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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The writ petition challenges (a) a notification issued under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and (b) an award made by the Special Tahsildar, Land Acquisition, Revenue Division, Visakhapatnam.

Relevant facts set out in the opinion:

  • The 3rd respondent, Anakapalle Co-operative Society, requested Government acquisition of land near the Municipal Market for construction of godowns to store jaggery.
  • A Section 4 notification was issued on 19-3-1956 specifying survey numbers (S. Nos. 221/2, 222 and 246/2) comprising 36,481 sq. ft.
  • After an enquiry under Section 5A, a Section 6 notification was published on 3-7-1958; subsequently notices under Sections 9 and 10 were given.
  • The 12th petitioner was served on 3-12-1960 and alleges ownership of half of S. No. 247/2 (area 5,457 sq. ft.). The 12th petitioner did not initially object to the acquisition or claim any rate per sq. ft., and neither appeared nor was represented in the proceedings.
  • Of the other 11 petitioners, some were tenants of the 12th petitioner and others were tenants of owners who accepted the award; these others are not represented before the Court.
  • The Government called upon the 3rd respondent to pay Rs. 44,902-7-2 for acquisition; the Society paid Rs. 30,931-2-8 on 3-5-1955 and Rs. 13,971-4-6 on 19-8-1960 (totaling Rs. 44,902-7-2).
  • The Revenue Divisional Officer (R.D.O.) delayed proceedings when he discovered the Government had not made a token contribution; subsequently a token contribution (noted as 6 n.p.) was made. An agreement taken by the 3rd respondent was notified, later denotified and cancelled on 27-5-1964. On 4-7-1964 the Government sanctioned Rs. 100 as its contribution.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the award is invalid because it was passed after an inordinate delay (allegedly seven years after publication of the Section 6 notification).
  2. Whether the Section 6 notification is void because the Government did not manifest an intention to pay, wholly or in part, from public revenues prior to publication of the Section 6 notification (i.e., whether the Government's intention required proof prior to notification).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Petitioner's) Arguments

  • The award was passed after an unjustified and inordinate delay of seven years after publication of the Section 6 notification.
  • The Government did not evince an intention to contribute from public revenues before publishing the Section 6 notification; therefore the Section 6 notification is void and the acquisition is invalid. The petitioner relied on earlier decisions of this Court to support that contention.
  • Specific factual circumstances said to indicate lack of intention by the Government included: (a) the Marketing Society being asked to pay the entire amount and complying; (b) the Government's publishing and later cancelling an agreement; (c) only token contributions being made after the Section 6 notification; and (d) correspondence showing that a token contribution was made only after the R.D.O. discovered the absence of a Government contribution during acquisition proceedings.

Respondent's / Government's Arguments

  • Reference was made to a Supreme Court decision (Somawanti / Somavanti) which, according to respondents, requires reconsideration of the earlier High Court and this Court decisions; the implication was that those earlier decisions (which required pre-notification manifestation of intention) should be overruled or re-examined.
  • The Government explained delay in passing the award as, in part, due to litigation between the Municipality and owners of the property.
  • The Government pointed to the contributions it made (including token contributions and later Rs. 100) as evidence that it had not decided against contributing from public revenues; and that publication and cancellation of an agreement did not establish a negative intention to contribute.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
M. Venkatapathi Raju v. State of Andhra (A.I.R. 1957 A.P. 686) This Court had held that the Government must manifest an intention to pay from public revenues prior to publication of the Section 6 notification. The Court noted this decision as part of earlier local authority holding; however, in view of the Supreme Court decision in Somavanti/Somawanti, such earlier constructions could not hold the field.
Mrs. R.D. Chand v. The State of Andhra Pradesh (A.I.R. 1963 A.P. 383) Also recorded the view that Government must manifest intention to contribute before Section 6 notification. The Court observed this authority but concluded it is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's ruling and therefore cannot continue to govern after Somavanti.
Dilawar Hussain v. Collector of Madras Earlier authority (from Madras High Court context) aligned with the view that Government should manifest intention before publication of Section 6 notification. The opinion grouped this case with other earlier authorities whose view was displaced by the Supreme Court decision in Somavanti/Somawanti.
Somawanti / Somavanti v. State (A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 151) The majority of the Seven-Judge Bench held that once a Section 6 notification is published, courts will not ordinarily go behind it to examine whether the Government intended to contribute from public revenues, unless it can be shown that the Government in fact decided not to contribute. It also held that the State's contribution need not be substantial; nominal contribution alone does not automatically invalidate the declaration, though courts can examine whether a contribution is so illusory as to be colourable. The Court treated this Supreme Court decision as controlling. It applied its principles: presumption that the Government intended to contribute once Section 6 is notified, and that nominal contributions do not per se render the declaration invalid; the petitioner's factual material did not prove a decision by the Government not to contribute, so the Section 6 notification could not be assailed on that ground.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in two main strands corresponding to the petitioner's two principal objections.

On the question of the Government's pre-notification intention (Section 6):

  • The Court placed decisive reliance on the Supreme Court's Seven-Judge decision in Somawanti / Somavanti (A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 151). That decision, by a majority, held that once a Section 6 declaration is published the courts should not ordinarily go behind that declaration to examine whether the Government intended to contribute from public revenues unless it is shown that the Government in fact decided not to contribute.
  • The Court recited the Somawanti majority's observations that (a) the Section 6 declaration is clear on the point that the land is being acquired at public expense and (b) Section 6(3) precludes courts from going behind such a declaration unless it is shown the Government had decided not to contribute (because a decision not to contribute would render the exercise colourable).
  • The Court acknowledged the petitioner's factual contentions intended to show the Government lacked intention: the Society being called upon to pay the entire amount; publication and later cancellation of an agreement; token contributions made only after the R.D.O.'s intervention; and later small contributions (6 n.p. and Rs. 100). The Court examined these facts in the light of Somawanti.
  • The Court concluded that none of these circumstances established a positive decision by the Government not to contribute. The fact that a token contribution was ultimately made, and that the Government later sanctioned Rs. 100, indicated absence of a negative intention. The Court also held that the publication and later cancellation of an agreement did not, by itself, demonstrate that the Government intended not to contribute.
  • Consequently, the Court held the Section 6 notification could not be successfully attacked on the ground that the Government did not intend to contribute from public revenues prior to notification.

On the question of delay in passing the award:

  • The Court acknowledged that there was inordinate delay in making inquiry and passing the award and that, ordinarily, such delays might justify interference with the award.
  • However, the Court found delay attributable to both sides. The Government explained part of the delay by reference to litigation between the Municipality and owners; the Court did not accept this as a sufficient excuse but also observed that the petitioner herself had been equally dilatory.
  • The petitioner received notices under Sections 9 and 10 repeatedly, did not appear or file objections, and only in 1965 (after long inaction) sought to challenge the proceedings on the ground of delay.
  • The Court noted additional practical considerations: a majority of owners (nearly 34,000 sq. ft.) had accepted the award and rate; the petitioner owned a negligible portion and had not shown prejudice; petitioner remained in possession and received rents. These factors weighed against disturbing the award.
  • Balancing these factors, and given the petitioner's failure to participate in the acquisition proceedings, the Court declined to set aside the award despite the delays.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition is dismissed. The Court explicitly records: W.P. dismissed, and the dismissal is ordered without costs.

Implications (as stated or directly implied in the opinion):

  • The Section 6 notification challenged in this petition was held valid because the petitioner did not prove that the Government had in fact decided not to contribute from public revenues prior to the notification.
  • The award challenged on grounds of delay was not set aside because of (a) delay attributable to both sides, (b) petitioner's failure to participate or object during the acquisition process, (c) acceptance of the award by the majority of owners, (d) the petitioner's small interest and lack of shown prejudice.
  • The Court applied the Supreme Court decision in Somawanti / Somavanti (A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 151) as controlling law on the question whether courts may go behind a Section 6 declaration; earlier High Court / this Court decisions taking a different view were held not to survive the Supreme Court ruling.
  • No broader new principle of law was announced by this Court beyond applying the controlling Supreme Court authority; the immediate consequence was to uphold the notification and the award for the parties in this case.

This summary is prepared strictly from the contents of the provided opinion and does not add or infer information beyond the text.

    Saragadam Apparao & Others v. Special Land Acquisition Officer And Other

    1. The main ground urged in support of this Writ Petition is that the notification under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (I of 1894) is not valid as it is not preceded by the Government's intention to grant public Revenue contemplated under proviso to section 6(1) of the said Act. Two decisions of this Court in M. Venkatapathi Raju v. State of Andhra . A.I.R 1957 A.P 686. and Mrs. R.D Chand v. The State of Andhra Pradesh . A.I.R 1963 A.P 383. are relied on to support that contention.

    2. It is pointed out by the other side that in view of the observations in Somawanti v. State of Punjab . A.I.R 1963 S.C 151. these decisions have to be reconsidered. This is a fit case therefore to go before a Bench. Orders of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice may therefore be obtained for a posting in that regard.

    3. This writ petition challenges the notification under Sec. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter called “the Act”) and the award made by the Special Tahsildar, Land Acquisition, Revenue Division, Visakhapatnam. In order to understand the contention urged by the petitioner's learned advocate, it is necessary to state a few facts.

    4. The 3rd respondent, Anakapalle Co-operative Society, moved the Government for the acquisition of a certain land in and around the Municipal Market place, for construction of godowns to store jaggery. A notification under sec. 4 of the Act was issued on 19-3-1956, setting out the details of survey numbers of the land which was proposed to be acquired, viz., S. Nos. 221/2, 222 and 246/2, comprising in all of 36, 481 sq. ft. After an enquiry under Sec. 5A was held, a notification under Sec. 6 was published on 3-7-1958. After that, notices under sec. 9 and 10 were given and the 12h petitioner, who alleges to be the owner of half of S. No. 247/2 comprising of an area of 5457 sq. ft. was served on 3-12-1960. Notwithstanding the receipt of notice, the 12th petitioner raised no objection either to the acquisition or the validity of the notifications; nor did she claim any particular rate per sq.ft It may be stated that of the other 11 petitioners, some of them are the tenants of the 12th petitioner and others are tenants of the owners who have accepted the award and arc not parties before us. They are also not represented by any one. Consequently, the only person whose claim we need consider in this writ petition is that of the 12th petitioner. It may also be stated that the Government had called upon the 3rd respondent to pay a sum of Rs. 44, 902-7-2 towards the acquisition and accordingly the 3rd respondent paid on 3-5-1955 a sum of 30, 931-2-8 and on 19-8-1960 Rs. 13, 971-4 6 making a total of Rs. 44, 902-7-2. The Revenue Divisional Officer who was at first seized of the matter seems to have delayed the acquisition, because he discovered when he was about to pass that the award that the Government had not made a token contribution, which it subsequently made, viz., 6 n.p Later an agreement was taken by the 3rd respondent and that was notified But that agreement was also denotified and cancelled on 27-5-1964. On 4-7-1964, the Government sanctioned Rs. 100/- as their contribution.

    5. The learned advocate for the petitioner challenges the notification and the award on the following two grounds namely

    (1) that the award has been passed after an inordinate delay, without any justification, of 7 years after publication of sec. 6 notification; and

    (2) that the intention to pay for the acquisition wholly or in part from public revenues was not mainfested by the Government prior to the publication of sec. 6 notification and as such the notification is void and illegal and must be quashed.

    6. In so far as the second point is concerned, namely, that the Govt. should evince an intention to pay wholly or in part for the acquisition from public revenues prior to sec. 6 notification is concerned, the recent case of their Lord-Ships of the Supreme Court in Somavanti v. State of Gujarat [A.I.R 1963 S.C 151] has laid a different emphasis to what has so far been held to be the law. Prior to this decision, the Madras High Court and this Court vide Dilawar Hussain v. Collector of Madras, Venkatapathi Raju v. The State of Andhra and Mrs. R.D Chand v. State . A.I.R 1963 A.P 383 at 388. held that the Government mutt manifest an intention to pay for the acquisition from out of public Revenue prior to the publication of sec. 6 notification. This is not the view which their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Somavanti's case have adopted. A Bench of 7 Judges, Subba-Rao, J (as he then was) dissenting, have held that once a notification under Sec. 6 is published, it will not be open to the Courts to go behind it and examine whether the Government have the intention to pay for the acquisition from out of public revenues, unless, of course, it can be shown that the Government did not have such intention when it published the said notification. Mudholkar, J., with whom sinha, C.J, Rajagopala Ayyangar and Venkatarama Aiyar, JJ. concurred, observed at page 167:—

    “Moreover the declaration under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 6 is clear on the point that the land is being acquired at public expense, and the provisions of sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 6 preclude a Court from going behind such a declaration unless it is shown that the Government has in fact decided not to contribute any funds out of the public revenues for that purpose. For, if the Government had in fact taken a decision of that kind then the exercise of the power to make an acquisition would be open to challenge as being colourable.”

    7. It was also contended before Their Lordships that the contribution by the State should not be nominal but substantial in order to justify the invocation of Part II of the Land Acquisition Act but that contention, also was negatived. The majority held that indeed the fact that the State's contribution is nominal may well indicate, in particular circumstances that the action of the State was a colurable exercise of power. ‘Part’ does not necessarily mean a substantial part and it will be open to the Court in every case which comes up before it to examine whether the contribution made by the State satisfies the requirements of the law. Subba Rao, J., on the other hand, held that a reasonable construction of the condition upon which the declaration under sec. 6 is based should be that in the case of an acquisition for a company, the entire compensation will be paid by the company, and in the case of an acquisition for a public purpose, the Government will pay the whole or a substantial part of the compensation out of public revenues. Subba Rao, J., also held that while a court will not go meticulously into the question to strike a balance between a part and a whole, it will certainly be in a position to ascertain broadly whether in a particular case the amount contributed by the Government towards compensation is so illusory that it cannot conceivably be a substantial part of the consideration. In any case, in view of the majority decision, it is now clear that in all cases where Government is making a contribution it need not necessarily be a substantial contribution. At the same time, the nominality of the contribution would depend upon the circumstances of each case. Secondly, once a declaration is notified under S. 6(1), there is a presumption that the Government has evinced an intention to contribute in part or whole from the public revenues for the acquisition unless of course it can be shown that the Government did not so intend. The decision of the Madras High Court and that of this Court laying down different constructions, cannot, in our view, hold the filed after the judgment in Somavanti's case. It is contended by the learned advocate for the petitioner that the facts and circumstances established in this case would show that the Government did not intend to contribute from the public revenues any amount for the acquisition of the land. The circumstances referred to are firstly that the Marketing Society was called upon to pay the entire amount of the acquisition and the compliance on the part of the Society itself would show that the Government did not intend to contribute any amounts itself; secondly, the Government called upon the Society to execute an agreement and on the execution of that agreement notified the same, and thereafter cancelled it, after which it declared its intention to contribute Rs. 100/- while on a previous occasion it had contributed only Rs. 0-06 nP., all these contributions being after the notification under S. 6; and thirdly the correspondence between the Collector and the R.D.O would show that it was only after the R.D.O had discovered during the acquisition proceedings and before passing the award that the State Government had not made a token contribution, that the contribution of Rs. 0-06 nP., was made, which itself would show that the Government did not intend to contribute from the public revenues towards the cost of the acquisition. We do not think that any of these grounds justify an inference that the Government had decided not to make a contribution. There is nothing on the record to suggest that it arrived at a positive decision that it will only acquire the lands on payment by the Society of the entire cost and that it would not contribute towards the acquisition. If that was so, even at the time when it was making a contribution of Rs. 0-06 nP., when it was called upon to make a token contribution by the R.D.O, it could have stated that it did not want to contribute towards the acquisition and that the procedure under Chapter VII ought to be followed. Contrary to this the Government did make a contribution which only goes to show that it had no negative intention. The subsequent conduct, however, in publishing the agreement, in our view, does not in any was affect this question because as pointed out by the learned Government Pleader that though this agreement was published it is always open to the Government to take an agreement even in cases where it is making a token contribution of a part of the acquisition so that the Society will not back out in so far as the other part of the compensation payable by it is concerned. We are, therefore satisfied that sec. 6 notification cannot be assailed on this ground.

    8. In respect of the first objection namely that there has been a long delay in passing the award, we think that there has been delay on the part of both the sides. The Government explained the delay on their part as being due to the fact that there was a litigation between the Municipality and the owners of the property but we do not consider it a sufficient excuse because once an award is passed and possession is given, title in the property vests in the Government free from all encumbrances and claims. The only claim will be against the compensation that can be cither settled by the Collector, R.D.O, Officer-in-Charge of the acquisition or by the Civil Court on a reference to it. The long and inordinate delay in making the inquiry and passing the award and between the publication of the Sec. 6 notification and the notices under Secs. 9 and 10 ordinarily would justify our having struck down the proceedings in the award. But in this case, the delay on the part of the petitioner is equally inordinate. It does not justify any relief being given to him. As we have said earlier, even after the notice under Secs. 9 and 10 were issued, the petitioner neither appeared in person nor was represented through Pleader.

    9. The petitioner did not file any petition objecting to the proceedings in any manner for that matter did she claim compensation. According to the learned advocate, notices under Secs. 9 and 10 were being issued each year and notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner was receiving them no appearance was put in. It is only in 1965 when a notice of hearing was received that the petitioner was reluctant to any longer accept the validity of the proceedings. We are at a loss to understand as to how when the petitioner once refrained from challenging the validity of the proceedings, she could subsequently contest it merely on the ground that there was delay. We do not think that the petitioner is justified in asking us to interfere with the award though, as we have said earlier, when inordinate delays such as these occur, it would justify us in interfering with the award. There is one other reason for our not interfering with it, namely, the majority of the owners of nearly 34,000 sq. ft. of land have accepted the validity of the award and the rate given to them, while the petitioner who is only owner of a negligible portion of land has raised the said objection. Further, it is also not shown that any prejudice has been caused to the petitioner. It may also be stated that she was not only in possession of the lands he was also receiving rents from tenants.

    10. For all these reasons, the Writ Petition is dismissed, but in the circumstance without costs.

    11. W.P dismissed.

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    Saragadam Apparao & Others v. Special Land Acquisition Officer And Other
    (Oct 4, 1967)