1. The petitioner is the Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board, a body corporate constituted under the provisions of the Electricity Supply Act 1948. By its constitution it is endowed with ‘perpetual succession and a common seal. In connection with its duty of generation, supply and distribution of electricity it has established several stations, sub-stations, offices and sub-offices within the State of Andhra Pradesh. Several Gram Panchayats in the State of Andhra Pradesh have called upon the petitioner to pay profession tax under the Gram Panchayats Act. The respondents are two such Gram panchayats. The Board claims that it is not liable to pay profession tax as it is neither a company nor a person within the meaning of the expressions as used in section 72 of the Gram Panchayats Acts. In any case, it is claimed that it is not liable to pay profession tax because it does not carry on any of its operations with a profit motive and therefore cannot be said to transact any business so as to become liable to the levy of profession tax. The petitioner therefore seeks a writ of Mandamus or other appropriate writ directing the respondents to refrain from demanding profession tax from the petitioner and its officers.
2. Section 69(1)(b) of the Gram Panchayats Act empowers a Gram Panchayat to levy a tax on professions trades or callings to be called ‘profession tax’.
3. Section 72 enacts that profession tax may be levied on
“(1) every company which transacts business in such village for not less than sixty days in the aggregate in that year; and
(ii) every person who, in that year—
(a) exercises a profession, art or calling or transacts business or holds any appointment public or private—
(i) within such village for not less than sixty days in the aggregate, or
(ii) without such village, but who resides in it for not less than sixty days in the aggregate or
(b) resides in such village for not less than sixty days in the aggregate and is in receipt of any pension or income from investments”.
4. There is an explanation to section 72 which is in the following terms:
“Explanation:— For the purpose of this section, the expression ‘person’ shall include a firm, association or joint Hindu family”
5. While ‘company’ is defined in Section 2(6) of the Act, as meaning a company as defined in the Companies Act of 1956, the Act does not contain any definition of ‘person.’ The Andhra Pradesh General Clauses Act however defines ‘person’ as follows:—
“Person” shall include any company or association of individuals, whether incorporated or not.”
6. Ordinarily words or expressions defined by the General Clauses Act shall have the meaning given to them therein in every Andhra Pradesh Act unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context of the particular enactment. The word ‘person’ as defined by the General Clauses Act is wide enough to include a body corporate such as the Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board. The question is whether there is anything in the subject or context of the Andhra Pradesh Gram Panchayats Act which requires that a different meaning should be given to the word ‘person’ than that given in the General Clauses Act and whether such a meaning will exclude bodies such as the Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board. It is not disputed that the Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board is not a company as defined in the Companies Act.
7. I may at this juncture refer to the observations of Lord Blakburn in Pharmaceutical Society v. London and Provical Supply Association . 5 Appeal cases 857 at 869. regarding the meaning to be attributed to the word ‘person’ He said.
“the word ‘person’ may very well include both a natural person, a human being, and an artificial person, a corporation. I think that in an Act of Parliament, unless there be something to the contrary, probably (but that I should not like to pledge myself to) it ought to be held to include both. I have equally no doubt that in common talk, the language of men not speaking technically, a ‘person’ does not include an artificial person, that is to say, a Corporation. No body in common talk, if he were asked, who is the richest person in London, would answer the London and North Western railway company. The thing is absurd. It is plain that in common conversation and ordinary speech ‘a person’ would mean a natural person, in technical language it may mean the artificial person; in which way it is used in any particular Act must depend upon the context and the subject matter. I do not think that the presumption that it does include an artificial person, a corporation if that is the presumption, is at all a strong one. Circumstances and indeed circumstances of a slight nature in the context, might show in which way the word is to be construed in an Act of Parliament, whether it is to have the one meaning or the other. I am quite clear about this, that, whenever you can see that the object of the Act requires that the word ‘person’ shall have the more extended or the less extended sense, then, whichever sense it requires, you should apply the word in that sense and construe Act accordingly.”
8. Adopting the approach suggested by Lord Blackburn. I will proceed to consider the question whether ‘person in section 72 of the Gram Panchayat Act means a natural person only or whether it in eludes an artificial person such as a corporation also. Notwithstanding the wide definition of ‘person’ in the General Clauses Act which includes a ‘company’ the Legislature when it enacted the Gram Panchayats Act chose to mention a ‘company’ and a ‘person’ separately as liable to the levy of profession tax. Thereby the Legislature, in my opinion, clearly signified its intention to abandon the definition of ‘person’ in the General Clauses Act for the purposes of the Gram Panchayats Act. The position is further clarified by explanation to section 72. While the explanation states that person shall include a firm, or association or joint Hindu family it does not refer to corporate bodies. The express exclusion of incorporated bodies from the explanation notwithstanding their inclusion in the definition of ‘person’ in the General Clauses Act coupled with a separate mention of ‘company’ in section 72 of the Gram Panchayats Act indicates that ‘person’ in sec. 72 of the Gram Panchayats Act means a natural person or a combination of natural persons but does not include an aritifical person. The Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board is, therefore, neither a company nor a person within the meaning of the expressions as used in section 72 of the Gram Panchayat Act and cannot therefore be subjected to the levy of profession tax under that provision. The writ petition is therefore allowed but in the circumstances without costs. In the view that I have taken it is unnecessary to go into the further question whether the Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board can be said to transact any business
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