(1) The petitioners challenge the validity of notification made under section 4 (1) of the land acquisition act, 1894 dated 19 - 6 - 1971 and a further notification under section 6 of the act dated 30 - 12 - 1971. Under the first notification it was stated that the land of the extent of eight acres in s. No. 477/2 (ac. 5 - 47 cents) and s. No. 488/2 - a (ac. 2 - 53 cents) were required for a public purpose, viz. For providing house sites for harijans of k. Bitragunta village. By the same notification. The enquiry under section 5 - a of the act was dispensed with on the ground of urgency.
(2) The case of the petitioners is that even as early as 1956, when such an acquisition was sought to be made, after full enquiry, the authorities concerned found that the lands being valuable garden and wet lands are not fit for house sites and there were other porambokes available as house sites for harijans. Again in 1962 the collector also came to the same conclusion and the acquisition proposals were dropped. Inspite of previous proceedings, after the panchayat elections were held in 1970, a deal was struck between the present president of the gram panchayat and the harijans that in exchange for the support of harijans during elections, he would use his political influence and secure the lands to them by acquisition. It was at his instance that this acquisition was being made. It was further contended by the petitioners that there was absolutely no urgency and the government without forming any genuine opinion of its own about the urgency, made a direction under section 17 (4) of the land acquisition act, dispensing with the provisions of section 5 - a. They further contended that s. No. 477/2 is of the extent of ac. 5 - 64 cents and an extent of ac. 5 - 48 cents alone is being acquired, leaving the petitioners in possession of only a well. For all the reasons it is prayed that this court may quash the notifications under section 4 (1) and section 6 of the act and to direct the authorities to refrain from taking further proceedings in pursuance of the said notifications.
(3) No counter - affidavit has been filed by the government, even though rule nisi was issued on 17 - 2 - 1972. But the records have been produced, some of the harijans for whose benefit the land is sought to be acquired have filed a petition to implead themselves as parties to this writ petition. That petition is hereby ordered. It is stated in the counter - affidavit filed on their behalf that the block development officer, after conducting spot enquiry, submitted proposals for the acquisition of the land and accepting the proposals of the block development officar, notifications were issued and hence the acquisition is valid. It is also stated that as many as 102 families of harijans are in need of houses and they are at present dwelling in unhealthy surroundings and have become victims of all sorts of diseases for lack of sanitary facilities.
(4) I have no hesitation in rejecting the contention that the acquisition in not for a public purpose. There cannot be any doubt that the purpose stated in this case, viz. To provide house sites for harijans 's a public purpose.
(5) The further contention that because the authorities came to a conclusion on prior occasions in 1956, and 1962 that the land is not fit fcr houses and other porambokes area available,the present notification cannot be sustained, is also untenable. While the opinion expressed on prior occasions may legitimately be taken into consideration it cannot be argued that the authorities while making an acquisition in 1971 are bound by opinions expressed in 1956 or 1962.
(6) It is further submitted that the notification is vague and liable to be quashed for that reason. In support of that contention, reliance was placed on a very recent decision of the supreme court in munshi singh v. Union of india in that case the supreme court had to consider a notification made under section 4 of the land acquisition act, 1894, where it was notified that the land was needed for a public purpose, viz. , "for planned development of the area". It was also stated that under section 5 - a of the act any person inteiested in the land may make on objection to the acquisition of the land. It was held that in the notification all that was stated was that the land was required for planned development of the area that there was no indication whatsoever whether the development was to be of residential and building sitts or of commercial and industrial plots, nor was it possible for any one interested in the land sought to be acquired to find out what kind of planned development was under contemplation. In order to make an effective representation in an enquiry under section 5 - a, a person interested in the land must have an opportunity to submit his objections and he can do so only if the notification gives some definite indication or the particulars of the said purpose which would enable the persons concerned to object effectively if so desired. In the absence of such specific or particular purpose being stated the objector cannot file any proper or cogent objections under section 5 - a, it was therefore held that owing to the vagueness and indefiniteness of the public purpose stated in the notifications under section 4 (l) , the appellants were wholly unable to object effectively and exercise their right under sections 5 - a of the acquisition act, the acquisition proceedings were therefore quashed.
(7) It was argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that this case also, the public purpose stated viz. , to provide house sites for harijans is vague and no particulars are given and hence the injured owners could not effectively make any rspresentation, even if an enquiry under setion 5 - a were held. Hence the entire notification has to be quashed. I do not think that the facts of this cass are similar to that in the supreme court case. So far as the purpose for which the land is sought to be acquired is concerned, i do not think there is "any vagueness about the purpose, viz,, to provide houss sites for harijans in the village. I cannot therefore hold that the public purpose stated is vargue and for that reason, the notification is liable to be quashed it is then contended that at any rats no case is made out for dispensing with an enquiry under section 5 - a of the act, as there is no urgency. This court has no doubt held that the question whether the matter is urgent or not is ultimately for the decision of the government, but it has also been repeatedly pointed out in a number of cases in the decisions of this court as well as of the supreme court that the government must apply its m ind and come to a conclusion that the matter is of such an urgent nature that it is necessary to dispense with an enquiry under section 5 - a of the act. In this case, it is merely stated in a memo, issued by the government on the date of notification that they accept the view that the acquisition is an urgent one and therefore they direct that the provisions of section 5 - a of the act shall not apply. It does not indicate as to why and how the government came to such a conclusion, on the other hand, the very circumstances under which this notification and the subsequent notification have been made would clearly indicate the absence of such urgency as to the necessity for dispensing with an enquiry under section 5 - a. A notification under section 6 was made nearly six months after the notification under section 4, if really there was such an urgency as to dispense with the enquiry under section 5 - a, it seems strange that the government should have waited for six months to make a notification under section 6. In this connection it has to be noticed that the time granted to a person for making his objections under section 5 - a is only 30 days and when the government considers the question of dispensing with the enquiry under section 5 - a, it has to consider whether the matter is so urgent that it cannnot wait even 30 days to erable the affected party to state his objections. In the supreme court decision referred to above, the importance of an enquiry undfr section 5 - a has been stressed. It is said that section 5 - a embodies a very just and wholescme principle that a person whose property is being or is intended to be acquired should have a proper and reasonable opportunity of persuading the authorities concerned that acquisition of the property belonging to that person should not be made. The right to file objections under section 5 - a is a substantial right when a person's property is being threatened with acquisition and that right cannot be taken away as if by a side wind, in that case, even when an opportunity was given to make objections under section 5 - a, the supreme court pointed out that the public purpose stated was so vague that no opportunity was given to make effective objections. These observations would apply with greater force to a case where the opportunity to make objections under section 5 - a is completely taken away.
(8) Inspite of repeated observations of this court with regard to the dispersing v ith enquiry under section 5 - a it is surprising still to come across cases of dispending with the enquiry under section 5 - a without any adequate reason whatsoever. The readiness with which the collector recommended the dispensing with an enquiry under section 5 - a and the equal readiness with which the government accepted such a recommendation without even considering the facts and circumstances of the case gives the impression that this procedure was adopted as a matter of routine without any one applying its mind to the question. The power to dispense with an enquiry under section 5 - a in cases of emergency ought net to be used as a regular means of circumventing the obligation to conduct an enquiry which is based on the elementary principles of natural justice that a person must be given an opportunity to show cause why his property should not be taken away. This procedure of dispensing with the enquiry in almost every case regardless of emergency, far from helping the cause of the persons for whom the acquisition is sought to be effected, very often proves detrimental to their interests. Naturally, such orders are attacked by the owners in question and having regard to the state of law as adumbrated by the supreme court and by this court, this court is constrained to quash the said notifications with the result, nearly 2 to 3 years elapse in this process, the result of trying to avoid an enquiry under section 5 - a which would last only one or two months, is that more than 2 years are taken in acquiring the lands concerned, and ultimately persons for whose benefit the acquisition is sought to be made are put to considerable suffering and inconveniences.
(9) The writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above, and the notitichtion made is quashed in so far as it dispensed with the enquiry under section 5 - a of the act. There will be no order as to costs. Advocate's fee rs. 100/ -.