1. Accused 4 and 6 in P.R.C No. 7/76 on the file of the VI Magistrate, Hyderabad have filed Crl. M.P Nos. 553 and 918 of 1977 respectively for quashing the proceedings in the said criminal casein so far as they were concerned. A4 is Sub-Inspector of Police and A6 is a Deputy Superintendent of Police and both of them belong to the Police service in Andhra area.

2. PRC. No. 7 of 1976 arises out of a private complaint filed by the 1st respondent in these petitions. On the whole there are nine accused in PRC. No. 7 of 1976. On 6th January 1975 the dead body of the son of the 1st respondent was seen floating in Kommanur canal about 8 kilometres from Swarna Village in Prakasam district. A4 and A3 in PRC. No. 7/76 found the dead body as they were returning from some investigation work. A3 was then an Inspector of Police. He got the body removed from the canal and directed A4 the Sub-Inspector of Police to investigate into the matter. Thereupon, the Sub-Inspector sent an FIR to Inkollu Police Station within whose jurisdiction the dead body was found. A case was registered in the Police. It is alleged in these petitions — it may here be pointed that the averments in the affidavits filed by A4 and A6 in support of Crl. M.P Nos. 553 and 918 of 1977 practically the same—that no external injuries were found at the time of inquest. The body was sent for post-mortem examination by the Medical Officer. Thereafter, the investigation was taken over by the Inspector of Police, A3, under the instructions of the Superintendent of Police. A6, the petitioner in Crl. M.P No. 918 of 1977, was at the time Deputy Superintendent of Police at Ongole within whose jurisdiction the dead body was found. He visted that place in the company of A7, who was another Sub-inspector.

3. The 1st respondent, the father of the dead person, sent a representation to the higher authorities complaining that the death of his son was homicidal and the local police were not taking proper interest in the investigation, thereafter the investigation was entrusted to Crime Branch, CID. A5, Inspector of the Crime Branch was directed by A8 Superintendent of the Crime Branch to investigate and submit a report. That report, has been filed in these petitions as Annexure “G”. After the report was filed, the investigation was taken over by the Superintendent of Police. The 1st respondent filed some private complaints before the Courts in Prakasam District alleging that the concerned police officers caused disappearance of evidence and they were also guilty of defamation. One such case is now pending in the Sessions Court. Ongole as Sessions Case No. 44/75. In that case 13 persons including A-1 to A-4 in P.R.C 7/76 were charged with offences punishable under Sec. 302, 201, 120-B and 218 I.P.C He also filed P.R.C 1/76 on the file of the Additional Munsif Magistrate's Court, Chirala, against the same 13 accused and some others. The case was committed to the Sessions Court and is now pending as S.C 8/76 before the Sessions Court, Ongole. He also filed another complaint C.C 7/76 before the Additional Munsif Magistrate, Chirala against some of these accused. That was directed to be clubbed with another case and both of them have been committed to the Sessions Court, Ongole. The accused in P.R.C 7/76 before the 6th Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, also figure as accused in that Sessions case and the same charges are levelled against the accused in that Sessions case as well.

4. On 29th of June, 1976 the 1st respondent filed a private complaint against nine accused in P.R.C 7/76. He described in the complaint petition the nature of the two offences as follows;

1. “120-B’ 120-B r/w 201 I.P.C Criminal’ conspiracy and Criminal conspiracy to suppress the evidence of murder and screening the murderers from legal punishment.

2. 120-B r/w 500 I.P.C Criminal conspiracy, criminal conspiracy to commit defamation and committing the same.”

5. A-1 in the case is the brother of the wife of the deceased son of the complainant. A-2 is an advocate at Chirala who is said to be related to A-1. A-3 is the Inspector of Police who investigated the case. A-4 is the Sub Inspector of police and A-5 is the Inspector in Crime Branch. A-6 is the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Ongole. A-7 is the Superintendent of Police of Prakasam District. A-8 is the S.P of the Crime Branch at Hyderabad and A-9 is the Director of Forensic Sciences.

6. Complainant i.e, 1st respondent in these petitions alleged in C.C 7/76 that;

“The nine accused were bent upon to destory the foundation of any offence by evolving the theory of suicide i.e for a wholesale suppression of the evidence of murder and screening the murderers (from) legal punishment”.

7. It was further alleged that;

“The tripartite combination of A-1 to A—9 above “Navagrahas” pooled all their resources, struck all necessary deals and by their combined efforts produced the Magna Carat of 9 typed pages and singned and presented by accused 5 to 8 on 14-1-75 Annexure ‘G’

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First A-5 booked on 12-2-75 Room No. 5 in Venkateswara Lodge kept it in reserve and moved to Room No. 416 to Annapoorna Hotel. He also reserved Room No. 415 intended for A-7. S.P Ongole. A-6 S.P Ongole came and occupied Room No. 5 Venkateswara Lodge. A-3 No. 319 and A-4. 150 in Venkateswara Lodge. My contact with A-5 on phone on 13th and 14th is corroborated by Annexure ‘G’ to the bogus report prepared on the 14th.

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Similarly my memorandum to the Chief Minister dated 3-4-75 para 2 Annexure ‘Q’ clearly refers to the conspiracy at Annapurna by details of Nos. of rooms etc. para 3 about A-8's collusion with A-6 (SC. 8/76) is a relative with relationship came to be known later. The registered letter Annexure ‘H’ dated 22-4-75 to A-8, D.I.G, I.G.P and C.M also furnishes full details of this conspiracy.

I had information that some report was manipulated on 14-1-75 at Annapoorna alleging suicide and was under the impression that the motive suggested therein was, the deceased discovered the pregnancy of the bride and thereafter went to the canal and committed suicide, xx xx None of these police officers A-3 to A-7 touched this case after 14-1-1975 giving a decent burial at Annapurna Hotel.

It is therefore clear that the conspirators through the means of report Annexure ‘G’ suppressed the evidence of murder and screen the murderer”

The complaint concluded with the following allegations:

“It is further submitted that the prosecution is not for making any report genuine or not or giving any opinion genuine or not and though the report may be the means the end has to be taken into account. Therefore, certain offences by their nature cannot be said to be in discharge of duty by a public servant. The offence of criminal conspiracy, criminal to suppress the offence of murder and screening the murderers or the conspiracy to defame and defaming can never be said to be the discharge of duty of any public servant. Vide 1960 S.C 266 and 1967 S.C 752.

It is therefore prayed that this Hon'ble Court be pleased to take the case on file u/s. 120-B, 120-B r/w 201 and 120-B, 120-B r/w 500 and commit the accused to the Court of Sessions.”

8. To complete the narration of events we may also refer to two petitions filed in this Court by A-3 and A-5 in P.R.C 7/76. They filed Crl. M.P 2750 and 2755 of 76 respectively to quash the proceedings in P.R.C 7/76 and by his order dt. 18-2-77 our learned brother Sheth, J. allowed them and quashed the proceedings in P.R.C 7/76 in so far as these two accused were concerned on the ground that the prosecution in P.R.C 7/76 was barred by limitation by virtue of Sec. 53 of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) District Police Act, 1859. Incidentally we may also mention that similar petitions filed by A-1 and A-2 were dismissed by the learned Judge.

9. The same accused viz., A-3 and A-5 also filed a number of petitions to quash the proceedings in SC. 7/76, SC. 8/76. SC. 44/76 pending in the Courts in Prakasam District. But they were dismissed by our learned brother Chennakesav Reddy, J. even at the admission stage.

10. Sri Eswara Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioners strongly relies on Sec. 53 of the District Police Act for contending that the prosecution action in P.R.C 7/76 is barred by limitation. The learned counsel points out that the complaint is based on the alleged conspiracy which took place amongst the nine accused in Annapoorna hotel in Hyderabad on 14th January, 1975. But the private complaint was lodged on 29th of June, 1976. However, Sec. 54 permits only a three months time to institute any action against persons who act in the discharge of their duties. He further relies on the circumstance that this argument appealed to our learned brother Sheth, J. Consequently learned counsel urges upon us to accept the same view.

11. Feeling considerable difficulty to accept this point of view advanced by the learned counsel and accepted by our learned brother Sheth, J. one of us (Sambasiva Rao, J.) referred these petitions to a Division Bench. They are consequently before us in a Division Bench.

12. We will now read Sec. 53 in its entirety.

“Limitation of action: All actions and prosecutions against any person, which may be lawfully brought for anything done or intended to be done, under the provisions of this Act, or under the provisions of any other law for the time being in force, conferring powers on the police shall be commenced within three months after the act complained of shall have been committed and not otherwise; and notice in writing of such action and of the cause thereof shall be given to the defendant, or to the Superintendent or other superior officers of the district in which the act was committed, one month at least before the commencement of the action, and no plaintiff shall recover in any such action, if tended of sufficient amends shall have been made before such action brought or if a sufficient sum of money shall have been paid into Court after such action, brought by or on behalf of the defendant; and though a decree shall be given for the plaintiff in any such action, such plaintiff shall not have cost against the defendant, unless the Judge, before whom the trial shall certify his approbation of the action:

Provided always that no action shall in any case lie where such, officers shall have been prosecuted criminally for the same act”

13. A plain reading of the section would show that it is not all actions and prosecuions against police officers and other persons which come within the ambit of Sec. 53. In so many words, the section states that only those actions and prosecutions which may be lawfully brought for anything done or intended to be done under the provisions of the District Police Act or under the provisions of any other law for the time being in force conferring powers on the police, are required to be commenced within three months from the date of the act complained of. That is to say, the limitation of three months would apply only to deeds done or intended to be done under the provisions of the District Police Actor under the provisions of any other law for the time being in force, conferring powers on the police. If the deed complained of is not a thing done or intended to be done under the provisions of the District Police Act or under the provisions of any other law for the time being in force, conferring powers on the police, the three months period of limitation would not apply to actions and prosecutions which may be launched against persons who have perpetrated it. Therefore, when the bar of limitation under Section 53 is raised, the Court will have to examine whether the act complained of is one which has been done or intended to done under the provisions of the District Police Act or under the provisions of any other law for the time being in force, conferring powers on the police.

14. We may here refer to sec. 21 of the District Police Act which says that every police officer shall be considered to be always on duty and shall have the powers of a police officer in every part of the general police district. It is his duly to use his best endeavours and ability to prevent all crimes, offences and public nuisances: to preserve the peace, to apprehend disorderly and suspicious characters, to detect and bring offenders to justice, to collect and communicate intelligence affecting the public peace, and promptly to obey and execute all orders aud warrants lawfully issued to him. Sri Eswara Prasad relies on this provision to contend for the argument that his clients were only discharging, while investigating the case relating to the death of the son of the 1st respondent, the duties conferred on them under section 21. Therefore, whatever they did are things done or intended to be done under the provisions of the District Police Act. He also refers us to section 4 of the Criminal Procedure Code which requires that all offences under the Indian Penal Code shall be investigated, inquired into tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions contained therein. So, the learned counsel for the petitioners argues that the two petitioners were only discharging their duties and functions enjoined on them under section 4 of the Criminal Procedure Code for the purpose of investigation of the crime. Such being the case, the complaint launched by the 1st respondent in PRC 7/76 comes within the ambit of section 53.

15. We cannot agree with this contention and the view of our learned brother Sheth, J. in accepting it. We have already seen the charges levelled by the 1st respondent against the nine accused in PRC 7/76. He complained there that the nine accused gathered together in Annapurna hotel, Hyderabad and conspired to suppress the evidence of murder to screen the murderers from legal punishment and also to commit defamation. We have also extracted certain passages from the long complaint which fromed the basis for the charge. These charges and the allegations on which the charges were framed may or may not be true. But the truth or otherwise, and their tenability or otherwise we are not concerned with in these petitions. The only question for our decision is whether the conspiracy alleged by the 1st respondent against the nine accused, including the two petitioners is something done or intended to be done under the provisions of the District Police Actor under the provisions of any other law for the time being in force, conferring powers on the police. Could it be postulated that a conspiracy of the nature which is now alleged in PRC 7/76 could, by any stretch of imagination, be something done or intended to be done under the provisions of the District Police Actor under the provisions of any other law for the time being in force, conferring powers on the police? The only answer in our view in an emphatic no. There is no law and in fact there can never be any law which confers power on the two petitioners and others to enter into a conspiracy which has now been alleged against them. We are firmly of the view that such power has never been and can never be conferred on the petitioners or any person.

16. Sri Prasad for the petitioners however, contends relying on H.N Rishbud v. State of Delhi (1) AIR 1955 Supreme Court 196-1955 Crl. L.J 526 State of M.P v. Mubarskali (2) AIR 1959 Supreme Court 707 that when A-5 has submitted the report Annexure G, the present petitioners formed an opinion as a result of their investigation and such formation of opinion after investigation is a police officer's function. The complaint lodged by the 1st respondent alleges that the two petitioners and others have formed false opinions. Whether the opinion is false or not will have to be decided by the Court of law. But formation of opinion as such, so argues the learned counsel, is part of a police officer's function and therefore comes within the protection given by section 53. This argument, we are afraid, is built upon a wrong premise. The complaint of the 1st respondent is not that the two petitioners and the other accused have formed a wrong opinion but that they have conspired to suppres, the evidence of murder and to screen the murderers and to commit defamation and that everything else is only in pursuance of that conspiracy. Therefore, this argument of the learned counsel has no force.

17. Strong relience is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Venugopal, AIR. 1964 S.C 33 : 1964 (1) Crl. L.J 16. However; on a reading of the decision it is manifest that it is against the contention of Sri Eswar Prasad. Das Gupta, J. speaking for the Court, made it clear that unless the act complained of appears to have been done or intended to be done under the provisions of the Police Actor of the other laws conferred powers on the police, the protection of Section 53 will not be available. In that case the complaint against the police officers was that they wrongfully confined certain persons in a room in the police station and there caused injuries to those persons. After infliction of the injuries, the police officers removed one person from the police station and threw the body at a place where it was ultimately found. The intention of the police officers was to screen themselves from punishment. A contention was raised before the Supreme Court that all this was done during the course of investigation and therefore the bar of limitation prescribed by Section 53 would apply to it. Repelling this argument, Das Gupta, J. pointed out in paras 17 to 19 thus:

“17 The act of beating or the act of confining was, it is true alleged to be done at a time when Venugopal was engaged in investigation. But it is not possible to see what reasonable connection these acts had with the process of investigation. Nor can one see how the act of sending away the injured person had any relation to the process of investigation.

11. The High Court fell into the error of thinking that whatever a police officer does to a person suspected of a crime at a time when the officer is engaged in investigating that crime should be held to be done in the discharge of his official duties to investigation and as such under the provisions of the law that imposed this duty on him. This view is wholly unwarranted in law.

19. In our opinion, it cannot possibly be said that the acts complained of in the present case were done or intended to be done under any provision of the Police Act or the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other low conferring powers on the police. Section 53 of the Police Act had therefore no application to this case.”

18. It is quite clear that this decision of the Supreme Court gives full support to the view we have expressed.

19. Reference is also made by the learned counsel for the petitioners to the Supreme Court's decision in Pukhraj v. State of Rajastan, (1973) 2 SCC 701 : A.I.R 1973 Supreme Court 2591 : 1973 Crl. L.J 1795. That was a case which arose under Sec. 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Once again this decision does not render much assistance to the learned counsel's argument. The complaint was that the Post-Master Genral kicked the complainant and abused him when the complainant was submitting his represenation for cancellation of his transfer. The Court held that the acts of the public servant so alleged could not be said to have been done in purported exercise of the duty.

20. Likewise, as we have said, to suppress the evidence of murder and to screen the murderers could never be postulated as part of a police officer's function either by the provisions of the District Police Act or by any other law which confers powers on the police.

21. Sri T.V Sarma, the 1st respondent in these petitions' who appears in person also raises the contention that Section 53 of the District Police Act has no application at all to P.R.C 7/76. In the light of the view we have expressed, it is not necessary to deal with that question. We express no opinion on that point. We therefore, do not agree with the view taken by our learned brother Sheth, J. on this question in his decision dated 18-2-1977 in Crl. M.P Nos. 2750 and 2755 of 76 and cannot uphold the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners.

22. In the result, the two criminal miscellaneous petitions are dismissed. Consequently, the two stay petitions viz., Crl. M.P Nos. 554 and 919 of 77 are dismissed and the stay granted therein is vacated.