1. This is an application for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the award in I.D No. 46 of 1968 relating to issue No. 1, published in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette dated 10-7-1969.
2. The material facts in order to appreciate the contentions raised before me are that, the Government by G.O.Ms 1384 dated 20th August, 1968 referred some disputes for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal. One of the questions was whether the dismissal of the workmen Sarvasri R. Subbarayalu, M. Narayana, T. Venugopal and V. Rajagopal from 9th May, 1968 is justified, and if not, to what relief are they entitled. I am not concerned in this writ petition in regard to the other issues referred to by the Industrial Tribunal as they are not disputed before me. The Industrial Tribunal, after a proper enquiry, by its award dated 30th May, 1969 held that the dismissal of the four employees was improper and therefore directed them to be reinstated with back-wages. It is to question the correctness of this part of the award that the present writ petition is filed. The principal contention of Sri K. Srinivasamurthi, the learned counsel for the petitioner, firstly is that the award which reversed the order of dismissal is bad. It is not, however, possible to accept this contention. The Industrial Tribunal has, on an appreciation of the evidence produced before it, reached the conclusion that the dismissal of these workers was improper. It is not the function of this Court to reappreciate the evidence in order to find out whether that conclusion is correctly drawn. The finding of fact is binding upon this Court. No attack on it was made on any permissible ground. Since no question of law also is involved. I do not experience any difficulty in rejecting the first contention.
3. It was then contended that the order of back-wages is not based on any enquiry or finding. I find sufficient force in this contentions.
4. Now, the law on the question of backwages does not seem to be in doubt. It is true that the relationship of master and servant is based on contract but in the field of labour law, such a contract is subject to certain principles which have been evolved in that field in view of the compelling necessity of doing social justice. Nevertheless the contract of service is not always completely disregarded. It is true that the Industrial Tribunal in certain permissible cases can alter the terms and conditions of the contract or in certain cases even re-make a contract between the parties. But those cases are different than the one with which I am concerned. In this case, the contract of service has been broken by the management because the services of the respondents were terminated improperly. For such a wrongful dismissal of an employee under the ordinary law, the employee would be entitled to sue for compensation caused by such wrongful dismissal which in a sense is a breach of contract. The employee would be entitled to compensation for any loss or damage caused to him by such wrongful dismissal which naturally arose in the usual course of things from such breach. In estimating the loss or damage arising from such a breach of contract or wrongful dismissal, the means which existed of remedying the inconvenience caused by the non-performance of the contract by the management must have to be taken into account. In other words, in assessing the loss or damage, if the employee who claims damage has not made any effort to secure another job or he was Employed elsewhere during the crucial period, then he would not be entitled to damages claimed by him although he may be entitled to some-nominal damages. Thus in order to successfully clam damages for wrongful dismissal, it is for the employee to show that he was not employed during the period for which be is claiming the compensation or although employed was not getting the same remuneration which be would the got if his service had been continued which was wrongfully terminated. He must also show that he made-honest efforts to secure a job thus mitigating the loss which he suffered. It is only whence-makes such assertions in the claim that the question of a warding back-wages would, arise. This position which exists under the normal law, in my opinion, exists also in a proceeding before the Labour Court on a reference made under section 10-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. If the employee during the relevant period on a remuneration which is equal or higher to their remuneration, which he was drawing when he was dismissed then he would be entitled only to a nominal damage for the wrongful dismissal. On the other hand, if he was not employed at all or although employed but, was not employed, on a remuneration which he was getting at the time when he was dismissed wrongfully, then he would be entitled to the compensation which would normally be equal to the remuneration which he as was drawing at the time of wrongful dismissal, but in order to successfully get that, he has to further prove that he made genuine efforts to secure in adequate employment. He is of course not bound to accept the employment which does not suit his aptitude or the nature of work which he was doing. Nevertheless honest efforts on his art to mitigate the loss has got to be asserted and proved.
5. Halsbury's Law of England summarises the position of law in Volume, 25 at page 523 in paragraph 995 thus.
“In any other case the damages are to be measured by the amount of wages which the servant has been prevented from earning by reason of his wrongful dismissal, including the valued any other benefit to which he is entitled by virtue of his contract and of which he is deprived in consequence of its breach, after taking into consideration the probabilities of his obtaining employment elsewhere. If, therefore, he obtains other employment immediately after his dismissal, the amount which would otherwise be payable as compensation must be reduced by the amount of remuneration which he receives in respect of such employment, and if he is paid the same or higher wages, his loss is merely nominal. Moreover, it is his duty to minimise his loss, and he must therefore use due diligence in endeavouring to obtain employment. If, but for his own default or neglect, he could, immediately after his dismissal, have obtained suitable employment at similar wages, he cannot recover more than nominal damages against the master. He is not however, bound to accept employment of a different kind, or even a lower position in the same kind of employment and in such cases, it is immaterial that the rate of wages offered is the same.”
6. That these principles prevail also in the industrial field is seen from the following decisions.
7. In Rakeshwar Dayal v. Labour Court . 1962 I L.L.J 3. the Tribunal had directed the reinstatement of the employee subject to the condition that he would be paid 50% of his salary during the period where he did not work for the employer. S.S Dhavan, J. of the Allahabad High Court observed:
“A servant who sues his employer for wrongful dismissal must show that he made effort to minimize his loss. The petitioner has not stated that he made any effort to minimise his loss during his period of enforced idleness. The Tribunal also considered the facts that the conduct of the employer was not mala fide and there was a bonafide dispute between the parties. It was within its powers to consider these matters which are not irrelevant. The petitioner seems to think that he became entitled to full salary for the interim period as soon as the tribunal used the word ‘reinstatement’.”
8. In Malik Dairy Farms v. Its Workers' Union . 1968-II L.L.J 525. a Bench of the Bombay High Court followed the above said decision of the Allahabad High Court. The learned Judges observed:
“As at present advised, we are inclined to agree with the view expressed by the Allahabad High Court in the case mentioned above”.
9. To the same effect is the decision of this Court given in W.P No. 2632 of 1968 dated 11-7-1969.
10. I do not think my learned brother Narasimham, J. decided anything contrary to what is stated above in Benaras Hall, Nellore v. Labour Court, Guntur . 1967-II An. W.R 309.. The learned Judge observed:
“There is sufficient authority to support the contention that the wages actually earned by the worker employed elsewhere have to be deducted.”
11. In support of thus contention, the learned Judge referred to the two decisions which I have considered in this case. This dictum supports the view which I am taking and I fail to see how it can be said that it goes inconsistent in the face of the clear language employed.
12. Mehta Brothers v. Amar Singh . 1961-II L.L.J 610. also takes a similar view although the facts of that case were somewhat different.
13. I also do not think that the decision in United Bleachers v. Labour Court . 1964-II L.L.J 156. is contrary to the proposition laid down above. What the learned Judge stated was:
“It is true the point has been taken by the management in their counter-statement before the Labour Court. But the management did nothing further, for it appears not one question was put by the management to the workman when he was given evidence to elicit the results of his employment so that the Labour Court would be in a position to assess the quantum of back-wages it should direct payment. On that view the Labour Court cannot be said to be in error on this question either.”
14. What had happened in that case was that the employee had claimed back wages and gave evidence in support of that claim. In the cross examination no questions were put to the employee in regard to his employment elsewhere. The learned Judge therefore on the appreciation of the evidence came to the conclusion that there was no reason to interfere with the award made by the Industrial Tribunal in regard to back-wages.
15. Strong reliance, however, was put by the learned advocate appearing for the employees on Daljeet & Co. v. State of Punjab . ???. a decision of the Punjab High Court. The following observation is relied upon:
“In the first place, it only deals with damages for dismissal and not with reinstatement and it seems to me that the normal order when a dismissal is set aside, and the dismissed employee is reinstated with continuity of service, is for the payment of full wages from the date of the dismissal held to be wrongful to the date of reinstatement. This is so whether the dismissed employee is a Government servant or employed in a private industry and in the present case the labour court has actually only allowed wages for the period in question at the rate of two-thirds. It seems to me that if an employer in an enquiry of this kind wishes the normal order to be departed from, and the only ground I can think of which would justify such a course would be that during the period in question the dismissed employee had obtained employment and been paid wages by another employer, it is for the employer to raise this matter in the course of the enquiry and prove that the employee has been earning wages for the whole or any part of the period in question but no such allegation appears to have been made at any stags in the present case, I am, therefore of the opinion that there is no forcing the appeal of the company.”
16. Based on this observation it is argued that the onus was on the petitioner to assert that the employees were employed during the relevant period and therefore they are not entitled to any compensation. I do not think that any such proposition can be inferred from the above said observation. After going through the judgment I am inclined to feel that the inclined judges were not laying down any law relating to the burden of proof, it is already seen that the duty to mitigate the damages is on the employee and consequently it is for the employee to state that either he was not employed at all or although employed was not getting full remuneration as he was drawing on the day when he was dismissed apart from showing that he made honest efforts to secure employment of equal status and fetching equal remuneration. If the Punjab High Court is taken to be deciding anything contrary to what is stated above, I respectfully disagree, I however feel that what all the learned Judges wanted to say in that particular case was that the assertions made by the employees who were granted back-wages by the Tribunal since were not denied by the employer, their Lordships declined to interfere in appeal. More than this it is difficult to read in the judgment.
17. For the reasons aforesaid I am satisfied that merely because an order of reinstatement is made, the respondents would not automatically be entitled to get the back-wages for the entire period. In order to entitle them to get that they have to prove as stated above that they were unemployed and/or under-employed and that they made sincere efforts to mitigate the loss or damage. It is then for the management to prove otherwise.
18. It is, however, seen from this case that without making any assertion of any kind, the employees seem to have demanded back-wages in the claim petition. The management also most cursorily stated that they are not so entitled. In the writ petition presented before me, however, the petitioner-employer in paragraph 8 asserted;
“The Industrial Tribunal also erred in granting back wages and attendant benefits. No evidence was let in by the concerned workmen that they were unemployed from the date of dismissal, neither have they stated that in spite of their best efforts, they could not get alternative employment, in the absence of evidence to that effect, it is not open to the Industrial Tribunal to grant back wages. Before granting hack wages, it must be specifically proved that for the entire period the workmen were unemployed and as already stated they could not get any alternative employment. So, the award of back wages is also one without jurisdiction.”
19. In the counter, no specific reply has been given to this paragraph. It is not asserted in the counter that all the four respondents were unemployed or under-employed during the said period. They have not mentioned as to how they could sustain the order of back-wages. In these circumstances, I think, I have to quash that portion of the award which relates to the back-wages and direct the Industrial Tribunal to accept written statements of the parties on this aspect of the matter, and after, providing them a reasonable opportunity to adduce such evidence as they desire, decide the matter relating to back-wages in the light of what is stated above. In so far as the order of reinstatement is concerned, it will remain in tact as I have already held that I do not find any reason to interfere with that part of the award.
20. As a result, the writ petition is partly allowed. In the circumstances of the case, however, I make no order as to costs.