(1) This is unsuccessful plaintiff's first appeal against the judgment and decree of dismissal of her suit for cancellation of the decree and permanent in junction in o. S. No. 26 of 1978 dated 31 - 12 - 1982 passed by the subordinate judge at warangal.
(2) The facts which are no longer in dispute before me, in short, are as follows: -
(3) The appellant and the 3rd respondent are cousins. The respondentno. 2 is the real brother of the respondentno. 3, who is the mother of the respondent no. 1. On 21 - 11 - 1974 the 1st respondent was married with the only son of the appellant - plaintiff, who was a school teacher and owned the house bearingno. 7/878 and 7/878/1 (for short 'the suit house') situated at ujli base, hanamkonda, warangal district.
(4) The appellant - plaintiff brought the suit o. S. No. 26 of 1978 against the respondents alleging that she is the second wife of her husband who had ten children from the first wife and only one child from her. Her son had become way ward and his behaviour was not good the relationship between her son and the 1st respondent became strained and, therefore, the 1st respondent started blaming the appellant for the unhappy state of affairs. She became worried as the domestic peace was distributed. The respondents exploited the situation to their advantage and gained ascendancy over the will by continuous coaxing and goading. They formulated a scheme and impressed upon the appellant - plaintiff that if the suit house is normally transferred in the name of the 1st respondent and she is shown to exercise the authority therein, it would act as a deterrent and would bring round her son and he may mend himself in pursuance of the aforesaid scheme formulated by the respondents, a suit bearing o. S. No. 137 of 1976 was filed in the court of subordinate judge at warangal by the respondents no. 1 against the appellant for a declaration that she should be declared as the owner of the suit house and for a permanent in junction restraining the appellant from interfering with her possession. On the strength of the oral gift alleged to have been made by the appellant - plaintiff, though she never made any oral gift in her favour, it was wrongly alleged in that suit that the 1st respondent has been put in possession of the suit house in pursuance of the alleged fictitious gift. The formality of service of summons was gone through and an advocate was got appointed for the appellant - plaintiff herein immediately and a consent written statement was got filed on her behalf suffering a consent decree on 20 - 12 - 1976. In order to show the action in reality, the 1st respondent also took steps for mutation of her name in the municipal registers in pursuance of the consent decree and attornment deeds of lease were executed by the respective lessees occupying the portions of the suit house. But the appellant was all along kept under the impression that the entire proceedings are only a make believe affair. Ithas also been alleged thatthe appellant - plaintiff continues to be the exclusive owner in possession of the suit house. She has never made any gift in favour of the 1st respondent. The plea as taken in the suit o. S. No. 137 of 1976 by the 1st respondents are untrue and fictitious and a consent decree has been obtained by undue influence and fraud and, therefore, the decree dated 20 - 12 - 1976 in o. S. No. 137 of 1976 being null and void deserves to be cancelled and the respondents are to be restrained from interfering with the possession of the appellant - plaintiff over the suit property or otherwise invade her rights over it in pursuance of the said decree.
(5) The 1st respondent through her written statement specifically denied the allegations made in the plaint she has pleaded that the appellant - plaintiffhad made an oral gift of the suit house in her favour at the time of her marriage only and had delivered thepossession of the same to her. She has accepted the gift and got her name mutated in the municipal records. The tenants also executed rent receipts in her favour. The appellant used to collect the rents from the tenants on her behalf to which she did not object with a view not to displease her. When the appellant - plaintiff tried to mortgage a portion of the suit house,some misunderstanding had arisen and, thereafter, the appellant started denying the title of the 1st respondent in the suit house. Talks of mutual compromise failed. She did not exercise any undue influence or fraud in obtaining the decree in o. S. No137 of 1976, in which the appellant through her written statement had accepted the plaint allegations, and, therefore, the suit deserves to be dismissed.
(6) The 2nd and the 3rd respondents filed a memo. Adopting the written statement of the respondent no. 1.
(7) The trial court framed five issues. In answer to issue no. 1 that the decree in o. S. No. 137 of 1976 dated 20 - 12 - 1976 on the file of subordinate judge at warangal was obtained by undue influence and fraud practised by the respondents and the same is fictitious and nominal, the learned lower court reached to the conclusion, on assessment of the evidence on record, that the appellant - plaintiff has failed to establish the undue influence or fraud practised on her, particularly, because the allegations made in the plaint and the admissions made in the plaint and the admissions made in her written statement in o. S. No. 137 of 1976 do not amount to fraud of the kind that would nullify the decree passed in the suit o. S. No. 137 of 1976 against the appellant - plaintiff. The trial court, inview of its finding in regard to issue no. 1, did not decide the second issue whether the appellant - plaintiff made an oral gift offte suit house in favour of the 1st respondent at the time of her marriage and, if is, it is valid and binding or not. In result, the trial court dismissed the suit
(8) Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and decree of dismissal of the suit, the appellant - plaintiffhas come up in appeal.
(9) I have heard the learned counsel of both the sides. A number of cases have been cited before me and i shall briefly notice the more important of them.
(10) In subbanna v. Bayamma (1) air 1925 madras 640, it has been held as follows: "the fraud must be extrinsic to the proceedings before the judge. It must be in the conduct of the suit, by keeping the defendant out of court, by practising afraud on him, or by not serving a notice upon him, or false declaration, inducing the court to believe that notice has been served and proceed with the suit ex - parte or by some other act by which the defendant is prevented from placing his case before the court, as fully as he would do, but for the act of the plaintiff. (emphasis supplied).
(11) The principle laid down in the case of chinnayya v. Rammanna (2) (1913) 38 madras 203, has been quoted with approval in the case of subbanna v. Bayyamma ( (1) supra) , wherein it has been laid down that: -
"the test to be applied is: is the fraud complained of not something that was included in what has been already adjudged by the court, but extraneous to it? if for instance a party be prevented by his opponent, from cunducting his case properly by tricks or misrepresentation, that would amount to fraud. There may also be fraud upon the court, if in a proceeding in which the party is entitled to get an order, without notice to the other side, he procures, it by suppressing facts which the law makes it his duty to disclose to the court."
(underlining is mine)
(12) In ramanathan v. Palaniyappa (3) air 1939 madras 146, it has been held that: -
"the allegation of fraud for vacating a judgment must be extraneous to everything which has been adjudicated on by the court and not any fraud which has already been dealt with by the court. Merely making a false statement knowing it to be false in the written statement cannot be regarded as extrinsic to the proceedings in the court. The whole of the written statement must be deemed to have been considered by the judgment and if for some reason or other the court accepted a certain allegation as true which is subsequently alleged to be false there is no ground for vacating the decree on the ground of fraud. The mere making of a false allegation in a written statement even with knowledge of its falsity, while it would amount to perjury, would not necessarily amount to afraud on the court"
(13) In konda boyan v. Palani swami (4) air 1942 madras 114, ithas been held that the decree on the forged document when obtained by playing a trick upon the court and also upon the debtor and the witnesses to prevent the truth being discovered, the decree on the forged pronote must be set aside as the case was one of fraud much wider than the scope of the matters decided in the actual suit wherein the wrong decree was obtained. It has also been held in this case that the decree will not be set aside merely on proof that it was obtained by perjury or that the document upon which it is based is a forged document.
(14) Similarly in the case of nageswara v. Ganesh (5) asr. 1942 madras 675,it is held that the mere fact that a false allegation was made in the petition and affidavit was no ground for holding that the order procured by fraud or treating it as a nullity.
(15) In basdevanand v. Shantanand (6) air 1942 allahabad 302, ithas been'held that
" the rule that a title once settled by a decision should not be questioned again between the same parties is intended not only to prevent a new decision but also to prevent a new investigation so that the same person cannot be harassed again and again in various proceedings upon the same question. A decree cannot be set aside merely because it was obtained by perjured evidence."
(16) Again, relying on ramanathan v. Palaniyappa ( (3) supra) , nageswara v. Ganesh ( (5) supra) and basdevanand v. Shantanand ( (6) supra) , it is held in p. Subramoniam v. D. Nagaramma (7) air 1963 kerala 26, as follows:
"fraud to avoid ajudgment, must be of the person who secured the judgment in his favour by means of such fraud unless it be a judgment in rem available against all the world. It is true that fraud vitiates the most solemn proceedings of courts of justice. It avoids all judicial acts. Statutory recognition is given to this principle in s. 44 of the evidenceact. But, equally well settled is the principle that a judicial decisionis conclusive inter parties on the matter decided; or, in other words, a matter decided is decided once for all. This principle of resjudicata also finds statutory expression in s. 1 l, code of civil procedure. These two principles haveto be reconciled in their application in practice. Fraud to be aground for vacating a judgment must be extrinsic or collateral to the adjudications involved in the judgment and not been, or deemed to have been, dealt with by the court in the impugned judgment"
(17) The idea behind the aforementioned decisions could be crystalised thus: - that although fraud vitiates the most solemn proceedings of courts of justice and avoids all judicial acts, yet fraud to be a ground for vacating a judgment must be extrinsic or collater altotheadjudications involved in the judgment and not been, or deemed to havebeen, dealt with by the court in the impugned judgment and adecree cannot be set aside merely on proof that itwas obtained by perjury or that the suit document is a forged document. But, this principle is equally true that if by the conduct of the defendant in keeping the plaintiff out of court by practising a fraud on him, or by false declaration, inducing the court to believe that the notice had been served and proceeded. The suit ex - parte or by some other act by which the plaintiff is prevented from placing his case before the court, as fully as he would do, but for the act of the defendant by playing a trick upon the court and also upon the plaintiff and the witnesses to prevent the truth being discovered, or by misrepresentation preventing the plaintiff from conducting his case properly in the previous suit against him, the decree should be set aside.
(18) After the very clear decision by the apex court in its judgment in as far shaik v. Soleman bibi (8) air 1976 sc 163, in orderto establish undue influence in the case of a gift inter vivos which is the same as is embodied in section 16 of the contract act, two important things must be proved: - that the relation between the donor and the donee was such that the donee was in a position to dominate the will of the donor and the donee has used position to obtain an unfair advantege over thedonor. And, it is insufficient for a person seeking the relief to show that the relations of the parties have been such that the one naturally relied upon the other for advice, and the other was in a position to dominate the will of the first giving it.
(19) So far as the question of practising undue influence on the appellant - plaintiff bythe respondents is concerned, it is to be remarked at the out set that neither the appellant - plaintiff has pleaded specifically that the respondents were in a dominating position to dominate the will of the appellant - plaintiff nor they had used that position to obtain unfair advantage over the other within the meaning of section 16 of the contract act.
(20) The main question that falls for determinationis whether there is extrinsic and collateral material on record to conclude that the respondents had prevented the appellant - plaintiff from conducting her case properly by tricks or misrepresentation amounting to fraud?
(21) It is not disputed before me that the appellant - plaintiff was ex. Urdu teacher at the time of the institution of the suit, that she had only one son, namely, abdul majid siddiq who had been married to the respondentno. 1, that her husband was also a retired government servant, that the relationship between the respondentno. 1 and her husband abdul majid siddiq was strained, that the family peace was badly disturbed because of the bad conduct and behaviour of the appellant's son abdul mjid siddiq and that she owned only the suit house, in a portion of which she had inducted three tenants.
(22) In para - 2 of the plaint it has been pleaded that the respondents used to blame the appellant for the unhappy state of affairs in the house and, therefore, she was disturbed and the respondent no. 1 had exploited the situation to her advantage and gained ascendancy over the will of the appellant - plaintif under the guidance of the remaining respondents. Due to continuous coaxing and goading the appellant - plaintiff and her husband were made to believe that if the suit house is nominally transferred in the name of the respondent no. 1 and she is shown to exercise authority over them, this would act, as a deterrent and reform him. Therefore, believing them, she agreed to act accordingly in order to bring peace back to home. In para - 3 of the plaint she has pleaded about the institution of the suit o. S. No. 137 of 1976 on the basis of a fictitious oral gift and delivery of possession of the suit house, the formality of service of summons and getting an advocate appointed for her and filing of a consent written statement in the court onher behalf resulting in a consent decree on20 - 12 - 1976. On reading para - 4of the plaint, it appears that she got the knowledge about what had actually happened in the court only sensing afoul play during a conversation in which threat was hurled on her by the respondents and on obtaining the certifified copies of the concerned documents.
(23) Pw - 1 has testified that she was taken to bhpmruthyanjayarao, advocate d w - 2 by the 1 st and 2nd respondents and her signatures were obtained on blank and printed forms. Signature ofher husband was also taken at that time on a blank paper and the nature of the proceedings werenotmade known to them at the time. When summons were served on her, therespondentno. 2 when enquired toldher that this was done only to give effect to the nominal proceedings, therefore, she did not approach anybody includingany advocate. In cross - examination she has stated that her signatures on plain as also typed papers were obtained by the 2nd respondent in the office of dw - 2 as also in her house and in the house of the 2nd respondent. She has further stated not to have gone to the advocate sri. V. Dilip kumar dw - 3. She has further stated that only on obtaining certified copies of the plaint, written statements/a, of the suit o. S. No. 137 of 1976 she had come to know that advocate v. Dilip kumar dw - 3 had filed a consent written statement on her behalf
(24) Circumstences are too numerous to mention which throw a cloud of suspicion in the preparation of the written statement and obtaining the consent decree.
(25) On the other hand advocate v. Dilip kumar dw - 3 has testified that he had started practising as an advocate from the month of march, 1976 and he had little independence practice as on 20 - 12 - 1976. Hurmathunnisa begum pw - 1 with her husband had come to him and had told him that she has compromised the matter out side the court, that she had already given the properties to the respondent no. 1 and requested him to draft the written statement, that she requested to file a petition for advancing the date of hearing and that the date of the case o. S. No. 137 of 1976 was fixed for 2 0 - 12 - 1976. He has further stated that pw - 1 gave vakalat which is ex. B - 10 and the written statement prepared on her behalf is at ex. B - 5. He had explained the contents of the written statement to her in hindi after drafting and she had signed the written statement.
(26) On perusal of the vakalatnama ex. B - 10, it is clear that the date of execution of the vakalatnama before the advocate has been written as 20th november, 1976. On the front page of the vakalatnama, below the word "accepted", the advocate v. Dilipkumar dw - 3 has signed and there appears to be over - figuring in the figure "16" to make it "20",but noover - figuring in the month and year, which is "12/76". Alookat the written statement ex. B - 5 reveals that the date above the word 'verification' appears to have been typed previously as - 11 - 1976 'any by over - figuring it by ink it appears as '20 - 12 - 1976'. It is noteworthy that the date had not been typed, only the month and year had been typed as " 11 - 1976". Similarly, in the last sentence of the 'verification' clause the date was not typed and the month of 'november' had been typed. The date '20th' has been written in ink in the blank space and the word 'november' has been scored out and the word 'dec. ' has been written in ink. On the reverse of summons for settlement of issues ex. C - 1, it has been mentioned that the summons were served on the appellant - plaintiff on20 - 12 - 1976 and the suit o. S. No. 137 of 1976 was fixed for 8th february, 1977. This summon was issued on 7th december, 1976.
(27) From what is discussed above, it appears that only after the service of summons on 20 - 12 - 1976, the appellant - plaintiff might have gone to her counsel advocate v. Dilip kumardw - 3 as stated by him. If that was so why the date of the vakalatnama has been shown as 20th november, 1976 by advocate v. Dilipkumar dw - 3 in it. As noted above there is also over - figuring in the date"16" below the signature of this witness. It is difficult to understand as to howon20 - l 1 - 1976 this witness could write the case number and the names of the parties in the vakalatnama ex. B - 10 and if that was not done on that date and it was done on 20 - 12 - 1976 only then it may be inferred that signature on blank vakalatnama had been obtained by some person which was used subsequently on 20 - 12 - 1976. It is interesting to note that the written statement was also typed in the month of november, 1976 to be subsequently as and when such occasion arises. There is no explanation given by dw - 3 as to howthe word 'november' has beentyped below the 'verfication' clause as also about filling the gaps by putting the date and overfiguring the month below and above the 'verification' clause. In this written statement the contents of the plaint, that is to say, the words 'suit house shown in the plaint schedule', with a prayer of decreeing the suit as prayed for have been mentioned. When the suit was non existent in the month of november, 1976 how could this written statement be prepared anticipating the allegations of the plaint. I hasten to add that i am mentioning the aforesaid contents of the written statement only for the limited purpose of considering whether the written statement was prepared on 20 - 12 - 1976 or it was already prepared in the month of november, 1976. It would be out of place to mention that the flame of the appellant - plaintiff in this suit appears to have been written in the hand writing of the same person on written statement ex. B - 5 and on the affidavit of badul gani, the husband of the appellant, which is at ex. B - 9.
(28) True that advocate v. Dilip kumar dw - 3 has not been cross - examined on behalf of the appellant - plaintiff in the lower court regarding the aforementioned glaring facts. But judges are not computers and they should evaluate the oral evidence with the aid of experience of their life even if there is no cross - examination or effective cross - examination of witnesses and, as such, their evidence should not be accepted on their face value.
(29) Advocate v. Dilip kumar dw - 3 did not know the appellant - plaintiff, according to him, from before 20 - 12 - 1976 as she had not visited him before that date. She did not visit him after 20 - 12 - 1976. For the aforesaid reasons, it is difficult to accept the statement of advocate v. Dilip kumar dw - 3 that the appellant - plaintiff had visited him on 20 - 12 - 1976 or she had instructed him after giving her vakalatnama ex. B - 10 or he had prepared the written statement on her instructions which is at ex. B - 5. As noted above, it appears that the vakalatnamaex. B - 10 and the written statement ex. B - 5 were prepared some time in the month of november, 1976 and, under these circumstances, it is difficult to accept the self - serving statement of advocate v. Dilip kumar dw - 3 that the appellant - plaintiff had also requested him to file a petition for advancing the date of hearing on the ground that she has compromised the matter out side the court for thesimple reason that in the month of november, 1976 neither the suit was filed nor the date was fixed. So, how could the appellant - plaintifftell this witness that the suit has been compromised out of court and he should file an application for preponing the date of hearing. Had the appellant - plaintiff really wanted to engage a counsel of her own, she would have definitely preferred her tenant mirza ghousullah baig pw - 2, who was practising in warangal court only, to an unknown newcomer advocate.
(30) Sri p. Mruthyamjaya rao dw - 2 has stated on oath thatthe appellantnever came to him before filing of the suit. After receipt of summons shehad come with her husband. Itis noteworthy that the 1st respondent has not pleaded in her written statement that after receipt of summons the appellant - plaintiffhad visited her house and had enquired about her advocate or had stated thatthe she didnot want to contest the suit. According to her, she did not accompany the appellant - plaintiffto the house of her advocate dw - 2. It is surprising that a person, before whomhis opponent comes and tells him that there is no dispute as the matter has been settled, and states that he does not want to contest the suit and wants to compromise the matter by giving a compromise decree to him, would not care to take that person to his advocate and instead would direct him togo to his advocate directly. Omission in the written statement regarding the aforesaid allegations makes the statement of dw - 1 that after the receipt of writ of summons the appellant - plaintiff had come to her to state that she does not want to contest the claim appears to be an after thought
(31) Dw - 2 has further testified that he had suggested pw - 1 to appoint an advocate onher behalf and to get the compromise petition filed through him. He has also stated in cross - examination that pw - 1 's husband had come once before filing the suit and he had given an affidavit for some interlocutory application the affidavit of the husband of the appellant - plaintiff pw - 1 is at ex. B - 9. A bare perusal of this affidavit shows that it was typed on 26 - 11 - 1976. There is over figuring in the dates by writing in ink the figure '6 - 12' as also the figure 'december'. In this affidavit reference has been made regarding the plaint schedule propertyas 'suit house'. When the suit was filed on 6 - 12 - 1976, how could the aforementioned words be used in the affidavit prepared and typed on26 - l 1 - 1976, which has been filed in the court
(32) Dw - 2 in his examination in chief has stated that yakub ali, that is, the2nd respondent did not come to him in the company of shamim fatima sultana, the 1st respondent, but in the subsequent sentence he stated that the suit expenses were also paid by yakubali and in cross - examination he has admitted that this yakub ali assisted shamim fatima sultana when she had instructed him to file the suit. Thus it appears that dw - 2 did not want to indulge yakubali, the 2nd respondent, in this case for reasons best known to him. It is noteworthy that this witness has stated in cross - examination that thehusband of the appellant - plaintiff had given affidavit for some interlocutory application, the nature of which he did not remember then. But, this affidavit ex. B - 9 has been filed in the court on 6 - 12 - 1976 by none - else but this witness only. There is no material on record to indicate that the husband of the appellant - plaintiff had ever visited the court during the pendency of suit o. S. No. 137 of 1976.
(33) As noted above, the affidavit of the husband of the appellant - plaintiff which is at ex. B - 9 was prepared on 26 - 11 - 1976 and the overfiguring by ink in the dates are apparent in it. The vakalatnamaex. B - 10 was executed by the appellant - plaintiff on 20 - 11 - 1976 with overfiguring in the date under the signature of dw - 3. The written statement was prepared some time in the month of 'november' has been scored out and the word 'dec. ' in ink has been written instead as also the date '20th' in ink was put in the blank space and over figuring was done on the typed figure'l - ll'to'20 - 12' in ink. The appellant - plaintiff was a stranger to dw - 3 prior to 20 - 12 - 1976, according to him, and after20 - 12 - 1976 she did not visit him. The summons were served only on 20 - 12 - 1976. Her going to the 1st respondent and thereafter with her husband, to her advocate dw - 2, then to dw - 3 for preparation of the written statement and giving her vakalatnama instead of going to the court and asking him to prep one the date of hearing from 28 - 2 - 1977 to 20 - 12 - 1976 only appear to be highly improbable.
(34) It is settled law that the probative effects of evidence in civil and criminal cases are not, however, always the same. In civil cases, the preponderance of probability constitutes a sufficient ground for a decision, but in criminal cases the prosecution has to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt, (see sarkar's evidence act, 10th edition, volume - i,page - 130). Of course, if the facts and circumstances are such that no reasonable man would draw a particular inference from them or if the degree of probability in the case is such as to include any other hypothesis besides the one proposed to beproved, then the party who relies on a particular theory cannot be said to have discharged the onus of proof of establishing that theory. But if there is evidence strongly preponderating in favour of any one of the theories setup, the courtis entitled to act upon it
(35) In the light of the aforesaid discussion of evidence and material on record, even ignoring the evidence of pw - 1 that she has signed some blank papers in the office of the advocate pmruthyamjaya rao dw - 2, her statement brought out in cross - examination that her signatures were obtained on typed matter with out telling her about the contents mentioned therein inspires confidence. This witness has been subjected to a very lengthy and gruelling cross - examinatioa there appearsaring of truth in her version. Therefore, i reach to the conclusion; particularly, in view of the admitted facts of the case mentioned in para - 21 of the judgement above, that the written statement ex. B - 5 was prepared some time in the month of november, 1976 and her signatures were obtained on it. Her signatures on printed vakalatnama ex. B - 10, having blanks, was also obtained some time in the month of november, 1976. The affidavit ex. B - 9of the husband of the appellant - plaintiff was also prepared and typed on 26 - 11 - 1976 and his signatureswereobtainedonit. Thus it appears doubtful that the appellant - plaintiff has personalty engaged and instructed the advocate v. Dilip kumar dw - 3.
(36) The respondent no. 2 did not enter into the witness boxthough allegations against him has been made by the appellant - plaintiffin her plaint as also in her deposition. Therefore, it isa fit case in which adverse inference for non - examination of the 2nd respondent should be drawn.
(37) The appellant - plaintiff appears to be a frustrated woman and, therefore, anyhow, wanted to buy peace in her house and for this reason she succumbed to the pressure put on her by the respondents, particularly, because they made her solely responsible for the said episode and agreed to the scheme, proposed by them, of hard reformative measure only with view to have her son's head screwed on the right way and became a play thing in their hands, little knowing that they were playing trick on her.
(38) In the case of ramanathan v. Palaniyappa ( (3) supra) , the defendant had made a false statement knowing it to be false regardinghis minority. But the plaintiffshadnot denied the allegation either during the trial or during hearing of the appeal in the previous case and it was pleaded in the subsequent litigation that the plaintiffs also honestly believed the allegation by the defendant of his minority at the time was true and, therefore, they did not take the trouble of verifying the truth of that allegatioa such is not the case here.
(39) In the case of basdevanand v. Shantanand ( (6) supra) a decree was obtained by perjured evidence and the decree was sought to be set aside merely on the ground that the decree was obtained by perjured evidence. Such is not the case here.
(40) In the case of subrahmoniam v. D. Nagaramma ( (7) supra) the plaintiff had executed the vakalatnama bearing an endorsement that she was known to the counsel and signed the same before him and the written statement also bore the same date as the vakalatnama and was counter - signed by her counsel, from which it was gathered that they were prepared and filed in the court simultaneously under the advice of counsel. It was mentioned in the written statement that the plaintiff had pleaded to take appropriate proceedings for the realisation of her dues from the 2nd defendant under these circumstances, in the second litigation, it was held that the said plea could not by itself spell out any fraud been played on her. This case is distinguishable on facts. The reason is that, as noted above, it was highly doubtful that the appellant - plaintiffhad prepared the written statement under the advice of her counsel v. Dilipkumar, dw - 3 or had given her vakalatnama directly to him it appears that she did not actually know the contents of the written statement, the date of its preparation as also of the preparation of the vakalatnama and even the name of her counsel.
(41) In the case of nageswara v. Ganesa ( (5) supra) the decree was sought to be set aside on the mere ground that a false allegation was made in the petition and affidavit in the previous litigation and, therefore, it was held that this was no ground for holding that the order was procured by fraud ortreating it as anullity. In the case in hand, the decree is sought to be set aside, inter alia, on the ground that the appellant - plaintiff was deceived by the respondents by misinterpretation that all the proceedings would be nominal and not real before the institution of the first suit.
(42) In the case of konda boyan v. Palani swami ( (4) supra) the defendant had obtained two decrees against the plaintiff, who was injail, one on the genuine promissory note executed by the plaintiff in his favour and the other on a forged pro - note, which was made to appear exactly similar to the genuine pro - note expect for one more attestor. The deccee on the forged document was obtained by playing a trick upon the court and also upon the debtor. The main witnesses who supported the forged promissory note were both individuals who were impersonating the proper witnesses and the whole scheme whereby both the suit were conducted was so devised that neither the debtor nor the true witnesses should realise the nature of the trick which was played. Under these circumstances, the high court found that such acase of fraud much wider than the scope of the matters decided in the actual suit wherein the wrong decree was obtained and one in which a trick was played upon the court as also upon the debtor and the witnesses to prevent the truth being discovered and, holding so, the second decree was set aside.
(43) Similarly, as in the case of konda boyan v. Palani swami ( (4) supra) , the appellant in this case could not realise the nature of the trick which was played by the respondents and fell a prey to the whole scheme prepared by them and could not conduct the suit,. Under these circumstances, it is a case wherein a fraud much wider in nature was played which prevented the appellant to discover the truth and thus the hard reformative measure to mendher son proved to be a weapon of destruction of her rights and, therefore, the consent decree in o. S. No. L37ofl976dated20 - 12 - 1976passed by the subordinate judge, warangalis liable to be set aside.
(44) Relying on pratabmull v. K. C. Sethia (9) air 1960 calcutta 702, it has been urged on behalf of the respondents that section 31 of the specific relief act cannot be applied to the cases of judgments of a court, although they may come within the general expression "written instrument'', because the expression "written instrument" in section 31 of the specific relief act mentions an instrument which has not already been adjudged by any formal court and, therefore, a suit does not lie for adjudging a decree void and being cancelled. It has been further urged on behalf of the respondents that section 34 of the specific relief act, where a court by its judgment declared the rights of a person claiming legal character or title within the meaning of section34of thespecificrelief act and once judgment is given, furtherquestion of title or character does not arise and what remains is only a matter of enforcement or execution of such legal character or right conferred by such award or judgment.
(45) The principle laid down in the case of pratabmull v. K. C. Sethia ( (9) supra) is of no help to the respondents because it has been observed in this case that a suit for declaration of civil rights in respect of a claim of civil nature inacivil suit is not barred from taking congnizance thereof under section 9 of the code of civil procedure unless it is either expressly or impliedfy barred.
(46) It is well setted that section 9 of the i code of civil procedure empowers the civil courts to try all suits of a civil nature except where the cognizance of such suit is either expressly or impliedly barred. The exclusionof the jurisdiction of the civil courts is not to be readily inferred. A right to get the decree set aside, which decree has been obtained by fraud, is always available under the general and common law and not only under the specific relief act. When the decree itself is under challenge, the question of its execution for eating the fruits of the decree does not arise. It can be gathered from the catena of cases referred to above that a decree obtained by fraud is liable to be set aside and the civil court has got jurisdiction to try such suits.
(47) For the reasons aforesaid, the contention of the learned counsel of the respondents cannot be accepted that a suit does not lie for cancellation of the decree obtained by practising fraud.
(48) On a combined reading of paras - 5, 6 and7 of the plaint it is revealed that the appellant has specifically pleaded that she has never intended to transfer the plaint schedule property in favour of the 1 st respondent and she has not gifted it by making an oral gift at any time muchless on 21 - l 1 - 1974. She has also claimed not to have delivered the possession of the plaint schedule property to the 1st respondent in pursuance of the alleged oral gift. She has claimed that she continues to be the exclusive owner in possession of the plaint schedule property and has claimed her entitlement for the relief of permanent injunction restraining the respondents frominterfering with her possession over the plaint schedule property and has claimed her entitlement for the relief of permanent injunction restraining the respondents from interfering with her possession over the plaint schedule property or invading her rights over the same, in any manner, on the strength of her title. The respondents have denied her case and they pleaded that on21 - ll - 1974 the appellant - plaintiff had voluntarily made oral gift in respect of the plaint schedule property which was accepted by her and possession was delivered to her in pursuance thereof
(49) The learned lower court has framed issue no. 2 as follows: '' whether the plaintiff made an oral gift of the suit house in favour of the defendant no. L at the time of marriage of the latter? if so, it is valid and binding?"
(50) But, the learned lower court, at the time of writing the judgement, deleted the aforesaid issue no. 2 on the ground that the suit for cancellation of the decree would stand or fell on the grounds available for settingitaside and the facts anterior to the suit o. S. No. 137 of 1976 cannot be gone into till the decree is set aside.
(51) The learned lower court has committed an error in not deciding the issue in order to complete the judgement because, in case, in appeal the finding of the learned lower court in respect of the first issue is set aside the appellate court could have decided the matter further by examining the finding of the lower court in respect of the second issue.
(52) True,that the appellant - plaintiff has not claimed declaration ofher title in this suit but, asnoted above, she has alleged herself to be the owner of the plaint schedule property and on the strength of her title only, she has claimed the relief of permanent injunction against the respondents. It would not be out of place to mention that in the relief clause of the plaint, she has prayed that such other relief be granted which is deemed fit and just.
(53) Relying on a full bench decision of the allahabad high court in mahabal singh v. Ram raj (10) air 1950 allahabad 604, it has been held in kaushal singh v. Ghanshim singh (11) air 1956 allahabad 639, that where a suit for redemption was brought by a mortgagor in respect of a suit for possession and the relief asked for could not be granted, there is no good ground for refusing the relief to which he is entitled and it is always open to the court to grant the party entitled to a relief other than what he asked for, i. E. , appropriate relief to which he might be entitled. The form of suit is of no consequence unless it has the effect of prejudicing the opposite party in his defence.
(54) 1 am in respectful agreement with the principles laid down mahabal singh v. Ram raj ( (10) supra) followed in kaushal singh v. Ghanshim singh ( (11) supra) and hold that the form of a suit is of no consequence unless it has the effect of prejudicing the opposite party in his defence, for granting appropriate relief to which the appellant - plaintiffis entitled though he has not specifically asked for.
(55) I would have remanded the case for decision of the lower court on the aforesaid issue no. 2. But in view of the fact that the suit was filed on21 - 3 - 1978 and both the parties to the suit in support of their rival contentions have adduced evidence and the lower court had also framed the relevant issue, i am not inclined to remand the case and, after recasting the afore mentioned issue, i proceed further to decide the same.
(56) Pw - 1 has testified that she has never gifted the plaint schedule property to the 1st respondent. She has also stated not to have delivered its possession to the 1 st respondent. She has stated that she has been continuously living in a portion of the plaint schedule property and has been realising the rent from the tenants who are occupying other portions of the plaint schedule property. Her statement is corroborated by the evidence of the tenants mirza ghousullah baig pw - 2 and t. Narayan rao pw - 4, on material particulars. They have stated in one voice that they have been continuously paying the rent of the accommodationin their respective possession to the appellant - plaintiff only. I get from the evidence of pws - 2 and 3 that the fact of gifting the property has not been mentioned in the 'jehez' list ex. A - 25. Pw - 3, who is the khazi and who has performed the marriage of the 1 st respondent, has stated on oath that ordinarily the bridegroom or his parents announce in the marriage gathering if they make any gift of property at the time of marriage. Hehas further stated that the column in ex. A - 26 is blank which is meant for mentioning the fact of the gift made or to be made immediately after the marriage. Pws - 2 and 3 have stated on oath that neither any gift was made by the appellant - plaintiff in favour of the 1st respondent nor they heard about the same at the time of the marriage. I get from the evidence of pws - 1,2 and 4 that prior to the passing of the consent decree pws - 2 and 4 had not executed the rent note in favour of the 1st respondent. The rent note executed by pw - 2 is at ex. B - 7 and it is dated 1 - 2 - 1977. True, that pw - 4 has stated in cross - examination that he had occupied the accommodation some time in the month of august, 1974 and the appellant - plaintiff had obtained a second rent note four or five months or six or seven months there after in the name of her daughter - in - law. But, it appears that this witness has committed an error due to lapse of time, because the 1st respondent herself has not pleaded in the written statement that prior to the passing of the decree pw - 4 had executed a rent note in her favour and, on the other hand, she has specifically pleaded in para - 4 of her written statement that after obtaining the consent decree the tenants had executed rent notes in her favour. It is pertinent to note that the rent note ex. B - 7 was also executed after the consent decree ex. A - 23. Had pw - 4 really executed the rent note in favour of the 1st respondent prior to the passing of the consent decree on 20 - 12 - 1976, there appears to be no reason why the said rent note was not put to this witness in an attempt to establish that he had actually executed the rent note some time in the month of february, 1975.
(57) Pw - 1 has testified that she had all along been paying the house tax of the plaint schedule property vide receipts which are at exs. A - 8 to 21 nothing could be brought out in cross - examination of these witnesses which could shake or weaken their testimonies. On the other hand, dw - 1, has testified that about one month prior to her marriage, the appellant plaintiff has told her that she would gift the plaint schedule property to her. She has stated so in the house of this witness in presence of her mother, maternal uncle and brothers. It is pertinent to note that this allegation has not been made in the written statement. It is settled law that the evidence should be tailored strictly according to the pleadings of the parties. No amount of evidence can be looked into the absence of specific pleadings about a particular allegation.
(58) Dw - 1 has further stated on oath that after the marriage ceremony in her house at about 4 - 30 p. M. , the appellant - plaintiff had come to her and in presence of the 2nd and 3rd respondents, her husband and brothers has declared to have gifted the house containing three portions in her favour and she has accepted the 'hiba' i. E. , gift. She was taken to the said house on the same night where she had stayed. Some days after her marriage, lease deeds were got executed by the tenants in her name in respect of the portions which were in occupation of the tenants. The rents were collected by her in - laws. As noted above, she has not pleaded in the written statement that some days after her marriage lease deeds were got executed by the tenants in her name in respect of the portions which were in their possession. It is also pertinent to note that in para - 3 of her written statement the 1st respondent has pleaded that after the solemnization of the marriage on 21 - 11 - 1974 she lived in the house of the appellant - plaintiff. This belies her statement that possession of the plaint schedule property was handed over to her after the alleged gift.
(59) The 2nd and 3rd respondents did not enter into the witness box to support the allegation of the 1st respondent that theappellant - plaintiff had made an oral gift ofthe plaint schedule property infavour ofthe 1st respondent and that shehadacceptedthesame. The 1strespondent had not exarnined her brothers and other relations who, according to her, had witnessed the gift ceremony. Forwith holding the best evidence; it appears to be a fit case in which adverse inference should be drawn against the 1st respondent
(60) As noted above, there is no reliable and acceptable evidence on record that possession of the plaint schedule property was ever delivered by the appellant - plaintiff to the 1st respondent. There is no evidence that the tenantshad ever recognised the istrespondent as their landlady,particularly, prior to the passing of the consent decree on 20 - 12 - 1976. They did not pay rent to her. The name of the 1st respondent was not mutated in the municipal records. After the alleged execution of the gift she never paid house tax of the plaint schedule property.
(61) It is an admitted fact that the appellant - plaintiff was a retired school teacher. She owned and possessed only one house, /. E. , the plaint schedule property, in aportion of which she has been residing and had let out the other two portions to different tenants. She had only one son of her own. There was neither any occasion or need to make an oral gift ofthe plaint schedule property nor there appears to be no reason for resiling from the act of gifting the plaint schedule property to her daughter - in - law subsequent to the alleged gift.
(62) For the foregoing reasons, i prefer the statement on oath of the appellant - plaintiff and her witnesses to the evidence of the 1st respondent and hold that the appellant - plaintiff had not gifted the plaint schedule property to the 1strespondent on 21 - l l - 1974 immediately after the marriage or at any time thereafter. I may add that what ever was done subsequent to that was only nominal in pursuance of the aforementioned secret mala fide claim of the respondents.
(63) There is evidence on record thatthe 1st respondent had tried unsuccessfully to realise the rents from pws - 2 and 4 and, therefore, the appellant - plaintiff has got a reasonable apprehension that the 1st respondent may disturb her possession in the plaint schedule property.
(64) In result, the appeal is allowed. The decree and judgment passed by the lower court are reversed and the decree passed in o. S. No. 137 of 1976dated20 - 11 - 1976 in the case of shamim fatima sultana v. Hurmathunnisa begum passed by the subordinate judge at warangal is cancelled and it is declared that the appellant - plaintiff is the owner in possessionof the plaint schedule property. I also pass a decree for permanent in junction restraining the respondents - defendants from interfering with the possession of the appellant - plamtiffin the plaint schedule property. However, in the circumstances of the case, i order the parties to bear their own costs.