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Factual and Procedural Background

These two Civil Revision Petitions challenge a common order of the Subordinate Judge, Chirala, dated 13-11-1970, which dismissed interlocutory applications (I.As. Nos. 26 and 29 of 1970) seeking amendment of plaints in O.S. Nos. 5 and 10 of 1970. The suits were for recovery on promissory notes executed by defendant No. 2 (managing partner of defendant firm) — each promissory note bearing insufficient stamps (four one-anna stamps instead of the required 0-25 paise stamps). The plaintiffs sued to recover sums due under those promissory notes after promissory notes were dishonoured.

In their written statements the defendants raised objection under Section 35 of the Stamp Act that the promissory notes were not duly stamped and therefore inadmissible in evidence. In O.S. No. 5 the trial court originally overruled that objection, but on revision this Court (Division Bench) held that the promissory note was not duly stamped and thus inadmissible; the trial court was left to decide whether the plaintiffs could be permitted to amend their plaints to fall back on the original cause(s) of action. Thereafter the plaintiffs filed interlocutory applications in 1970 seeking such amendments; the Subordinate Judge dismissed them with costs, leading to these Civil Revision Petitions.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code can entertain and correct the trial court's decision refusing amendments to pleadings (i.e., whether the revision petitions are maintainable) when the question of amendment relates to the jurisdiction of the trial court to try the suit.
  2. Whether a plaintiff whose suit is founded on an unstamped or insufficiently stamped promissory note (inadmissible under Section 35 of the Stamp Act) may, by amendment of the plaint, fall back on the original cause of action — particularly where the suit on the original cause of action is barred by limitation either on the date of filing the suit, or on the date of the amendment application.
  3. If such fallback amendments are permissible at all, under what circumstances (e.g., presence of "special circumstances", lack of prejudice to defendant, or where the amended claim is not barred on the date of the amendment) they may be allowed.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (for allowing amendments)

  • Amendments necessary to determine the real controversy between parties should be allowed where they do not work injustice or prejudice to the other side; courts have allowed amendments even at appellate stages and even where limitation issues existed at the date of amendment.
  • The real controversy is the respondents' indebtedness to the petitioners; technicalities should not defeat genuine claims.
  • The delay in filing amendment applications was caused by the trial court's initial view that the promissory notes were admissible; the High Court later reversed that view.
  • Even if promissory notes are inadmissible in evidence, they can be used for collateral purposes (e.g., acknowledgements) to extend limitation, and thus plaintiffs should be allowed to amend to the original cause of action.
  • The petitioners' counsel relied on several decisions of the Supreme Court, this Court and other High Courts to support allowance of amendments in the interests of justice.

Respondents' Arguments (against allowing amendments)

  • The revision petitions are not maintainable because this Court, in revisional jurisdiction, cannot correct mere errors of law (unless they relate to jurisdiction).
  • As a rule, amendments that have the effect of depriving defendants of a valuable defence of limitation should not be permitted; permitting such amendments after long delay would prejudice defendants and work injustice.
  • Unstamped or insufficiently stamped promissory notes are inadmissible under Section 35 of the Stamp Act for any purpose; therefore such notes cannot be used even as acknowledgements to extend limitation periods.
  • In the present cases the suits on the basis of the original causes of action are barred not only on the date of the amendment petitions but also on the dates of filing the suits themselves; hence amendments to fall back cannot be permitted.
  • The respondents relied upon various authorities supporting the proposition that where earlier causes of action are time-barred, fallback amendments should be refused.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Pandurang Dhondi Chougule v. Maruti Hari Jadhave, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 153 The High Court under Section 115 C.P.C. cannot correct errors of fact or errors of law unless those errors relate to the jurisdiction of the court to try the dispute. Applied to determine maintainability of revision petitions: Court held that amendment questions relate to jurisdiction, therefore revision petitions are maintainable under Section 115.
Pirgonda Hongonda Patil v. Kalgonda Shilgonda Patil (Supreme Court) Amendments ought to be allowed if (a) they do not work injustice to the other side and (b) are necessary to determine the real questions in controversy; amendment must be refused if it would deprive defendant of a defence (e.g., limitation) causing irremediable injury. Adopted as governing principle for allowing or refusing amendments; used as the primary test whether amendment would cause injustice to defendant.
L.J. Leach & Co. Ltd. v. Jardine Skinner & Co. Courts as a rule decline amendments if a fresh suit on amended claim would be barred on the date of application; but this is a discretionary factor and does not remove the Court's power to allow amendment in interests of justice. Relied upon to show limitation on its own is a factor in discretion; amendments may nevertheless be allowed in appropriate circumstances.
A.K. Gupta & Sons Ltd v. Damodor Valley Corporation, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 96 General rule: party not allowed by amendment to set up new cause of action if suit on new cause is barred; but if amendment is merely a different/additional approach to same facts, it may be allowed even after statutory period expires. Used to distinguish between adding a new cause of action (which is generally disallowed if time-barred) and varying approach to same facts (which may be allowed).
Konduru Seshu Reddi v. Vemareddy Rama Ragavareddy, A.I.R. 1964 A.P. 118 Following Supreme Court principles, amendment may be allowed in appeal (e.g., on payment of costs). Cited as local appellate authority where amendment was allowed subject to conditions (costs), supporting discretionary allowance in some circumstances.
Pendyala Narsimham v. Pendyala Venkata Narsimha Rao, A.I.R. 1963 A.P. 78 Amendment should be permitted if special circumstances exist; permissible even when an alternative is claimed provided it furthers justice and does not impose real hardship. Applied to the proposition that special circumstances can justify amendments despite limitation concerns; Court found no special circumstances here.
Rahmatullah v. Mastan Seth, 1956 III A.L.T. 806 Observations supporting allowance of amendments in appropriate circumstances. Cited as consistent authority recognising circumstances where amendments should be permitted without causing hardship.
Nallapureddy Eswaramma v. P. Rangamma, 1969 I An. W.R. 242 Order V, Rule 17 C.P.C. is wide enough to permit amendments even if claim is time-barred, but this is an exception; normally defendant should not be deprived of limitation-based rights. Emphasised that allowance to amend despite limitation is exceptional; used to justify caution in permitting fallback amendments.
Official Assignee v. V.A. Kuppuswamy Naidu (Full Bench, Madras High Court) Full Bench allowed amendment to base claim on original cause of action where suit on basis of promissory note was barred by limitation. Court held this authority not helpful to petitioners because that case did not turn on inadmissibility of promissory note under the Stamp Act; therefore distinguishable.
Gangaram v. Keshava Deo (Division Bench, Rajasthan High Court) Where promissory note is not admissible in evidence, plaintiff can be permitted to amend plaint so as to convert suit to original cause of action. Noted by this Court; used to classify case law and to observe that such fallback is permissible provided the amended claim is within limitation.
Dhondi Emkiramal v. Hazari Vittal (Hyderabad High Court) & N. Shivonna v. J.B. Thimmiah (Mysore High Court) Decisions to same effect as Gangaram: where promissory note inadmissible, plaintiff may be permitted to fall back on original cause of action. Cited as supporting instances where fallback was allowed, subject to limitation constraints.
Anwaruddin v. Fathim Bai Abidin (Wallace J.) If suit is brought on an unstamped promissory note, plaintiff may be allowed to fall back on the original cause of action provided the suit on the original cause is not barred. Applied as authority that fallback is permissible only when original cause is within limitation; Court distinguished present cases where earlier causes were time-barred.
Bhagwan Baksh v. Parag Narain (Division Bench, Oudh High Court) Suit on an insufficiently stamped promissory note cannot be decreed even on admission if the earlier promissory note (which was renewed) was time-barred. Cited to support refusal to permit fallback amendments where the earlier cause of action was already barred; used to justify dismissal of amendment petitions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two analytical stages: (1) maintainability of the revision petitions; and (2) merits of the amendment applications in light of statutory provisions and precedent.

On maintainability, the Court relied on Pandurang Dhondi Chougule v. Maruti Hari Jadhave to state that Section 115 C.P.C. does not permit the High Court to correct mere errors of fact or law unless those errors relate to the jurisdiction of the trial court. The Court then analysed whether the question of permitting or refusing amendment of pleadings relates to the jurisdiction of the court to try the suit. The Court concluded that it does: allowing an amendment wrongly would mean the court assumed jurisdiction it did not have; refusing an amendment wrongly would mean the court failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it. Because questions of amendment thus implicate the trial court's jurisdiction, the revisional petitions were held maintainable and the preliminary objection to maintainability was rejected.

On the merits, the Court reviewed the statutory provision (Section 35 of the Stamp Act) and relevant authorities. The Court emphasised the clear language of Section 35 that an instrument chargeable with duty shall not be admitted in evidence for any purpose unless duly stamped. The Court rejected the petitioners' contention that an inadmissible promissory note could nevertheless be used for collateral purposes (such as acknowledgements to extend limitation), noting the absence of any provision in the Stamp Act analogous to Section 49 of the Registration Act for collateral use.

The Court then surveyed case law governing amendments: the Pirgonda line of authority setting the twin conditions for amendment (no injustice and necessary for determining real controversy); the L.J. Leach and A.K. Gupta authorities clarifying discretion where amendments would raise time-barred claims; and various High Court decisions that permitted fallback only if the amended claim was within limitation or if special circumstances existed. The Court distilled the principles:

  • Amendments necessary to decide the real controversy and not causing injustice should be allowed.
  • If the amended claim is barred on the date of the amendment application, amendment will normally be refused because it would deprive defendant of the limitation defence.
  • Amendments adding a new cause of action after limitation are not allowed unless they are merely a different approach to the same facts or special circumstances exist.

Applying those principles to the present cases, the Court observed that the suit promissory notes were executed in renewal of earlier promissory notes and that, in these cases, the suits on the amended causes of action were barred both on the date of the amendment petitions and on the dates of filing the suits. The Court further held that an inadmissible promissory note could not be admitted even for collateral purposes to save limitation. Relying on authority such as Bhagwan Baksh v. Parag Narain and Anwaruddin v. Fathim Bai Abidin, the Court concluded that where earlier causes are time-barred, fallback amendments cannot be allowed; and in the absence of special circumstances here, allowing the amendments would work irremediable injustice to defendants.

Consequently, the Subordinate Judge's dismissal of the interlocutory applications was held to be correct.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Civil Revision Petitions are dismissed. The Court held that the Subordinate Judge was right in dismissing the interlocutory applications seeking to amend the plaints to fall back on the original causes of action; the revision petitions therefore fail and are dismissed with costs.

Implications: The direct effect is that the trial court's order dismissing the amendment petitions stands: the plaintiffs are not permitted to amend their plaints to rely on the earlier causes of action in these suits. The Court made clear that where a suit promissory note is inadmissible for want of proper stamping, such a note cannot be used even for collateral purposes (such as acknowledgements to extend limitation). The decision applies established principles concerning amendments and limitation; the opinion treats the outcome as an application of existing law rather than the establishment of any new legal precedent.

    Indlamudi Veeraiah v. Kamala Mining Corporation

    1. These two Civil Revision Petitions are directed against common order passed by the Subordinate Judge, Chirala, on interlocutory Applications No. 26 and 29 of 1970 in O.S Nos. 5 and 10 of the 1970. Since both the Civil Revision Petition, give rise to a common question of law, they are disposed of by a common order.

    2. The material facts leading to the filing of these Civil Revision petitions may briefly be stated:— Defendant No. 2, as the Managing Partner of defendant No. 1 firm, executed two promissory note., one in favour of Yarlagadda Ballah and the other in favour of Indlamudi Veeriah, Four one-anna denomination stamps were affixed on each of those promissory notes instead of 0-25 paise stamps as required by law. Since the promissors did not pay the moneys due by them, the promisees, Yarlagadda Ballah and Indlamudi Veeriah, filed suits for the recovery of moneys due to them under those promissory notes. Those original Suits were re-numbered as O.S No 5 of 1970 and No. 10 of 1970 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Chirala. In their respective written statements the defendants, inter alia raised an objection that the full promissory notes were not duly stamped according to law and hence, on that account inadmissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Stamp Act. In O.S No. 5 of 1970 the aforesaid objection raised by the defendants was over-ruled by the Subordinate Judge, who by his order dated 17-I2-1963, held that the suit promissory note was duly stamped and was admissible in evidence. The defendants carried the matter in revision to this Court in C.R.P No. 613 of 1964. A Division Bench of this court allowed the said revision petition holding that the suit promissory note was not duly stamped and was, consequently, inadmissible in evidence. The question whether the suit could be considered on the cause of action as stated in the plaint, or the plaintiff should be permitted to amend the plaint to a to fall back on the original cause of action, was left open to be decided by the trial court.

    3. In those circumstances, in both the original Suit Nos. 5 and 10 of 1970 the plaintiff, filed I.A Nos. and 26 and 29 of 1970 respectively for amendment of their plaints, so as to fall back on the original causes of action. The Subordinate Judge, Chirala, by his common order dated 13-11-1970 dismissed both the I.As with costs, against which the present Civil Revision Petitions are filed.

    4. The learned counsel, Sri R.V Vidya Sagar. appearing for the petitioners, submitted that it is now well established that all amendment which are necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties, when they do not work injustice or prejudice to the other side, should be allowed. Courts have allowed amendment even at the stage of appeal, though the suits on the dates of amendment petitions were barred by limitation. The real controversy in these suits was whether the respondents are indebted to the petitioners. The delay in filing the interlocutory applications for amendment of the plaints, was due to the fact that the lower court had held the promissory notes to be admissible in evidence, but the High Court reversed the view of the trial court Although the promissory notes are inadmissible in evidence, a promissory notes, to prove the respondents liabilities, still they can be used and locked late for the collateral purposes at acknowledgments extending the periods of limitation for filing the suits on the basis of the original causes of action. Genuine claims should not be permitted to be defeated for technical reasons by refusing permission to amend the plaints, in support of the above arguments, the learned counsel relied upon a number of decided cases of the Supreme Court, this Court and various other High Courts.

    5. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that the revision petitions are not maintainable, for the simple reason that, even assuming that the lower court had taken an erroneous view of law, this Court would not, in the exercise of III revisional power, correct errors of law. Assuming these revision petitions are maintainable still as a rule, amendments of plaints will not be permitted when the suits are barred on the dates of amendment petitions so as to deprive the defendants of a valuable defence of the plea of limitation If amendments are allowed in such cases after long delays, the defendants will be prejudiced and it will work injustice to the opposite-party. Therefore, the trial judge rightly dismissed the amendment petitions. No un-stamped or insufficiently stamped promissory notes can be admitted in evidence under section 35 of the Stamp Act, for any purposes whatsoever, inadmissible promissory notes, cannot, as acknowledgements, extend the periods of limitation so as to bring the suits based on original causes of action within time when they would actually be barred. The decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners are only cases where, on the dates of amendment petitions, the suits were barred by limitation. The instant cases are those where the suits on the basis of the original causes of action are not only barred on the date of the amendment petitions, but also on the dates of filing of the suits Hence such amendment cannot be permitted in law in support of this argument, the learned counsel relied upon various decisions.

    6. I will first decide the question of the maintainability of the revision petitions. What the Supreme Court has held in Pandurang Dhondi Chougule v. Maruti Hari Jadhave . A.I.R 1966 S.C 153. is that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, cannot correct errors of fact, however gross they may be, or even errors of law unless those errors have got relation to the Jurisdiction of the Court to try the dispute itself.

    7. The question of permitting or refusing to permit amendment of pleadings, in my opinion, relates to the question of jurisdiction of the court to try the suit. If the Court allows an amendment of pleadings when, in law, is ought not to, it would mean that the Court had assumed jurisdiction which did not vest in it. If the Court wrongly refuses to permit an amendment, it would mean that the Court had failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it. In either case, the question of amendment of pleadings relates to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the suit, and hence the present Civil Revision Petitions are maintainable. The preliminary objection to the maintainability of the Civil Revision Petitions relied by the respondent Counsel is, therefore, without substance and is, accordingly rejected.

    8. Before I consider the merits, some more facts are required to be stated.

    9. The suit promissory note in O.S No 5 of 1970 was executed by the defendant on 17-12-1958 in renewal of an earlier promissory note dated 17-12-1955 for a sum of Rs. 6,800/- O.S No 5 of 1970 was filed in the proper Court on 18-12-1961, i.e on the last date of limitation from the date of suit promissory note, 17-12-1961, the proceeding day being Sunday and a public holiday.

    10. O.S No 10 of 1970 was filed on 16-12-1961 on the basis of the promissory note dated 16-11-1958 executed defendant No. 2 in renewal of an earlier promissory note. It was stated that the loans are evidenced by entries in the account-books. The suits were filed. In 1961 and notwithstanding the defences raised by the defendants in their 4 written statements that the suit promissory notes were not duly stamped and were inadmissible in evidence, the respective plaintiffs filed amendment petitions, i.e, I.A Nos. 26 and 29 of 1970 in the year 1970. The Learned Subordinate Judge observed that, in the plaints, the respective plaintiffs did not refer to the original transactions of loan. The learned counsel, Sri R.V Vidya Sagar disputed that observation of the Subordinate Judge. In one case the plaint copy has been shown to me, but was not filed as a material paper. The plaint in the other suit was stated to be on the same terms. The plaint copies in both the suits have, however, not been filed in these Civil Revision Petitions, as material papers. To rely upon documents. In Civil Revision Petitions without filing copies of those document is not a commendable practice. However, the question of correctness or otherwise of he observation of the Subordinate Judge need not be decided in these Civil Revision Petitions.

    11. The learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the interlocutory Applications, observing that:—

    “……If the petitioners are now allowed to amend the plaint and introduce original causes of action which were not originally pleaded in the plaint, it would amount to allowing the plaintiffs to bring fresh claims based on original consideration which had clearly become time barred”

    12. The principles governing the amendment of pleadings are now well established. In Pirgonda Hongonda Patil v. Kalgonda Shilgonda Patil the Supreme Court laid down the following principles Which govern the question of amendment of pleadings:—

    “… All amendments ought to be allowed which satisfy the two conditions (a) not working injustice to the other side, and (b) of being necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties Amendments should be refused only where the other party cannot be placed in the same position as if the pleading had been originally correct, but the amendment would cause him an injury which could not be compensated in costs it is merely a particular case of this general rule that where a plaintiff seeks to amend by setting up a fresh claim in respect of a cause of action which since the institution of the suit had become barred by limitation, the amendment must be refused to allow it would cause the defendant an injury which could act be compensated by costs, by depriving him of a good defence to the claim. The ultimate test therefore still remained the same; can the amendment be allowed without injustice to the other side”.

    13. In L.J Leach & Co. Ltd. v. Jardine Skinner & Company, the Supreme Court held that:—

    “……It is no doubt true that Courts would, as a rule, decline to allow amendments, if a fresh suit on the amended claim would be barred by limitation on the date of the application. But that is a factor to be taken into account in exercise of the discretion as to whether amendment should be ordered, and does not affect the power of the Court to order it, if that is required in the interests of Justice.”

    14. In A.K Gupta & Sons Ltd v. Damodor Valley Corporation . A.I.R 1967 S.C 96, the Supreme Court held that:—

    “In the matter of allowing amendment of pleadings the general rule is that a party is not allowed by amendment to set up a new case or a new cause of action particularly when a suit on the new cause of action is barred. Where, however, the amendment does not constituted the addiction of a new cause of action or raise a different case, but amounts merely to a different or additional approach to the same facts, the amendment is to be allowed even after expiry of the statutory period of limitation”

    15. In Konduru Seshu Reddi v. Vemareddy Rama Ragavareddy . A.I.R 1964 A.P 118., following the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the above two cases, this Court allowed the amendment in appeal on payment of costs.

    16. In Pendyala Narsimham v. Pendyala Venkata Narsimha Rao . A.I.R 1963 A.P 78., a Division Bench of this Court held that amendment should be permitted if special circumstances exist and even in a case where an alternative was claimed provided it was in furtherance of justice and it did not involve the other side in real hardship.

    17. To the same effect are the observations of Chandra Reddy J (as he then was) in Rahmatullah v. Mastan Seth . 1956 III A.L.T 806.

    18. In Nallapureddy Eswaramma v. P. Rangamma . 1969 I An. W.R 242., Gopal Rao Ekbote, J. observed that:—

    “It is true that Or. V.I R. 17 Civil procedure Code, is wide enough to permit all such amendments although the claim of the plaintiff it time barred. But this not a rule. It is an exception. Normally the defendant should not be deprived of valuable right which has accrued to him on the basis of limitation”.

    19. It is seen from the above cases that all amendments which are necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties are to be allowed. If the amended claim is barred on the date of amendment application, the amendment would not, normally, be allowed, because it would work injustice to the other party and would deprive him of a valuable defence based on limitation, which cannot be compensated by costs, Such amendments can be allowed only if special circumstances exist, but not in the ordinary circumstances, Amendments will not be allowed if a new case or cause of action is sought to be added after limitation, unless it is a different or as additional approach to the some facts. These are the general principles governing the question of allowing or disallowing amendments of pleadings.

    20. Before those general principles are applied to cases of amendment petitions filed in cases where suit promissory notes are inadmissible in evidence, I would consider whether any, or If so, for what purposes can an inadmissible promissory note be admitted in evidence? Section 35 of the Stamp Act says that no instrument chargeable with duty shall be admitted in evidence for any purpose, or shall be acted upon, or registered, etc, unless such instrument is duly stamped. It is not disputed that the suit promissory notes are inadmissible in evidence. The language of the section is clear. If the Legislature wanted that unstamped or insufficiently stamped promissory notes are to be admitted in evidence for collateral purposes, it would have stated so in the section itself. I do not find anything in the section to that effect. A document requiring registration can be used for collateral purposes of proving the nature and character of possession under Section 49 of the Registration Act, but there is no such provision in the Stamp Act in regard to unstamped or insufficiently stamped documents.

    21. An improperly stamped promissory note, which note contains a statement of amounts due on previous promissory notes, cannot be admitted in evidence to prove the amount of liability in order to save limitation in respect of the promissory notes previously executed. A long line of authorities in support of the above proposition is found at page 252 of the 3rd Edition of the Indian Stamp Act by K. Crishnamurthy. Hence I reject the contention of the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners that an inadmissible promissory note for a collateral purposes can be admitted in evidence.

    22. The Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Official Assignee v. V.A Kuppuswamy Naidu, is a case where amendment was allowed for basing the claim on the original cause of action when the suit on the basis of the promissory note was found barred by limitation. That is not a case of falling back on the original cause of action on account the inadmissibility of the promissory note is evidence. That decision does not, therefore help the petitioners.

    23. in Gangaram v. Keshava Deo, a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court held that where, in a suit for the recovery of money on a promissory note, the promissory note is not admissible in evidence the plaintiff can be permitted to amend his plaint so as to convert his suit on the original cause of action.

    24. The Court observed that “where a promissory note is inadmissible in evidence, the plaintiff can be permitted to have his claim on the original cause of action”, has been the subject-matter of controversy among various High Courts and those cases can be broadly classified into two: (1) where the promissory note is executed in respect of an exterior claim, and (2) where the loan in contemporaneous with the exception of the promissory note in respect of the first class of cases. The Court observed that the law is now well settled that if a promissory note is not admissible is evidence, the plaintiff can be permitted to fall back on the original cause of action, provided it is within the period of limitation.

    25. To the same effect is the decision of Siadat Ali Khan, J. of the Hyderabad High Court in Dhondi Emkiramal v. Hazari Vittal, and Sadasivayya, J. of the Mysore High Court in N. Shivonna v. J.B Thimmiah.

    26. Thus, in cases where the suit promissory notes are executed in renewal of earlier promissory notes, amendment can be allowed so as to fall back on the original cause of action, provided the suit on the amended cause of action is not barred, if, on the date of the amendment petition the claim on the amended cause of action can be allowed not in the ordinary circumstances but if there exist special circumstances. No special circumstances exist in these cases.

    27. Apart from the fact that suits on the amended causes of action are barred on the dates of the amendment petitions, they are also, in these cases, barred on the dates of suits. In such cases, it has been held by Wallace J, in Anwaruddin v. Fathim Bai Abidin, that where a suit is brought on a promissory note which is unstamped, the plaintiff, If the suit on the original cause of action is not barred, may be allowed to fall back on the original cause of action by amending the plaint.

    28. A Division Bench of Oudh High Court, in Bhagwan Baksh v. Parag Narain. held that a suit on an insufficiency stamped promissory note, cannot be decreed even on admission by the defendant of the genuineness of the promissory note, if the suit on the previous promissory note, of which the subsequent promissory note was a renewal, was barred by time.

    29. It is, therefore manifest that in a suit based on a promissory note which is inadmissible in evidence for want of proper stamp, amendment so as to fall back on the original cause of action cannot be permitted if the suit on the basis of the earlier promissory note, in renewal of which the suit promissory note was executed, is barred, either on the date of suit or on the date of the amendment petition, and particularly in the latter case, when no special circumstances exist for allowing the amendment. If such amendments are allowed, it would work injustice to the other side which cannot be compensated by costs, and the defendant would be deprived of a valuable defence based on limitation.

    30. The Subordinate Judge was therefore, right in dismissing the amendment petitions. The Civil Revision petitions fail and are dismissed with costs in CRP No. 59 of 1970.

    31. C.R.Ps dismissed with costs

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    Indlamudi Veeraiah v. Kamala Mining Corporation
    (Jan 21, 1972)