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Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
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Acts
  • Eviction Control) Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Kent Control Act).
  • Section 7(3)(a) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949
  • provisions are section 1O(3)(a)(i) and (b) and Section 10(3)(c).S. 10(3)(a)
  • Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Rent Control Act.
  • Section 10(3)(a)(i)(a) of the Rent Control Act. Section 7(3)(a)
  • clause (b) of Section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Rent Control Act
  • Section 10(3)(a)(i)(a) of the Rent Control Act
  • Section 10(3)(a)(i)(b) of the Rent Control Act
  • Rent Control Act
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Eviction Control) Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Kent Control Act).
  • Section 7(3)(a) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949
  • provisions are section 1O(3)(a)(i) and (b) and Section 10(3)(c).S. 10(3)(a)
  • Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Rent Control Act.
  • Section 10(3)(a)(i)(a) of the Rent Control Act. Section 7(3)(a)
  • clause (b) of Section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Rent Control Act
  • Section 10(3)(a)(i)(a) of the Rent Control Act
  • Section 10(3)(a)(i)(b) of the Rent Control Act
  • Rent Control Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision petition arises from eviction proceedings taken under the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction Control) Act, 1960 (referred in the opinion as the "Rent Control Act"). The respondents are two undivided brothers constituting a Joint Hindu Family and owners of a house (No. 65/66 / new Nos. 5-2-434, 435 and 4401) in Hyderbasti, Secunderabad. They had let this building to the petitioner on a monthly rent of Rs. 100 for residential purposes; the petitioner had been in occupation since 1948.

The respondents also owned another residential building in a different locality (Pan Bazar) which they formerly used for their residential purposes. Because the respondents' family had grown (each brother now married with several children, and their widowed mother living with them) and they had separated their household messes, the respondents claimed they required the rented building for the occupation of the 2nd respondent and sought to evict the petitioner on that ground.

The respondents filed a petition under Section 10(3)(a)(i)(b) (and also under clause (a) as indicated later) of the Rent Control Act for eviction. The Rent Controller granted eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement for the 2nd respondent's occupation. On appeal, the Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad, confirmed the Rent Controller's order. The tenant (petitioner) challenged that order by way of this revision petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the respondents bona fide required the rented building for the occupation of the 2nd respondent such that eviction under the Rent Control Act was justified.
  2. How Section 10(3)(a)(i) — in particular clause (b)’s use of the word "instead" — should be construed when a landlord owns more than one building in the same locality and claims another building for personal occupation.
  3. Whether clause (a) of Section 10(3)(a)(i) is applicable to a member of a Joint Hindu Family who, though a co-owner, may be considered not to be "occupying a residential building of his own" for the purpose of claiming bona fide requirement.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner (Tenant) — Arguments

  • The petitioner's counsel (Sri V.V.L. Narasimha Rao) emphasized the language of Section 10(3)(a)(i)(b), particularly the word "instead", arguing that where a landlord already occupies one residential building in the locality and owns more than one building, the landlord may require another building only "instead" — i.e., as a substitute — implying the landlord cannot occupy more than one building at the same time for personal use. The submission was that the Act does not permit a landlord to claim an additional building in addition to the one already occupied.

Respondents (Landlords) — Arguments / Case Presented

  • The respondents' case, as presented and accepted by the lower courts, was that their joint family accommodation had become insufficient due to growth of family (wives, children, and mother) and separation of mess; they agreed that the 1st respondent and his family would remain in the house they occupied and the 2nd respondent and his family would move into the rented building. Accordingly, they asserted a bona fide requirement of the rented building for the 2nd respondent's own occupation and applied for eviction under the Rent Control Act.
  • It is noted that the eviction petition was filed under both clauses (a) and (b) of Section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Rent Control Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kolandivelu Chettiar v. Koolayana Chettiar (Madras High Court, single judge) Interpreting a provision (Section 7(3)(a) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949) similar to Section 10(3)(a)(i)(a) of the Rent Control Act: a landlord may seek possession where he requires a residential building for his own occupation and is not occupying a residential building of his own in the same locality. The court relied on the decision to support the proposition that a landlord (or a member of a joint family seeking separate accommodation) may invoke a clause similar to Section 10(3)(a)(i)(a) to evict a tenant where the landlord's son or family seeks separate residence. The precedent was treated as analogous authority justifying application of clause (a) in the present facts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning proceeded in a sequence of analytical steps grounded on the facts found by the courts below and the statutory text:

  1. Factual findings: The lower courts had concurrently found, based on evidence, that the respondents' joint family had expanded since 1948, the brothers had established separate messes, they had an agreement that the 1st respondent would occupy the family house while the 2nd respondent would require the rented building, and therefore the 2nd respondent reasonably required the building for his occupation. The court accepted those findings as established and uncontroverted at the revision hearing.
  2. Statutory framework: The court set out Section 10(3)(a)(i)(a), (b) and Section 10(3)(c) of the Rent Control Act, explaining the three classes where a landlord may seek eviction for bona fide personal occupation: (a) where the landlord is not occupying a residential building of his own in the locality and requires it for his occupation; (b) where a landlord who has more than one building is in occupation of one and bonafide requires another "instead" for his own occupation; and (c) where the landlord occupies only part of a building and requires additional accommodation.
  3. Meaning of "bona fide requirement": The court interpreted "bona fide requirement" to mean a reasonable requirement, not an absolute necessity. It emphasized that the Rent Control Act seeks to prevent unreasonable eviction but does not impose unreasonable restrictions on owners; thus, a reasonable, bona fide requirement of the landlord for personal occupation is a legitimate ground for eviction unless shown to be vitiated by oblique motives (such as harassment or extracting higher rent).
  4. Construction of "instead" in clause (b): Addressing the petitioner's counsel's submission that "instead" restricts a landlord to occupying only one building (i.e., the landlord may have only one residential building for personal occupation and any other building sought must be taken only in substitution), the court rejected that narrow construction. The court reasoned that it would be contrary to the scheme and objects of the Act to prevent a landlord from occupying more than one building where the landlord bonafide needs more accommodation. In context, the court concluded the word "instead" can be read to mean "in addition" and accordingly that a landlord may require more than one building for personal occupation where the requirement is bona fide and reasonable.
  5. Alternative application of clause (a) given joint family facts: Even if the court's preferred construction of "instead" were not accepted, the court concluded clause (a) would apply on the facts. It analyzed the legal status of a Joint Hindu Family as a juridical person and explained that where the 2nd respondent, though a co-owner, has no separate building for his own occupation (because the family arrangement allocated the existing family house to the 1st respondent and his family), the 2nd respondent cannot be said to be "occupying a residential building of his own" for clause (a)'s purposes. Thus, the 2nd respondent qualifies under clause (a) as a landlord who is not occupying a residential building of his own in the locality and may seek the rented building for his own occupation.
  6. Reliance on analogous precedent: The court referenced the single-judge Madras decision (Kolandivelu Chettiar) interpreting a similar statutory provision to show that establishing a separate residence (e.g., for a son or separate family unit) was a recognised ground for invoking such a provision; the court treated that authority as supportive of applying clause (a) in the present case.
  7. Conclusion on merits: Given the concurrent findings of bona fide requirement, the court held the respondents' claim was sustainable under Section 10(3)(a)(i) (either under the court's construction of clause (b) or, alternatively, clause (a) given the joint-family facts). Accordingly, the eviction order of the Rent Controller as confirmed on appeal was correct and the revision petition lacked merit.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revision petition is dismissed. The court upheld the eviction order directing the tenant (petitioner) to vacate the building on the ground that the respondents bona fide required the premises for the occupation of the 2nd respondent. The petitioner was granted two months' time to vacate and the dismissal was made with costs.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the eviction order stands and the tenant must vacate the premises within two months as ordered by the court.
  • The court's interpretation endorses that a landlord may claim premises for bona fide personal occupation where the requirement is reasonable; the court read the word "instead" in clause (b) broadly (as capable of meaning "in addition") and alternatively applied clause (a) where a co-owner in a Joint Hindu Family has no separate accommodation for his own household.
  • The opinion does not purport to establish a novel legal principle beyond interpreting the statutory language and applying established concepts of bona fide requirement; the decision affirms the eviction on the facts rather than announcing an expansive new precedent beyond the reasoning applied to these facts.

    K. Nagappa Petitioner/ v. T.D Krishnasa And Another S/Petitioners.

    1. This revision petition arises out of proceedings taken by the two respondents herein under the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Kent and Eviction Control) Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Kent Control Act’). The two respondents are undivided brothers and they constitute a Joint Hindu Family and are owners of a house bearing No. 65/66 (corresponding to new Nos. 5-2-434, 435 and 4401 situate in Hyderbasti, Secunderabad. The building was let out to the petitioner herein on a monthly rental of Rs. 100/- for residential purpose a long time ago, i.e the petitioner has been in occupation of the building as a tenant since the year 1948. The respondents have another building, situate in another locality called Pan Bazar, of their own and they were using it for the residential purpose of both the respondents previously. On the ground that the respondents require the building let out to the petitioner also, for their own occupation they wanted him to vacate the building. When he did not do, so the petition under Section 10(3)(a)(i)(b) of the Rent Control Act was filed by the respondents for evicting the petitioner and to put them in possession of the building on the ground that they bonafide require it for the occupation of the 2nd respondent Both the Rent Controller and on appeal the learned Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court. Hyderabad, found that the respondents bonafide require the building for the occupation of the 2nd respondent and accordingly the Rent Controller ordered the eviction of the petitioner and that order was confirmed by the Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad in the appeal. It is questioning the correctness of that order the tenant has preferred this revision.

    2. The facts which are either not in controversy or have been established by evidence and accepted by the Courts below and which have not been controverted at the time of hearing of this petition are the following in the year 1948 when the building in question was let out to the petitioner the joint family of the respondents consisted of the two brothers, namely, the respondents herein and their mother and the respondents were still young then and were unmarried. Now both the respondents are married. The 1st respondent has his wife and five children, while the 2nd respondent has his wife and four children. The mother of the respondents who is widow is also living with them. The House which they were occupying consists of three rooms, a kitchen, a bathroom, a lavatory and a varandab. The respondents 1 and 2 though continue as members of a joint family without any division they have separated in mess. Thus the family of the respondents has grown very much since the building in question was let out to the petitioner in the year 1948. They are having a number of children and their mother also is living with them. They are having separate messes and therefore they require separate kitchens. Under these circumstances the case of the respondents is that both the respondents with their families are unable to manage with the accommodation available in their present building and therefore they agreed between themselves that the 1st respondent with his family members should continue to live in their present house and the 2nd respondent and the members of his family should move into the building in question. Therefore it is necessary that the petitioner should vacate the building as it is required for the occupation of the 2nd respondent and the respondents require the building bonafide for their own occupation.

    3. From the facts as stated above it is absolutely clear that the respondents reasonably require the building in question for their own occupation and therefore their requirement is bonafide. But the learned Counsel. Sri V.V.L Narasimha Rao has argued for the petitioner-tenant by laying great emphasis on the language used in the relevant provision of the Kent Control Act. He contended that as per the language used in Section 10(3)(a)(i)(b) of the Act the landlord who has more buildings than one at a particular place can not have for his own occupation more than one building and he can have for his own occupation only one or the other of those buildings and not more than one building and if he bonafide require some other building which is not in his occupation he can have that building only on surrendering to the tenant, if it is required by him, the building which is in his occupation.

    4. It is convenient to extract here the relevant provisions of Section 10 so far as they relate to residential buildings where the landlord can bonafide require his building for his own occupation even without any default or fault on the part of the tenant. Those provisions are section 1O(3)(a)(i) and (b) and Section 10(3)(c).

    “S. 10(3)(a) A Landlord may, subject to the provisions of clause (d) apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building (i) in case it is residential building:—

    (a) if the landlord is not occupying a residential building of his own in the city, town or village concerned and be requires it for his own occupation;

    (b) it the landlord who has more buildings than one in the city, town or village concerned is in occupation of one such building and he bonafide requires another building instead, for his own occupation”

    “S. 10(3)(c) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building whether residential or non-residential may, notwithstanding anything in clause (a), apply to the Controller for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for residential purposes or for the purpose of a business which he is carrying on, as the case may be”.

    5. A reading of the above provisions would show that a landlord can bonafide require his residential building for his own occupation if be is not occupying (1) a residential building of his own in the city, town or village concerned and he requires it for his own accusation; (2) the landlord who has more buildings than one in the city and is in occupation of one such building and he bonafide requires another building instead, for his own occupation, and (3) where the landlord of the building is only occupying a part of the building requires also the remaining portion of the building as additional accommodation.

    6. Therefore in all these three classes of cases the landlord can ask the Rent Controller to evict the tenant and to put him in possession of the building if he requires it bonafide for his own occupation. Thus though the main object in enacting the Rent Control Act is to benefit the tenants, as the preamble of the Act itself would show, the object of the Act is only to prevent unreasonable eviction of tenants. The provisions mentioned above would also amply stow that in enacting the Rent Control Act it is not the intention of the Legislature to put unreasonable restrictions in the use of their buildings by the landlords and the intention of the Legislature is clear that whenever a building is required for the bonafide use of the landlord he can always approach the Rent Controller to evict an unwilling tenant and to put him in possession of the building. Bonafide requirement of the landlord does not mean absolute requirement of the landlord without which it is impossible for the landlord to get on. Bonafide requirement is no other than reasonable requirement. The requirement of the tenant may be greater than that of the landlord, but being the owner, so long as the right of private ownership is recognised by law, the requirement of the landlord, so long as it is reasonable and bodafide and if it is for his own occupation and the requirement is not vitiated by any oblique motive intended to harass the tenant to extract more rent or otherwise to let out to some other tenant, and things like that the requirement of the landlord should be supreme.

    7. As already seen above it was concurrently found by both the Courts below and it cannot be doubted that the building in question is reasonably required for the use of the 2nd respondent. The learned Counsel for the petitioner laid great stress on the word “Instead” in clause (b) of Section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Rent Control Act to contend that inspite of anything else when the landlord has more buildings than one when he is in occupation already of one such building he can require for his own occupation another building only instead (the stress is mine) i.e, in place of or as an alternative or as a substitute for the building which is already in his occupation. According to him there is no provision in the Rent Control Act enabling a landlord to require another building of his own for his own occupation when he is already in occupation of a building of his own. I do not think this would have been the intention of the Legislature as in the present case when the requirement of the landlord for accommodation increases very much and when he is owning more than one building and not one of these buildings is reasonably sufficient for his own occupation there is no reason why he should not require and occupy one more building in addition to the one already in his occupation, From the objects and the scheme of the Act it does not appear that would have been the intention of the Legislature. In my opinion that the word “instead” used in the above provision, in the context, can only mean in addition. In this view of the matter the landlord can require more than one building for his own occupation if he bonafide requires it.

    8. Even assuming that the view expressed above cannot be capable of acceptance in construing the clause (b) of Section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act, I think even clause (a) of Section 10(3)(a)(i) can be made applicable to the facts of this case. As per the provision made in that clause if the landlord is not occupying a residential building of his own in the city, town or village concerned and he requires it for his own occupation be can apply to the Rent Controller for an order directing the tenant to put him in possession of the building. It may be urged in this case that the landlord is already occupying a residential building of his own in the City. But it cannot be said so having regard to the facts of this case in this case the owner of the building in question is a joint Hindu Family consist ting of two brothers, namely, the respondents 1 and 2 herein. The Joint Hindu Family being a juridical person where a building belongs to such a family the requirement of any member of it would be the requirement of the landlord Here the 2nd respondent requires the building in question for the occupation of himself and the members of his own family. As per the arrangement entered into between him and his brother, the 1st respondent the latter and the members of his family are to occupy the present building which is said to be in the occupation of the landlord. It that is so, there is no building for the occupation of the 2nd respondent and the members of his family. In which case it means the building is required by the 2nd respondent landlord and he cannot be said to be occupying a residential building of his own. In this view of the matter also I am of opinion that the tenant is liable to be evicted from the building in question. It may be noted that the petition before the Rent Controller was filed both under Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Rent Control Act.

    9. A similar view was taken in a single judge decision of the Madras High Court in Kolandivelu Chettiar v. Koolayana Chettiar(1) The learned Judge. Mr. Justice Venkatadri who decided that case was considering the matter under Section 7(3)(a) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949 which is similar to the present Section 10(3)(a)(i)(a) of the Rent Control Act. Section 7(3)(a) is as follows:—

    “A landlord may, subject to the provisions of clause (d), apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building (i) in case it is a residential building, if the landlord requires it for his own occupation and he is not occupying, a residential building of his own in the City, town or village concerned.”

    10. The facts there are: The landlord has got three other buildings besides the building in question. The reasons for eviction as alleged in his petition are that the second son of the landlord is married and he wants to set up for his son an independent family of his own and for the said purpose he requires the building for the occupation of his own and his personal use. Under those circumstances the learned Judge held that the landlord is entitled to apply under that provision for eviction of the tenant on the ground that he requires the building for establishing a separate residence for his son and the fact that the son is living in the joint family house cannot be a bar to the maintainability of the application.

    11. In the present case also even assuming that at the time the eviction petition was filed the 2nd respondent was living along with the 1st respondent in the same building which was in their occupation, when they were having separate mess and the building which was in their occupation was not at all sufficient for the purpose of the members of both their families and it was agreed between themselves that the 1st respondent alone should occupy the building which was already in their possession it could only mean that the 2nd respondent was without a building for his own occupation. Being a member of the joint family he is also a landlord for the build log in question and being a landlord as he has no building of his own he is entitled as provided under Section 10(3)(a)(i)(a) of the Rent Control Act to apply to the Rent Controller for an order evicting the tenant and to put him in possession of the building. It may also be added that the building now required to be vacated by the petitioner also appears to be of similar accommodation as the one now in the occupation of the respondents and there, fore it cannot also be said that even that will be sufficient for the purpose of both the respondents.

    12. Therefore the petitioner has rightly been ordered to be evicted from the building. Accordingly there are no merits in this revision petition and it is dismissed with costs. Time granted for the petitioner to vacate the building is two months.

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    Comments

    K. Nagappa Petitioner/ v. T.D Krishnasa And Another S/Petitioners.
    (Aug 7, 1970)