1. The above two appeals are filed under section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act. In each of them the appellant is the Insurance Company. In the first of the appeals, the petitioner before the Accidents Claims Tribunal in O.P No. 84 of 1970 claimed Rs. 17,500/- as compensation consequent upon the death of one Chellu Subbarao, as a result of an accident that took place on 4th May, 1970 on the Vijayawada-Hyderabad Trunk Road when lorry A.P.T No. 7676 belonging to the 1st respondent in the petition dashed against the cart in which he was travelling. The driver was impleaded as the 2nd respondent and the insurer was impleaded as the 3rd respondent. Originally the petitioners were the mother and the foster-son of the deceased Subba Rao. Subsequently, during the pendency of the proceedings, the 1st petitioner (mother) died, and the 3rd petitioner was added as the legal representative of the deceased 1st petitioner. He is the brother of the deceased. In the second of the appeals arising out of O.P No. 85 of 1970 on the file of Tribunal, the respondents were the same as in the other original petition. This claim also arose out of the same accident, but in respect of death of one Shaik Meera Saheb, who also died by reason of the accident. The petitioners in this original petition are the wife, the minor son and the mother of the deceased Meera Saheb. The petitions in the lower Court were resisted by the respondents. The Tribunal framed appropriate issues in both the petitions. In O.P No. 84 of 1970 an Issue No. 1, which was common to both the petitions viz., whether the deceased died due to the alleged and negligent driving of the lorry No. 7676 by the driver, the Tribunal found in favour of the petitioners. On the question raised by issue No. 2 in O.P No. 84 of 1970, whether the petitioners were the heirs-at-law of the deceased, the Tribunal held that the 2nd petitioner, the foster-son, was not a dependent on the deceased and could not figure as a claimant in the petition. So far as the 3rd petitioner was concerned, it was held that he was entitled to compensation. In O.P No. 84 of 1970, the mother, who claimed a sum of Rs. 9,000 as loss to her, died soon after the petition was filed and the claim regarding that Rs. 9,000 was given up. The particulars of the claim in O.P No. 84 of 1970, were, Rs. 1,000 towards damages for strain and suffering of the deceased and Rs. 4,000 towards loss of expectation of the life of the deceased, Rs. 9,000 as loss to the 1st petitioner mother, (given up) and Rs. 3,500 as loss to the 3rd petitioner. The Tribunal awarded Rs. 1,000 as damages for the suffering of the deceased before he died. It further awarded Rs. 4,000 in a lumpsum directing the 3rd respondent, the insurer, to pay the amount.

2. In O.P No. 85 of 1970, a sum of Rs. 32,500 was claimed Rs. 1,000 towards pain and suffering of the deceased before death, Rs. 4,000 for loss of expectation of life, Rs. 27,000 towards compensation for loss to the petitioners and Rs. 500 for the loss of consortium to the wife of the deceased. It was held that the loss to her was Rs. 9,000. Then towards loss to the estate which was claimed in the original petition at Rs. 5,000, Rs. 1,000 towards compensation for pain and suffering and Rs. 4,000 for the loss of expectation of life of the deceased. The Tribunal had awarded Rs. 500 for pain and suffering of the deceased and Rs. 3,000 as compensation for the loss of expectation of the life of the deceased. These amounts were directed to be paid by the respondents. In C.M.A No. 374 of 1972, a memorandum of cross-objections was filed by the respondents in the appeal.

3. It was inter alia urged by the appellant that in C.M.A No. 372 of 1972, the brother of the deceased, is not a legal representative and that therefore no compensation could be awarded to him. It was also urged that for the pain and suffering of the deceased, no compensation could be awarded and such compensation could be awarded only in case of injury sustained by a claimant and not where the injured died. In the other appeal, C.M.A No. 374 of 1972, it was urged that no compensation could be awarded for loss of consortium to the wife and also that no compensation could be awarded for the pain and suffering of the deceased and that in any case the petitioners had not proved that the accident had occurred by reason of the rash and negligent driving of the driver. In any case, the compensation awarded in both the cases was arbitrarily fixed. Counsel also urged that the decisions are not uniform as to the assessment of compensation in the matter of loss of expectation of the life of the deceased. He stated that the memorandum of cross-objections in appeals under section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act is incompetent. These and various related matters have been argued before me and I reserved the judgment. Since the reservation of judgment I came to the opinion that the several questions raised and debated need an authoritative pronouncement by a Division Bench, as it appears that there is a conflict of decisions in the several High. Courts on some of the matters argued. Who are the legal representatives for the purpose of section 110-A(1)(c) of the Act? Does that word mean the same as defendants under the Fatal Accidents Act? Is a brother a legal representative for purposes of the claim under section 110 of the Act? What are the guidelines for fixing compensation under the various heads? The Act itself contains no indications whatsoever. Under what heads can the compensation be awarded?

4. In Dewan Hari Chand v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi . 1973 A.C.J 87., Ansari, J., of the Delhi High Court held that under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, there was no specification of the persons who would be entitled to receive compensation for the death of a person. He observed that it has been generally recognised that only such relations would be entitled to receive compensation under the Act as would be entitled to receive compensation under the Fatal Accidents Act of 1855 and the learned Judge was of opinion that the relations that are specified in section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act, viz., the husband, wife, parent and the child of the deceased alone would be entitled to compensation. In this decision, the learned Judge also held that in determining the financial loss, the life expectancy of the deceased will not be a relevant factor.

5. In Mohammed Habibullah v. K. Seethammal . 1966 A.C.J 349. a Division Bench of the Madras High Court took the view that the provisions of sections 110 to 110-F of the Motor Vehicles Act were a self-contained Code for the adjudication of claims for compensation on behalf of victims of a motor accident and that those provisions had no connection whatever with the Fatal Accidents Act of 1855. This Bench decision was followed by Ramaprasad Rao, J, in Chinnaponnu Ammal v. T.N Mooka Pillai . 1968 A.C.J 24.. It was held by the Madras High Court that a sister could be legal representative entitled to make a claim under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, while Ansari, J., in Dewan Hari Chand v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi . 1973 A.C.J 73. held that a brother of the deceased was not entitled to compensation.

6. Regarding the question whether a memorandum of cross-objections would lie in an appeal under section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, Chinnappa Reddy, J., in C.M.A Nos. 493 and 494 of 1972 by his judgment dated 6th August, 1973 held that the cross-objections do not lie, while in Delhi Transport Undertaking v. Raj Kumari . 1972 A.C.J 403. Ansari, J., of the Delhi High Court took the view that since the High Court became seized of an appeal even in case where the appellate jurisdiction was conferred under a special statute, the rules of practice and procedure of the said Court became applicable to the appeal, unless there was any specific rule to the contrary in the special statute. The learned Judge, saw no legal impediment in entertaining the cross-objections. But my own view of the matter accords with the view expressed by Chinnappa Reddy, J., in Manjula Devi Bhuta v. Manjusri Raha the High Court of Madhya Pradesh took the view that a memorandum of cross-objections lies.

7. What I have stated above inclines me to refer the above two Civil Miscellaneous Appeals for a decision by a Division Bench and the appeals are accordingly directed under rule 1 of the Appellate Side Rules.

8. In pursuance of the said order referring to a Bench these appeals and the memorandum of cross-objections coming on for final hearing before the Bench (Obul Reddi, C.J, and A.V Krishna Rao, J.)

9. T. Venkataramana, for Appellant in both M. Sitarama Rao, for Respondent No. 1 in A.A.O No. 372 of 1972.

10. I. Koti Reddy, for Respondents Nos. 1 to 3 in A.A.O No. 374 of 1972 and for cross-objectors.

11. K. Mangachary, for Respondent No. 2 in A.A.O No. 372 of 1972, and for Respondent No. 4 in A.A.O No. 374 of 1972.

The Judgment of the Bench was delivered by

A.V Krishna Rao, J.:— These two appeals have been directed by one of us (A.V Krishna Rao, J.) to be posted before a Division Bench and hence have been posted before us.

12. The appeals have need filed under section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act against the orders of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Krishna District. In each of them, the appellant is the Vanguard Insurance Company Ltd., Vijayawada.

13. There was an accident on the night of 4th May, 1970 on the Vijayawada-Hyderabad Trunk Road at about 3 A.M the accident had occurred when an empty lorry A.P.T 7676 belonging to the 1st respondent in her original petitions, dashed against a cart in which one Chellu Subbarao died as a result of the accident in the Vijayawada Hospital at about 2 PM, on that date. The mother and foster-son of the deceased Subbarao filed O.P No. 84 of 1972. During the pendency of the Original Petition, the mother died and the 3rd petitioner, who is the brother of the deceased, was added as the legal representative.

14. At the same time on that day as a result of the same accident, one Shaik Meera Saheb also died and his wife, minor son and mother had filed O.P No. 85 of 1970 claiming compensation. Both the O.Ps were tried together.

15. In O.P No. 84 of 1970, one of the questions was whether the foster-son and the brother of the deceased were heirs-at-law of the deceased. It was held by the Tribunal that the 2nd petitioner, the foster-son, was not a dependant of the deceased and could not figure as a claimant in the petition. So far as the 3rd petitioner was concerned, it was held that he was a legal representative of the deceased and that he was entitled to compensation representing the loss to the estate of the deceased. As the 1st petitioner in O.P No. 84 of 1970 viz., the mother of the deceased, who claimed a sum of Rs. 9,000 as pecuniary loss to her, died after the filing of the petition the claim of Rs. 9,000 made by her was given up. In O.P No. 84 of 1970, after the claim of Rs. 9,000 of the mother was given up and as the foster-son, the 2nd petitioner, was held to be not entitled to any claim, the claims that remained were in respect of Rs. 1,000 towards damages for strain and suffering of the deceased and Rs. 4,000 towards loss of expectation of life. The Tribunal had granted to the 3rd petitioner in O.P No. 84 of 1970, Rs. 1,000 for pain and suffering of the deceased and Rs. 4,000 for loss of expectation of life of the deceased.

16. In O.P No. 85 of 1970 a sum of Rs. 32,500 was claimed under the following heads: Rs. 1,000 towards pain and suffering of the deceased Meera Saheb, Rs. 4,000 for loss of expectation of life and Rs. 27,000 towards compensation for loss to the petitioners and Rs. 500 for loss of consortium to the wife of Meera Saheb. The Tribunal granted Rs. 500 towards the pain and suffering of the deceased, and Rs. 3,000 towards loss of expectation of life. To the 1st petitioner, the wife, a sum of Rs. 500 was granted towards loss of consortium and Rs. 9,000 as loss to her. Rs. 2,700 was awarded to the 2nd petitioner, the minor son of the deceased, as compensation for his loss and Rs. 1,000 to the 3rd petitioner, the mother of the deceased towards her pecuniary loss. The various amounts were directed to be paid by the Insurance Company and hence the appeals by the Insurance Company.

17. Having regard to the arguments of the appellant the questions that arise for consideration are:

1. Whether the deceased Chellu Sub-barao and the deceased Meera Saheb died due to the rash and negligent driving of the lorry bearing No. A.P.T 7676 by the driver of the lorry?

2. Whether the 3rd petitioner in O.P No. 84 of 1970, who is the brother of the deceased Subbarao, is entitled to maintain the action as a legal representative of the deceased and obtain relief?

3. Whether any compensation is payable to the claimants in law under any of the heads of the claims? and

4. Whether the compensation awarded by the Tribunal is excessive?

18. Point No. (1):— Unless rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver is established, the action for compensation is not sustainable. The onus of proving this point is on the claimants. The lorry in question belonged to the 1st respondent. The accident took place on 4th May, 1970 at about 3 A.M near Thummalapalam village on the Vijayawada-Hyderabad Road. The village is about a furlong from the main road. According to the petitioners, the lorry was being driven at a great speed and had dashed against the cart in which the two deceased were travelling. The lorry had lifted the cart and the wheels of the cart were stuck up in the front lower portion of the lorry. The body of the cart was smashed into pieces and the he-buffaloes, which were drawing the cart were also killed. Post-mortem examinations revealed serious injuries to the two deceased persons. As to how the accident took place, we have the evidence of P.Ws 1 to 3.

19. P.W 2 was the driver and owner of the cart in which the deceased persons were sitting at the time of the accident. There was another cart belonging to P.W 3 which was in front of the cart. P.W 1 was sitting in the second of the carts. P.W 2's evidence is that both the carts were going along the left side of the road and the lorry came at a great speed from behind the carts. Owing to the impact of the lorry, hit cart was lifted and the witness bad lost consciousness. He was emphatic that no horn was blown by the lorry driver. According to P.W 2, both his he buffaloes and his cart completely damaged and he was paid Rs. 850 towards compensation. The deceased Subbarao, according to P.W 2, was his cousin. A suggestion was made to him that the cart-men and the others were all sleeping, that the he-buffaloes got frightened and that is why the accident had taken place. It is also in the evidence of P.W 1, who was travelling in the cart of P.W 3 that the lorry had come at high speed. He stated that cart was going along the road margin on the left side and that the lorry had dashed against the cart of P.W 2 and was lifted by the bumper and also dashed against the buffalo of the cart in which he was sitting and that the buffalo had died. The buffaloes of P.W 2's cart also fell down and died. After leaving the cart of P.W 2, the lorry proceeded further and dashed against the field bund and came to a halt. At the time of the accident, Subbarao and Shaik Meera were badly injured. In a cart that came from Vijayawada, the injured were taken to the hospital at Vijayawada. P.W 3 also spoke to the same facts as P.W 1.

20. R.W 1 was the driver of the vehicle. According to this witness, a new case was stated in his evidence that the lorry could not be stopped because of the mechanical defect due to the breaking of the tierod of the steering. He admitted the time and place of the accident. The witness stated that when he first saw the carts, they were proceeding side by side. But this cannot be accepted because it was not so stated in the counter, nor suggested to the witnessest R.Ws 1 to 3. We are inclined to think that the tierod had broken as a result of the accident. We are also inclined to agree with the Tribunal to the extent it had cut the evidence of R.W 1, which proves his negligence. There is no evidence whatsoever of any mechanical defect in the vehicle over which the driver had no control.

21. The Tribunal had accepted the evidence of these witnesses as establishing the fact that the accident had occurred owing to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the lorry. We are not persuaded to take a different view of the evidence. We hold that the tortious act which gave rise to the claim for compensation by the petitioners in both the O.Ps had been committed giving rise to the liability.

22. Point No. (2): The question is whether the 3rd petitioner, who was impleaded as a legal representative after the death of the mother of Chellu Subbarao, is entitled to maintain the action and claim compensation as a legal representative. The learned Counsel for the appellant, Insurance Company, contends that the 3rd petitioner in O.P No. 84 of 1970 is not a legal representative and the action should have been dismissed by the Tribunal. We have seen that what survives for consideration after the death of the 1st petitioner, who was the mother of the deceased, is only the claim of Rs. 1,000 towards the claim for damages for strain and suffering of the deceased and Rs. 4,000 towards loss of expectation of life of the deceased.

23. It is relevant to notice that originally in the Law of Torts, on account of the maxim of actio personalis cum persona, no action could be maintained by any one in respect of the death of a person, even though the death had been caused by the defendant by committing a tortious act. So, it was that the representatives of a deceased could not sue for the suffering and pecuniary loss caused to the deceased before he died, when death had occurred by reason of an injury. It was the law that when the tortious act which resulted only in an injury, the injured person could maintain an action for damages. While no action could be maintained against a person who caused death, an action could be maintained against that person if he had merely caused an injury and not death. This resulted in the peculiar position that a wrong doer could very well say that it was cheaper to kill than to maim or cripple a person. Naturally such an unsatisfactory state of law could not be allowed to continue. It was to overcome this state of the law that in England the Law Reforms Act and the Fatal Accidents Act, 1846 were passed. The latter Act had come to be known as Lord Campbell's Act.

24. India did not remain behind and a legislation on the lines of the two above English Acts came to be passed. The first is the Legal Representatives Suits Act (XII of 1855) and the Indian Fatal Accidents Act (XIII of 1855) were enacted on the same day viz., 27th March, 1855. Under Act XII of 1855, the cause of action in respect of loss to the estate of a person whose death had been caused by a tortious act was made to survive and be available to the executors, administrators or representatives of the deceased. Under section 1-A of the Indian Fatal Accidents Act (XIII of 1855), a new right was created in favour of certain defendants viz., the wife, husband, parents (which term includes not only father and mother, but also grand-father and grand-mother) and child which term includes not only son and daughter but also grandson and granddaughter and step-son and step daughter, who or on whose behalf an action could be maintained for any loss to those defendants consequent upon the death of a person due to the wrongful act of another person. That action was to be for the benefit of the wife, the husband etc., whom we may call the dependants of the deceased. The suit should be brought by and in the name of the person deceased. Section 2 of the Act enacted a proviso that not more than one action or suit should be brought for and in respect of the same subject-matter of complaint. That section also provided that in any action brought under section 1-A of the Act, the executor, administrator or representative might answer a claim for and recover any pecuniary loss to the estate of the deceased occasioned by such wrongful act etc., and which sum when recovered should be deemed to be a part of the assets of the estate of the deceased. The result of the above two Acts was that a suit could be filed by the persons empowered which included a representative of the deceased to file suits.

25. The 20th century had seen the birth of the motor car and transport by motor vehicles. It was inevitable that accidents should occur as a result of the ever increasing number of motor vehicles such as motor cars, buses, lorries and motor cycles etc., being driven on the road. The suits contemplated by the Fatal Accidents Act were necessarily expensive and the process time consuming. It was for this reason that in 1956 provisions were introduced in the Motor Vehicles Act for the purpose of affording speedier and cheaper remedies to those who were entitled to have recourse to the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act earlier. In place of the civil Courts, a new forum was established viz., Tribunals under sections 110-A to 110-F in the Motor Vehicles Act. These sections provide for the constitution of Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals and how applications to such Tribunals should be made and disposed of. These provisions only relate to procedure and have nothing to do with the substantive rights and liabilities of the parties. Such rights and liabilities of course have to be determined having regard to the Law of Torts, the Legal Representatives Suits Act and the Fatal Accidents Act. The proceedings are to be initiated as original petitions before the Tribunal and only one appeal is provided to the High Court under section 110-D. It is to be seen that in Act XII of 1855 and Act XIII of 1855, the word used was only “representative” and not “legal representative”. In the Civil Procedure Code of 1882, the expression “legal representative” was not defined. It was only in the Civil Procedure Code of 1908 under section 2(11) it was defined as follows:

“‘Legal representative’ means a person who in law represents the estate of the deceased person, and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party suing or sued.”

26. Notwithstanding the expression “legal representative” being defined in the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, in Act XII of 1855 the word “representative” alone continued. For the purpose of action under section 110-A to 110-F under the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals Rules, 1961, the State of Madras had framed a rule by reason of the authority conferred upon the State Government in this behalf under section 111-A. Rule 2(c) of the said rules stated that ‘legal representatives’ shall have the, meaning assigned to it under Clause (11) of section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Our attention is not drawn to the framing of any such rule by the State of Andhra Pradesh. Under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, an application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in sub-section (1) of section 110, may be made

“(b) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased:

27. Provided that whereas all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation, the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives who have not so joined, shall be impleaded as respondents to the application.”

28. While the above provisions as they stand now are as amended by Act LVI of 1969, the expression “legal representative” was not defined in the Act. We will, therefore, be justified in seeking to rely upon the expression “legal representative” as defined in the Civil Procedure Code. For the purpose of the present case if the 3rd petitioner, who is the brother of the deceased in law represents the estate of a deceased person, he fulfils the description of a legal representative for the purpose of the Act. The deceased was a Hindu. He had no wife and children. He had only a mother, who was a Class I heir in existence. The mother died having made a claim in regard to her own personal pecuniary loss and also a claim of loss to the estate of the deceased. On her death, the brother who is a Class II heir to the deceased under the third head of Class II heirs, had come on record. He is the only person entitled to succeed to the estate of the deceased person. If he is entitled to succeed to the estate of the deceased person, it cannot but be said that in law he represents the estate of the deceased person. We have no manner of doubt that the 3rd petitioner is a legal representative of the deceased Subbarao. In Perumal v. Ellusamy Reddiar Ramasami, J., observed:

“Any one who represents the estate of the deceased would be entitled to claim compensation towards loss to the estate. Such person who represents the estate need not necessarily be the heir of the deceased. But in this case the claimants being the brothers and sister of the deceased who was a bachelor and he having left no parents or his nearest heirs, they are undoubtedly entitled to claim loss to the estate of the deceased.”

29. In the aforesaid decision, it was further stated by the learned Judge:

“The term ‘legal representative’, therefore, should necessarily include not only persons who represent the estate of the deceased (who can claim loss to the estate of the deceased) and the next-of-kin who are mentioned as defendants under section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act, who can claim compensation for loss of benefit to themselves, whether they represent the estate of the deceased or not. In other words, it should take in all persons who can maintain an action under the Legal Representatives' Suits Act (or under section 2 of the Fatal Accidents Act, as the case may be) as well as those who can maintain an action under section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act. That being so, one cannot restrict the meaning of the term ‘legal representative’ occurring in section 110-A of the Act as that in section 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure”.

30. On the facts of this case, we are clearly of opinion that the 3rd petitioner is legal representative entitled to maintain the action and obtain the relief as a legal representative to the estate of the deceased.

31. In O.P No. 84 of 1970 the claim made was under two heads. One is the pain and suffering caused to the deceased Subbarao and the other is the pecuniary loss to the estate by reason of the death of Subbarao. What was claimed in the petition was Rs. 1,000 under the first head and Rs. 4,000 under the second head. It is contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant placing reliance upon the decision Perumal v. Elluswamy Reddiar that the basis of the assessment by the Tribunal was wrong. It was urged that as a result of the consideration of the English cases and the Supreme Court decision in Gobald Motor Service v. Veluswami it was laid down in the above Madras case that possible future earnings of the deceased or the savings therefrom should not be calculated as part loss of to the estate. It is true that the learned Judges in the above case had stated so, and distinguished the Supreme Court case. We will, therefore, refer to the relevant portion of the Judgment in Gobald Motor Service v. Veluswami. Subbarao, J. (as he then was) observed as follows:

“The principle in its application to the Indian Act has been clearly and succinctly stated by a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court in Secretary of State v. Gokal Chand. In that case, Sir Shadi Lal, C.J observed at p. 453 (of I.L.R Lah.) (at p. 636 of A.I.R) thus:

“The law contemplates two sorts of damages: the one is the pecuniary loss to the estate of the deceased resulting from the accident; the order is the pecuniary loss sustained by the members of his family through his death. The action of the latter is brought by the legal representatives, not for the estate but as trustees for the relatives beneficially entitled; while the damages for the loss caused to the estate are claimed on behalf of the estate and when recovered from part of the assets of the estate.”

32. Then the learned Judge went on to clarify the position by way of an illustration. The illustration runs thus:

“X is the income of the estate of the deceased Y is the yearly expenditure incurred by him on his dependents (we will ignore the other expenditure incurred by him). X-Y i.e, Z is the amount he saves every year. The capitalised value he saves every year. The capiatalised value of the income spent on the dependants, subject to relevant deductions, is the pecuniary loss sustained by the members of his family through his death. The capitalised value of his income subject to relevant deductions, would be the loss caused to the estate by his death (italics ours). If the claimants, under both the heads are the same, and if they get compensation for the entire loss caused to the estate, they cannot claim again under the head of personal loss the capitalised income that might have been spent on them if the deceased were alive. Conversely, if they got compensation under section 1, representing the amount that the deceased would have spent on them, if alive to that extent there should be deduction in their claim under section 2 of the Act in respect of compensation for the loss caused to the estate.”

33. The portion italicised in the above extract by us viz., that the capitalised value of the income of the deceased, subject to the relevant deductions, would be the loss caused to the estate by his death is significant. In our opinion the income which the deceased was getting and the possible savings he might make after deductions could be capitalised so as to arrive at the loss to the estate. It is well-settled that under the head ‘loss to the estate of the deceased’ damages could be claimed towards pain and suffering, loss of earnings and other damages actually suffered by the victim between the date of the accident and the moment of death, damages towards loss of personal property and damages for loss of expectation of life may be awarded (See Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, page 100).

34. In considering matters arising in this case, we may also refer to the decision in C.K.S Iyer v. T.K Nair wherein Hegde, J., observed (at page 380):

“The law on the point arising for decision may be summed up thus: Compulsory damages under section 1-A of the Act for wrongful death must be limited strictly to the pecuniary loss to the beneficiaries and that under section 2, the measure of damages is the economic loss sustained by the estate. There can be no exact uniform rule for measuring the value of the human life and the measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculations but the amount recoverable depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. The life expectancy of the deceased or of beneficiaries whichever is shorter is an important factor. Since the elements which go to make up the value of the life of the deceased to the designated beneficiaries are necessarily personal to each case, in the very nature of things, there can be no exact or uniform rule for measuring the value of human life. In assessing damages, the Court must exclude all considerations of matter which rest in speculation or fancy though conjecture to some extent is inevitable. As a general rule parents are entitled to recover the present cash value of the prospective service of the deceased minor child. In addition they may receive compensation for loss of pecuniary benefits reasonably to be expected after the child attains majority. In the matter of ascertainment of damages, the appellate Court should be slow in disturbing the findings reached by the Courts below, if they have taken all the relevant facts into consideration.”

35. In O.P No. 84 of 1970, the Tribunal found on the evidence that Subbarao was conscious until he died, though he could not speak. The evidence of the doctor showed that he had sustained serious injuries by the liver being ruptured and ribs being broken. Undoubtedly the suffering must have been intensive. Subbarao was aged about 35 years. He was an agriculturist and living in the village. The Tribunal put his life expectation at about 55 years. Having regard to the circumstances that the Tribunal found that he could have saved money and improved the estate the Tribunal made a modest estimate of a saving yearly of Rs. 250/-, multiplied that amount by 20 times to capitalise it and arrived at the figure of Rs. 5,000/-. As in the petition only a sum of Rs. 4,000/- was claimed, even deducting a sum of Rs. 1,000/- because of a lumpsum payment the Tribunal opined that Rs. 4,000/- was quite modest. For the pain and suffering of Subbarao it awarded Rs. 1,000/-. In all the circumstances, the claims made and the amounts awarded are very modest and reasonable. There is no warrant for interfering with the award made by the Tribunal.

36. So far as O.P No. 85 of 1970 is concerned, the claimants are the widow, the minor son and the aged mother of the deceased. The deceased at the time of his death was aged about 35 years as found from the evidence by the Tribunal. The deceased was working as a labourer in loading and unloading lorries earning about Rs. 5 to Rs. 6 a day. The petitioners are undoubtedly his dependants. The 1st petitioner is aged about 25 years. The 2nd petitioner is a minor aged about five and the third petitioner, the mother, was aged about 50 or 60. It is in the evidence of the wife that in each year she was receiving Rs. 1000 from her husband for the maintenance of the household. There is also the evidence of P.Ws 6 and 7 who according to the Tribunal established that Meera Saheb was an agricultural cooly in the village knew brick making which is a semi-skilled job and that at the time of his death he was working as a cooly in the quarries at Adda Road and earning Rs. 6 a day besides what he was earning by making bricks. Having regard to the evidence, it was estimated by the Tribunal that the loss to the mother could be put at Rs. 1,000 lumpsum, having regard to her age and the fact that she had other sons who might have contributed to her maintenance. In the case of the minor son, the Tribunal estimated that the deceased would have spent about Rs. 15 per month upon his son and capitalising the same by multiplying the annual income by 15 up to which time the 2nd petitioner would have been a dependant, the Tribunal fixed it at Rs. 2,700. Regarding the wife, the Tribunal awarded Rs. 500 for loss of consortium which was all that was claimed. The Tribunal relied on the decision in Abdul Kadar Ebrahim v. Kashinath Mateshwar where on the death of the wife the husband claimed compensation for loss of consortium which was awarded at Rs. 500, having regard to the fact that the husband was aged 60 years. In the present case, the wife is only aged 25 years and the husband was aged 35 and the claim made under this head is too modest to be refused. So far as the loss to her is concerned, the Tribunal estimated that a minimum of Rs. 30 would have been received by her for maintenance each month and that annually it would come to Rs. 360 and that her age at the time being 25 years, she would have received that much of amount each year towards her maintenance for at least 25 years in the normal course of things and in that view it arrived at the figure that loss to her could be fixed at Rs. 9,000 as an irreducible minimum. In that view of the matter, the loss to the 1st petitioner was fixed at Rs. 9,500 in all. Then coming to the question of loss to the estate, the amount claimed by the petitioners was in all Rs. 5,000; Rs. 1000 as compensation for pain and suffering to the deceased and Rs. 4,000 for loss of expectation of life. Having regard to the fact that the accident took place at about 3 A.M and the injurend had died at about 8 A.M, the amount of compensation was assessed by the Tribunal at Rs. 500 on account of the pain and suffering to the deceased and that the compensation for loss of expectation of life was assessed at Rs. 3,000. We are of opinion that the assessment of compensation under the various heads is not in any way liable to be interfered with. The appeals are dismissed with costs. There is a memorandum of cross objections filed in C.M.A No. 374 of 1972. The learned Counsel appearing for the cross objectors had submitted that he was withdrawing the cross objections. In the circumstances, it is not necessary for us to consider whether the memorandum of cross-objections is maintainable. It is accordingly dismissed as withdrawn. There will be no order as to costs.

37. Appeals and cross-objections dismissed.