Gopal Rao Ekbote, J.:— This is an appeal under Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent against a judgment and decree dated 30-6-1961 given by Mr. Justice Srinivasachari in S.A 768/57. The facts which are essential to appreciate the merits of the contentions advanced before us may be briefly stated.
2. The plaintiffs-respondents instituted a suit for declaration of their title and for delivery of possession against the defendants-appellants alleging inter alia that the two house sites marked ABCD and EFGH belonged to the defendants 4 and 5 who sold them to the plaintiffs by registered sale deed dated 5-6-1953. The defendants Nos. 1 to 3 are residing in the house situate between the above said two sites. The house in which defendants 1 to 3 are living was constructed by them on the site which also originally belonged to defendants 4 and 5. The plaintiffs wanted to carry on certain constructions on the suit house sites, but defendants 1 to 3 obstructed. Hence the suit was laid Defendants 4 and 5 remained ex-parte. Defendants 1 to 3 however in their written statement denied the allegation that the suit sites at any time belonged to defendants 4 and 5. Their contention was that the suit sites belonged to the Government and that the defendants were in possession of the same since thirty years. They denied the fact that the plaintiffs purchased the suit sites from defendants 4 and 5. The defendants also denied that they obstructed the plaintiffs from any constructions on the suit house sites.
3. On these pleadings the District Munsiff, Anantapur, framed appropriates and after recording the evidence adduced by the parties decreed the plaintiff's suit as against defendants 1 to 3 and dismissed against defendants 4 and 5. The learned District Munsiff held that defendants 1 to 3 have failed to prove their adverse possession and that the plaintiffs therefore are entitled to a decree. He found that the house sites belonged to the plaintiffs and that they purchased the same from defendants 4 and 5 through a sale deed of 1953.
4. Dissatisfied with that judgment and decree defendants 1 to 3 went to appeal before the Subordinate Judge, Anantapur, Agreeing with the conclusions of the District Munsiff the learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the appeal. Defendants 1 to 3 therefore preferred a second appeal which came up for hearing before Srinivasachari, J. The second appeal was heard by the learned Judge on 14th November, 1960. The learned judge held that “the approach of both the courts is wrong in that they came to the conclusion that because adverse possession of the defendants was not established, the plaintiffs were entitled to succeed. The fact is that the principle of possession following title would be applied in cases where there is no satisfactory evidence on either side as regards possession.” The learned judge therefore remanded the case to the lower appellate Court to decide the case afresh on the evidence in the light of the observation made in the said judgment.
5. The plaintiffs thereafter seem to have filed an application under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code seeking the review of the judgment given by Srinivasachari, J. on 14th. November, 1960. The learned Judge allowed that petition and heard the appeal again. The learned Judge this time disallowed the appeal and confirmed the judgment and decree of the lower courts. Distinguishing the Full Bench case of the Madras High Court The official Receiver of East Godavari v. Govindaraju1. the learned Judge found that defendants 1 to 3 have failed to establish their adverse possession and as there is no specific allegation of the plaintiffs having been dispossessed by defendants 1 to 3, the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree. It is this judgment which is now challenged before us in this Letters Patent Appeal.
6. The principal contention of Mr. Padmanabha Reddy, the learned Counsel for the appellants, is that the plaintiffs have instituted the suit for delivery of possession through the Court. It was therefore incumbent on the plaintiffs to not only prove their title to the suit property, but also the fact that they were dispossessed or their possession was discontinued next within 12 years before the institution of the suit. We find sufficient strength in this contention. The plaintiffs in their plaint merely stated that “after purchase when the plaintiffs attempted to put up some construction over it, defendants 1 to 3 caused an obstruction…………………” They however in an unequivocal language prayed that they be put in possession of the suit property. That being the relief which the plaintiffs have claimed it follows that they were not in possession of the suit property at least on the day when the suit was instituted. It is now a firmly established principle of law that in suits for ejectment where the plaintiff sue??? possession of immovable properly in the occupation of the defendant, the plaintiff cannot rest the case merely on title. Art. 142 of the Limitation Act applies to such suits and the plaintiff apart from establishing his title must show that be has exercised rights of ownership by being in possession within 12 years, of the suit. See Official Receiver of East Godavari v. Govindaraju. This position has not been disputed by the learned Advocate for the respondents. He however argues that the nature of possession in this particular case to be proved is such possession as the property is capable of, or such as has been the normal method of user. He contends that as the house sites are vacant sites, some fugitive acts of possession of the plaintiffs would not amount to ouster. His submission therefore is that the defendants would be deemed to be in possession and that the plaintiffs would not be considered to have acquired any title by adverse possession over such property. While it is true that as a general rule in a suit for ejectment when the plaintiff seeks on the strength of title and dispossession to oust the defendant in possession, he must prove possession within 12 years of the suit, it is also true that the possession to be proved in such cases is such as the properly is capable of. It is only however in cases where parties who claim possession are unable to prove any act of effective possession and the normal method of possession is not referable to any such acts and effective enjoyment of the property is not the customary method of exercising the rights of possession, that the wholesome principle to be followed is that possession in such cases would be presumed to be with the person holding title to the extent to which that title is found valid. In his case the Court below as well as Srinivasachari, J, came to the conclusion that defendants 1 to 3 have been unsuccessful in establishing their claim of title to the suit property by way of adverse possession. This conclusion, in our opinion, cannot be assailed. Despite this conclusion the fact remains that if the plaintiffs want to succeed in their suit for possession based on title, Art. 142 of the Limitation Act being applicable, they will have to prove not only their title, but the fact that they were in possession of the suit property next within twelve years of the suit. The principle of law that possession follows title would apply to a case of a vacant site adjacent to its owner's site and the owner would be considered as being in possession of it so long as there has been no effective intrusion. But once the plaintiffs admit that defendants 1 to 3 have dispossessed them and the parties have led evidence on behalf of their respective possession the principle that possession follows title would apply only when the evidence led by the parties is balancing. As stated above, that applies only in cases where parties have not adduced any evidence, or not made any specific allegation in regard to dispossession, or discontinuance of possession on the evidence led by the parties is balancing. For the purpose of Art 142 of the Limitation Act it is imperative for the plaintiffs to prove by whatever evidence they can adduce that they were in possession next within twelve years of the suit. We are fortified in our conclusion by a decision of the Madras High Court in Rev. Michael v. Krishnaveni2. and by one in Karutkuyya v. Karuthayya3.. We do no think that decisions in Aichayya Palrudu v. Jalaluddin Sahib and Ramanathan Chettiar v. Lakshmanan Chettiar decide in any way contrary to what has been stated above.
7. If defendants 1 to 3 set up adverse possession in respect of the suit sites they are not entitled to succeed unless they establish that they have been in possession of the sites continuously for the statutory period under such circumstances as are capable in their nature of notifying mankind that they are on the sites claiming them as their own openly and exclusively. That, in our opinion, defendants 1 to 3 have failed to prove. That does not however necessarily mean that the plaintiffs would automatically succeed in their claim. Defendants' failure to acquire title through adverse possession does not automatically mean that the plaintiffs can get a decree on the basis of title without proving that they had been in possession of the suit property within 12 years of the suit. In this suit the trial Court as well as the first appellate Court merely rested their judgments on the ground that as defendants 1 to 3 have failed to prove their adverse possession, the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree-a proposition which cannot be accepted as correct. Srinivasachari, J. in his judgment under appeal however came to the conclusion that mere obstruction by defendants 1 to 3 does not mean deprivation of the plaintiff's possession. We fail to see how after such a finding the plaintiffs would be entitled to a decree for possession. Either the plaintiffs are in possession of the suit property, or they are not. When they claim that they have not been in effective possession of the suit property what follows necessarily is that for the purpose of Art. 142 of the Limitation, Act they must either prove that they were dispossessed or that their possession was discontinued within twelve years of the suit. In this respect there is absolutely no finding of either the trial court or the first appellate Court. Undoubtedly that is a pure question of fact which it is not possible for us to decide here. In this connection it it perhaps not without relevance to mention that the 1st. plaintiff who has been examined as P.W 2 stated that a house on the site was constructed about 18 years ago and that defendants 1 to 3 and the father of defendants 1 and 2 have been enjoying the suit sites since then. Defendants 1 to 3 however contended that the house was constructed thirty years ago and not eighteen years as mentioned by P.W 2. The learned Advocate for the respondent contended that that statement of P.W 2 being casual which can effectively be explained, no final judgment can be rested on such a statement. It is true that the Courts below have not applied their mind to the central question regarding the dispossession or discontinuance of possession of the plaintiffs next within twelve years of the suit. We have therefore no option than to set aside the judgment of Srinivasachari, J. and remand the case to the trial court for a fresh decision in the light of the observations made by us above. The parties will have reasonable opportunity to adduce such evidence in regard to the central question mentioned above. The trial court after recording such evidence would dispose of the case in accordance with the law. The costs of this appeal will depend upon the result of the suit. The appeal is thus allowed.
8. Appeal allowed.