(1) The respondent by an agreement dated july 27, 1982, undertook to execute lining to the bed and side slopes of d. B canal from m5/6 to m6/0 and m6/0 to 6/2. Ninety percent of the contract was completed by june 30, 1984 and the balance on april 16, 1985. Accordingly, the work was handed over. Despite repeated requests to settle the claims, no action was taken by the petitioners. By letter daced february 19, 1986, he requested to settle the claims within thirty days from the date of receipt of that letter. But however, oo july 25, 1986, the petitioners have rejected the claim. Thus arose the dispute between the respondent and the petitioners. As a result, the respondent invoked arbitration clause 73. Thereunder, a panel of three arbitrators, viz. , the chief engineer, srisailam project; deputy secretary, finance, government of andhra pradesh and the director of accounts, pochampad projects are the designated arbitrators. The government, in g. O. Rt. No. 5, finance and planning dt. January 2, 1988, upgraded the post of the deputy secretary, finance to the post of joint secretary and he was kept in - charge of the subjects hitherto being dealt with. The chief engineer, srisailam project, in his letter dated february 24, 1988 requested the respondent to enter into a supplemental agreement agreeing for arbitration by the joint secretary, finance and planning as well. The respondent has stated that as there is no post of deputy secretary of finance which is one of the designated arbitrators and the joint secretary is not the deputy secretary, thereby, the deputy secretary of finance is incapable of acting as an arbitrator and as a consequence, a vacancy in the panel of arbitrators has arisen. As the contract provides for arbitration by the named three arbitrators and the second arbitrator viz , the deputy secretary is incapable of performing the duties as an arbitrator, he requested by his notice dated april 18, 1988 under section 8 of the indian arbitration act (act 10 of 1940) , for 'short, "the act' , to refer the dispute within fifteen days from the date of receipt of the notice to any of the named four retired chief engineers from the service of the first petitioner and reiterated in his notice dated april 20, and april 21,1988 respectively. Since it revoked no response, he invoked the jurisdiction of the court below under sections 8, 1 1 and 12 of the act for appointment of a retired chief engineer as a sole arbitrator and intimated to the petitioners. This was resisted by the petitioners. It is contended that the joint secretary, finance, is looking after the same subject viz , arbitration also, therefore, he is one of the designated arbitrators under the contract; a supplemental agreement was asked to be entered into; the respondent did not agree for the same; therefore, the petitioners are prepared to arbitrate through the remaining two arbitrators. They are not agreeable for the appointment of a sole arbitratora retired chief engineer. The court below, after giving reasonable opportunity to both patties and after considering the documentary evidence and the contentions advanced, appointed one sri a. P. Ranganatha swamy, a retired chief engineer as sole arbitrator and directed him to give award withia four months from the date of his entering in the reference. Assailing the legality thereof, the revision petitoin has been filed. At the stage of admission, the respondent has taken notice and sri subrahmanya reddy, advocate has entered his appearance on behalf of the respondent. Both sides addressed the arguments on merits.

(2) Sri suryaprakasa. Rao, learned government pleader has contendedthat the post of deputy secretary, finance and planning was upgraded to the post of joint secretary, finance with the same duties; in the contract he is one of the designated arbitrators; therefore, the court below is devoid of power under section 8 to displace the agreed arbitrators and appoint sole arbitrator. Alternatively it is contended that two out of the three of panel of arbitrators are available; they could have been directed to arbitrate tbe dispute.

(3) section 8 (1) (b) of the act is relevant which reads thus :

"8. Power of court to appoint arbitrator or umpire : (1) in any of the following cases, (a). (b) if any appointed arbitrator or umpire neglects or refuses to act, or is incapable of acting, or dies, and the arbitration agreement does not show that it was intended that the vacancy should not be supplied, and the parties or the arbitrators as the case may be, do not supply the vacancy."

(4) The question, therefore, is whether the deputy secretary, financeand planning, has become incapable of acting as a panel arbitrator. Admittedly by virtue of the upgradation and re - designation of the post of the deputy secretary as joint secretary, finance, there is no post of deputy secretary, finance who is contracted to be a panel arbitrator. The question thereby is whether the deputy secretary has become incapable of performing the duties as arbitrator. The intention of the parties is to be gathered from the contract. From the contract, it is seen that the panel of arbitrators are the chief engineer, srisailam project; deputy secretary finance and the director of accounts, pochampad project. On its upgradation, the post of deputy secretary, finance, no longer exists. In its place, the only post is the joint secretary finance and planning. The question then is whether the deputy secretary has become incapable of performing the duties as an arbitrator.

(5) In juggilal vs. General fibre dealers, the meaning of the phrase"incapable of performing", falls for consideration. The facts therein were that the named arbitrators were found to have misconducted in the performance as arbitrators. Accordingly award was set aside by the high court for the misconduct of the arbitrators. On application to make a reference for arbitration de novo, another tribunal was constituted to arbitrate the dispute afresh. The question was whether the tribunal so constituted had jurisdiction to decide the dispute afresh on a second reference. The contention raised was that there is no provision in the rules for appointment of an arbitral tribunal where the award was set aside for misconduct. The earlier tribunal was not adjudicating the dispute. While considering that question, wanchoo, j. (as he then was) speaking for the court held that the words "becomes incapable of acting" apply not only to physical disablity and in particular, stress is laid on the collocation of words where these words follows the word 'dies'. The words cannot take their colour from the word 'dies' and are a separate category by themselves and must be interpreted on their own. Generally speaking, the arbitrator may become incapable of 'acting because of some physical cause, , for example, he may fall ill or may go mad or so on. These words not only refer to physical incapacity they also supervene after the appointment of an arbitrator, even to an incapacity from before but which was not known to the parties or before they were appointed.

(6) In russel or arbitration, 15th edition, page 187, considering sec. 10 (b) of the english arbitration act, interpreted thus :

"it would appear that the word "incapable" in section 10 (b) must refer to some incapacity arising after the date of the appointment, not or known to the parties at that date. "

Thus it was held in that case, the words "becomes incapable of acting" are of wide amplitude and of not refer to cases only of physical incapacity but to any kind of incapacity arising after the appointment or even before the appointment provided it was not known to the parties, or to the chamber in that case. Accordingly the appointment of new arbitrators was upheld. The same ratio with proprio vigore applies to the facts in this case. The incapacity has arisen due to upgradation of the post as joint secretary and promotion of him as joint secretary, and the deputy secretary no longer discharges the duties as deputy secretary after his assumption of office as joint secretary. The parties contracted to enter upon the arbitration from the panel only by the deputy secretary, finance and planning. It is obvious that the petitioners realised. This legal consequence and requested she respondent to agree to enter into a supplemental contract incorporating the joint secretary, finance to be a panel arbiirator. Therefore, 1 have no hesitation to hold that the deputy secretary, finance has become incapable of performing the duties as a panel arbitrator the question may is whether the court can supply the vacancy? in p. O. Agencies vs union of 'india the facts are that the parties contracted to make a reference of dispute to the judicial commissioner ol himachal pradesh. On his declining to act an arbitrator, an application was filed under section 8 for appointment of an arbitrator. The court dismissed the application. On appeal it was confirmed. On further appeal, hedge, j. Speaking for the court has held :

"therefore the only question is whether the agreement read as a whole shows either explicitly or implicitly that the parties intended that the vacancy should not be supplied. It may be note that the language of the provision is not 'that the parties intended to supply the vacancy' but on the other hand it is that the 'parties did not intend to supply the vacancy'. In other words, if the agreement is silent as regards supplying the vacancy, the law presumes that the parties intended to supply the vacancy. To take the case out of section 8 (1) (b) what is required is not the intention of the parties to supply the vacancy but their intention not to supply the vacancy. We have now to see whether the agreement before us indicate such an intention."

On consideration of the evidence it was held that it was not intended. Therefore, the appointment of an arbitrator by the court was accepted and the appeal was allowed. The same view was reiterated in union of india vs. Raghunath singh and co. Therein, the post of director of storage in the minister of food, government of india was abolished and no person holding that post was available for arbitration under the contract. The contention was that when there was a named arbitrator even though he was named by office it was not open to the court to supply the vacancy in his place under sections (1) (b) of the act. It was negatived holding that the court had no power to supply the vacancy under section 8 (1) (b) only if the arbitralion agreement did not show that the parties did not intend to supply the vacancy. If no such intention could be culled out from the arbitration clause, the court could supply the vacancy. Accordingly, the appointment of the sole arbitratrator was upheld. The decision in government of a. P. Vs. G. Ramachandra reddy co. Is of little assistance to the state. Therein, the question was whether the deputy secretary, finance is equivalent to the deputy secretary, finance and planning department. In that context the division bench has held that it is only nomenclature and the intention was that the ' deputy secretary, finance is no other than the deputy secretary, finance and planning after merger, therefore, there is no vacancy in the office of the deputy secretary, finance and planning.

(7) From the resume of the facts narrated hereinbefore it is clear thatthe parties did not intend to supply the vacancy and that the parties did intend to arbitrate their dispute by a panel of the three named arbitrators though by virtue of their office. When there is a vacancy in the panel of the three arbitrators, the two arbitrators are incapable of performing the duties and there is no intention to supply the vacancy between the parties. It is obvious from the fact that on realising that by the state government in requesting the respondent to agree tor a supplemental agreement incorporating the joint secretary, finance to be one of the named panel arbitrators. Thus, i hold that the court has got power and jurisdiction under section 8 (1) (b) to supersede the panel of arbitrators under the act and appoint sole arbitrator.

(8) The next contention of sri suryaprakasa rao is that the courtbelow relying upon the decision reported in v. Raghunadha rao vs. State of a. P. Removed the panel of arbitrators on the ground that they would be biased against the contractor. But the supreme court in secretary to govt. , transport dept. , madras vs. Munuswamy held that unless there is any express of proof of bias, the named arbitrator cannot be removed. In that view, the ratio in raghunatha rao's case requires reconsideration and the court below committed error of law in placing reliance on raghunatha rao's case.

(9) Justice bachawat in his "law of arbitration" second edition (1987) , at page 465 adumbrated the duty of the arbitrator to act impartially thus :

"rules of natural justice mean that the arbitral tribunal must act honestly and impartially. When they eater on arbitration, the arbitrators must not be guilty of anything which may be construed as indication of partiality. It is not a question, of the effect which the misconduct might have produced but of what it might have possibly produced. An aribitrator is bound to proceed fairly and honestly and to conduct himself without bias or partiality towards either side and he subject himself to the gravest censure if he act otherwise. The arbitrators must regard themselves as judges and bound by the same rigid rules as judges of his majesty's courts not only not of being actuated by corrupt and fraudulent motive and partiality but of so comporting themselves as to be above suspicion of being so actuated. The authority of the arbitrator may be revoked if he is partial or biased."

(10) As regards the official bias, in g. Nageswara rao vs. A. P. S. R. T. Corpn. (referred to as first case) it was contended that the secretary to the government is only an impartial body and he can only function through the machinery and in the manner prescribed by law. Under the distribution of the government functions, the secretary is empowered to discharge those duties. The secretary gave a personal hearing to the parties and he placed the material before the chief minister who approved the scheme for nationalisation. Therefore the state gave a hearing to the appellant in the manner prescribed by the rules. It is not vitiated by the doctrine of bias. In considering that question, subba rao, j. (as he then was) speaking for the majority held at page 327 thus :

"it is also a matter of fundamental importance that a person intertsted in one paity or other should not, even formally take part in the proceedings though in fact he does not influence the mind of the person who finally decides the case. This is on the principle that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done. The secretary is a part of the government."

10. In franklin vs. Minister of town country planning approved by the supreme court in the above nageswara rao case, the doctrine of official bias was stated at page 103 thus :

". Those who occupy judicial office, or those who are commonly regarded as holding a quasi - judicial office, such, as an arbitrator,. Having to adjudicate as between two or more parties he must come to his adjudication with an independent mind, without any inclination or bias towards one side or other in the dispute."

It was held in nageswara rao case (supra) that the secretary being part of the government,he heard the arguments and the chief minister has taken the decision, it is violative of the principles of natural justice. B. P. Sinha, j. (as he then was) wrote a dissenting judgment. While reiterating this view it was held in nageswara rao vs. State of a p. 9 (referred to as second case) that the minister who lays down the policy is also entitled to take a decision that the decision so taken is not violative of the doctrine of bias. In this case, the dichotomy between the secretary and the minister has been noticed since the action taken is only by the minister. It was held thus :

"under art. 166 of the constitution and the rules framed thereunder, a minister incharge of a department is primarily responsible for the disposal of the business pertaining to that department, but the ultimate responsibility for the advice is on the entire ministry. Bat the position of the secretary of a department is different. Under the said rules, the secretary of a department is its head i. E. , he is part of the department. There is an essential distinction between the functions of a secretary and a minister ; the former is a part of the department and the latter is only primarily responsible for the disposal of the business pertaining to the department"

With that distinction the action of the minister's approval to nationalise the routes was upheld by subba rao, j. (as he then was) speaking for the court. Sinha, j. In this case, agreed with this view.

(11) Thus, the supreme court maintained the dichotomy betweenthe official who is part of the governmental machinery and the minister. In the case of minister, bias cannot be imputed unless personal bias is proved but by necessary implication it" an official act on behalf of the department by an officer of the department it is implicit, therefrom that bias could be implied and impartial adjudication is doubtful, it is liable to set aside. The ratio in nageswara rao case (second case) was reiterated in h. C. Narayanappa vs. State of mysore. In kondalrao vs. A p. S. R. T. Corpn. When the nationalisation of the transport services in west godavari district was challenged on the ground of official bias, by the chief minister, subba rao, j. (as he then was) speaking for the constitution bench while reiterating nageswara rao case (second case) of the distinction between official bias of an authority which is inherent in a statutory duty imposed on it and personal bias of the minister in favour of or against one of the parties, held :

"it is not out of place here to notice that in england the parliament is supreme and therefore a statutory law however repugnant to the principles of natural justice, is valid ; whereas in india the law made by parliament or a state should stand the test of fundamental rights declared in part iii of the constitution"

On the facts it was held that corporation is a legal entity; it is not a department of the state government ; the state government was discharging the statutory function. Therefore, no parsonal bias could be imputed to have been actuated. From this ratio, two principles would emerge. Firstly that the distinction of the official bias of the officer of the department and the minister was maintained and secondly any law made should stand the test of the fundamental rights in part iii of the constitution. Therefore, the law or rules violating articles 21 are liable to be struck down. This reiterated view finds its birth from nageswar rao case (second case)

(12) In u. P. Co - operative federation vs sunder bros , delhi the factswere that under the co operative secieties rules power was given to the registrar to refer the dispute to an arbitrator. The registrar is ex - officio president of the society with whom the dispute had arisen. It was contended that as he is the chief controlling and supervising officer of the society, the registrar may not act fairly - in the matter and it was improper that he should nominate an arbitrator is decide the dispute. While considering that question, ramaswami, j. Speaking for the court upholding that objection, held :

"in our opinion there is much validity in this argument". , it was further held : "it is obvious that a party may be released from the bargain if he can show that the selected arbitrator is likely to show bias or by sufficient reason to suspect that he will act unfairly or that he has been guilty of continued unreasonable conduct".

Accordingly they upheld the stay granted under section 34 of the act.

(13) In executive engineer irrigation division, puri vs. Gangaramthe facts were that clause 23 of the contract provides that a superintending engineer of the public works department unconnected with the work is to be appointed as a sole arbitrator in terms of the contractor. It was contended that the public works superintending engineer is biased and thereby his appointment is not valid. In considering that question in the context of sections 8 and 20 and section 41 - a of the orissa amendment act, sen, j. Speaking for the court has held that the object is that the superintending engineer unconnected with the work will be unbiased and fair and a decision would be taken by him in an objective manner. The rationale behind this is that bias would be implicit in that regard if an officer connected with the work of the department is appointed. The appointment of the officer who is not connected with the work in question, though he is a governmental official as arbitrator in the light of the amended section 41 - a brought by orissa state would be unobjectionable. It is also implicit from this rule that an official connected with the work would inherently have bias and there by he becomes disqualified to be an arbitrator on behalf of the government and if an official unconnected with the work is appointed, unless bias is established it may not be implied.

(14) In state of karnataka vs. Rameshwara rice mills, thirthallithe facts are that the respondent entered into an agreement with the state of mysore to purchase paddy on its behalf and it provides for reference to government to assess damages for breach of conditioas. The state alleged that the respondent committed breach. The reference was resisted on the ground that they would be biased. In that context, natarajan, j. Speaking for the court considering the legality of reference to an officer of the state to adjudicate damages for the breach of the contract, held thus ;

"interests of justice and equity require that where a party to a contract disputes the committing of any breach of conditions the adjudication should be by an independent person or body and not by the other party to the contract. The position will, however, be different where there is no dispute or there is consensus between the contracting parties regarding the breach of conditions. In such case the officer of the state, even though a party to the contract will be well within his rights in assessing the damges occasioned by the breach in view of specific terms of clause 12"

In "administrative law by durga das basu, second edition, at pages 239 - 240, it is stated that official or departmental's bias thus:

"in india, a distinction has been made between ths political head of a department (i. E. , the minister) and the official head of a department (i. E. , the secretary) on the ground that while the secratary is identified with the department, the minister's rols is only advisory"

The learned author quoted the ratio in nageswara rao's case (first case) thus :

(a) that the secretary of the state transporst dapartmeat, as the head of the department, is disqualified from hearing objections of private operators under the motor vehicles act, to the schemes framed by the transport department as the statutory 'undertaking' created by the act, but

(b) that the minister in charge of the transport department is not disqualified to hear the same objections, on the ground that while the secretary forms a part of the department, the minister does not. A minister is only a member of the council of ministers, which, as a body, advises the governor, and a minister is only responsible for the disposal of the business in a particular department".

The learned author also quoted the observations from sargent vs. Dale thus:

"the law does not measure the amount of interest which a judge possesses. If he has any legal interest in the decision of the question one way he is disqualified, no matter how small the interest may be. The law, in laying down this strict rule, has regard not so much perhaps to the motives which might be supposed to bias the judge as to susceptibilities of the litigant parties. One important object, at all events, is to clear away everything which might engender suspicion and distrust of the tribunal and so to promote the feeling of confidence in the administration of justice which is so essential to social order and security"

In a latter case, in govindaraja vs. State of t. N. However, it is stated that the immunity from disqualification given to a minister appears to have been extended to the secratery of the department, in respect of a policy decision. In the author's view

"the real distinction is that a minister, who formulates a policy has only a general interest in the subject matter, as distinguished from the secretary who is responsible for carrying out that policy and has thus a 'specific interest' in the cause wich would disqualify him to hear objections against such implementation, where his previous participation related to the implementation, as distinguished from its formulation"

(15) In "administrative law" by wade (fourth edition) at page 414it is stated that objectionable bias may be found in a wide variety of situations and relationships. Any indication that an adjudicator has prejudged the case or any reasonably be suspected of doing so, will normally disqualify him. This occurred where certain justices were directors and share - holders of a hotel which applied for a liquor licence ; they sat with the licensing justice who granted a licence, but before doing so they resigned their directorship and sold their shares. Even though they then had no pecuniary interest, their object from the start was to procure the grant of a licence, which was therefore quashed.

(16) In the same edition, at page 410, while drawing the distinctionbetween reasonable suspicion versus real likelihood of bias, it is stated thus:

"some confusion has been caused by the concurrent use of two differently formulated tests for disqualifying bias. Many judges have laid down and applied the real likelihood formula, holding that the test for disqualification is whether the facts give rise to a real likelihood of bias ; and this test has naturally been emphasised in cases where the allegation of bias was excessively far - fetched at the same time it was frequently emphasised that justice must be seen to be done, and that no person should adjudicate in any way if it might reasonably be thought that he ought not to act because of some personal interest. In one case it was even said that the rule for judges of all kinds was that they must be free from even unreasonable suspicion of bias, but that dictum is recognised as having gone too far"

(emphasis supplied) how the bias is to be adjudged has been considered by the supreme court in ranjit thakur vs. Union of indian. Reasonable apprehension in the mind of the party was the test laid down. Venkatachalaiah. J. Speaking for the court laid the test of likelihood of bias on the part of respondent no. 4 and entertained by the party in respect of the official and the adjudicator quasi judicial tribunal. In that context the court or tribunal passing it observes at least the minimal requirement ot natural justice is composed of impartial person acting fairly and without bias ?nd in good faith. A judgment which is the result of bias or want of impartiality is a nullity and the trial coram non judice. As to the test of the likelihood of bias what is relevant is the reasonableness of the apprehension in that rgard in the mind of the partv. The proper approach for the judge is not to look at his own mind and ask himself however, honestly, "am i biased ?" but to look at the mind of the party before him, and the question is not, whether in fact he was or was not biased, and the court cannot enquire into that the person who is to take in adjudication should not be in such a position that he might be suspected of being biased. On the facts in that case it was held that the 4th respondent rendered himself suspect of bias and thereby the proceedings were held to have become coram non - judice. (emphasis supplied)

(17) In international airport authority of india vs. K. D. Bali,sabyasachi mukharji, j. Speaking for the court also reiterated the same view thus :

"it is well settled that there must be purity in the administration of justice as well as in administration of quasi - justice as are involved in the adjudicatory process before the aroitrators. It is well said that once the arbitrator enters in an arbitration, the arbitrator must not be guilty of any act which can possibly be construed as indicative of partiality or unfairness. It is not a question of the effect which misconduct on his part had in fact upon the result of the proceedings, but of what effect it might possibly have produced. It is not enough to show that, even if there was misconduct on his part, the award was unaffected by it, and was in reality just ; arbitrator must not do anything which is not in itself fair and impartial"

It was observed that vague suspicion or whimsical or capricious or unreasonable belief should not be made a standard to regulate the actions. La regard to the purity of the adjudication, it is stated thus :

"the purity of administration requires that the party to the proceedings should not have apprehension that the authority is biaied and is likely to decide against the party. But it is not every suspicion felt by a party which must lead to the conclusion that the authority hearing the proceedings is biased. The apprehension must be judged from healthy, reasonable and average point of view and not on mere apprehension of any whimsical person"

On the facts in that case, it was held that there was no bias.

(18) In munuswami's case (6 supra) relied on by the government, nodoubt, sabyasachi mukharji, j. Speaking for the court laid down that it is common knowledge that the parties knew the scheme that the chief engineer is the superior and the superintending engineer is subordinate to him and yet entered into the agreement of arbitration and indeed submitted to the jurisdiction of the superintending engineer and that therefore the superintending engineer cannot be removed under section 8. The facts therein are one superinfending engineer was nominated and on his transfer his successor has entered upon the arbitration. No bias has been attributed to him, yet the court has removed him. In that context it was held that unless there is some proof of bias on the part of the successor - arbitrator, he cannot be removed in exercise of the power under section 8. In that cass there is no express allegation of bias against the successor - officer. Thus the contention of the state was upheld. It does not appear to have been brought to the notice of their lordships of the supreme court of the distinction which it has been maintaining of the reasonable apprehension of the party as the real test and the party cannot be expected to weigh its pros and cons sitting in an arm - chair and have an objective assessment of the likely bias of an official. The question in each case is whether the party is justified to entertain suspicion of bias by an official of the government. The mere agreement due to unequal bargain for arbitration of the dispute by state government official/officials does/do not relieve the satisfaction test of just, fair and reasonable laid under article 21. The participation by departmental official is inherently suspect of bias and the apprehension of the party that the officials are likely to be in favour of the government's view, cannot with reasonable certitude, be said to be capricious, whimsical or unreasonable.

(19) In raghunatha rao's case (5 supra) , this court surveyed the entirecase law including many of the judgments referred to hereinbefore in the context of assailing clause 73 of the a. P. Standard specifications referring for arbitration on the anvil of article 21 of the constitution and the fair procedure and this court after extensive survey, held :

"appointment of an impartial judge or tribunal coupled with objectivity are sine quo non for fair procedure. Justice should not only be done but seemingly appears to have been done. He must bs able to act above suspicion of unfairness. Without any inclination of or bias towards one side or the other in dispute. The aprehension that the official arbitrator may always be hunted with the idea of his career prospects of promotion or his objective and unbiased adjudication against the state would be an inhibitive factor cannot with reasonable certainty, be removed from the mind of a suitor."

Fair procedure is that the dispute shall be referred to an independent arbitrator or panel of arbitrators of their kno wn integrity, accordingly, it was declared that clause 73 contains an unfair procedure offending article 21 of the constitution.

(20) In view of the above discussion and the dichotomy maintainedby the supreme court, viz. , the officer being part of the department is inhe rently suspect of being biased ; the apprehension that fair and impartial justice cannot be had from their hands is a reasonable aprehension in the mind of the contracting party with the state for arbitration; the equity, fairness and justness require that an independent arbitrator or panel of arbitrators known for their integrity and impartiality would assuage the feeling in the mind of the contractor that a fair and impartial adjudication would be meted out to him. Therefore, this part of the law is not inconsistent with the latest view of the supreme court and raghunatha rao's case is still a good law and does not stand over - ruled by munuswamy's case. Moreover, from the evidence it is clear that the cheif engineer and director of accounts must have had dealt with the subject in question. That apart the sole arbitrator after his appointment, had already entered on the arbitration and the petitioners have participated in number of sittings. As laid down in prasun roy vs. Calcutta m d. A. , the petitioners by their conduct have waived their objection for appointment of the sole arbitrator and they are estopped now to question the appointment of him. In fact, the division bench in ramchandra reddy and co. Case (4 supra) also declined to interfere with the order when the arbitrator appointed by the court had already entered the reference.

(21) Thus considered, i hold that there is no manifest error of jurisdictionor material irregularity in exercise of the jurisdiction in appointing the sole arbitrator, warranting interference. The c. R. P. Is accordingly dismissed. No costs.