Citation Codes

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citation codes

Case Number

W.P No. 6737 of 85 etc.

Advocates

For the Appellant: P. Sriraghuram, P.V. Seshaiah, Advocates.

Judges

Seetharam Reddy, J.

Acts

section 4 (1) and section 6 (1) notifications
section 4 (1) of the land acquisition act
section 6 by act 68 of 1984
sub - section (1) of section 4
sub - section (1) of section 6
sub - sec. (1) of section 6
section 9 (3) and 10
section 4 (1)
section 6 (1)

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Smart Summary

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Three writ petitions challenged a common notification under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. The section 4(1) notification was issued on 14-9-1981 and stated only that the land was acquired for a "public purpose" without further particulars. On 13-9-1984 a declaration under section 6 was published. Prior to that, the inquiry under section 5-A had been dispensed with by the section 4(1) notification; subsequently, when the section 6 declaration was published, the earlier dispensation of the section 5-A inquiry was deleted, meaning the inquiry was to be held. Notices under sections 9(3) and 10 were served on 30-3-1985. The petitions raised (i) whether the section 4(1) notification was defective and liable to be quashed and (ii) whether the subsequently proposed holding of a section 5-A inquiry after publication of the section 6 declaration made that declaration invalid and whether a fresh declaration could be published in view of an amendment (Act 68 of 1984) to section 6 requiring publication within three years of the section 4(1) notification.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the notification under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was defective (because it stated only "public purpose") and therefore liable to be quashed.
Whether, in circumstances where a section 5-A inquiry that had earlier been dispensed with was subsequently sought to be held after a section 6 declaration had already been published, the section 6 declaration remained valid; and if not, whether a fresh section 6 declaration could be made in view of the amendment by Act 68 of 1984 (which requires the section 6 declaration to be published within three years from the section 4(1) notification).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

The section 4(1) notification merely stated that the land was acquired for "public purpose" and gave no particulars; consequently, interested persons could not meaningfully object under section 5-A.
Relying on the Supreme Court decision in Narendrajit Singh v. State of U.P., the petitioners argued that a vague statement of "public purpose" in the section 4(1) notification is defective and cannot be cured by fuller particulars in a later section 6 notification.
Because the section 4(1) notification did not furnish a definite indication of the purpose, the right to make effective objections under section 5-A was rendered illusory.

Government's (Respondent's) Arguments

The learned government pleader relied on the Supreme Court decision in Babu Singh v. Union of India (1979), contending that the statement of public purpose in section 4(1) need not be identical in wording to that in section 6(1) and that the defect, if any, could be remedied or was not fatal in the facts of the case cited.
Implicitly, the government argued that a broadly understandable statement of public purpose suffices to enable objections under section 5-A and that specifics may be furnished later.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Narendrajit Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1971 SC 306	Notification under section 4(1) must be strictly construed; a vague notification cannot be cured by fuller particulars in a subsequent section 6 notification; interested persons must have an immediate ability to object.	The court treated this decision as directly analogous and dispositive: it held that where the section 4(1) notification contains only "public purpose" without particulars, the defect is fatal and the notification must be quashed.
Babu Barkya Thakur (Barkya Thakar) v. State of Bombay, AIR 1960 SC 1203 (and related citations)	It is not always necessary for the section 4 notification to contain detailed particulars; in substance, if investigation shows land is needed for a public purpose (e.g., for a company) requirements may be satisfied and a defect in section 4 is not necessarily fatal, particularly where s.5-A or s.40 investigations are to follow.	The court considered this authority but distinguished it on facts: it noted the decision allows some defects in s.4 where acquisition is effectively investigated later, but found the present case analogous to Narendrajit Singh and therefore held the s.4 notification defective.
Smt. Somavanti v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 151	Observed that a notification under section 4(1) is a condition precedent to making a notification under section 6(1); simultaneous issuance was discussed and accepted only where section 5-A did not stand in the way.	The court relied on the principle that section 4 precedes section 6 and emphasized that section 4 must provide sufficient indication so that objections under section 5-A can be made.
Munshi Singh v. Union of India, ALR 1973 SC 1150	Held that an interested person must have some definite indication of the purpose in the section 4(1) notification to enable effective objections under section 5-A; vagueness defeats the statutory right to object.	The court cited this authority for the proposition that vague or indefinite statements in section 4(1) notifications prevent effective exercise of rights under section 5-A, supporting the decision to quash the s.4 notification here.
Babu Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1979 SC 1713	Where the public purpose in section 4(1) and section 6(1) notifications are broadly the same (even if one is more detailed), the declaration under section 6 need not be invalidated solely because of differences in phraseology; the law requires a broad, understandable statement of public purpose to enable objections.	The court considered this case relied upon by the government but found it distinguishable: in Babu Singh the section 4 statement was sufficiently informative (e.g., soil conservation, green belt), whereas in the present case the section 4 notification merely said "public purpose" and was too vague to permit effective objection.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by addressing the two central questions in turn, relying on the authorities cited in the petition and response and on the statutory scheme:

On the validity of the section 4(1) notification:
- The court emphasized that a section 4(1) notification is the "first stop" towards depriving a person of property and so must be strictly construed. It must, at least in substance, give a definite or particular indication of the public purpose so that interested persons can object under section 5-A.
- The court accepted the reasoning in Narendrajit Singh and Munshi Singh that vagueness in the section 4(1) notification defeats the right to effectively object, and that particulars cannot be supplied belatedly in the section 6 notification to cure an otherwise defective section 4 notification.
- The decision in Babu Barkya Thakur was considered but distinguished on its facts: while that authority permits some defects in s.4 when investigation under s.5-A or s.40 is to follow, the present case involved a bare statement of "public purpose" without particulars and therefore did not furnish the necessary guidance to those affected.
- Consequently, the court concluded the section 4(1) notification was defective and fatal and quashed it.
On the validity of the section 6 declaration given the revival of the section 5-A inquiry:
- The court found it was impermissible to revive or order a section 5-A inquiry after a section 6 declaration had already been made because the inquiry's purpose is to allow objections that might persuade authorities to abandon, limit, or modify acquisition before a section 6 declaration is made.
- Because the section 5-A inquiry was ordered after the section 6 declaration, the declaration could not stand and was set aside.
On whether a fresh section 6 declaration could now be made:
- The court noted the amendment to section 6 by Act 68 of 1984 requires that the section 6 declaration be published within three years of the section 4(1) notification. Given that the three-year period had elapsed, a fresh declaration within the statutory period was no longer possible.
- Accordingly, that statutory time-limit further militated against sustaining the original proceedings, reinforcing the decision to quash the section 4(1) notification.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court quashed the notification under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act and allowed the writ petitions. The section 6 declaration was also set aside as the section 5-A inquiry could not properly be ordered after the section 6 declaration.

Immediate consequences for the parties:

The section 4(1) notification impugned in these petitions is quashed.
The section 6 declaration made in reliance on that process is set aside because the section 5-A inquiry was improperly revived after the declaration.
Because Act 68 of 1984 requires a section 6 declaration within three years of the section 4(1) notification, and that period had expired, a fresh valid section 6 declaration could not now be made within the statutory period.
Costs were awarded: advocate's fee of Rs.100/- in each petition.

No broader policy pronouncement or new precedent was claimed to be laid down by the court beyond applying existing Supreme Court authorities; the court's ruling applied established principles (as found in the cited authorities) to the facts before it.

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V. Subba Rao v. District Collector, Land Acquisition, Visakhapatnam

(1) These three writ petitions assail a common notification, and the facts being similar and so, are disposed of by this common order.

(2) The notification under section 4 (1) of the land acquisition act issued in these three writ petitions states merely that the land in question is acquired for a 'public purpose' and nothing more this was on 14 - 9 - 1981. Long thereafter, i. E. On 13 - 9 - 1984 the declaration under section 6 of the act was published. Earlier the inquiry under section 5 - a of the act was dispensed with under the notification issued under section 4 (1) and when the declaration under sec. 6 of the act was made it was stated that the dispensation with the inquiry under section 5 - a as made earlier is now deleted, meaning thereby that the inquiry will be held. Then on 30 - 3 - 1985 notices under section 9 (3) and 10 were served.

(3) Essentially two questions do arise, the first being whether the notification under section 4 (1) of the act is defective and therefore liable to be quashed, and secondly in as much as the inquiry under section 5 - a of the act which was earlier dispensed with is how sought to be held and since the declaration is already published whether that declaration will be valid and if it is not, whether the 2nd declaration could not be made in view of the amended provisions enacted in section 6 by act 68 of 1984 under which within three years from the date of the notification under section 4 (1) the declaration under section 6 must be published. Relying on the decisions of the supreme court in narendrajit singh vs. The state of u. P (1) air 1971 sc page 306 wherein it is held :

"10. Ft was urged before us that the notification was in terms of the section and that the petitioners could not complain inasmuch as the defect was remedied by the notification under sec. 6 which was issued within a fortnight after the section 4 notification. In our view this contention cannot be accepted. Any notification which is the first stop towards depriving a man of his property must be strictly construed and courts ought not to tolerate any lapse on the part of the enquirying authority in the issue of such notification if it be of a serious nature. In the case of babu barkya thakur (1961) 1 scr 128= (air 1960 sc 1203) (supra) it was pointed out by this court that "the proceedings being with a government notification under section 4 that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose".

It is well known that a person interested in the land which is affected by any notification under sec. 4 (1) may immediately object to it and take proceedings in court against it. In smt. Somavanti vs state of punjab (1963) 2 scr 774= (air 1963 sc 151) ' one of the main questions before this court was whether a notification under section 4 (1) and em under section 6 (1) could be issued simultaneously. Although the court took the view that where section 5 - a was not in the way there was no irregularity in publishing the notification on the same day, yet it observed that :

"notification under sub - section (1) of section 4 is a condition precedent to the making of a notification under subsection (1) of section 6."

In our view the defect in a notification under section 4 (1) cannot be cured by giving full particulars in the notification under section 6 (1). In this case it is apparent that even before the issue of the first notification government had made up its mind to acquire the lands of the petitioners in as much as there was no enquiry in between the two notifications and no valid reason has been put forward to explain why the. Details specified in the notification under section 6 (1) could not be given in the one under section 4 (1). The fact that the petitioners did not go to court immediately after the publication of the first notification is not a matter of any moment. The defects were not cured and cannot be glossed over by reason of the fact that the petitioners went to court after the issue of the notification under section 6 (1) ". And in munshi singh vs union of india (2) alr 1973 sc 1150 wherein it was held at page 1156:

"if it has any purpose and if it has to be given its full effect the parson interested in the land proposed to be acquired must have an opportunity to sub/nit his objections and that he can only if the notification under section 4 (1) whilc mentioning the public purpose gives some deslinite indication or part ; - culars of ine said purpose wiiich would enable the persons concerned to object effectively if so desired. In the absence of such specific or particular purpose being stated the objector cannot file any proper or cogent objections under sec. 5 - a which he has a right to do under that provision. We would accordingly held that owing to the vegueness and indefiniteness of the public purpose stated in the notifications under sec. 4 (1) and in the absence of any proof that the appellants were either aware of or were shown the scheme or the master plan in respect of the planned development of the area in question the appellants were wholly unable to object effectively and exercise their right under sec. 5 - a of the acquisition act."

The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the case covered by narendrajit singh vs the state of uttar pradesh. (1) supra is in fact analogous to the case on hand. What all has been stated in the instant case in the notification under section 4 (1) of the act is that the land has been acquired for 'public purpose' and nothing else. It is impossible for any person who is interested in the land so acquired to decipher the object for which the land is sought to be acquired and therefore there is absolutely no scope whatsoever to submit any objections. Hence the notification under section 4 (1) in the matter must be quashed. The counter - contention of the learned government pleader while relying on the decisions of the supreme court reported in babu singh vs union of india (3) air 1979 s. C. Page 1713 wherein it is held :

"7. The next contention is that the public purpose set out in the notification under sub - section (1) of section 4 and the one under sub - section (1) of section 6 being different from each other, the declaration made under sub - section (1) of section 6 and the consequent notification publishing the declaration would be invalid. The contention is that the declaration can be made under sub - sec. (1) of section 6 in respect of that public purpose for which the notification under sub - section (1) of section 4 is issued. Without examining the merit of contention in law it must fail in the facts of this case because we see no difference in the statement of public purpose in the notification under section 4 (1) and in the notification under sec. 6 (1). Public purpose for which the land is needed as set out in the notification under section 4 (1) is : "for (he execution of soil conservation and other improvement works in the catchment areas of sikhana lake. Chadigarh and for raising a green belt around the capital. Public purpose as set out in the notification under section 6 (1) is : "for carrying out soil conservation measures in sukhana lake catchment are in kharar tahsil, district ambala" a mere comparison of the statement of public purpose made in the respective notifications would by itself negative the contention raised on behalf of the appellant. The statement o? public purpose under section 4 (1) notification is more comprehensive setting out details of improvement works while the one set out under section 6 (1) notification is more precise and restricted in terms. Broadly speaking the public purpose for which the land is acquired is for soil conservation measures in sukhana lake catchment area. A green belt is one such measure and its explicit statement does not change the public purpose. What the law requires is broad and understandable statement of public purpose and this is being insisted upon with a view to giving an opportunity to those whose lands are proposed to be acquired to effectively object the proposed acquisition in an inquiry under section 5 - a. If such be the object behind the provision requiring setting out of public purpose in the notification issued under section 4 (1) as also one under section 6 (1). It would appear that the statement of public purpose as set out in both the notifications is the same and there is no difference between the two. We specifically requested mr. Varma to point out any real contradiction between the statement of public purpose in section 4 (1) and section 6 (1) notifications to appreciate his submission but none such was pointed out, and, therefore, the contention must be negatived".

(4) In barkya thakar vs state of bombay (4) air 1960 sc page 1203 it is held - :

"it is not absolutely necessary to the validity of land acquisition proceedings that the statement that the land sought to be acquired was needed for a public purpose should find a place in the notification actually issued. The requirements of the law will be satisfied if in substance, it is found on investigation, and the appropriate government is satisfied as a result of the investigation that the land was needed for the purpose of a company, which would amount to a public purpose under part - vii. It is further held : "the purpose of the notification under section 4 is to carry on a preliminary investigation with a view to finding out after necessary survey and taking of levels, and, if necessary, digging or boring into the sub - soil whether the land was adapted for the purpose for which it was sought to be acquired, ft is only under s. 6 that firm declaration has to be made by government that land with proper description and area so as to be identifiable is needed for a public purpose or for a company. What was a mere proposal under s. 4 becomes the subject matter of a definite proceeding for acquisition under the act. Hence, a defect in the notification under s. 4 is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings particularly when the acquisition is for a company and the purpose has to be investigated under s. 5a or s. 40 necessarily after the notification under s. 4".

Is that the notification cannot in this case be held to be defective as it is not necessary to give any details in section 4 (1) notification and that the words 'public purpose' as employed in the notification are adequate.

(5) I apprehend the contention of the learned government pleader is not well founded and it is indeed very difficult for me to accede to the said submis - ' sion, particularly in view of the judgment of the supreme court in narendrajit singh. V. The state of u. P. (1) supra, which is on all fours analogous to the case on hand. Indeed the ratio decidendi of the said decision is that if public purpose is not mentioned in detail and if inquiry is sought to be held, then there will be little ground or scope for the person interested to make representation or tender objections. Even otherwise, before section 6 declaration is made, whan the gist of the notification is published in the locality it it still open to the person interested to submit objections and may be the authority might bs convinced as to why the lands in question should not be acquired and eventually they might even give up - publication of section 6 declaration. Viewed from any angle, therefore, the insistance on furnishing the purpose for which the land is acquired must in brief be stated in the notification under section 4 (1). If it is not stated the entire object behind this will be rendered otiose. The decision reported in babu singh vs. Union of india (3) supra will not be of any assistance to the government for the reason that therein fairly elaborately the purpose for which the land is acquired has been stated namely for the execution of soil conservation and other improvement works in the catchment areas of sukhana lake, chandigarh and for raising a green belt around the capital'. Surely, this furnishes enough guidance to the person interested to tender his objections, if any, whereas in the case on hand it is merely stated 'public purpose' which is the vaguest possible indication, which does not provide any guidance whatsoever to the person interested for submitting his objections. Hence, i have no hesitation in holding that the notification in this case is defective and indeed fatal and therefore the notification under section 4 (1) of the act has to be quashed and it is accordingly quashed.

(6) The second question in fact does not arise. However since arguments were addressed on that as well, it may also be dealt with. The declaration under section 6 of the act is admittedly published just one day before the expiry of three years, period. Very curiously, which is incomprehensible, the inquiry under section 5 - a which was earlier dispensed with is now revived. While doing so, it will be like putting the cart before the horse. The very purpose of section 5 - a inquiry is to let the authorities know that the acquisition is not propar for various reasons and the must consider all those objections and quite often than not in some cases they might even give up the idea having been convinced with the objections raised by the person interested or in some cases they might restrict the acquisition of the area to a limited extent and so forth, and it is thereafter the declaration under section 6 might be made. Therefore the declaration already issued under section 6 cannot stand in view of the ordering of inquiry under section 5 a. It is, therefore, accordingly set aside.

(7) Now the question is whether a fresh declaration could now be made under section 6 of the act. Sec. 6 as it amended by act 68 of 1984 mandates that the declaration under that section must be made within three years from the date of the publication of the notification under section 4 (1) , which is an impossibility of its performance because the time has already expired. Hence, for that reason also the notification under section 4 (1) of the act cannot stand.

(8) In the result the notification under section 4 (1) of the act is quashed and the writ petitions allowed, no opsts. Advocate's fee rs. 100/ - in each.

V. Subba Rao v. District Collector, Land Acquisition, Visakhapatnam

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

Government's (Respondent's) Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

V. Subba Rao v. District Collector, Land Acquisition, Visakhapatnam

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