also supporting the plaintiff saying that late ramamma did not get an absolute estate in respect of the properties which are covered by the vested remainder of the plaintiffs mother. But even the 1st defendant is still relying upon the family settlement, ex a - 3, dt. 14 - 3 - 1952 and the partition deed dated 24 - 9 - 1955 under which she and her mother agreed to take absolute estate, in respect of different portions of the property which was the subject matter of the vested remainder in favour of the 1st defendant.
(5) Before adverting to the legal question,i must refer to the fact that the settlement under ex. A. 3 was a result of a litigation in o s no 139/50 on the file of district munsif's court gurazala, between ramamma and defendants 1 and 2. As already stated, at the time of the settlement and the partition the plaintiff was a minor and her mother having died in 1944, she was ugder the guardianship of late ramamma.
(6) There was also another litigation, which is not really relevant in the present context. Late ramamma entered into a compromise in 0 s no 366/55 on the file of district munsif's court, gurazala, with certain strangers to the family in respect of ac. O. 21 cents of land. The present plaintiff questioned that compromise by filing 0 s no 189/60 on the file of the same court. While the trial court and the 1st appellate court proceeded on the basis that the said ac. O. 21 cents was part of the vested remainder given to the plaintiff and that it had not become the absolute estate of ramamma, the high court in s a no 272/80 disposed of on 9 - 6 - 1981 held that the said property was not part of the vested remainder of the plaintiff and that the defendants therein - had prescribed 'title by adverse possession. That matter is now said to be pending in the supreme court. But it is common ground that that has no bearing on the present appeal.
(7) In this appeal, it is contended by sri c. Poornaiah the leanned counsel for the plaintfff - appellant as also the 66th defendant, who argued the case very ably in person that the provisions of section 14 (1) of the act do not apply to cases governed by wills. It is also argued that the decision of the supreme court jn karmi vs. Amru (1) afr 1971 s c 745 is an authority for the proposition that section 14 (1) of the act is not attracted to cases governed by wills executed prior to the act. Even otherwise, it is argued that late ramamma by her conduct at the time of the family settlement under ex. A - 3 in 1952 and the partition under ex - a - 4 in 1955 and in her written statement in o s no 189/60 had agreed to abide by the terms of the will of her husband of the year 1929 and that therefore principles of estoppel and election are attracted and have to be given effect to, even if the provisions of sec. 14 (1) of the act are attracted.
(8) Ob the other hand sri s l chennakesava rao and 'sri jagdish and sri p v r sarma. Appearing for the contesting defendants and the alienees have argued that the provisions of sectfon 14 (1) ,of the act are attracted even to cases of wills. , in view of the explanation to section 14 (1) and the case is fully governed by the judgment of the supreme court in v tulasamma vs v sesha reddi (2) air 1977 sc 1944. Sri k b r krishna murthy, representing the branch of the 1st defendant supported the case of the appellant.
(9) On the basis of the above contentions the two points that arise for consideration in this appeal are : - (1) whether the provisions of section 14 (1) of the hindu succession act are attracted to cases governed by wills providing for a vested remainder and whether in such cases the provisions of the indian succession act 1925 apply or do not apply ? (2) whether the conduct of the widow prior to the hindu succession act, 1956 or there after would raise any questions of estoppel or election and whether the provisions of section 14 (1) of the hindu succession act cannot, in such situation be given affect to ?
(10) Point no. 1 : - section 14 (1) of the hindu succession act, 1956 provides that any property possessed by a female hindu whether acquired before or after the commencement of this act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. The explanation to sub - section (1) says that the 'property' above mentioned includes moveable and immoveable property acquired by a female hindu by inheritance or devise or at partition or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance or by gift from any person, whether a relalive or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner what - so - ever, and also any such property held by her as sridhana immediately before the commencement of the act. Sub - section (2) provides that nothing contained in sub - section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of a gift, will or other instrument or the - decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property.
(11) The above provisions have now been explained by the supreme court in tulasamma's case (2 supra) separate judgments have been rendered by bhagwati, j. (as he then was) and fazal ali, j. In both the judgments it has bean clearly laid down that the right of a hindu female for maintenance against her husband or the joint family is preexisting right in property even though maintenance is not a charge either on the property of the husband or on the joint family property. It has been further held that if property is held by a female in pursuance of a pre - existing right, such as a right of maintenance, such property would become the absolute property of the female upon the commencement of the act. However, if the property is acquired for the first time under a particular document by the female and the said acquisition is not in lieu of any pre - existing right inhering in her, then the provisions of sec. 14 (1) of the act will not apply and such property will not become her absolute estate. Bhagwati, j. (as he then was) in a separate judgment laid down some more principles of law emanating from sec. 14 (2) of the act. Lt is stated by the learned judge that even if the acquisition is a restricted estate it will become an absolute estate under section 14 (1) provided it is given in lieu of a pre - existing right and will not fall within the provisions of sec. 14 (2). For the purpose of applicability of sec. 14 (2) two conditions are necessary viz. , (1) that the property should not have been acquired in lieu of a pre - existing right of a female, and (2) the proyerty acquired must be a restricted estate. Unless both these conditions are present, sub - section 14 (2) will not apply. This is clear from the following observations by bhagwati, j. (as he then was) :
". This circumstance would also seem to indicate that the legislative intendment was that sub - section (2) should be applicable only to cases where acquisition of property is made by a hindu female for the first time without any pre - existing right a kind of acquisition akin to one under gift or will where however, property is acquired by a hindu female at a partition or in lieu of right of maintenance it is in virtue of a pre - existing right and such an acquisition would not be within the scope and ambit of subsection (2) , even if the instrument, decree order or award allotting the property prescribes a restricted estate in the property"
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(12) It will be seen that the statute 'itself in the explanation to section 14 (1) speaks of a device which only means a testamentary disposition. It is therefore not possible to accept the contention that notwithstanding the express reference to a will in section 14 (1) read with the explanation the said provision does not apply to cases of property given to a female under a will.
(13) In this context it is argued for the appellant by sri c. Poornaiah that the earlier decision of the supreme court in karmi vs amru (1 supra) was a case of a will and it was held that the estate given to the female did not become enlarged and that the vested remainder came into operation. It is pointed that this decision was not explained or overruled in tulasamma's case (2). It is necessary to examine the facts of this case. One jaimal died in 1938 leaving behind him his wife nihali. The appelant karmi was the daughter of his deceased son ditta. The respondents were the colaterals of jaimal. Under the second will of november 13, 1937 jaimal provided that his estate should devolve on his widow nihali and thereafter on his collaterals. On the eath of jaimal, nihali enjoyed the property till 1960 when she died. While the collaterals claimed the property as the vested remainder holders under the will, the appellant claimed the property under another will executed by nihali in her favour on 25 - 4 - 1358. The supreme court held that the vested remainder under the will dated november 13, 1937 executed by jaimal had to be given effect to and that estate did not become an absolute estate in the hands of nihali it is true that in tulasamma's case (2) there is no reference to this case. Having. Regard to the absence of any discussion of the legaf principles in this case as compared to tulasamma's case (2) we have to understand the case on the basis of the principles enunciated in tulasamma's case. Obviously if nihali was given the property as life estate not in lieu of any pre - existing right, sec. 14 (2) would operate as decided in that case. But if the property was given to nihali in lieu of any pre - existing right, such as a right to maintenance, it must be held that the conclusions arrived at in this case run counter to tulasamma's case in which event, we should follow the latter decision in tulasamma's case in which the legal principles were elaborately enunciated. I am therefore of the view that the decision in karmi vs. Amru (1 supra) cannot help the appellant.
(14) There are, however, several other cases or wills and vested remainders given thereunder which have been held to be governed by sec. 14 (1) provided the property was given in lieu of maintenance or other pre - existing rights. A division bench of this court consisting of sambasiva rap, j. (as he then was) and raghuvir, j in m. Devamma vs. M. P nagireddi (3) 1977 aphn 322=1975 alt 147 (nrc) held that even in respect of case covered by a testamentary disposition the provisions of section 14 (1) can apply. Similarly ramaswamy, j in nanindi mahalakshmaiah vs. Komati basavamma (4) 1984 (2) an. W. R. 110 also applied the provisions of section 14 (1) of the act to the case of properties given to a female under a will and held that a clause conferring vested remainder would not take effect. I may also refer to preetam singh vs. Bachan kuer (5) air 1985 punjab 4 (fb) and jinnappa vs. Kallawa (6) air 1983 karnataka 67 where the estates given to a female under a will were held to have become absolute estates by operation of section 14 (1). However, the other decision of the supreme court in g appaswami vs. R sarangapani (7) , air 1978 sc 1051 relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, can be easily distinguished. It is true that was a case of a will but there the property was given by the testator to a married daughter for her life and then a vested remainder. It was held that a marued daughter had no right of maintenance or other pre - existing right against her father and therefore the provisions of sec. 14 (1) of the act are not attracted. It was therefore held that the vested remainder operated. This case is clearly distinguishable.
(15) The learned counsel for the appellant then placed reliance upon the provisions of sections 4 and 30 of the hindu succession act for contending that bequests made under a will are governed by the provisions of indian succession act, 1925 and that the provisions of the latter act have not been expressly repealed or otherwise interfered with by the provisions of the hindu succession act and therefore the vested remainders created under a will should be given fufl effect notwithstanding the provisions of the hindu succession act. In my opinion this submission cannot be accepted.
(16) Section 4 of hindu succession act reads as follows:
"s 14 (1) save as otherwise expressly provided in this act. A) any text, rule or interpretation of hindu law or any custom or usage as part of that law in force/immediately before the commencement of this act shall cease to have effect with respect to any matter for which provision is made in this act; (b) any other law in force mmediately before the commencement) f this act shall cease to apply to hindus n so far as it is inconsistent with any of he provisions contained in this act"
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(17) The heading of this section s mentioned as 'over - ridding effect of act'. It is obvious that sub - section (1) s intended to abrogate the sastriac hindu aw and custom and usage in force with aspect to any matter for which provision s made under this act while sub - section (2) is intended to abrogate any statutory aw to the extent that the provisions hereof were inconsistent with the provisions of the hindu succession act. In ther words so far as statutory laws are concerned the abrogation is not total but inly partial and only to the extent that the provisions thereof are inconsistent with the provisions of this new act. Section 14 (1) read with the explanation learly referes to titles created under estamentary dispositions governed by he indian succession act, 1925. If under section 14 (1) read with the explalation, life estates are given under a bestamentary disposition in favour of a emale in lieu of a pre - existing right they become the absolute property of the l:emale thereby nullifying the vested renairiders, as per the decision in tulasanma's cass. It follows that section 4 (2) vould operate to the extent of over - rid - ting or abrogating the provisions of hindu (sic. Indian) succession act to the extent mentioned above. In other words where property is given under a wili to a female in lieu of a pre - existing light including the right of maintenance the life. Estate would become an absolute lestate thereby nullifying the vested re - mainder and to that extent there is an abrogation of the relevant provisions of the indian succession act, 1925 and his is the effect of the provisions of section 4 (2) of the hindu succession act, 1956. I, therefore, hpld accordingly and reject the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant in this regard.
(18) It is then argued for the appellant that unless there is a specific reference in the will that the property is given in lieu of a pre - existing right such as a right of maintenance, the provisions of sec. 14 (1) cannot apply.
(19) I may point out that sec. 14 (1) of the act as explained in tulasamma's case (2 supra) applies to all properties possessed by a female hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of the act, and shall become her absolute property provided the property is given in lieu of a pre - ex - sting right. There is no provision either in section 14 (1) or in the explanation that the document under which the property is given to the female should itself expressly specify the right in lieu of which or the reasons for which the life estate is being granted in favour of the female. In my view, the question whether the property is given to a female in lieu of a pre - existing right including a right of maintenance, is to be decided in the context of the facts and circumstances of a given case. If on the date of the execution of the document there was in existence a right in the female for maintenance or similar right, the bequest or gift should be deemed to have been given in lieu of that right even if the reason for the bequest is not specified in the document. In other words it is the existence of the right of a female that is relevant but not the specification or the enumeration thereof in the document that is relevant. This view is supported by the observations of the supreme court in tulasamma's case.
(20) Further, we have seen that in g appaswami vs k sarangapani (7 supra) the married daughter who was provided a life estate under a will" was held not entitled to an absolute estate under section 14 (1). The reason for denying her an absolute estate was that she did not have any pre - existing right of maintenance against hr father. This was deduced by the supreme court not with reference to any express mention in the document but by reason of the general principles of hindu law. I am therefore of the view that it is not necessary that the will or gift should specify that the property was given to the female by reason of a pre - existing right or a right of maintenance.
(21) Reliance is placed in this context on a decision of madhava rao j in bhimireddy chennareddy vs bhoosapalli peda yerranna and another sa no. 437/77 date. 21 - 2 - 1979 of andhra pradesh high court where one peda chennaiah executed a will and died in 1947 giving a life estate to his widow and a vested remainder to two other persons. There were no specific. Words used in the will that the property was given to her in lieu of her maintenance. The learned judge held that the estate given to the widow did not become an absolute estate and that on her death the property can be recovered by the vested remainder holders. The learned judge also referred to the decision of the supreme court in tulasamma's case (2). In my opinion, the observations of the learned judge that in that will express reference was not made to the facts that the property was being given in lieu of maintenance must be confined to the facts of that case. If the learned judge laid down any proposition that the document must mention that the property is g;ven in lieu of maintenance i am of the view that the said proposition cannot be supported with reference to the decision of the supreme court in tulasamma's case as well as the subsequent decision of the supreme court in baivijaya vs thakur bai (9) air 1979 sc 993.
(22) The learned counsel for the appellant also relied upon the decision of the kerala high court in janki vs. Govinda (10) air 1980 kerala 218. That was also a case of a will and the house property was given to a female in lieu of her right of residence. It was held that the property did not become the absolute property of the female, lam unable to agree with this view. Under hindu law, the right - of residence of a female is a pre - existing right and therefore even if property is given in lieu of a right of residence the principles laid down in tulasamma's case are attracted and the estate becomes an absolute estate. I, therefore, dissent from this view.
(23) Reference is also made to s. 30 of the hindu succession act, 1956 and it is argued that that has a bearing on s 14 (1). But in my opinion, it has no bearing. Under the hindu law before this act, a hindu could not bequeath his undivided interest in the joint family property. That disability has now been removed. Sec. 30 therefore has no impact on section 14 (1) or its explanation.
(24) Thus, i hold that the provisions of sec. 14 (1) are attracted to cases governed by wills and that if the property is given to the female in lieu of a pre - existing right the widow becomes an absolute owner of the property and the vested remainder is accordingly nullified and the provisions of the indian succession act, 1925 will not, in such cases, apply and i also hold that it is not necessary that the will or other document under which property is given to a female shojld expressly specify that the property is given in lieu of a pre - existing right or a right of maintenance. It is sufficient if such a right was in existence in favour of the female on the date when the document is executed. I hold on point no. 1 accordingly.
(25) Point no 2: - it is argued by the learned counsel for the appellant and" by the 66th defendant, in person, that the recitals in the settlement deed, ex. A - 3, dated 14 - 3 - 52 and in partition deed, ex a - 4, dated 24 - 9 - 55 as also the averments in the written statement, ex. A - 6, dt. 27 - 10 - 61 show that ramamma has accepted to abide by the terms of the will dated 19 - 3 - 1929 of her husband and that this amounts to an election by her to abide by the will and therefore ramamma and those claimed through heuare estopped from relying upon the provisions of s 14 (1) of the hindu succession act.
(26) So far as the settlement deed, ex. A - 3 and partition deed, a - 4 are concerned there is no doubt that at that time ramamma was prepared to abide by the terms of the will above mentioned of the year 1929. If that position continued, the plaintiff would have been able to enforce her vested remainder. But it was only subsequent to exs. A - 3 and a - 4 that the hindu succession act, 1956 came into force. If the rights of ramamma were altered during the year 1956 by virtue of the statute - even assuming that ramamma agreed to abide by the terms of the will when she executed the settlement deed on 14 - 3 - 52 and the partition deed, ex. A - 4 dated 24 - 9 - 1955, the same cannot help the plaintiff. The real question is whether, after the commencement of the hindu succession act, there is any such election or estoppel made out and even, if so, whether it would be binding. The only document affer 1956 on which reliance can be placed for the plaintiff - appellant will be ex. A - 6 written statement of ramamma dt. 27 - 10 - 1961. Para 2 of the said written statement has been relied upon strongly by the learned counsel'for the appellant in as much as there is a reference to the will in that paragraph. But, in my opinion, paragraph 2 of the above said written statement only mentions the historical facts but the real averment is contained in paragraph 7 wherein it is clearly stated that, after the death of subbaiah, ramamma has taken the properties covered by the will and that "she acquired rights under the 1956 act". Therefore, after the 1956 act came into force, there is, in fact, no statement by late ramamma that she will abide by the terms of the will. Hence there is no question of any election or estoppel arising in the case as a fact. Even as a matter of law, if ramamma's estate had indeed become absolute by force of the statute and even if she made a statement in 1961 that her estate was not enlarged, such a statement would not be binding on her or those who claim through her, in as much as it is wall settled that there is no estoppel on a pure question of law. This is clear from the decision reported in ramabadra vs gopalaswami (11) air 1931 ma d r a s 404 wherein it is clearly held that there can be no estoppel with regard to a statement made on an erroneous view of the law. I, therefore, hold on point no. 2 that there is no question of any election or estoppel which precludes the defendants from relying on the provisions of 1956 act.
(27) In view of the above findings the appeal fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances, without costs.