K.Ramaswamy, J.:-
(1) The first respondent - wife kid complaint against the appellant - husband in c. C. No. 21 of 1986 before the vi additional judicial first class magistrate, vijayawada under section 498 - a of the indian penal code (act lv of 1860) , for short, "the code", as amended by act xiv of 1983, for short "the amendment act", which ignited the appellant to hit her back by knocking off its bottom by assailing the constitutional validity of the amendment act on the anvil of articles 14, 20 and 21 of the constitution of india. The material facts in nut - shell are that the first respondent was married to the appellant on february 23, 1984 as per hindu custom's and rites. They lived together as wife and husband. The appellant and his mother made unconscionable demand for dowry and payment of a sum of rs. 30,000/ - was made by sale of the property of her mother. The first respondent also was given certain articles. The list thereof has been appended to the complaint. Yet, the satiety of the appellant and his mother remained unquenched. They had been constantly mentally harassing, ill - treating and physically torturing and subjecting her to untold mental cruelty during her stay with the appellant to bring further amounts. She bore with the same but became unbearable. She apprehends danger to her life and property at the hands of the appellant. Therefore she accuses that the appellant and his mother have committed cruelty punishable under section 498 - a of the code. Her private complaint laid under section 200 of the code of the criminal procedure, 1973 was referred to the police who investigated into it and laid a charge - sheet against the appellant alone under section 498 - a of the code which is numbered as c. C. No 15/87. Thereon, the appellant was served with summons and on receipt thereof, he filed w. P. No. 2258 of 1987 assailing the constitutional validity of section 498 - a of the code and sec. 113 - a of the indian evidence act, 1872 as amended under the amendment act. By judgment dated february 27, 1987, our learned brother, s s. M. Quadri, j. Dismissed the writ petition, against which the present writ appeal has been filed.
(2) The appellant's learned counsel, sri veerabhadra rao contends that the definition of the word 'cruelty' under section 498 - a of the code should be explicit, specific and definite, but it is delightfully vague and wide of its mark. Therefore, it is arbitrary. It is further contended that husband and relatives of husband cannot be singled out for the purpose of legislation under the amendment act. There is no reasonable relation, not any nexus to single them out from the general body of offenders. Accordingly, it is obnoxious to art; 14 of the constitution. It is further contended that the procedure prescribed lugging the husband or relatives of husband for the offence of cruelty is violative of arts. 20 and 21 of the constitution offending right to life. Even otherwise, on a reading of the complaint and the charge - sheet, no offence has been made out. Therefore, the court below cannot take cognisance of the, crime. It is further contended that s. 113 - a of the evidence act placing burden oh the accused is in negation of the criminal jurisprudence and the settled notion of law that the accused is presumed to be innocent and the burden is always on the prosecution to establish beyond reasonable doubt the crime committed by the offender. Therefore, raising the presumption under section 113 - a of the evidence act is violative of article 14 of the constitution.
(3) We find no substance in any of the contentions. It is not in dispute and cannot be disputed, that the parliament is competent to make law in respect of all matters included in the indian penal code by operation of entry 1 of the concurrent list (list iii) of the seventh schedule to the constitution, and marriages under entry 5 and evidence under entry 12 thereof. Therefore, the parliament is competent to make the impugned law of cruelty by the husband or the relatives of the husband in relation to a woman and evidence in respect thereof. The question is whether the word 'cruelty' is vague? before considering that question, it is necessary to extract section 498 - a which is brought on statute under chapter xxa of the code as amended by sec. 2 of the amendment act, which reads thus.
"of cruelty by husband or relatives of husband : 498 - a: husband or relative of husband of a women subjecting her to cruelty : whoever being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation :for the purpose of this section, "cruelty" means : (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger (o life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman ; or (b) harassment of the women where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. "
As a corollary thereto, sub - sec. (3) of sec. 174; sub - sec. (1) of sec. 176 of the code of criminal procedure, 1973 were suitably amended and section 198 - a was brought on statute under the code of criminal procedure. They are not relevant for the purpose of this case and hence they are not extracted. The first schedule to the code of criminal procedure was suitably amended by section 6 of the amendment act. By section 7 of the amendment act, section 113 - a was brought into the indian evidence act, 1872, after section 113, which reads as follows :
"sec. 113 - a : when the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband. Explanation :for the purposes of this section 'cruelty' shall have the same meaning as in section 498 - a of the indian penal code."
(4) Thus, section 498 - a declares that cruelty to a woman by her husband or any relative of her husband is an offence punishable with imorisonment for a term which may extend to three years and also with fine. The explanation explains the term 'cruelty'. Clause (a) thereof specifies wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) as cruelty. Equally, clause (b) thereof amplifies harassment of a woman as cruelty when it is caused with a view to coerce her or any person related to her to meet any "unlawful demand for any property or valuable security" or is on account of failure by the woman or any person related to her to meet such demand. "
(5) The contention of sri veerabhadra rao is that the definition of 'cruelty' is wide of mark and any sort of harassment or conduct by a husband or relatives of the husband would be lugged within the compass of sec. 498 - a of the code. Therefore, it is arbitrary, unless the definition is explicit, specific and definite, being criminal provision and it offends article 14 of the constitution. We are unable to agree. The definition clause itself is a statutory innovation as a dictionary of the legislature which it seeks to mainfest its intention and to avoid making different provisions of the statute to be cunbersome. When a word is defined in the statute and the word is used in a provision to which the definition is applicable, the effect is that wherever the word is used in that provision the definition of the word gets substituted. So, the definition given must be applied and given effect to; it should be considered in the light shed by the subject and the context in which the word is definied by the legislature. It is true that by its verv nature, the definition by a legislature would appear to be artificial or arbitrary. But as stated earlier, it is to be considered in the light of the object the statute seeks to achieve and the purpose which it seeks to subserve and the context in which the definition is made. By artificial definition many a situation may be encompassed within the meaning of the definition. But morely beeause it appears to be in excess of the ordinary acceptation of the word which is the subject of the definition, it cannot be said to be wide of the murk and on that pretext the legislature is devoid of pow. Er or jurisdiction to define or it becomes arbitrary offending article 14 of the constitution.
(6) It is well settled that the explanation is part of the section. So, explanation to section. 498 - a is its part. Section 498 - a of the code postulates that the husband or the relatives of the husband of a woman, if they subject such woman "to cruelty", he or they shall be liable to punishment prescribed thereunder. Though the word 'cruetly' has not been defined in section 10 of the, hindu marriage act or other allied personal laws, the word 'cruelty' is an apt word though capable of absorbing diverse colours but is intelligible and easily discerible in the context of marital relations known to personal laws of the parties. The harassed woman would unfold them at trial. It is common knowledge that despite prohibition of the pernicious social evil of demand or offer or payment of dowry under dowry prohibition act, 1961, the number of dowry deaths is escalating in countless number every year. It has become a subject of grave concern to the enlightened section of the society and subject of an anxious consideration by the joint committee of the houses ot parliament. Diverse methods, forms and situations are being created meting out cruelty to a helpless married fair sex to meet unconscionable or unlawful demands which the parents or relatives of the woman are unable to meet. As a result, by constant harassmint, nagging. Humiliation, etc, the married woman becomes helpless, and being unable to dear with, driven to commit suicide by her or to murder her by her husband or the relatives of the husband, etc. This problem is an indelible blot on the civilized society. As a result, the legislature thought it expedient to deal with the situation by making a legislation preventing commission of those acts, declaring them to be an oflence by bringing section 498 - a through the amendment act. The statement of objects and reasons relevant for the purpose reads thus :
"the increasing number of dowry deaths is a matter of serious concern. The extent of the evil has been commented up on by the joint committee of the houses to examine the working of the dowry prohibition act 1961. Cases of cruelty by ihe husband and relatives of the husband which culminate in suicide by, or murder of, the hapless woman concerned, constitute only a small fraction of the cases involving such cruetly. It is, therefore, proposed to amend the indian penal code, the code of criminal procedure and the indian evidence act suitably to deal effiectively not only with cases of dowry deaths but also cases of cruetly to married women by their in - laws"
(emphasis supplied)
(7) In this light, we have to examine the explanation appended to section 498 - a. As seen. Under clause (a) of the explanation it is wilful conduct that is made punishable. The phrase 'wilful conduct' is not capable of precise definition. The human ingenuity is such that several forms could be devised to drive a married woman to the extremity of putting an end to her precious life. The conjugal society and marital home are intractable terrain to others and exclusive domain to the husband and accessible habitation to his relations. From crude physical injury or harm to subtle devices with intellectual arrogance could be employed in causing cruelty or harassment to a married woman. Each case is to be adjudged in the light of the facts presented and proved. Under clause (b) thereof, if the harassment of the woman is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlavfnl demand or any property of valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand, it is defined to be cruelly punishable under the main part of the section. The explanation explains only some of the facets latent in the word 'cruelty'. The harassment under clause (b) of the explanation to section 498 - a also brought within its ambit the word 'cruelty'. When the word 'cruelty' is read in this light and the historical circumstances which necessitated the legislature to bring on statute section 498 - a, we find no vagueness nor appear to be imprecise. Therefore, it is not arbitrary, nor vague, no indefinate. It is not violative of article 14 of the constitution as being arbitrary.
(8) The next contention that the husband or relative or relatives of the husband cannot be treated as a class apart from general class of offenders is also devoid of substance. Article 14 accords equality of treatment to all persons similarly situated. Any invidious discrimination is obnoxious to equality. When it is denied, its validity is to be tested by the doctrine of reasonable classification to find whether the discrininated person or class of persons or things are not in similar circumstances. The question then is whether it is a reasonable classification and bear out any just and reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved. It is to be further seen what is its effect on the rights of the persons effected. The legislature is free to recognise a degree of harm and may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest. The classification may be founded according to objects. A single person or class of persons may be treated as class for the purpose of article 14 if the law deals equally with the members of a defined class, it is neither obnoxious nor open to charge of denial of equality of protection on the ground that it has no application to other persons. As seen, the dowry deaths are due to wilful conduct of the husband and his relatives or cruelly or harassment to a married woman is due to her failure or inability to meet unlawful or unconscionable demands and to coerce her or her relative either of bringing property or any valuable security. Due to the constant harassment meted out to her she is driven to the exteme extent of putting an end to her precious life by committing suicide or the in - laws or the husband themselves committing murder of her or abatement thereof with a view to have the husband marrying another woman capable of meeting their unconscionable or unlawful demands, this is a pernicious evil corroding the social fabric. It is peculiar to the married woman. So the husband and his relative which includes the relatives are treated as a class. Therefore, the legislature stepped in and made the law. It is the settled rules of construction right from heydon's case vide crraies on statute law, (1584) 3 co. Rep. 7a. (7th edition) , page 96, that the court has to discern four things : (1) what was the law before the making of the act; (2) what was the mischief and defect for which the law did not provide; (3) what remedy the parliament has resolved and appointed to cure the defect ; and (4) the true reason of the remedy. These four tests are amply satisfied in this case. Preceding the amendment act there is no law occupying the field. On account of the phenomenal increase in the dowry deaths, cruelty, and harassment to the married women, the legislature felt it expedient to step in and bring on statute the offence of cruetly. Therefore, the law presumably hits the evil where it is felt most acute. Thus it cannot be overthrown merely because there are other instances to which it might be applied equally well; but it is for the legislature to judge whither this can be extended to the other areas. So long as the need is felt acute, it is for the legislature to remedy the defect. As held by holmes, j. In brain peanut co. Vs. Pinsilvania, (1930) 28 u. S. 499 at 501
"we must remember that the machinery of the government would not work if it were not allowed a little play in its joints."
(9) It is true that equality in law provided under article 14 of the constitution precludes discrimination of any kind, but equality by itself will not negate the power of the legislature but allows the legislature due to expediency to accord differential treatment to attain an object between person situated in different situations. Therefore, the court must be satisfied that (1) there is in fact discrimination and (2) it is impermissible and is an unreasonable classification bearing no nexus to the object which laws seeks to achieve. It is abhorent to the conscience of every civilised individual to hear or witness bride - burnings or deaths. The crime is against the conscience of he civilised humanity. The statutory animation is not to revenge or retribution against them but a vindication of civilisation by lugging them as a class and bring them to book at a joint trial so that the persons involved in committing the crime or having proclivity to the crime or persons who abet the commission thereof must be dealt with and punished according to law. In chiranjit lal vs. Union of india, air 1951 sc 41 at 58 (para 64; mukerjea, j. (as he then was) held thus :
". The legislation made to one individual or one family or a body corporate per se does not violate the guarantee of equal protection rule. There can certainly be a law applying to one person or to one group of persons and it cannot be held to be unconstitutional if it is not discriminatory in its character."
But the classification must rest upon the real and substantial distinction having a reasonable and just relation to the object which the law seeks to achieve. The classification is permissible if the individuals or the class of individual possess real and substantial features different from the other individuals or class of individuals in relation to the object of the legislation in question. If the law is made applicable equally to a class of persons or things and the classification is based upon differentia having a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved, it cannot be assailed on the ground that its application is found to affect only one person or class of persons or things. As seen, the husband or relative or relatives of the husband constitute a class for the p ur - pose of offence of cruetly. It is common knowledge that these offences are committed within the confines of the family to which others normally have no access. The in mates of the house have special knowledge regarding wilful conduct or the harassment or cruetly, etc. Meted out to the married woman. Therefore, in a given situation, either the husband or the in - laws or the relative or relatives "of the husband may be prime offenders or abettors or one or all of them may be jointly or individually responsible for commission of the crime. Therefore they are treated as a class for the purpose of sec. 498 - a of the code. Thus they constitute a class by themselves apart from the general offenders. The classification has reasonable nexus and bears just relation to the object to be achieved. Therefore, sec. 498 - a of the code cannot be said to be an unreasonable classification. Thereby, it is not offensive of article 14 of the constitution.
(10) It is next contended that section 113 - a of the evidence act hits the off unders viz. , husband and his relatives below their belt lifting them from the general body of offenders who have the right to keep their month shut by placing the burden on the prosecution to prove the offence beyond any shadow of doubt and if any reasonable doubt arises, the accused is entitled to the benefit thereof. This normal presumption of innocence is displiced by the statute and burden is cast on the husband or relatives of the husband under section 113 - a of the evidence act. Therefore, it is obnoxious to right to life and fair procedure provided under article 21 and article 20 or compel him to be a witness violating article 20 (3) of the constitution. We find no difficulty to reject it. As stated, when there is commission of crime of suicide by a married woman or abetment thereof by her husband or any relative of the husband and when it is shown that she has committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of marriage and her husband or relatives of the husband subjected her to cruelty, the court is called upon to draw a presumption that having regard to all other circumstances of the case that such suicide has been abetted by her husband or the relatives of the husband. In this case, practically the need to go into the question doss not arise for the reason that it is not a case of suicide. But the learned counsel for the appellant has pressed the question contending that cruelty is a facet of it as per its explanation. So we are called upon to answer the question. The word 'cruelty' under the explanation to sec. 113 - a ot the evidence act is the same as given in 498 - a of the code which also includes harassment. It is true that in criminal jurisprudence, the prosecution has to prove its case to the tilt and the burden is always on the prosecution. The question is whether sec. 113 - a is offensive of article 14. This point too is no longer res integra. When the legislature indicates a statutory presumption in respect of certain act or acts or a burden of proof upon certain persons, the statute cannot be challenged as discriminatory if the rule of evidence has a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the act. This is only a rebuttable presumption and it is applicable to the husband of a married woman or his relative or relatives. As stated earlier, the offences are committed within the confines of marital home of woman. It is an intractable terrain to others but the exclusive domain accessible to the habitation of the names class of offenders. The inmates have special knowledge of the circumstances under which the offence of suicide is committed or cruelty or harassment is caused leading to the commission of suicide. Therefore, the legislature drew presumptive evidence in favour of the prosecution. It does not relieve the prosecution to prove its case on the touch stone of "proof beyond reasonable doubt". If some evidence is adduced by the husband or his relatives, it displaces the presumptive evidence; then the presumption is rebutted and the burden is always on the prosecution to establish the case beyond reasonable doubt. Evidence may be by oral or documentary during examination under sec. 313 of the code of criminal procedure, 1973. The validity of presumptive evidence was considered by a constitution bench of the supreme court in emden vs. State of u. P, air 1960 sc 548. In that case, under section 4 (1) of the prevention of corruption act, 1947, the statute has drawn a presumption that a public servant accepted or agreed to accept or attempted to obtain gratification, etc. As reward or motive as mentioned in section 161 of the code without consideration or for inadequate consideration. When its validity was assailed on the anvil of article 14 of the constitution, it was held that the basis adopted by the legislature in classifying one class of public servants who are brought within the net of sections 161, 165, of the code or sec. 5 (1) of the prevention of corruption act, is a perfectly rational basis. It is based on intelligible differentia and there can be no difficulty in distinguishing the class of persons covered by the impugned section from other classes of persons who are accused of committing other offences. Thejobject is eradication of corruption among public servants. Therefore, it was held that it is not offensive of equality clause. The same ratio applies with equal force to the facts in this case. As stated earlier, the husband or his relatives constitute a class. The offences are committed within the confines of the conjugal society or marital home of the woman. Therefore, it becomes intractable for the prosecution to place the entire material in that regard. In respect of offences of suicide by a married woman, under section 113 - a of the evidence act, rebuttable presumption' was drawn against the husband or his relatives with a view to relieve partly the prosecution of its burden of proof. However, it is for the court on totality of the facts and circumstances to find and hold whether the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, it has a. Reasonable and just relation to the object sought to be achieved, viz. , prevention of crime in the marital home oi the woman. Therefore, the presumption drawn under section 113 - a of the evidence act is not violative of article 14 of the constitution. It does create no offence much less greater offence attracting article 20 (1). Equally it is a procedure as per the evidence act and sec. 113 - a is one of the facets of adduction of evidence in proof of a crime to meet a peculiar circumstance in intractable areas. So it is neither unfair nor unjust nor unreasonable attracting either article 14 or article 21 of the constitution, offending right to life. It is true that they are accused attracting article 20 (3). Article 20 (3) accords an immunity from testimonial compulsion or self - incrimination thus : " no person accused of an offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. " this has its inspiration from the fifth amendment of the american constitution. The immunity, against self - incrimination has been held to have its own limitations. It is always open to an accused to waive the privilege there is no prohibition to make a voluntary confession or an admission as provided under section 164 of the code of criminal procedure, equally if he volunteers to give evidence, he waives his privilege and gives testimony on any point and he has to speak to the whole truth. Sec. 315 (1) of the code of criminal procedure, 1973 expressly gives that right subject to the safeguard in the proviso thereto. Once he gives oral evidence, he comes within the teeth of section 132 of the evidence act. If he enters into the box and gives evidence, he will be subject to cross - examination upon his evidence in chief with the same latitude as would be exercised in the case of an ordinary witness. Though an element of compulsion is implicit in section 113 - a, it is for the accused to exercise his privileges engrafted under article 20 (3). It is optional. As already held, adduction of evidence by the accused need not necessarily be by examining himself as a witness. He can also tender his evidence in his examination under sec. 313 of the code of criminal procedure, 1973. It is enough to raise a reasonable doubt. The presumptive evidence under sec. 113 - a of the evidence act has been drawn keeping in view of the paramount social interest than against the interest of a specified class of offenders, viz. , husband or his relatives. Thus considered, we are of the view that section 113 - a of the evidence act does not offend articles - 20 (3) of the constitution. We make it clear that we are not expressing any opinion that sec. 113 - a applies to a case calling under explanation (b) to sec. 498 - a of the code. It would appear that section 113 - a of the evidence act would apply to a case falling under explanation (a) to section 498 - a of the code, that too for abetment of suicide.
(11) We do not propose to go into the merits in this case though the learned counsel for the appellant seeks to contend, since it is for the parties to establish their case on merits at the trial before the learned magistrate.
(12) The considered, we find that there is no substance in the contentions. Accordingly, the writ appeal is dismissed, but in the circumstances, without costs. Advocate's fee rs. 250/ -.