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Factual and Procedural Background

The suit concerns alienations of ancestral property by the 1st defendant (the father of the plaintiffs), who sold lands, houses and other items in the ancestral village Pachala Tadiparru during 1953–1954. The sales in controversy for this appeal are those evidenced by Ex. B-28 (10-2-1954) in favour of the 2nd defendant, Ex. B-12 (7-2-1954) and Ex. B-14 (22-2-1954) in favour of the 16th defendant, and Ex. B-32 (19-2-1954) in favour of the 15th defendant.

The plaintiffs (sons of the 1st defendant) alleged that these alienations were nominal, lacked consideration, were not legally necessary and were not for the benefit of the family, and therefore were not binding on them. The defendants (purchasers) maintained that they paid consideration, the sales were preceded by agreements showing the 1st defendant intended to purchase lands at Chevur (Krishna district) for the family's benefit, and that the sale proceeds were in fact applied to those purchases.

On these pleadings, the primary issues framed and tried included issues 1 and 7 (relating to the sales under Exs. B-28 and B-12), and issues 4, 4(a), 5, 5(a) and 5(b) (relating to the sale of the tiled house and cattle-sheds). The Subordinate Judge found the alienations were for the benefit of the estate. The plaintiffs appealed; the present opinion affirms the lower court's findings in respect of the matters now under appeal and dismisses the appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the alienations evidenced by Ex. B-28 (10-2-1954), Ex. B-12 (7-2-1954), Ex. B-14 (22-2-1954) and Ex. B-32 (19-2-1954) were intended to benefit the joint family of which the 1st defendant and the plaintiffs were undivided members.
  2. Whether the purchasers (alienees) had made bona fide enquiries and paid consideration (including payments to Narasimharao) such that they can rely on the sales.
  3. Whether the sale proceeds were applied by the 1st defendant to purchase land at Chevur and, if so, whether those purchases were for the benefit of the family.
  4. Whether sales of the tiled house and the cattle-shed were justified (including the application of part of the tiled-house sale proceeds to ancestral debt and other procedural dispositions).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Plaintiffs') Arguments

  • The 1st defendant had no necessity to sell or to migrate to another village; the sales were unnecessary.
  • The alienations were nominal and intended to defeat the rights and interests of other coparceners; therefore the sales are not binding on the appellants.

Respondents' (Defendants / Purchasers') Arguments

  • The 2nd defendant: Paid Rs. 8,000 for Ac. 2-40 cents (Ex. B-28), with prior agreement and instalment payments (Rs. 3,000 on 11-9-1953 and Rs. 5,000 on 2-2-1954) made to Narasimharao (the vendor who sold to the 1st defendant); the 1st defendant endorsed receipts on the agreement; thus the sale was supported by consideration and the proceeds used to purchase property at Chevur.
  • The 16th defendant: Paid Rs. 6,000 on 11-9-1953 and Rs. 11,000 on 2-2-1954 to Narasimharao (endorsements present), and relied on an agreement of sale (Ex. E-13 / other agreements) showing purchases at Chevur.
  • Defendants 5 and 6: Contended the tiled house was sold at market value (Rs. 5,000 on 19-2-1954) and that the amount was applied by the 1st defendant to purchase houses at Chevur.
  • 15th defendant (and his legal representatives): Claimed the cattle-shed (item 3) was sold for Rs. 1,500 and the consideration was applied by the 1st defendant to acquire similar property at Chevur.
  • Collectively: The defendants asserted they made bona fide enquiries, examined the sale agreements/scribes/attestors, and were satisfied sales were to enable the 1st defendant to settle at Chevur and to purchase more productive lands for the family's benefit.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hunooman Persad v. Mussumatbaboojee (1856 6 M.I.A 393) Manager's power to alienate ancestral property is exercisable only in case of need or for benefit of the estate; bona fide lender not affected by prior mis-management if charge is one a prudent owner would make to benefit the estate. Used to state that “benefit” must be real and that a manager must act as a prudent person; supports requirement that purchasers acting in good faith are protected where transactions appear to benefit the estate.
K.P.L.S Planiappa Chetty v. Sreemath Devasikhamany Pandara Sannadhi (A.I.R. 1917 P.C. 33) A shebait (manager of endowed property) can alienate only for necessity or benefit (e.g., preservation, defence, protection); difficulty in precise definition, but examples given. Court relied on these illustrations to accept a broad conception of “benefit” (preservation, protection, etc.) when assessing whether the alienations served the estate's interest.
Sri Krishna Das v. Nathuram (A.I.R. 1927 P.C. 37) Where purchaser acts in good faith after due enquiry and sale is justified by legal necessity, purchaser need not enquire into application of surplus; not obliged to make repayment of surplus. Distinguished legal necessity from "benefit" and supported principle that a bona fide purchaser who made enquiries and relied on necessity/benefit may not be required to further account for application of sale proceeds.
Durgaprasad Barmal v. Jewdhari Singh (Calcutta High Court Division Bench) Purchaser under Mitakshara law is not obliged to enquire into application of surplus if (1) purchaser made bonafide enquiry as to legal necessity, and (2) sale is justified by legal necessity. Cited for the proposition that a purchaser who made bona fide enquiries and where sale is justified may be protected; the court applied the idea that bona fide enquiry and justification are material to validate purchases.
Jagat Narain v. Mathura Das (Full Bench, Allahabad High Court) Alienation must be for benefit of estate and such as a prudent owner would have carried out with knowledge available; transactions to be judged by expected results at the time, with prudence akin to that required of a trustee. Adopted as the "correct position" that a karta must exercise utmost care and caution; court applied the prudence standard in assessing the 1st defendant's conduct and the purchasers' enquiries.
Sellappa Chettair v. Suppan Chettiar Benefit is distinct from need; transactions need not be defensive in character to be validated as for benefit of estate. Used to support the view that benefit alone (even absent defensive necessity) can justify an alienation if it reasonably confers advantage on the family.
Sital Prasad Singh v. Ajablal Mander Where mortgage/transaction finances a profitable purchase beneficial to the family, it can be held to be for the benefit of the estate and thus a legal necessity not challengeable by non-executant minors. Illustrates that a financially profitable and properly applied purchase supports validity of the antecedent alienation; court referenced this to assess whether proceeds were applied to purchase profitable land at Chevur.
A.T. Vasudevan (reported matter) Manager of joint Hindu family competent to alienate joint family property if transaction is clearly beneficial, even without legal necessity. Cited (via quotation) and relied upon as a principle that benefit alone can validate alienations; the court noted Supreme Court approval of this view in Balamukund v. Kamalawati.
Balamukund v. Kamalawati (A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1385) Quoted and approved the view that sales may not be strictly for 'legal necessity' but can be sustained if they are for the benefit of the family. Supported the court's treatment that transactions showing family benefit (and adequately evidenced) may be binding on non-executant members.
Sengoda Goundan v. Muthuvelappa Goundan Sale of unproductive property at advantageous price to buy other land can be supported as for family benefit; absence of proof of utilisation of sale proceeds defeats claim of benefit. Applied to emphasize that proof of utilisation of sale proceeds in purchase of other property is essential for validating the alienation as beneficial.
Medukenduri v. Kata Venkatayya Benefit need not be defensive; if transaction is financially non-speculative and calculated to confer advantage, sale is valid and binding. Reinforced the court's conclusion that purchases at Chevur, if profitable and actually effected, could validate the ancestral sales.
Yadlapati Subbarao v. Yadlapati Narasimharao Benefit includes transactions neither risky nor speculative but calculated to confer positive advantage; requires (1) proceeds were actually applied to purchase of other land, and (2) purchaser made bona fide enquiries that karta was selling to buy other land. The court expressly applied this formulation as the defence in the present case mirrored these two requirements and found both satisfied by the evidence produced by defendants 2 and 16.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded along several principal lines (stated in the opinion and applied to the facts):

  1. Burden and nature of proof: The court emphasized that the burden is on the alienees (purchasers) to show they made bona fide enquiries and were satisfied that the 1st defendant intended to sell in order to settle elsewhere and to purchase lands with the sale proceeds. The court relied on authorities explaining purchaser protection where enquiries are bona fide.
  2. What constitutes "benefit": The court surveyed an extensive line of authorities to explain that "benefit to the estate" may include transactions that are not merely defensive, that a karta must act as a prudent manager, and that benefit must be concrete rather than speculative. The court adopted the Full Bench view (Jagat Narain) that the transaction must be justifiable as one a prudent owner would have entered, judged by expected results at the time.
  3. Examination of documentary and oral evidence: The court examined the contemporaneous agreements and sale deeds (Ex. E-13, Exs. B-12, B-28, B-39, B-40), endorsements by the 1st defendant on those agreements, payments made (in instalments) to Narasimharao (the vendor to the 1st defendant), and testimony of the scribe and attestors (D.W.5, D.W.6, D.W.8, etc.). These items were used to establish (a) that agreements preceded the sales and recited the purpose of buying property at Chevur, (b) that purchasers paid amounts (some directly to Narasimharao) and obtained endorsements, and (c) that the 1st defendant subsequently acquired land at Chevur (Ex. B-39 and Ex. B-40).
  4. Failure of plaintiffs to rebut: The 1st defendant remained ex parte and the plaintiffs (including the major 1st plaintiff) did not come into the witness box to rebut the defendants' oral and documentary evidence. The court treated this omission as significant in assessing credibility and sufficiency of proof.
  5. Specific dispositions: The court considered the tiled house sale (Ex. B-14) and found Rs. 2,000 out of Rs. 5,000 discharged an ancestral debt; Rs. 3,000 was deposited by the 5th defendant in an inter-pleader suit. The cattle-shed sale (Ex. B-32) for Rs. 1,500 was explained as part of winding up the establishment at Pachala Tadiparru.
  6. Assessment of family benefit: The court noted evidence that yield per acre at Chevur was greater than at Pachala Tadiparru and that the acreage acquired at Chevur (per Exs. B-39 and B-40) amounted to about 24 cents. In absence of contrary evidence, and on the showing that sale proceeds were actually applied to acquisitions at Chevur, the court concluded those purchases were profitable and beneficial to the joint family.
  7. Conclusion from combined analysis: Applying the legal principles from the cited authorities (prudence, bona fide enquiry, actual application of sale proceeds, and definition of benefit), and given the documentary and oral evidence supporting payment, endorsements, agreements and subsequent purchases, together with plaintiffs' failure to rebut, the court held that the alienations were bona fide and for the benefit of the family.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court CONFIRMED the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge in respect of the matters before it and APPEAL DISMISSED.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The alienations under the sale deeds in question (Exs. B-28, B-12, B-14 and B-32 as addressed) are held to be valid as they were found to be supported by consideration, preceded by agreements showing intent to purchase lands at Chevur, and the sale proceeds were applied to purchases that benefited the joint family. The lower court's decree in favour of the defendants on these issues is thereby affirmed.
  • Broader legal consequences: The opinion applies established authorities about the scope of a karta/manager's power to alienate ancestral property, reiterating that transactions may be sustained if they are for the benefit of the family even where not strictly defensive. The court did not purport to create new law; rather it applied existing precedents (as cited) to the facts and evidence of this case.

No other implications beyond confirmation of the lower court's decision were discussed in the provided opinion.

    Dasari Jayachandrareddi And Others v. Dasari Venkatasubbaiah And Others

    Obul Reddi, J.:— The result of this appeal will depend upon the answer to the question whether the alienations made by the 1st plaintiff, were intended to benefit the joint family of which the 1st defendant and the plaintiffs were undivided members.

    2. In this appeal, we are only concerned with the alienations made by the 1st defendant under Ex. B-28 dated 10-2-1954 in favour of the 2nd defendant, and under Ex. B-12 dated 7-2-1954 in favour of the 16th defendant, and the alienations covered by Ex. B-14 dated 22-2-1954 in favour of the 16th defendant, and under Ex. B-32 dated 19-2-1954 in favour of the 15th defendant. We may state at the outset that neither the 1st plaintiff, the major son of the 1st defendant, nor the 1st defendant, nor the mother of the plaintiffs has gone into the witness box to rebut the evidence adduced by the defendants 2, 5, 6, 25 and 26.

    3. The facts giving rise to this appeal are these. The plaintiffs are the sons of the 1st defendant, and they were residents of Pachala Tadiparru, a village in Bapatla taluk. They owned dry and wet lands, some houses, a rice mill and other items of property as shown in Schedules A, B and C. Their father, the 1st defendant sold all the properties at Pachala Tadiparru, either on the ground of discharging the debts incurred by his father, or on the ground of “necessity”. So far as the items with which we are now concerned, they were sold on the ground that those properties were not yielding enough income and that it would be profitable to sell those lands and migrate to another village-Chevuru in Kaikalur taluk of Krishna district where lands of higher productivity could be purchased at a cheaper rate. The lands in question, as also the house, which are the subject-matter of this appeal, were sold by the 1st defendant for purchasing properties at Chevur for the benefit of the family. The alienations thus effected by the father, the 1st defendant, were questioned by the sons on the ground that those sales are not supported by consideration. They were nominally executed in favour of defendants No. 2, 5, 25 and 26. All these alienations were said to have been made in the course of the two years, and by the end of 1954, there was not a single item of ancestral property left in the village of Pachala Tadiparru. In short, it is the case of the plaintiffs that they were made without any legal necessity, and without any benefit to the family.

    4. The 2nd defendant resisted the action contending inter-alia that he purchased under the sale deed Ex. B-28 dated 10-2-1954 Ac. 2-40 cents, item 1(a) of the plaint A schedule for Rs. 8,000/- and that the sale was preceded by an agreement and that that agreement would show that the 1st defendant sold the properties to purchase some other properties from Narasimha Rao of Chevur, and that before the sale deed was executed by the 1st defendant, he had paid Rs. 3,000/- on 11-9-1953 and Rs. 5,000/- on 2-2-1954 to the vendor of the 1st defendant at Chevur, and the 1st defendant himself had made the endorsement on the agreement of sale executed by Narasimharao in favour of the 1st defendant.

    5. The defence set up by the 16th defendant who purchased Ac. 4-52 cents, covered by items 1, 4, and 5 of the plaint schedule, is also on the similar lines. He paid Rs. 6,000/- on 11-9-1953 and Rs. 11,000/- on 2-2-1954 to Narasimharao, the vendor of the 1st defendant and had those payments made by him endorsed on the agreement of sale.

    6. Defendants 5 and 6 have similarly contended that the 1st defendant sold tiled house to them at the market value for Rs. 5,000/- on 19-2-1954 and that that amount was applied by the 1st defendant for purchasing houses at Chevur.

    7. What was sold to the 15th defendant, whose legal representatives are brought on record after his death, was item 3 of the plaint A schedule a tiled cattle-shed for Rs. 1500. The sale consideration??? according to this defendant, was also applied by the 1st defendant for purchasing similar property at Chevur.

    8. The main issues that came to be considered on these pleadings were issues 1 and 7. Issues 4, 4(a) and 5 and 5(a) and 5(b) relate to the sale of tiled house and cattle-sheds. We may here mention that after the death of defendant No. 15, defendant Nos. 25 and 26 were brought on record as his legal representatives.

    9. Issue Nos. 1 and 7 relate to the sale of land under Exs. B-28 and B. 12, and it was answered by the learned Subordinate Judge that the alienations were for the benefit of the estate, and so was the finding as regards the other issues referred to above.

    10. Mr. N. Bhaskararao, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants strenuously contended that there was absolutely no need for the 1st defendant to sell any of the items or to migrate to a village in another district and the alienations were all nominally made by the 1st defendant to defeat the rights and interests of the other members of the coparcenary and as such the alienations are not binding upon the appellants.

    11. What is to be considered, in the first instance, is whether the transactions are supported by consideration and if so, whether the sale proceeds were applied by the 1st defendant for purchasing properties at Chevur, and if so the purchases are for the benefit of the family.

    12. As already adverted to the burden, of course, is upon the alienees to show that they made bonafide enquiries, and were satisfied with their enquiries that the 1st defendant alienated the properties in order to settle down in another village, and that for purposes of settling down in another village, from the consideration paid by them, the 1st defendant purchased properties at the other village.

    13. What exactly is meant by ‘benefit’, and in what circumstances it could be said that the alienations would be for the advantage or benefit of the family, has been explained in a catena of decisions. In this connection, it has also to be borne in mind that a Hindu father has special powers of alienating coparcenary property which no other coparcenor has. It would be open to him to make a gift of the ancestral immovable property and he may sell or mortgage ancestral property, including the interest of his sons, grand-sons and great-grand sons for the payment of his own debt, provided the debt was an antecedent debt, and was not tainted by immorality or vice. But, so far as other alienations are concerned, he stands on no better footing than any other manager or karta of a Hindu joint family, and he cannot alienate coparcenary property except for legal necessity, or for the benefit of the family.

    14. As early as in Hunooman Persad v. Mussumatbaboojee . 1856 6 M.I.A 393. the Privy Council said:—

    “It (the power) can only be exercised rightly in a case of need, or for the benefit of the estate. But where in the particular instance, the charge is one which a prudent owner would make in order to benefit the estate the bonafide lender is not affected by the precedent mis-management of the estate.”

    15. A manager should act as a prudent person while exercising his rights as manager in the matter of alienation of coparcenary property. As has been stated by the Privy Council in the same case, the benefit that he seeks to bestow on the family should be something real and not speculative or imaginary.

    16. The Privy Council considered the power of a “shebait” in the management of the property entrusted to him in K.P.L.S Planiappa Chetty v. Sreemath Devasikhamany Pandara Sannadhi . A.I.R 1917 P.C 33.. It was held that a Shebait can Alienate endowed property only for necessity or benefit of the estate such as preservation of the estate or a part of it. They however, expressed difficulty in giving precise definition of the expression, “of benefit to the estate”, or, “necessity”. Therefore, their Lordships said that—

    “the preservation, however, of the estate from extinction, the defence against hostile litigation affecting it, the protection of it or portions from injury or deterioration by inundation, these and such like things would obviously be benefits”.

    17. The illustrations given by them are not exhaustive, as, the expression, ‘such like things’ may also be of benefit to the estate.

    18. In Sri Krishna Das v. Nathuram . A.I.R 1927 P.C 37. their Lordships dealing with the case of ‘legal necessity’, observed:—

    “Where the purchaser acts in good faith and after due enquiry, and is able to show that the sale itself was justified by legal necessity he is under no obligation to enquire into the application of any surplus and is, therefore, not bound to make repayment of of such surplus to the members of the family challenging the sale.”

    19. The principle laid down in this case was followed by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Durgaprasad Barmal v. Jewdhari Singh. According to the learned judges, the purchaser of property owned by a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law from the karta or the manager of the said family is under no obligation to enquire into the application of the surplus money, on the co-existence of the conditions, namely (1) that the said purchaser has made bonafide enquiry as to the existence of legal necessity, and also (ii) that the sale is justified by legal necessity.

    20. Here, we are concerned with a case of benefit to the family, and it is not enough if the purchaser had made bonafide enquiries about the sale of properties by the vendor in order to migrate to another village and purchase lands which are more productive, but that the sale proceeds have also been applied for purchasing properties in the other village.

    21. A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Jagat Narain v. Mathura Das considered whether alienation of family property by the managing member was for the benefit of the estate. The learned Judges expressed the view that:—

    “In order to sustain an alienation of joint family property made by the managing member of the family the transaction must be one which is for the benefit of the estate and such as a prudent owner would have carried out with the knowledge available to him at the time. Transactions must be justifiable on the principle of “benefit to the estate” and not limited to those transactions which are of a “defensive nature”.

    The transaction must be judged, not by its actual results, but by what might have been expected to be its results, at the time it was entered into. The degree of prudence Which might fairly be required from a person who was not the sole owner of the property might naturally be some what greater than that which might be expected in the case of a sole owner and might well be held to be that which would be demanded in ordinary cases for a trustee.”

    22. In our opinion, the opinion of the Full Bench represents the correct position that the Karta of joint family must exercise utmost care and caution when he enters into transactions of the kind with which we are now concerned, on the ground of benefit to the estate. If, at the time of the alienations in order to purchase property elsewhere with the sale proceeds, it could be shown by the alienees that the alienor acted as a prudent man ought to, and the alienations were not to the detriment of the other members of the family, then the alienations made by him, could be said to be to the advantage and benefit of the family.

    23. Justice Venkatasubbarao sitting with Justice Cornish in Sellappa Chettair v. Suppan Chettiar considered the question of “benefit of the estate”. That was a case where the holder of an impartible estate and his son mortgaged some of their impartible properties and borrowed two sums of money for meeting the expenses of the marriage of the daughter of the late Zamindar, and the question arose how far the above debts could bind the impartible estate. The learned Judges, after considering the cases cited before them, held:

    “that if the original purchase of the house could be justified, it would follow that that part of the debt should be held binding. Naturally it led to the question what was the extent of a manager's power in regard to buying a property. To hold that the rule of benefit should be confined only to cases where both need and benefit co-existed would be to disregard “benefit” as affording a distinct ground of justification. The transaction need not be of a “defensive nature”. The pronouncements of the judicial committee would not justify the narrow view being taken of the expression “for the benefit of the estate”.

    24. In Sital Prasad Singh v. Ajablal Mander the adult members of a joint family executed a mortgage of the ancestral property. The Consideration of the mortgage was to be applied towards the payment of the purchase price of a certain property which the family had purchased. The property was purchased in the village in which the family already owned other properties. From the financial point of view the purchase was a profitable transaction and its approximate profits were more than sufficient to cover the amount of interest on the mortgage amount. It was therefore, held:

    “that the purchase transaction was for the benefit of the estate and family. The mortgage which was therefore executed to pay the purchase price was one for legal necessity and hence it could not be challenged by the non-executant minor member of the family.”

    25. Yahya Ali J. in the matter of A.T Vasudevan said:

    “The manager of a joint Hindu family is competent to alienate joint family property if it is clearly beneficial to the estate even though there is no legal necessity justifying the transaction.”

    26. This decision was quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in Balamukund v. Kamalawati . A.I.R 1964 S.C 1385.. Sales may not be for ‘legal necessity’ but if they are for the benefit to the family, then such sales could be sustained against the challenge of non-executant members of the family, whether minors or majors.

    27. Mudholkar J. in that case said that:

    “For a transaction to be regarded as of benefit to the family it need not be of defensive character so as to be binding on the family. In each case the court must be satisfied from the material before it that it was in fact such as conferred or was reasonably expected to confer benefit on the family at the time it was entered into. Where adult members are in existence the judgment is to be not that of the manager of the family alone but that of all the adult members of the family, including the manager.”

    28. Rajamannar, C.J in Sengoda Goundan v. Muthuvelappa Goundan Minor by next friend Plani Goundan held:

    “The sale of unproductive family property at an advantageous price for the purpose of buying other land could be supported on the ground of benefit of the family. But where though the sales were for an adequate price and but for a town planning scheme the properties (dry lands) would have had no appreciable market value and were not fetching any income to the family, in the absence of proof of utilisation of the sale proceeds in the purchase of other property for the family, the alienations cannot be held to be for the benefit of the family.”

    29. Chandra Reddy J. (as he then was) in Medukenduri v. Kata Venkatayya similarly observed:—

    “In order to validate a sale of ancestral land by the father, the benefit need not be purely of a defensive or protective character. To hold so should be to miss the significance of the expression “benefit to the estate”. If the transaction is not a speculative or risky one but is beneficial or advantageous from the financial point of view and is calculated to confer a benefit on the estate the sale must be held to be a valid one binding on the members of the estate.”

    30. Justice Seshachalapathi in Yadlapati Subbarao v. Yadlapati Narasimharao explained the meaning of the expression “benefit to the estate” after referring to the several cases cited before him from Hanuman pershad v. Mussumat Babojee. onwards. In the words of the learned Judge:

    “The expression “benefit to the estate” comprehends also a transaction by the manager which is neither risky, nor speculative, but is calculated to confer a positive advantage on the family. Where a kartha of a Hindu Joint Family sells the ancestral property and applies the proceeds of the sale for the purchase of better land, it cannot be said that the family has not been benefited. In such a situation, the sale would certainly be binding upon the other members of the family, adult or minor. It must, however, be further established, first, that the proceeds of the sale was actually applied to the purchase of other land, and secondly, that the purchaser made bona fide enquiries that the karta was selling the property for the purchase of other lands”.

    31. The defence in this case is based exactly on what has been explained by Justice Seshachalapathi.

    32. Under Ex. B-12, defendant No. 16 purchased Ac. 4-37 ½ cents for Rs. 18,000/-, and under Ex. B-28, the 2nd defendant purchased Ac. 2-40 cents for Rs. 8,000/-. There is an agreement of sale, Ex. E-13, dated 16-8-1953, preceding the sale under Ex. B-12. In this agreement, it is recited that the land covered by it is being sold to purchase other properties. The consideration was paid in instalments to Narasimharao, the, vendor who sold the land to the 1st defendant in Chevur village. The 1st defendant himself has endorsed on the agreement, the receipt of the sale consideration. The amount of Rs. 8,000/- was paid in two instalments to Narasimharao, by the vendee the 2nd defendant Rs. 3,000/- once and Rs. 5,000/- on another occasion, and the scribe has been examined to prove the payments and the endorsements on Ex. B-25, the agreement of sale. The attestor, D.W 5 also has been examined. The fact that the vendee paid the sale consideration under Ex. B-28 to Narasimharao, the vendor of the 1st defendant, goes to show that the 2nd defendant made necessary enquires and was satisfied that the 1st defendant has entered into an agreement with him to sell the property, sold the land covered by the sale deed in order to purchase lands in Chevur village, to which place, Narasimharao, the vendor of the 1st defendant belonged. That the 1st defendant purchased Narasimharao's land is borne out by the sale deed, Ex. B-39 dated 4-10-1954. This sale deed is taken by the 1st defendant in favour of himself and his two sons.

    33. Similarly, the 16th defendant purchased Ac. 4-37-½ cents of B. schedule property from the 1st defendant. D.W 6 and the scribe, D.W 5 went to Chevur along with the 2nd defendant and 16th defendant at the instance of the 1st defendant to meet Narasimharao. The 16th defendant similarly paid Rs. 6,000/- and Rs. 11,000/- on two occasions to Narasimharao. There is an agreement of sale executed by Narasimharao in favour of the 1st defendant dated 27-8-1953 for the sale of his lands to the 1st defendant. It is after satisfying themselves of the agreement of sale by Narasimharao that defendants 2 and 16 paid the sale consideration payable by them to the 1st defendant, to Narasimharao and obtained the endorsement of the 1st defendant on the agreement of sale obtained by them.

    34. The 1st defendant remained Ex-parte. It would have been easy for the plaintiffs to have examined their father to show that the transactions, were either nominal, or that no consideration passed under the transactions, or that the consideration paid was not adequate. Not even the 1st plaintiff, who is admittedly a major, has chosen to come into the witness box to rebut the evidence adduced on behalf of defendant 2 and 16. Defendants 2 and 16, apart from examining themselves, have also examined the scribe and the attestors of all the agreements of sale and the sale deeds, evidencing sale of property at the ancestral village of the 1st defendant, and the purchase of land at Chevur in Krishna District.

    35. It would appear from the evidence of D.W 16 that from the sale consideration paid by him for the purchase of Ac ???-37-½ cents of B schedule property, the 1st defendant purchased property under Ex. B-40 dated 14-7-1955 in the name of his wife, Venjalaya Devi.

    36. From the evidence adduced we find that all that was given to the wife of the 1st defendant at the time of marriage was one acre of land, and little or no jewellery. The 1st plaintiff nor his mother has chosen to come into the witness box to say that the property purchased by the 1st defendant under Ex. B-40 was with the monies of the plaintiff's mother, and very discreetly the 1st defendant has not chosen to contest the suit or examine himself, and the plaintiffs also, for the reasons best known to themselves, have not chosen to rebut the large volume of evidence, oral and documentary, produced by the defendants.

    37. The learned Subordinate Judge, therefore, was right in holding that the land covered by Ex. B-40 was purchased with the sale proceeds realised by the sale of Ac. 4-37-½ cents, to the 16th defendant who examined himself as D.W 8. His evidence goes to show that he made bona-fide enquiries and he was satisfied that not only the 1st defendant wanted to sell his properties, but in fact applied those monies and purchased properties at Chevur. It is also to be noted that the total acreage under Ex. B-39 and B-40 come to about 24 cents. There is also evidence to show that the yield from the lands per acre at Chevur is more than the yield per acre at Pachala Tadiparru. There is no evidence contra to show that the yield from the lands at Pachala Tadiparru was not in the interest of the family and that they derived no advantage in his father (D 1) purchasing the lands at Chevur.

    38. So far as the sale of tiled house under Ex. B-14 is concerned, Rs. 2,000/- out of the total consideration of Rs. 5,000/- went in discharge of an ancestral debt, and the balance of Rs. 3000/- was deposited by the 5th defendant in an Inter-pleader suit in the court.

    39. The cattle shed was sold for Rs. 1500/- under Ex. B-32, as the 1st defendant was winding up his establishment at Pachala Tadiparru.

    40. Therefore the defendants, with whom we are now concerned, have made bonafide enquires and were satisfied that the 1st defendant not only intended to sell his properties and migrate to Chevur village, but, in fact with the sale proceeds realised from out of the sale of the items with which we are now concerned in this appeal he purchased properties at Chevur which proved to be profitable and beneficial to the joint family.

    41. In the result, we confirm the judgment and decree of the lower court in so far as this appeal is concerned.

    42. Appeal dismissed.

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    Dasari Jayachandrareddi And Others v. Dasari Venkatasubbaiah And Others
    (Aug 2, 1972)