Gopalrao Ekbote, J.:— Two questions have to be answered in this enquiry. The first is whether Sec. 71 of the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1964 hereinafter called the Act is ultra vires of Art. 14 of the Constitution. The second question is whether before grant of Certificate under Sec. 71(1) of the Act in the absence of any rule made in that behalf the enquiry postulated by that Section is to be conducted according to the principles of natural justice.
2. We have before us a petition filed by 68 persons seeking the issue of a writ of Mandamus declaring that Secs. 70 and 71 of the Act are ultra vires of the Constitution and as such cannot be enforced. The petitioners are the members of the Multi-purpose Co-operative Society Kannaram, Huzurabad taluk, Karimnagar District. The said co-operative society has been advancing crop loans and mid term loans to various ryots in its area of operation. In pursuance of relevant schemes the petitioners also were given loans by the above said society ranging from Rs. 300/- to Rs. 3,000/-. The crop loans are generally issued between the said range. The Mid-term loans however are generally given in a sum of Rs. 3,000/-. The crop loans are to be repaid within a period of one year and the mid-term loans are to be returned within a period of three years.
3. It is contended that these loans were collected under Sec. 61 of the Act which section and the rules made thereunder provide procedure for determining as to what debt is due as well as for their recovery. Inspite of the presence of these provisions Sec. 71 was introduced by way of Amendment Act 10 of 1970 published in the Gazette of 22-7-1970. It is contended that the said section is discriminatory in its character and offends Art. 14 of the Constitution.
4. Sec. 71 reads:
“(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Actor in any other law for the time being in force and without prejudice to any other mode of recovery which is being taken or may be taken the Registrar may on the application made by primary agricultural credit society for the recovery of arrears of any sum advanced by it to any of its members for seasonal agricultural operations or for medium term purposes, and on its furnishing a statement of accounts in respect of the arrears and after making such enquiry as it deems fit issue a certificate for the recovery of the amount stated thereto to be due as arrears.
(2) Where the Registrar is satisfied that a primary agricultural credit society has failed to take action under sub-section (1) in respect of any amount due as arrears he may on his own motion and after making such enquiry as he deems fit issue a certificate for the recovery of the amount stated therein to be due as arrears and such a certificate shall be deemed to have been issued on an application made by the society concerned.
(3) A certificate issued by the Registrar under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be final and conclusive proof of the arrears stated to be due therein and the certificate shall be executed in the manner specified in sub-section (2) of Sec. 70”
Section 70(2) is as follows:—
“Every order or decision made under Sec. 60, Sec. 71, Sec. 76, Sec. 77 or Sec. 78 for the recovery of any amount may be executed in the following manner:
(a) by the Civil Court having local jurisdiction on a Certificate signed by the Registrar or any person authorised by him in his behalf as if the order or decision were a decree of the court; or
(b) by the collector on an application made to him within twelve years from the date fixed for payment in the order or decision and if no such date is fixed from the date of the order or decision along with a certificate signed by the Registrar or by any person authorised by him in this behalf as if the amount due under the order or decision were an arrear of land revenue; or
(c) by the Registrar or any other person authorised by him in this behalf in the manner provided under sub-section (1)”.
5. A close and analytical reading of Sec. 71 would reveal that notwithstanding anything mentioned in the Act or in any other law and without prejudice to any other mode of recovery the Registrar has been empowered by sub-sec. (1) to issue a certificate for the recovery of the amount due on an application made by a Primary Agricultural Credit Society for the loans advanced for seasonal agricultural operations or for medium term purposes after making such enquiry as the Registrar thinks fit. Sub-sec. (2) empowers the Registrar to issue such certificate on his own motion but after making such enquiry as he deems fit. And sub-sec. (3) declares that such a certificate shall be final and conclusive proof of the arrears mentioned therein and it further stipulates that the certificate shall be executed in accordance with Sec. 70(2). It is seen that according to sec. 70(2) there are three alternative modes by which an order passed under. Sec. 71(1) or (2) or certificate issued can be executed, firstly by the Civil Court, secondly by the collector; and thirdly by the Registrar or any other person authorised by him in this behalf.
6. The manner of execution of the certificate is indicated in Sec. 70(1). Clauses (a) to (f) which deal with various kinds of debts due to the co-operative society can be recovered by the Registrar or any person authorised by him in this behalf by the attachment and sale or by sale without attachment of the property of the person or the society against whom such decision or order has been passed or certificate issued.
7. It will thus be plain that while Sec. 71 postulates an enquiry and grant of certificate Sec. 70 is enacted for the purpose of executing that certificate. One can broadly say that while Sec. 71 is on the original side of the Registrar's jurisdiction Sec. 70 is on the execution side.
8. What has to be seen therefore is whether the special provision made in Section 71(1) and (2) for the purposes of only two kinds of debts mentioned therein is offensive to Art. 14 of the Constitution. What was contended was that Sec. 61 of the Act provides for the reference of any dispute to the Registrar. A claim by a society for any debt or other amount due to it from a member, according to Explanation (1) of the said section is a dispute within the meaning of that section. Under Rule 49 made under the said section a specific procedure is prescribed to determine the reference in regard to a debt made to the Registrar. Since rule 49 is not applicable to an enquiry into a debt under Section 71 of the Act and in as much as no rules are framed for the purpose of determining the debt under Section 71, it was contended that the department is following quite unlawful and strange procedure to issue certificate and recover the amount advanced by it in the form of the two specific said loans. As the procedure followed under Section 71 is more tyrannical than the procedure prescribed under rule 49 to determine and recover a debt under Sec. 61 of the Act, Section 71 is inconsistent with Art. 14 of the Constitution.
9. It was not disputed that, the legislature can provide specially for the recovery of certain specific debts separately from the general provisions made for such purpose. Such a classification it was agreed is permissible. If two procedures are prescribed for the recovery of two such classified debts it is doubtful whether Art. 14 would apply to such case.
10. However it is now well settled that in order to attract the wrath of Art. 14 of the Constitution in cases where two different procedures are prescribed two things must exist (1) the authority must have an unguided discretion to choose between the two different procedures and secondly that one set of procedure is more despotic than the other. In this background if the present case is examined can it be said that merely because no rules are prescribed for effectuating the purpose of Sec. 71 and because a curious procedure is followed by the department, Sec. 71 itself is more despotic in its character than Sec. 61 read with rule 49?
11. We do not think that Sec. 71 suffers from any such infirmity. It must be borne in mind that where a legislative authority by an enactment set up a Tribunal or other body and envisages rules to be made governing the procedure of such Tribunal or body and no such rules are made the Tribunal or body is not necessarily thereby disabled from performing its function. In such a case the Tribunal or body acts effectively provided it acts in accordance with the principles of natural justice and to promote the objective with which it was set up and possibly by analogy with the rules of procedure prescribed for comparable Tribunals or bodies (See. Qareshi v. Qureshi . 1971-2, Weekly Law Reporter 518 at 535.)
12. Although Section 113 empowers the State Government to frame rules to effectuate the purpose of Sec. 71, so far no rules are made in that behalf. Rule 49 admittedly is not applicable for the enquiry contemplated under Section 71. That does not however mean that the Registrar or the person authorised by him for the purpose of Sec. 71 is disabled from issuing certificate. The Registrar or the authorised person can effectively hold an enquiry and issue certificate provided they act in accordance with the well accepted principles of natural justice. The minimum which a fair enquiry in such cases expect is firstly a proper notice issued in the name of the defaulter informing him of the nature and details of the debts and asking him to state his case if he so desires on a particular date. It is plain that the time given to a defaulter to submit his case must be reasonable. Thus the two essential requirements of a valid notice are that it must sufficiently give details of the debt in regard to which enquiry is proposed to be held and the time granted to the defaulter to state his defence must be reasonable. That apart if the debtor disputes the claim an enquiry is necessarily to be held. It may be that the section leaves it to the discretion of the Registrar or the authorised authority to hold “such enquiry as he deems fit”. What is clear is that he has to hold an enquiry but the manner of such enquiry is left to the Registrar or the authorised person. It does not however make the Registrar or the authority a dictator out of that provision. He has to follow the minimum requirement of a fair enquiry That means the defaulter would have an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses produced by the society and would have a right to adduce such evidence as he desires fit. After the completion of such an enquiry the principles of natural justice further require that the Registrar or the competent authority would pass a reasoned order. The benefits of such an order are obvious. It is necessary that the order should be a reasoned one because it was conceded that Sec. 76 provides an appeal against the issue of such a certificate under Sec. 71 of the Act. This procedure would provide analogy with the procedure prescribed by rule 49 for a comparable tribunal mentioned in sec. 61 of the Act.
13. If that is the implication of Sec. 71 as we comprehend that to be then the further question which arises is whether the said procedure which the Registrar or the empowered authority is bound to follow can be said to be more arbitrary than the one prescribed under Rule 49 for the purposes of Sec. 61 and 62 of the Act. On a careful comparison of the two procedures we do not find that there is any material or substantial dispute between the two. In Immaterial detail they may differ. But for all substantial purposes both the procedures in our view are similar and do not provide any ground for complaint. The order passed under both the provisions are appealable under Sec. 76 of the Act. Thus in all essential features the two procedures are not so materially and substantially different as to attract the wrath of Art. 14 of the Constitution. We are therefore satisfied that Section 71 does not infringe Art. 14 of the Constitution.
14. It is true that the notice issued by the Department in such cases is far from satisfactory. One of the notices reads:
“Whereas the above named society has made an application to me under Sec. 71 of the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Act 1970 claiming or it has come to by notice that you owe a sum of Rs. 3,200/- only as arrears by way of principal and Rs. 093-40 Ps. only by way of interest upto 30-11-1970. You are hereby directed to appear before me in person on 28th day of November 1970 at 1 P.M at Kannaram to show cause against the said application failing which the said application will be determined exparte and it will be presumed that you have admitted the claim of the above named society.
15. The notice is inadequate to meet the requirement of principles of natural justice. It does not in our judgment provide sufficient details of the debt and of the interest due, for the purpose of meeting the claim. For example on what date the loan was taken by the person and under what head are not made clear in the notice. The notice seems to have been issued on 23rd of November 1970, was served on 27th Nov. 1970 and the enquiry was proposed to be held on 28th Nov. 1970. It will thus be plain that not only the notice was inadequate but it does not provide reasonable time to the defaulter to meet the case. Such a procedure does not in our view to satisfy the requirement of natural justice.
16. It does not however mean that merely because the department is following a procedure which does not satisfy the requirement of natural justice, Sec. 71 can be said to be bad. In any individual case if it is brought to the notice of this court that individual case can be struck down as bad. Merely because the department is not following the proper procedure no infirmity can be attached to Sec. 71 of the Act.
17. In this case the learned advocates for the parties at our request scrutinized the proceedings in regard to all the 68 applicants. After such a scrutiny they have informed us that in regard to 9 petitioners there were no notices issued nor any proceedings taken against them for the purpose of issuing certificates under Section 71. In regard to petitioners Nos. 4 and 9 the notices which were given were undisputably inadequate and the time given was also insufficient. The grant of certificates therefore against petitioner Nos. 4 and 9 was bad and the certificates have therefore to be quashed. In regard to all other applicants notices seem to have been given to them and proceedings are still pending and certificates have not so far been issued in their cases. We have no doubt that the department would give them reasonable opportunity of being heard in the light of what is stated above before the certificates if any are issued. What follows is that except in the case of petitioners 4 and 9 whose certificate we have quashed no case has been made out in regard to other petitioners and therefore, their petition will have to be dismissed. In the view which we have taken it is not necessary to consider the other questions raised in the petition which relate to the execution of the certificates. In this case no such question arises and no decision on any such question is therefore called for.
18. For the reasons we have endeavored to give above we allow the writ petition of petitioners Nos. 4 and 9 and quash the certificates issued against them and dismiss the writ petition in regard to other petitioners. We leave to parties to bear their own costs. Government Pleader's fees Rs. 100/-.