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Smart Summary

Case Summary — Opinion by S. Dasaradharama Reddy, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, who was facing trial in S.C. 207 of 1993 before the II Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad (who was also an additional designated judge under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act — "the TADA Act"), filed a writ of quo warranto challenging the appointment of the third respondent, Mr. K. Mahalaxmi Rao, as a judge of a designated court. The ground of challenge was that the appointment was contrary to section 9(6) of the TADA Act, which requires that a person appointed as a judge of a designated court must have been immediately before such appointment a sessions judge or an additional sessions judge.

The learned single judge dismissed the writ petition. The appellant then filed the present appeal against that dismissal.

Relevant chronological facts (as recited in the opinion):

  • The third respondent was temporarily promoted as District and Sessions Judge Grade II by G.O. Rt. No. 4131 dated 25-9-1992.
  • On 2-11-1992 he was posted as member, Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings, Hyderabad.
  • By a High Court posting notification No. 82-3 Spl. dated 19-4-1994 (part of the postings and transfers), he was posted as Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court – cum – II Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, and he took charge on 5-5-1994.
  • The High Court had earlier issued a general notification (ROC No. 25/SO/74 dated 14-8-1974) under Section 9(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) appointing district judges by virtue of their office to be sessions judges and additional district judges to be additional sessions judges.
  • Government orders under the TADA Act (e.g., G.O. Ms. No. 345 dated 25-7-1987 and G.O. Ms. No. 518 dated 29-10-1987) had constituted designated courts and appointed judges/additional judges for designated courts with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a person appointed as District and Sessions Judge (or holding equivalent nomenclature) qualifies as a "sessions judge" or "additional sessions judge" for the purpose of section 9(6) of the TADA Act (i.e., must the person have been immediately before appointment a sessions judge or additional sessions judge?).
  2. Whether general notifications issued by the High Court under Section 9(2) and (3) of the CrPC or by the government under Section 9(4) and (5) of the TADA Act can confer sessions-judge or additional-sessions-judge status without separate, individual notifications, and whether such general notifications are permissible.
  3. Whether section 9(6) of the TADA Act should be interpreted to require actual prior exercise of sessions-judge functions (i.e., that the appointee must have "actually worked" as a sessions judge) rather than being appointed or empowered as such by notification.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • Under section 9(6) of the TADA Act, a person must have been immediately before such appointment a sessions judge or an additional sessions judge; since the third respondent was not a sessions judge or additional sessions judge before 19-4-1994, he is not eligible to preside over the designated court.
  • An appointment as "District and Sessions Judge" is different from the empowerment conferred by sections 9(2) and (3) of the CrPC; being appointed a district judge does not make one a sessions judge for the purposes of the CrPC or the TADA Act.
  • Article 236's inclusion of "sessions judge" within the definition of "district judge" is limited to Chapter VI of Part VI of the Constitution and cannot be used to interpret the statutory expression in this context.
  • Holding posts such as presiding officer of a labour court, member/chairman of various tribunals, or member of a disciplinary tribunal (as the third respondent did) does not make one a sessions judge or additional sessions judge.
  • Implicitly, the appellant also contended that section 9(6) should be read to require prior actual service as a sessions judge (i.e., "actually worked" as such) before appointment to a designated court.

Respondent / High Court's Position (as recited in the opinion)

  • The High Court had earlier issued a general notification (ROC No. 25/SO/74 dated 14-8-1974) under Section 9 of the CrPC, by which district judges and additional district judges were appointed by virtue of their office to be sessions judges and additional sessions judges respectively; therefore, specific separate notifications were not necessary whenever a district judge or additional district judge was appointed.
  • By virtue of the High Court's posting notification (No. 82-3 Spl. dated 19-4-1994), the third respondent was posted as Additional Chief Judge / II Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge and, because of the general notification, was empowered with sessions jurisdiction and was a sessions judge from 19-4-1994.
  • G.O. Ms. No. 518 dated 29-10-1987 had appointed the II Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge to be an additional judge to exercise jurisdiction in the designated court for the metropolitan sessions division; thus the third respondent was qualified to be appointed as an additional judge of the designated court.
  • General notifications under CrPC Section 9(2)/(3) and TADA Section 9(4)/(5) are a convenient administrative mode to avoid multiplicity of individual notifications, and neither statute prohibits issuing such general notifications.
  • Additionally, the third respondent had prior experience as an Assistant Sessions Judge earlier in his career, so the appointment was not that of a direct recruit with no sessions experience.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Premanath v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1967 SC 1599 Interpreting Section 9 of the earlier CrPC (1898) — principle that appointment as an additional sessions judge under Section 9 is a distinct appointment; when a judge holds combined posts the appointment as additional sessions judge is by exercise of power under Section 9 and the combined status does not mean the posts are "clubbed" into one indistinguishable office. The court observed that this decision supports the appellant's plea (i.e., that appointment as District and Sessions Judge is not automatically identical to being a sessions judge for the relevant statutory purpose). The opinion cites the decision to show that appointments as additional sessions judge are made under Section 9 and that the nature of the appointment matters.
Karfar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569 Authority for the proposition that when appointing any judge to a designated court, the government should consider whether the judge will have sufficient tenure at the initial appointment stage; also that Section 9(7) TADA was upheld in that case. The court relied on this decision to note that Section 9(7) was upheld and that Section 9(6) did not fall for interpretation in that case; the opinion uses this precedent to distinguish the present issue and to affirm that tenure considerations are relevant but do not resolve the present interpretation of Section 9(6).
University of Mysore v. Govinda Rao, AJR 1965 SC 491 Authority on the circumstances in which a writ of quo warranto may be claimed (i.e., locus/availability of the remedy). The court noted this decision only to record that it is an authority on quo warranto claims; because the respondents did not challenge the appellant's locus standi, the court said the decision need not detain them further.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through statutory and contextual analysis based exclusively on the materials and authorities placed before it:

  1. Statutory import and reference to CrPC: Section 2(1)(i) of the TADA Act provides that expressions used but not defined in the TADA Act and defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure shall have the meanings assigned in the CrPC. Thus the court examined the CrPC provisions (notably Section 9) to interpret the expressions "sessions judge" and "additional sessions judge."
  2. The court observed that the CrPC itself does not strictly define "sessions judge" and "additional sessions judge," but Section 9(2) and (3) of the CrPC provide for appointment by the High Court of sessions judges and additional sessions judges for courts of session. The court considered the "spirit" of Section 2(1)(i) of the TADA Act to take aid from CrPC provisions for interpretation.
  3. The court acknowledged the appellant's reliance on Premanath (interpreting the older CrPC provision) to support the proposition that an appointment as District and Sessions Judge is not necessarily the same as an appointment as a sessions judge under Section 9. The court accepted that the learned single judge erred in rejecting the appellant's plea that the nomenclature "District and Sessions Judge, Grade II" does not by itself mean the person is a sessions judge under the CrPC.
  4. However, the court then turned to the administrative reality: the High Court had issued a general notification, ROC No. 25/SO/74 dated 14-8-1974, under Section 9 of the CrPC, appointing district judges and additional district judges by virtue of their office to be sessions judges and additional sessions judges for their respective sessions divisions. That general notification, which was not placed before the learned single judge, meant that when the third respondent was posted as II Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge by the posting notification dated 19-4-1994, he was thereby empowered with sessions jurisdiction and was a sessions judge from that date.
  5. The court further noted the government order G.O. Ms. No. 518 dated 29-10-1987 under Section 9(5) of the TADA Act, which appointed the II Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge as an additional judge to exercise jurisdiction in the designated court for the metropolitan sessions division. Taken together, the general CrPC notification and the government order supported a conclusion that the third respondent was qualified to be appointed an additional judge of the designated court.
  6. The court considered the appellant's submission that Section 9(6) should be read to require that a person must have "actually worked" as a sessions judge or additional sessions judge prior to appointment. The court rejected that interpretation, holding that there is "nothing in the section to warrant such an interpretation."
  7. The court acknowledged administrative practice: general notifications under CrPC Section 9(2)/(3) and TADA Section 9(4)/(5) were likely issued to avoid multiplicity of notifications, and neither provision prohibits general notifications. Consequently, the third respondent's qualification derived from valid general administrative notifications.
  8. The court also observed that the third respondent had prior experience as an Assistant Sessions Judge in his earlier subordinate-judicial work, so his appointment was not that of a direct recruit to sessions functions without any prior sessions experience.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court UPHELD the decision of the learned single judge (though for reasons differing from the learned single judge's reasoning) and dismissed the appeal. The final operative sentence in the opinion reads: "For the above reasons, we uphold the decision of the learned single judge though for different reasons. The appeal dismissed no order as to costs."

Implications:

  • Direct effect on parties: The appellant's writ of quo warranto failed; the appointment of the third respondent, Mr. K. Mahalaxmi Rao, as (an) additional judge of the designated court stands as valid and the appeal is dismissed.
  • Interpretative consequence: The court rejected an interpretation of Section 9(6) of the TADA Act that would require prior actual working in sessions-judge functions; instead, the court accepted that statutory and administrative notifications (including general notifications issued under Section 9 of the CrPC and under Section 9(4)/(5) of the TADA Act) can confer the requisite status for appointment to a designated court.
  • Precedential stance: The opinion applied existing authorities (including Premanath and Karfar Singh) and administrative practice but did not purport to lay down a novel legal doctrine; the decision upholds the appointment on the specific factual and administrative record before the court rather than creating a broad new precedent that departs from established interpretations.

No costs were awarded and the appeal was dismissed.

    Patel Sudhakar Reddy v. The Registrar (Administration) High Court And Ors.

    S.Dasaradharama Reddy, J.:-

    (1) The appellant who is facing trial in s. C. 207 of 1993 on the file of ii additional metropolitan sessions judge, hyderabad - cum - additional designated judge under terrorist and disruptive activities (prevention) act (for short 'the tada act') has filed writ of quo warranto challenging the appointment of third respondent, mr. K. Mahalaxmi rao, as a judge of the designated court on the ground that it is contrary to section 9 (6) of the tada act, which requires that the person before appointment as a judge of a designated court must have been immediately before such appointment a sessions judge or an additional sessions judge. Our learned brother dismissed the writ petition and against that order, this appeal has been filed

    (2) To appreciate the point raised by the appellant, it is necessary to state a few facts which are not in dispute. The third respondent nas been promoted temporarily as district and sessions judge grade ii by g. O. Rt. No. 4131 dated 25 - 9 - 1992. On 2 - 11 - 1992, by g. O. Rt no. 4730, he was posted as member, tribunal for disciplinary proceedings, hyderabad. By notification no. 82 - 3. Spl. Dated 19 - 4 - 1994, while making postings and transfers, the high court has posted him as additional chief judge, city civil court - cum - ii additional metropolitan sessions judge, hyderabad. He took charge on 5 - 5 - 1994.

    (3) By roc. No. 25/so/74 dated 14 - 8 - 1974, the high court exercising power under sub - section (2) of Section 9 of the code of criminal procedure, 1973 (central act ii of 1974) , appointed district judges by virtue of their office to be the sessions judges of the respective courts of session and also additional district judges to be the additional sessions judges. By go. Ms. No. 345 dated 25 - 7 - 1987, the government of andhra pradesh in exercise of powers conferred by clause 8 of the terrorist and disruptive activities (prevention) ordinance, 1987 (central ordinance 2 of 1987) , which has become later section 9 in the act, constituted all courts of sessions in the state as designated courts within their respective jurisdiction and appointed the principal sessions judges of the courts of sessions as judges to preside over the designated courts. By go. Ms. No. 518 dated 29 - 10 - 1987, issued under sub - section (5) of section 9 of the tada act, the government appointed with the concurrence of the chief justice of high court, ii additional metropolitan sessions judge, hyderabad, as additional judge to exercise jurisdiction in the designated court constituted for metropolitan sessions division. By another g. O. Ms. No. 328 dated 7 - 6 - 1988, also issued under section 9 (5) of the tada act the government with the concurrence of the chief justice of the high court appointed all the additional sessions judges in the state as additional judges to exercise jurisdiction in designated courts except the ii metropolitan sessions judge. This government order is, however, not material for purpose of this writ appeal.

    (4) The contention of sri k. G. Kannabiran, learned senior counsel for the appellant, is that under section 9 subsection (6) of the tada act, for appointment as a judge of a designated court, the officer must have been immediately before such appointment, a sessions judge or an additional sessions judge and as the third respondent was not a sessions judge or additional sessions judge before 19 - 4 - 1994, when he was posted as ii additional metropolitan sessions judge, hyderabad, he is not eligible to preside over the designated court. Mr. Kannabiran elaborates his argument by saying that appointment as district and sessions judge is different from empowering him with sessions powers under section 9 sub - sections (2) and (3) of the code of criminal procedure. He further submits that the district judge does not include sessions judge and that article 236 of the constitution of india defining district judge to include sessions judge and additional sessions judge among other designations is only for the purpose of chapter 6 of part vi of the constitution. The learned counsel further says that a person who is appointed as district and sessions judge may hold the post of presiding officer of labour court or state transport appellate tribunal or chairman of sales tax appellate tribunal or chairman or member of tribunal for disciplinary proceedings as in the case of third respondent and that it does not mean that he is a sessions judge or additional sessions judge.

    (5) To appreciate the points raised by sri kannabiran, learned counsel for the appellant it is necessary to notice the relevant provisions. section 2 (1) (i) of the tada act says that words and expressions used but not defined in the tada act and defined in the code of criminal procedure shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in the code. Section 9 sub - section (2) of the code of criminal procedure says that every court of session shall be presided over by a judge to be appointed by the high court. Sub - section (3) of Section 9 of the code of criminal procedure similarly says that the high court may also appoint additional sessions judges to exercise jurisdiction in a court of session. Section 9 of the tada act omitting clauses not relevant reads as follows:

    " 9 (1) the central government or a state government may, by notification in the official gazette, constitute one or more designated courts for such area or areas, or for such case or class or group of cases as may be specified in the notification. 9 (4) a designated court shall be presided over by a judge to be appointed by the central government or, as the case may be, the state government with the concurrence of the chief justice of the high court. 9 (5) the central government or, as the case may be, the state government may also appoint with the concurrence of the chief justice cf the high court, additional judges to exercise jurisdiction in a designated court. 9 (6) a person shall not be qualified for appointment as a judge or an additional judge of a designated court unless he is, immediately before such appointment a sessions judge or an additional sessions judge in any state."

    (6) As the expression sessions judge or additional sessions judge is not defined in the tada act. We have to necessarily refer to the code of criminal procedure by virtue of section 2 ( 1 xi) of the tada act. But even in the code of criminal procedure, the expressions sessions judge and additional sessions judge are not defined so strictly speaking. Section 9 of the code of criminal procedure may not be applicable. However, taking the spirit of section 2 (1) (i) of the tada act we may take the aid of provisions of the code of criminal procedure for interpretation of these words. Under section 9 sub - sections (2) and (3) of the code of criminal procedure, the high court shall appoint a sessions judge or additional sessions judge or assistant sessions judge for every court of session. The definition of district judge in article 236 of the constitution of india including sessions judge is only for limited purpose of chapter 6 of part vi of the constitution of india and cannot ,be taken in aid for interpreting the expression here in this context. The decision of the supreme court in premanath v. State of rajas than (1) air 1967 sc 1599, interpreting section 9 of cr. P. C. , 1898 which is analogous to section 9 of cr. P. C. 1973, supports the plea of the appellant. The supreme court, held as follows: "therefore, when a civil judge is also appointed as an additional sessions judge or when a person is appointed both as a civil judge and also as an additional sessions judge such appointment as an additional sessions judge is made in exercise to power under Section 9 of the code. When such a civil judge exercises the power of an additional sessions judge, he does so not because he is a civil judge but because of his being appointed as additional sessions judge under Section 9 of the code. The two posts, therefore, cannot be said to have been clubbed together. Factually, what happens is that a person who is or who is appointed a civil judge is also appointed a civil judge is also appointed an additional sessions judge. It makes no difference whether he is first appointed as a civil judge and an 'additional sessions judge at the same time. When such an appointment is made, the appointee exercises both the powers of a civil judge and those of an additional sessions judge. From such a combination of powers in the same person it does not follow that he is not an additional sessions judge or that he is a civil judge and, therefore, does not fall under the definition of a "district judge' in article 236 (a). Since such a post falls under that definition, it would be article 233 and the rajasthan higher judicial service rules which would apply to him and not article 234 or the rajasthan judicial service rules, 1955. "'

    (7) Similarly, the reference to district and sessions judge, grade ii, in the category ii of andlira pradesh state higher judicial service does not mean diat a person appointed as district and sessions judge is a sessions judge for the purpose of code of criminal procedure. We are of the opinion that the learned single judge is not correct in rejecting this plea of the appellant.

    (8) But this does not help the appellant. We have been told by the learned counsel for the high court that the high court has issued general notification roc. No. 25/so/ 74 dated 14 - 8 - 1974 under Section 9 of the code of criminal procedure appointing all district judges, additional district judges to be sessions judges and additional sessions judges to exercise jurisdiction within their respective sessions divisions, and in view of this, there is no necessity to issue seperate notification whenever a district judge or an additional district judge is appointed this notification was not brought to the notice of the learned single judge. We have already seen that by notification no. 82 - 3. Spl. Dated 19 - 1 - 1994, the third respondent is posted as additional chief judge. City civil court - cuni - ii additional metropolitan sessions judge, hyderabad. So by virtue of the notification roc. No. 25/so/74 dated 14 - 8 - 1974, the third respondent is empowered with sessions jurisdiction and was a sessions judge from 19 - 4 - 1994. Again, by g. O. Ms. No. 518 dated 29 - 10 - 1987, the ii additional metropolitan sessions judge of the metropolitan sessions court, hyderabad, is appointed as additional judge to exercise jurisdiction in the designated court constituted for metropolitan sessions division, and thus third respondent is qualified to be appointed as additional judge of designated court.

    (9) All this controversy has arisen because of general notifications issued by the high court under section 9 subsections (2) and (3) of the code of criminal procedure and by the government under section 9 sub - sections (4) and (5) of the tada act. Normally, when a district judge is appointed as sessions judge, a notification under section 9 sub - sections (3) or (4) of the code of criminal procedure, as the case may be, has to be issued by the high court, similarly, whenever a district judge or an additional district judge is sought to be specified as a judge or additional judge for a designated court, notification must be issued by the government under section 9 sub - section (4) and (5) respectively. Perhaps, to avoid multiplicity of notifications, general notifications were issued born under the code of criminal procedure and under the tada act as easy and convenient mode. Neither section 9 of sub - sections (2) and (3) of the code of criminal procedure nor section 9 sub - sections (4) and (5) of the tada act prohibit issuing of such general notifications. Thus, the third respondent was duly qualified to be appointed as additional judge for the designated court. The contention of sri kannabiran. Learned counsel for the appellant that as per section 9 sub - section (6) of the tada act, one should have actually worked as sessions judge or additional sessions judge is not correct. There is nothing in the section to warrant such an interpretation. The decision in karfar singh v. State of punjab (2) (1994) 3 scc 569, is an authority for the proposition that at the time of appointing any judge to the designated court, the government should keep in mind that the judge designate has sufficient tenure of service even at the initial stage of appointment, so that no one may entertain any grievance for continuance of service of a judge of the designated court after attainment of superannuation and accordingly section 9 sub - section (7) of the tada act was upheld section 9 sub - section (6) did not fall for interpretation in that case. It is also to be noted that the third respondent had experience as assistant sessions judge while he worked as subordinate judge earlier. So, it is not as if any person, for example direct recruit has been appointed to the designated court directly as the first appointment.

    (10) Lastly, we have to refer to one decision referred by the learned counsel for the appellant in university of mysore v. Govinda rao (3) ajr 1965 sc 491 which is only an authority to show in what circumstances writ of quo warrant can be claimed. The respondents are not challenging the locus standi of the appellant and hence this decision need not detain us.

    (11) For the above reasons, we uphold the decision of the learned single judge though for different reasons. The appeal dismissed no order as to costs.

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    Patel Sudhakar Reddy v. The Registrar (Administration) High Court And Ors.
    (Sep 27, 1994)