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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 25-F and 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act)
  • Section 25-F of the Act
  • Clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Act
  • Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act
  • Sections 25-F and 25-G of the Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 25-F and 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act)
  • Section 25-F of the Act
  • Clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Act
  • Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act
  • Sections 25-F and 25-G of the Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The case concerns the termination of Ishwar Singh (“the workman”), a daily-wage employee whose services were ended on 13-2-1987. The Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court found the termination violative of Sections 25-F and 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (“the Act”) and ordered reinstatement with full back wages on 9-3-1993. The employer’s writ petition and subsequent review petition were dismissed in limine by the Punjab and Haryana High Court on 9-2-1994 and 27-5-1994 respectively. The employer appealed to the Supreme Court against both High Court orders.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the workman had completed 240 days of continuous service so as to attract the protection of Section 25-F of the Act.
  2. Whether the termination of the workman’s services constituted “retrenchment,” or was excluded by clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) because it was effected under a contractual stipulation allowing termination without notice.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • The workman actually worked only 214 paid days; Sundays and holidays should not be counted toward the 240-day requirement under Section 25-F.
  • Even if the 240-day requirement were met, the termination does not amount to “retrenchment” because clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) excludes terminations effected in accordance with a contractual stipulation. The appointment letter dated 9-1-1987 expressly allowed either party to terminate employment without notice or compensation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC, (1994) 2 SCC 323 Termination effected in accordance with a contractual stipulation falls within clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) and therefore is not “retrenchment.” The Court relied on this authority to hold that the workman’s termination, executed under a clause permitting dismissal without notice, was likewise excluded from the definition of retrenchment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court deemed it unnecessary to decide whether the workman completed 240 days of service. Instead, it resolved the case on the alternative ground that clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) excluded the termination from the ambit of “retrenchment.” The appointment letter dated 9-1-1987 expressly empowered the employer to terminate services at any stage without reason or notice. Citing M. Venugopal, the Court held that a termination made pursuant to such a contractual stipulation does not constitute retrenchment. Consequently, statutory protections under Sections 25-F and 25-G did not apply, rendering the Labour Court’s award legally unsustainable.

Holding and Implications

APPEALS ALLOWED; Labour Court award and High Court orders set aside.

Direct consequences: the employer is relieved from reinstating the workman and from paying back wages, although any sums already disbursed under interim orders are not recoverable. Broader implications: the decision reinforces the scope of clause (bb) of Section 2(oo), affirming that terminations explicitly sanctioned by contract fall outside the statutory concept of retrenchment, thereby limiting the protections otherwise available under Chapter V-A of the Industrial Disputes Act.

    Escorts Limited v. Presiding Officer And Another

    Order

    1. These appeals arise out of an industrial dispute relating to termination of the services of Ishwar Singh, Respondent 2, (hereinafter referred to as “the workman”) which was referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court. By award dated 9-3-1993 the Labour Court found that the service of the workman had been terminated in violation of Sections 25-F and 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) and, therefore, the said termination was illegal and unjustified. The Labour Court has directed that the workman be reinstated with continuity of service and full back wages. The writ petition filed by the appellant against the said award was dismissed in limine by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana by order dated 9-2-1994. The review petition filed by the appellant for the review of the said order was dismissed by order dated 27-5-1994. These appeals have been filed by the appellant against both these orders of the High Court.

    2. Shri N.B Shetye, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, has submitted that the Labour Court was in error in applying the provision of Section 25-F inasmuch as the workman had not completed 240 days of service on 13-2-1987 when his services were terminated and further that the termination of the services of the workman does not amount to retrenchment in view of clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Act because the said termination of services of the workman was effected in accordance with the terms of employment of the workman. It is urged that there is no dispute that the workman had worked on daily-wage basis during the period from 5-2-1986 to 29-4-1986, 14-7-1986 to 31-12-1986 and 9-1-1987 to 12-2-1987 and his services were terminated on 13-2-1987. According to Shri Shetye, the total number of days the workman had actually worked and for which he was paid during this period comes to 214. The submission is that since the workman was not being paid for Sundays and other holidays those days could not be counted and that the Labour Court was in error in counting Sundays and holidays to arrive at the conclusion that the workman had worked for more than 240 days. Shri Shetye has also invited our attention to the letter dated 9-1-1987 whereby the workman was given temporary appointment for a period of 2 months. In the said letter it was stated:

    “Your temporary services can be terminated, at any stage, by either side without assigning any reason and without any notice or payment of compensation in lieu of notice.”

    3. The submission is that in accordance with the terms of employment contained in the said appointment the letter dated 9-1-1987 the services of the workman were terminated on 13-2-1987.

    4. We do not consider it necessary to go into the question whether the workman had worked for 240 days in a year and whether Sundays and other holidays should be counted, as has been done by the Labour Court, because, in our opinion, Shri Shetye is entitled to succeed on the other ground urged by him that the termination of services of the workman does not constitute retrenchment in view of clause (bb) in Section 2(oo) of the Act. Clause (bb) excludes from the ambit of the expression “retrenchment” as defined in the main part of Section 2(oo) “termination of the services of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein”. The said provision has been considered by this Court in M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC (1994) 2 SCC 323, (1994) 27 ATC 84. The appellant in that case had been appointed on probation for a period of one year from 23-5-1984 to 22-5-1985 and the said period of probation was extended for further period of one year from 23-5-1985 to 22-5-1986. Before the expiry of the said period of probation, his services were terminated on 9-5-1986. It was held that since the termination was in accordance with the terms of the contract though before the expiry of the period of probation it fell within the ambit of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act and did not constitute retrenchment. Here also the services of the workman were terminated on 13-2-1987, as per the terms of the contract of employment contained in the appointment letter dated 9-1-1987 which enabled the appellant to terminate the services of the workman at any stage without assigning any reason. Since the services of the workman were terminated as per the terms of the contract of employment, it does not amount to retrenchment under Section 2(oo) of the Act and the Labour Court was in error in holding that it constituted retrenchment and was protected by Sections 25-F and 25-G of the Act.

    5. The appeals are, therefore, allowed, the impugned orders of the High Court as well as the award of the Labour Court are set aside. Any amount that has been paid to the workman on the basis of the interim order passed by this Court will not be recovered from him on the ground of setting aside of the award of the Labour Court by this order. No order as to costs.

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    Comments

    Escorts Limited v. Presiding Officer And Another
    (Dec 4, 1996)