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  • Conservation Assistant-Suspension-ordered-Regarding.Under Rule 13(1) of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Service (C.C A) Rules,
  • Rule 13 of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, hereinafter called the Rules.
  • section 2(3) of the Civil Aviation (Licensing) Act, 1940.
  • rule 13 an appealable order.18. Rule 23
  • SECTION 13 WEALTH TAX ACT
  • provision of Rule 15(1)(a).77.
  • Rule 15 of the C.C.A Rules
  • Rule 13(1) of the Rules.
  • appointment.17. Rule 20
  • Rule 13 of the Rules.
  • interest.13. Rule 14
  • Rule 13 or Rule 15
  • services.12. Rule 8
  • Rule 13(1).40.
  • Rule 13(1).63.
  • sub-rule (1)
  • Rule 13.37.
  • Rule 13.68.
  • Rule 14.72.
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Conservation Assistant-Suspension-ordered-Regarding.Under Rule 13(1) of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Service (C.C A) Rules,
  • Rule 13 of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, hereinafter called the Rules.
  • section 2(3) of the Civil Aviation (Licensing) Act, 1940.
  • rule 13 an appealable order.18. Rule 23
  • SECTION 13 WEALTH TAX ACT
  • provision of Rule 15(1)(a).77.
  • Rule 15 of the C.C.A Rules
  • Rule 13(1) of the Rules.
  • appointment.17. Rule 20
  • Rule 13 of the Rules.
  • interest.13. Rule 14
  • Rule 13 or Rule 15
  • services.12. Rule 8
  • Rule 13(1).40.
  • Rule 13(1).63.
  • sub-rule (1)
  • Rule 13.37.
  • Rule 13.68.
  • Rule 14.72.

    M. Nagalakshmaiah v. State Of Andhra Pradesh

    1. Mr. Y. Suryanarayana, Advocate moved on behalf of all these petitioners for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the proceedings No. Estt. IX(2) 1031/71-A, dated 28-5-1972 of the 2nd respondent suspending the petitioners during the pendency of enquiry of certian charges against the petitioners.

    2. Seldom do we come across misappropriation, of course, alleged on a large scale involving more than hundred members of the service both high and low as here. It was alleged that there has been “a deliberate, calculated, preplanned affair from the officers of the Directorate to the lower level in the District of Ananthapur in Soil Conservation.” The alleged misappropriation is said to be of about Rs. 11 lakhs. The Government therefore suspended the six officers with whom we are not concerned and the Director of Agriculture was asked to suspend all the soil Conservation Assistants land Sub-Assistants working under the four Assistant Soil Conservation officer with immediate effect and to report to the Government within a week. These suspensions were effected pending the enquiry into the said alleged misappropriation. From the note file it appears that the Minister, Agriculture, also passed the following order on 16-5-1972.

    “The Director of Agriculture may be charge-sheeted for his slackness and incapacity in exercising control over such large scale fraud under his very nose. He never cared to find out what is happening there partly due to his lethargy and partly due to his ignorance of technical aspects of work thereby proving himself incapable of holding the post of Director of Agriculture.”

    3. The file was marked to the Chief Minister. The Chief Minister wanted the Chief Secretary and Secretary, Agriculture, to speak to him in regard to the order passed by the Minister against the Director of Agriculture. In regard to the suspension of the officers referred to above, he agreed with the order of the Minister suspending these officers.

    4. The Chief Minister seems to have discussed the matter with the Chief Secretary. The note-file, however, is silent as to what happened to the order of the Minister to charge-sheet the Director of Agriculture. We are, however, not concerned with that aspect in this case. We have referred to it only to point out that the Director of Agriculture was also allegedly involved in the said matter.

    5. Going back to the order of the Minister dated 16-5-1972, the Director of Agriculture accordingly issued the following order:

    No. Estt. IX (2) 1031/71(A) Office of the Director of Agriculture, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, dated 28-5-1972.

    PROCEEDINGS

    Sub:— Establishment-Agriculture Department-Soil Conservation-Anantapur District-Sri M. Naga Lakshmaiah, formerly Soil Conservation Assistant under A.S.C.O Dharmavaram at present working as Soil Conservation Assistant-Suspension-ordered-Regarding.

    Under Rule 13(1) of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Service (C.C A) Rules, Sri M. Nagalakshmaiah, formerly Soil Conservation Assistant, is placed under suspension with immediate effect in public interest, pending enquiry into grave charges, initiation and completion of disciplinary proceedings against him.

    6. These orders take effect from the date of service on the subordinate.

    7. During the period of suspension the Subordinate shall be paid subsistence allowance as per the provisions under F.R Rule 53.

    (Under orders of Government of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad)

    Sd/- B.R Venkatram, for Director of Agriculture.

    8. To,

    Sri M. Nagalakshmaiah, Soil Conservation Assistant (THROUGH the Dy. Director of Agriculture, Ananthapur in triplicate.)

    9. The Dy. Director of Agriculture is requested to serve the Proceedings on the delinquent subordinate, obtain his acknowledgment on the duplicate copy and return it to this office immediately.

    /forwarded by order/

    Superintendent.

    Endt. 6053/72 dated 29-5-1972

    Forwarded

    Deputy Director of Agriculture, Ananthapur.

    10. It is this order that is assailed mainly on the ground that the Director of Agriculture has not exercised his independent mind and judgment as to whether circumstances exist for passing the impugned order. It was submitted that since the Government is the appellate authority, it had no power to direct the Director to pass an order of suspension.

    11. Now, the Civil services of the State are classified as (a) the State Services and (b) the subordinate services.

    12. Rule 8 describes the penalties which can be imposed upon members of both these services. Suspension, where a person has already been suspended under Rule 13(1), to the extent considered necessary is one of the penalties. This suspension, it is obvious, is imposed by way of punishment. This suspension must be distinguished from the suspension under Rule 13 of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, hereinafter called the Rules. According to that rule a member of service may be placed under suspension from service pending investigation or enquiry into grave charges where such suspension is necessary in the public interest.

    13. Rule 14 then describes the authority which may impose suspension under Rule 13 on members of the State Service mentioned in column 1 of the table, mentioning the authority in column 2 thereof.

    14. A proviso to this rule has been added by G.O.Ms No. 24 dated 5-1-1971. It reads:

    “Provided that nothing in this rule shall preclude the Government from imposing suspension under rule 13 on any such member, notwithstanding that they are not the authority mentioned therefor”.

    15. We are not concerned with this rule as it relates to the State Services. Since the petitioners are the members of the subordinate service, it is Rule 15 which is applicable to them. The rule is important and therefore has to be read in full.

    “15(1)(a) The authority which may impose on a member of a subordinate Service, the penalty of suspension under rule 13 or the penalties of—

    (i) ensure;

    (ii) find and

    (iii) withholding of increments.

    shall be his immediate superior gazetted officer, or where the appointing authority for such member is a non-gazetted officer, such officer or any higher authority.

    16. The authority which may impose, on a member of a Subordinate Service, the penalty of recovery from pay of the whole or any part of the pecuniary loss caused to the Government or the Central Government or to a local authority or to a Corporation owned or controlled by the State or Central Governments by negligence or breach of orders, shall be the officer next above the immediate superior gazetted officer;

    Provided that the appointing authority or any higher authority may also impose the aforesaid penalty:

    Provided further that the Assistant Excise Superintendents Tahsildars, Deputy Commercial Tax Officers, Personal Assistants to the Superintendent of police and Deputy Superintendent of Police, except to the extent provided in Appendix III to these rules, shall not exercise the powers vested in a gazetted officer under this sub-rule; but such powers shall be exercised by the Superintendent of Excise, the Revenue Divisional officer or the Superintendent of Police, as the case may be.

    Provided also that in the case of the members belonging to the categories of officers specified in Appendix IV to these rules, the authority which may impose any of the penalties referred to in this clause shall be specified thereof against each such category.

    (b) The authority which may impose on a member of Subordinate Service, the penalties of—

    (i) withholding of promotions, where such penalty is imposed on the ground of some specific fault or misconduct;

    (ii) reduction to a lower rank in the seniority list or to a lower post or time-sale, whether in the same service or in another service or to a lower time-sale or to a lower stage in a time-sale.

    (iii) compulsory retirement;

    (iv) removal from the civil service of the State of a member of a Subordinate service; and

    (v) suspension where a person has already been suspended under rule 13, to the extent considered necessary;

    shall be the appointing authority or any higher authority.

    Provided that in the case of the members of the services specified in Appendix III to these rules, the authority which may impose any of the penalties mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of this sub-rule or suspension under rule 13 shall be as specified thereof against each.

    Provided further that the authority which may impose the penalty of suspension and the penalties specified in items (i) to (v) above shall be the Chief Secretary in the case of section officers in the General Administration Department and the Secretary concerned in the case of Section officers in other Departments of the Secretariat.

    Explanation—For the purpose of this proviso, Secretary includes the Second Secretary, special Secretary or Additional Secretary.

    (2) Where in any case a higher authority has imposed or declined to impose a penalty under this rule, a lower authority shall have no jurisdiction to proceed under this rule in respect of the same case.

    (3) The fact that a lower authority has imposed a penalty or exonerated a member of a service in any case shall not debar a higher authority from exercising his powers under this rule in respect of the same case the order of such higher authority shall supersede any order passed by a lower authority in respect of the same case.

    (4) A gazetted officer may, at any time and without specific authorisation by the authority competent to impose the penalty, frame charges against or enquire into the conduct of, an officer directly subordinate to him, although he may not be competent to impose a penalty.

    (5) In this rule, the appointing authority means the authority who actually made the officiating or substantive appointment of the person, against whom disciplinary proceedings are proposed to be initiated, to the post held by him at the time of initiation of such proceedings, and not the authority who is, under the rules regulating the recruitment to such post, competent to make an appointment”.

    17. Rule 20 then describes the orders which are appealable. Clause (d) of that rule makes the order of suspension passed under rule 13 an appealable order.

    18. Rule 23 then lays down the authority to which appeal under various appealable orders can lie. This rule as amended by G.O.Ms No. 393 dated 20-3-1965 provides review instead of an appeal to the Governor as was the case prior to the amendment against an order passed by the Government. Rule 21 is also amended suitably. According to amended Rule 23, an appeal lies against an order made under Rule 13 to the next higher authority to whom the authority which made the order is administratively subordinate.

    19. A careful reading of these rules would indicate that in so far as a member of subordinate service is concerned, he can be placed under suspension under rule 15(1)(a) by his immediate superior gazetted officer. In the instant case, it was a common ground that the Director of Agriculture not only is the appointing authority but is also an immediate superior Gazetted Officer to the petitioners. Thus the Director can place the petitioners binder suspension under Rule 13 of the Rules.

    20. The real question, however, is whether the Government has also a power to suspend a member of subordinate service under Rule 13 of the Rules. The answer of this question depends upon the construction of the first proviso to Rule 15(1)(a). While it is contended by the petitioners that the proviso is applicable only to the second para of Rule 15(1)(a), the contention of the Principal Government Pleader, on the other hand, is that it governs the whole clause (a). We think the contention of the Government Pleader is right.

    21. It is the office of the proviso to restrict the general operation of the enacting part of the section to which it is attached. A proviso is said to remove special cases from the general enactment and provide for them specially. Whatever may have been the old rule, at present the Courts have adopted, and rightly, the rule, that as in all other cases, a proviso should be interpreted consistently with the legislative intent. The proviso will thus be applied according to the general legislative intent and will limit a single section or the whole Act depending on what the Legislature intended. What must, however, be remembered is that no presumption arises from the mere location of the proviso, that it is applicable only to the section in which it appears or to preceding section or its part. Although the form and the location of the proviso may be some indication of the Legislative intent, form alone however will not control.

    22. Our attention was invited to Bindra's Interpretation of Statutes 5th Edition, page 58 where it is said that:

    “A proviso must be considered with relation to the principal matter to which it stands as a proviso. The section must be read along with the proviso as a whole. It is impossible to read the section as it were contained in watertight compartments. It may be that read as a whole the effect of the proviso is to qualify the words which immediately precede it, whether proviso to all preceding matters or only to those immediately preceding. “The question whether a proviso in the whole or in part relates to and qualifies, restrains or operates upon the immediately preceding provisions only of the Statute” observed Holroyd J., In R.V Newark Inhabitants (38 & C at page 71) “or whether it must be taken to extend in the whole or in part to all the preceding matters contained in the statute, must depend, I think, upon its words and import, and not upon the division into sections that may be made for convenience of reference in the printed copies of the statute”. The general rule, no doubt, is that the operation of a proviso should be confined to that clause or portion of the statute which directly precedesait, but the rule will not be applicable where in so construing it some repugnancy or absurdity occurs”.

    23. We do not consider this extract to be in any way in conflict with what we have said earlier. In fact it is in perfect accord with it.

    24. It is equally clear that a legislature may enact a substantive provision in the garb or guise of a proviso and if the court is satisfied that the language used in the so called proviso is incapable of making it applicable to the Section, then the Court, if the proviso has a clear meaning, must look upon the proviso as a substantive provision and give effect to it.

    25. Thus the proviso may either except and deal with a case which would otherwise fall within the general language of the main rule or it may even provide a substantive rule. It is in this general background regarding the function of a proviso that we have to consider the arguments.

    26. It is no doubt true that the proviso appears as third para and uses the words “impose the aforesaid penalty”. The word “aforesaid” it was contended, only means immediately preceding. We find no justification for any such contention. Nor “immediately preceding” would inevitably mean the para preceding it and not the clause proceeding it. According to the dictionary meaning of the word “aforesaid”, it means “aforenamed aforesaid or previously named.” It is no doubt true that Stroud's judicial dictionary, Vol. I page 83 at note 10 says ‘aforesaid’ naturally refers to its “immediate antecedent”. That observation is made because of Peak v. Screech . 7 Q.B 610.. That decision has to be if ad in the context of the facts of the case. The same observation would apply to the meaning given in Law Lexicon by Venkataramiah. Even otherwise there is no warrant whatsoever to contend that “immediate antecedent” necessarily means immediately antecedent part of the section or sub-section and not the whole of the sub-section. We have no doubt that the word ‘aforesaid’ appearing in the proviso refers to the whole of clause (a), in other words to both the paras of clause (a).

    27. The contention that since the word ‘penalty’ is used in the proviso, it relates to the penal by referred to in second para of clause (a) is equally untenable. Even a casual reading of clause (a) would indicate that it first refers to the penalty of suspension under Rule 13. Although stricto sensu suspension under rule 13 is not referred to as such. In Rule 8, nevertheless it is called penalty. Secondly, the penalties of (i) censure (ii) fine and (iii) withholding of increments are also referred to. Thus in all, first paragraph of clause (a) refers to four kinds of penalties and then states who the authority to impose such penalty would be.

    28. In the second para another kind of penalty i.e, of recovering from pay, the whole or any part of the pecuniary loss is referred to and the authority which can impose the penalty is mentioned.

    29. What is thus plain is that for various penalties which are referable to Rule 8 and the penalty of suspension under Rule 13, authority or authorities which can impose these punishments on a member of subordinate service are stipulated.

    30. What the proviso does is that over and above the authority referred to in clause (a), it empowers the appointing authority or higher authority to impose the a foresaid penalty.

    31. Ridiculous results will follow if the operation of the proviso is confined to para 2 of clause (a). While for recovery of losses the appointing authority or any higher authority would be clothed with the power, the superior authorities, however, would have no power to impose the four penalties including suspension under, Rule 13. It would make the provision purposeless.

    32. There are enough indications in Rule 15 itself to support the view that the first proviso controls both the paras of clause (a). The word also appearing in the proviso clearly indicates that apart from the authorities mentioned in clause (a) the authorities mentioned in the proviso are also empowered. Secondly the word ‘aforesaid’ as stated earlier undoubtedly relates to both the paragraphs in clause (a). Likewise the word ‘penalty’ not only applies to the penalty mentioned in para 2 but also to every penalty mentioned in first para of clause (a). There can be little doubt that the specifically referred to penalty of suspension under Rule 13 is controlled by proviso.

    33. More than that the two subsequent provisos indisputably control clause (a) also. If that is so, then the words “provided further” appearing in the second proviso and “provided also” in the third proviso can leave no one in doubt that the first proviso likewise governs clause (a) wholly. Wherever the area of operation was intended to be widened provision is made in apt language. For example second proviso refers to “Under this sub-rule” which can only mean that it governs the entire sub-rule (1) which includes both clauses (a) and (b) and it is seen that clause (b) appears subsequently. The words “any of the penalties referred to in this clause” appearing in the third proviso convey the same idea as is conveyed by the words “the aforesaid penalty” appearing in the first proviso.

    34. The scheme of this set of rules is that after mentioning that a suspension order pending investigation or enquiry can be made, Rule 14 lays down the authority which may impose such suspension. The proviso to that rule also empowers the Government to order suspension. Rule 14 relates to members of the State Services. A similar provision is made for members of subordinate services in Rule 15 empowering Government also as an authority to effect suspension.

    35. It was not doubted before us that higher authority mentioned in first proviso would include the Government also.

    36. Sub-rules (2) and (3) in a way support the conclusion that the Government is also empowered to impose the penalty of suspension under Rule 13. Thus there is more than enough internal indications in Rule 15 to lead one to the conclusion that the first proviso governs the entire clause(a) and consequently Government as a higher authority can also impose the penalty of suspension under Rule 13.

    37. Apart from the scheme to which reference is already made, it would be seen that Rule 20 makes the order of suspension under Rule 13 appealable. Such appeal can lie to the Government if the order is made by any subordinate competent authority. And if the Government is the authority which has passed the order of suspension under Rule 13, previously appeal was provided to the Governor but now under the amended Rule 23 an application to review such order can be filed with the Government.

    38. From these internal as well as external aids, it becomes clear beyond any doubt that the first proviso to Rule 15(1)(a) empowers the Government to make an order of suspension under Rule 13 in regard to any member of subordinate service. Thus the Government has concurrent power with the power which the Director of Agriculture has, to suspend the petitioners pending enquiry into the alleged charges.

    39. The question then arises as to whether the impugned order can be said to have been passed by the Government. A careful reading of the impugned order should not leave anyone in doubt that it is the Government whose order of suspension is being implemented by the Director of Agriculture. It clearly mentions that the order is issued by the Director “under orders of Government of Andhra Pradesh”. It does not say that the Director has made the order of suspension nor does it say that the order of suspension is passed by the Director at the dictation of the Government. If it is borne in mind that the order is signed by one B.R Venkatram for Director of Agriculture and as the order nowhere, mentions that it is the Director who has passed the order of suspension and when it is seen that the order passed by the Government is merely communicated, then there will be no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the order of suspension is made by the Government in reality but is communicated as was ordered by the Government by Sri B.R Venkatram on behalf of the Director to the petitioners. Reference to Rule 13(1) in the order does not establish that it is the Director who passed the order of suspension under that rule because we have already seen that the Government also can pass an order of suspension under Rule 13(1).

    40. We also carefully went through the office file produced for but perusal. We are not left in doubt from that file that it is the Minister who passed the order of suspension against six superior officers expressly and took decision to suspend the petitioners also. This decision of the Minister is endorsed by the Chief Minister. There were two ways open thereafter to the Government. First to issue the order of suspension directly and serve upon the petitioners without the intervention of the Director. Secondly, after having taken the decision to suspend the petitioners, the Government can ask the Director to give effect to that decision by communicating the same formally to the petitioners. It is the second method which the Government seems to have followed. Since the Director of Agriculture himself was under a shadow of suspicion, it was right in the circumstances for the Government to take the decision to suspend the petitioners and to ask the Director to communicate them to the petitioners who are his immediate subordinates.

    41. We are therefore convinced that in truth and reality the order of suspension pending enquiry was passed by the Government against the petitioners and in form it was Sri B.R Venkatram, who, on behalf of the Director, served the orders of the Government, suspending the petitioners, on the petitioners. As a result no question really arises that the Director of Agriculture, who is the appointing authority, has passed the impugned order at the dictation of the Government. The impugned order therefore is not vitiated on that account.

    42. Even if it is held that the order of suspension is passed by the Director on the instructions of the Government, we do not think that in such a case it can be characterised as an abuse of power. It is true that in such a case it is the Director who should ordinarily exercise the discretion and should not act at the dictation of a person who is not conferred with an authority to exercise the discretion.

    43. Now, discretion is not self-defining. Its ambit is usually established by judicial interpretation. It is of course plain that such an interpretation is not made in the abstract. It is made on the basis of a case. We may broadly define the term ‘discretion’ to mean the power which is given by statute to make a choice among competing considerations. Most powers to act, of course, involve some elements of choice even if it relates to mere details. Thus discretion implies power to choose between alternative courses of action.

    44. It is, however, clear that despite such discretion, a Court is competent to review agencies' use of discretion in order to determine whether it is within the permissible class of actions. Presumptively, an exercise of administrative discretion is reviewable for legal error, procedural defect or abuse. One of the methods of vitiating the exercise of the discretion is where the person entrusted with it, exercises it at the dictation of some other person. In such cases the reasoning adopted is that although such a person is acting himself, it is not his own discretion which governs the act, as the legislature intended that it should be.

    45. But this is not an absolute rule to be applied blindly to each and every case. There are, in our opinion, two exceptions to this general rule. The first is that wherever an explicit statutory provision has been made for a person to be given binding instructions by a superior and if that person acts accordingly the action would not be vitiated. See S.A De Smithi's, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, page 293. The learned author refers by way of illustration to section 2(3) of the Civil Aviation (Licensing) Act, 1940. Under that provision, the Minister may direct air transport Licensing Board to refuse an application for an air service licence if certain international difficulties would arise when it be granted.

    46. This view is clearly laid down in Schmidt v. Home Secretary . 1969 2 Chancery Page 149. where Lord Denning held that the Home Secretary may validly instruct immigration officers not to admit any alien wishing to enter the country as a student member of a cult which he deems to be harmful to the public welfare.

    47. Article 1(1) of the Aliens Order (1953) says that an alien shall not land or embark in the U.K except with the leave of Immigration Officer. The secretary of State under Article 20 can make a deportation order: Article 30(2) of the order provides that “in the performance of their functions immigration officers shall act in accordance with such instructions as may be given by the Secretary of State”. Lord Denning in the light of these provisions observed at page 169.

    “The Secretary of State is responsible for the immigration control. He has to give instructions to immigration officers so that they shall know how to act. That is recognised by article 30 of the Aliens Order. He must, therefore, be able to lay down general policy and give guidance to his officers for their day-to-day tasks. For instance, he can tell his officers that students may be admitted if they are coming to study at a recognised educational establishment, and he can tell them which establishments are recognised and which are not”.

    48. In Sirpur Paper Mills v. W.T Commissioner . 1970 1 SCC 795 after referring to section 13 of the Wealth Tax Act which provides that “all officers and other persons employed in the execution of that Act shall observe and follow the orders, instructions and directions of the Revenue Board”, it was observed that:

    “These instructions may control the exercise of the powers of the officers of the Department in matters administrative but no quasijudicial”.

    49. What follows therefore is that wherever there is such a provision empowering the Superior authorities to give instructions or directions, the inferior authorities are bound to carry out them. Such a direction would not amount to interference in the exercise of the administrative discretion of the subordinate authority which has under the enactment a discretion to exercise.

    50. Simms Motor Units, Ltd. v. Minister of Labour . 1946 2 All. E.R 201. was cited to us. That case is easily distinguishable. In that case, the Minister was entitled to confer power upon himself or his representatives only by statutory rules or orders. As long as the rules which he made continue to confer discretion upon the national service officer, it was held that the Minister without amending the rules cannot merely issue instructions to the national service officers limiting their discretion. It is because of this position of law that it was held that the Minister could not, by giving instructions which were not orders limit the duties or discretion conferred on the national service officers by the Essential Work (General provisions) (No. 2) Order, 1942. It was further held that, “direction to reinstate given in the instructions by the Minister was invalid because the national service officer had not exercised his discretion in the matter as required by orders.”

    51. It will immediately be plain that cast has no bearing whatsoever on the present case. Unlike the said case, in the instant case, the Government has concurrent power to suspend from service. If the Government had no power to suspend and Rule 15 had merely empowered the Director to pass such an order, then perhaps the said decision would have governed the present case. The Minister in that case was not a concurrent authority. The authority under the rules which the Minister had made exclusively vested in the national service officers. He therefore could have exercised his discretion. But the Minister without conferring upon himself the power to give instructions under the rules cannot by issue of instructions bind the national service officer to exercise the discretion in a particular way. The said decision impliedly supports the view that if the rules had authorised the Minister to issue instructions in matters relating to exercise of discretion, then the national service officers would have been legally bound to exercise their discretion according to the instructions of the Minister. Since the Minister was not so empowered to issue instructions and as the national service officer nevertheless had acted according to the instructions, his decision was struck down.

    52. The second exception to the general rule that an authority entrusted with a discretion must not, in the purported exercise of its discretion, act under the discretion of another body or persons is that if the instructions are issued to the authority exercising the discretion by a person who in law can himself exercise that discretion it would no vitiate the action of the person who in fact passed the order. In other words, both the authorities superior as well as subordinate, if they have concurrent power to exercise administrative discretion, then even if the inferior authority purports to exercise the discretion at the behest of such superior authority, such an exercise of discretion would not be bad in law.

    53. It is perhaps relevant to refer to a passage from S.A De Smith at page 232. It reads:

    “But as a number of less colourful cases illustrate it is enough to show that a decision which ought to have been based on the exercise of independent judgment was dictated by those not entrusted with the powers to decide.”

    ‘(Emphasis supplied)’

    54. This passage, if put in other words, would mean that if the discretion is exercised by a subordinate authority at the instance of a superior authority having concurrent power in that behalf, it cannot be said that the exercise of discretion by the subordinate officer would be an abuse of power. What is objected in such cases is the unlawful interference of persons who are absolute strangers and have no concern whatsoever with the exercise of the discretion. Even if one is a superior officer or even a Government, if not clothed with the concurrent authority to exercise he discretion he or they cannot direct the subordinate officer who alone in law has the power to decide, to act in accordance with such directions. But in cases where the superior authority also has the same power as his subordinate has in any case, in administrative matters, the superior authority instead of acting itself can direct such inferior authority to act. Even if it is considered that the subordinate authority acted at the instance of the superior authority, it would not be bad because the superior authority itself had such power and it cannot be said that the direction was given by an authority which was “not entrusted with the power to decide”. This would be so in administrative matters. We are here not concerned with a case of qusi-judicial exercise of discretion. We need not therefore express our opinion as to what would be the position in such cases. We are however clear that in administrative matters in such cases the decision cannot be said to be bad in law.

    55. The order of suspension passed under Rule 13 cannot but be an administrative order. It could not be pointed out as to why such an order can be said to be quasi-judicial. No authority characterising such order as quasi-judicial was brought to our notice, not are we aware of any such authority. It may be that from such an order of suspension some evil effects follow and the officer suspended thereby is affected, but that would not make an order a quasi-judicial order. There is ample authority to hold that such an order is an administrative order.

    56. We have already seen in Schmidt v. Home Secretary that even in a case where in regard to a specific matter the Minister has announced a policy in the Legislature and if following that policy, the Home Secretary makes an order, he cannot be said to have exercised the discretion against the law. The Minister had the right to lay down and announce the policy. In pursuance of such a policy if the Secretary decides an individual case of course applying his mind to that case, his decision was not allowed to be attacked as bad.

    57. What follows therefore is that even if it is held that the Director of Agriculture passed the impugned order of suspension at the dictation of the Government who is also competent to make such an order, the order of the Director would not be vitiated on that account.

    58. The argument based on State of Punjab v. Hari Kiskan . A.I.R 1966 S.C 1081. that the Government being an appellate authority would be deemed to have usurped the powers of primary authority and therefore the petitioners have lost their valuable right of appeal is not effective. In the Supreme Court case the appellate authority which could hear only appeals directed the primary authority to send all the applications for disposal to it. The primary authority therefore did not decide the applications. They were all disposed of by the appellate authority it is in that background that the order of appellate authority was struck down. In that case there was no concurrent power to decide the applications. There was only an appellate power. The principles of that case therefore would not apply to the present case. In the instant case when the Government passed the order it acted as a primary authority under the proviso to rule 15(1)(a) and not as an appellate authority. Previously there used to be appeal against such an order of the Government to Governor. Now a review petition lies. No question of losing any right of appeal therefore can in this case arise.

    59. Moreover it ought to be remembered that right of appeal is a creature of statute. Nobody has a right to appeal unless it is conferred by law. It would be fallacious in cases where concurrent powers are conferred, to contend that the superior authority should not exercise the power because the person affected would have no further right of appeal and has to content himself with a review application.

    60. Let us then examine the decisions which are said to have produced conflicting views.

    61. The first case is K. Rama Singh v. State of Andhra Pradesh . 1971 II Lawyers Reference 339.. That case related to an order of suspension pasted by the Board of Revenue. A member of State Service to whom Rule 14 applied was suspended by the Board of Revenue. Rule 14 as it stood at the relevant time did not confer any concurrent authority on the Government to suspend. The rule then prevailing authorised only the full Board of Revenue to pass an order of suspension under rule 13. The Government, however, issued Memo dated 2-2-1970 directing the Board of Revenue to place the petitioner under suspension. The Board of Revenue referred to the Government proceedings dated 2-2-1970 and in obedience to it placed the petitioner under suspension. It is in these circumstances that the Bench consisting of Sharfuddin Ahmed and Vaidya JJ., held that “the Board of Revenue surrendered its judgment to the Government and did not exercise it discretion vested in it under Rule 13(1) of the Rules”. The order being vitiated on that account was quashed.

    62. The judgment was right when it was given. A proviso empowering the Government to suspend a member of State Service was added to Rule 14, perhaps as a result of the said decision. That judgment therefore cannot be an authority for the proposition that even when the Government has a concurrent authority to suspend a member of State Service, it cannot instruct the Board of Revenue to put an officer of that service under suspension under Rule 13(1).

    63. The observation of the learned Judges that “an appeal to the Government would be an empty formality and the petitioner was therefore deprived of a valuable right of appeal” his to be understood in the light of the position of law then prevailing. After the addition of the proviso to Rule 14, no such argument would be available obviously because the Government also would be now a concurrent primary authority along with the Board of Revenue.

    64. We do not, however, agree with the view expressed, in the judgment that “in all cases where an administrative authority has been given a discretion to act in a particular manner that administrative authority has to exercise its own judgment and cannot surrender it to a superior authority”.

    65. We have already stated that there are at least two exceptions to this general rule. The rule is not absolute in its character and does not apply to all cases without any exception.

    66. We also do not share the view expressed by the Bench in regard to Sirpur Paper mills v. W.T Commissioner. We have already considered that case above and observed that it recognises the principle that in certain circumstances, in administrative matters, an inferior officer can be instructed by the superior officer where statute so empowers him to instruct. Section 13 of the Wealth-tax Act was specifically referred to.

    67. Another Bench decision of Obul Reddi and Madhava Reddy JJ., was given in W.A No. 113 of 1972 on 14-3-1972. That case however, related to a member of subordinate service. Admittedly to such a case Rule 15 applies. In that case also, the Government had issued instructions to the disciplinary authority to suspend the appellant from service. The learned Judges, in our view, were right when they said that “this is not a case where the discretion of the Tribunal or Judge is sought to be interfered with by the executive in any manner. In fact Rule 15 of the C.C.A Rules provides ample power to a superior authority to impose the penalty of suspension under Rule 13.”

    68. They were also right in observing that “there is nothing in Rule 13 or Rule 15 which says that the Government as a superior authority cannot give instructions to a subordinate competent authority or it cannot itself exercise that power delegated to a competent subordinate disciplinary authority.”

    69. We do not, however feel that reliance should have been placed on Govt. of India, Ministry of ??? v. Tarak Nath Ghosh . 1971 1 SCC 734 in support of the said conclusion. That case had nothing whatsoever to do with the above proposition. Moreover that decision was expressly disapproved in a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in P.R Nayak v. Union Of India . 1972 1 SCC 332.

    70. We however agree with the conclusion of the Bench in the above said case that “the Government is fully competent either to suspend the Government servant on its own motion or instruct accordingly the disciplinary authority to place the Government servant under suspension.”

    71. What is thus plain is that the first case arising under Rule 14 as it then was in force was rightly decided. The authority, however, would not be effective after the addition of the proviso to Rule 14.

    72. The second Bench case arose out of Rule 15 and was, in our view rightly decided.

    73. Since these two cases arise out of two different provisions not similar when the first Bench decision was given, they cannot be said to be deciding the same matter conflictingly.

    74. The two decisions which now remain to be considered are of Kondaiah, J.

    75. T. Sathiraju v. Government of A.P . 1972-I, An. W.R 93. is a case coming under Rule 14 as it was concerned with a member of State service. At the relevant time Rule 14 had not reserved the power of suspension with the Government. This case therefore falls in the category to which K. Rama Singh v. State of A.P belonged. What we have observed about that case applies with equal force to this Case also. After the proviso is added to Rule 14 this decision also his become ineffective in so far as cases arising after the amendment are concerned.

    76. The other case is Ratneswara Rao v. Govt. of A.P . 1972-I, An. W.R 302.. That case related to a member of subordinate service and naturally Rule 15 governed the case. By an order dated 17th May, 1971 passed by the State Government, the petitioners were placed under suspension under Rule 13(1). The contention was that the Government was not empowered to pass such an order as it was only an appellate authority. The learned Judge came to the conclusion that “It is the Executive Engineer as well as the Chief Engineer that are competent to pass the order of suspension against the Supervisor under Rule 13”. Observing that the petitioner's case fell under the first limb of Rule 15(1)(a), the learned Judge held that the immediate superior gazetted officer is empowered to suspend the petitioner under Rule 13. So far there can be little difficulty in agreeing with the learned Judge. But with great respect to him, we do not think he was right in holding that. “The first proviso to Rule 15(1)(a) does not, in my considered opinion, govern the main provision of Rule 15(1)(a)”.

    77. For the reasons which we have given we cannot persuade ourselves to agree with his view that “The use of the words ‘the aforesaid penalty’ in the first proviso to Rule 15(1)(a) would make it abundantly clear that the proviso refers only to the case of the penalty of recovery from pay of the whole or any part of the pecuniary losses caused to the Government by negligence or breach of orders”.

    78. It is also very difficult to agree with the observation of the learned Judge that the words “higher authority” in the first proviso do not pertain to the State Government in the instant case”.

    79. We likewise, for reasons already given, find it impossible to share the view that the first proviso “applies only to the second category of cases providing for the penalty of recovery from pay any pecuniary loss caused by the public servant”.

    80. We have no manner of doubt that the said decision does not lay down the law correctly. In the view which we have taken, it is unnecessary to consider whether irrespective of the first proviso to Rule 15(1)(a), the Government in pursuance of its inherent or general power as the executive, can give instructions to its subordinate competent officers to place a member of service under suspension. The following decisions no doubt take that view. We do not, however, think we are called upon to consider that question in this case. W.P No. 4913 of 1970 dated 11th February, 1971, W.P No. 2724 of 1971 dated 21st February, 1972 and Mritunjai Singh v. State of U.P . 1971 Service Law Reporter 523.. We do not therefore give any opinion on this question.

    81. For the above said reasons, we find no merits in these writ petitions. They are therefore dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 100 in each case.

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    M. Nagalakshmaiah v. State Of Andhra Pradesh
    (Aug 3, 1972)