Murtaza Fazl Ali, J.:— By an order dated 17th of Feb. 1959 this court issued a notice to the respondent to show cause why proceedings for contempt should not be taken against him.

2. It appears that the respondent had made a speech in a public meeting held in Reasi town, District Jammu in which he had made some comments with respect to a pending case and had also uttered words scandalising the Sub-Judge at Reasi. P.F.W 1 Sharif Hussain the Sub-Inspector of police in charge police station Reasi had taken down his speech in his diary and had sent a report to the Registrar High Court who after taking the opinion of the Advocate General forwarded the copy of the speech to the Deputy Registrar. The Deputy Registrar drew the attention of this court to the aforesaid Speech which formed the subject matter of the present proceedings. A notice to the respondent in pursuance of the order of this court dated 17-2-1959 was issued from the court on 21-2-1959, The respondent appeared through Mr. Bhalgotra his counsel on 11th March, 1959 and prayed time to file his objections. The proceedings then continued and as the respondent chose to contest the proceedings on facts, and both the parties desired to lead evidence in support of their respective allegations a full opportunity was given to them to adduce their respective evidence. We might further state that on 27-4-1959, that is long before the parties started their evidence, the respondent was handed over the entire copy of the speech referred to above. Thereafter, he filed an affidavit dated 2-12-1959, and it was after this that the evidence started.

3. The respondent is the President of the Praja Parishad at Reasi. A meeting was held in connection with the death anniversary of Dr. Shayamma Prasad Mukerjee in Mohalla Chowk Chabutra Reasi, on 26th of June, 1958 in which a number of persons delivered Speeches including the respondent. According to the evidence the meeting started at about 9 P.M and lasted till about midnight. The respondent in course of his speech is alleged to have made three statements which are the subject matter of the present proceedings.

4. The first statement made be quoted.

5. The second part of his speech to which objection has been taken may be quoted thus:

6. The third part of his speech by which he is alleged to have scandalised the Sub-Judge at Reasi may be quoted thus:

7. These words referred to above are mentioned ad verbatim in Ex. P. 2 which is the diary prepared by P.W 1 Sharif Hussain who was present in the meeting and had heard the entire speech of the respondent.

8. The stand taken by the respondent in this case does not seem to be consistent. The respondent was given plenty of opportunity to offer unconditional apology in order to purge out of the contempt but he refused to do so and chose to contest the proceedings. The stand taken by the respondent in his affidavits filed by him on 23-3-1959, 30-3-59, 24-4-1959 and 2-12-1959 so far as the first two statemests alleged to have been made by him and which refer to the comments in a pending case—and the fact that the courts generally are not honest — is that he never made these statements and that they have been concocted by P.W 1 Sharif Hussain out of enmity and in collusion with the then Sub-Judge Kotwal Tek Chand.

9. As regards the third part of his statement by which he had made scathing and scurrilous remarks, the respondent had admitted to have so stated but his case is that he had stated these facts not with respect to the judicial function which the Sub-Judge had to perform but with respect to his personal capacity and further that these statements were made by way of bona fide criticism in public benefit. The respondent also sought to justify this part of his speech on the ground that the allegations made by him were true. The respondent was however, examined as a witness in these proceedings and in his statement he has even denied to have said that the Sub-Judge was a corrupt person. On the other hand, he has stated in his evidence that he did not know whether the Sub-Judge was corrupt or not and all that he said was that the people were not happy with the Sub-Judge although he was not in a position to know, the reasons for the same.

10. In support of the rule, the Advocate General has examined eight witnesses and the respondent has examined seven witnesses including himself in support of his own case.

11. I would first take up the allegations against the respondent regarding that part of his speech by which he had made some comments regarding a murder case Pending at Srinagar known as ‘Hazratbal Murder Case’. To begin with there is the evidence of P.W 1 Sharft Hussain who had deposed that Ex. P2 is the ad verbatim record of the speech delivered by the respondent on 26th of June, 1958 at Reasi. The witness has further stated that he was present in file meeting and was sitting at a very close distance from the platform where the respondent was delivering his speech. The evidence of this witness has been criticised by learned counsel for the respondent on various grounds. In the first place, it has been contended that the witness admits in his cross-examination that it was difficult to take down the speech word for word, although he has asserted that the objectionable portions have been taken down word for word.

12. Learned counsel for the respondent had drawn our attention to the fact that the witness admits in his evidence that before preparing Ex. P2 he had taken down short notes of the speech delivered by the respondent at the spot and yet those short notes were not Produced before the court in order to test the veracity of Ex. P2. The witness further admits that Ex. P2 was partly in his hand and partly in the hand of Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police who also has not been examined. In our opinion, the argument of learned counsel for the respondent is not devoid of substance. If would have been much better if the witness had produced the original notes of the speech which he had taken down. It also appears that the respondent did say something against P.W 1 Sarif Hussain which also finds mention in Ex. P2. In order to corroborate the evidence of the Sub-Inspector, certain other witnesses have also been examined and we are of the opinion that the evidence of these witnesses does not inspire much confidence. (Then after discussing evidence of other witnesses their Lordships held). It is, therefore, manifest that the evidence in this case with respect to those portions of the speech which related to “Hazaratbal Murder Case” or casting of aspersions on the courts in general is not sufficient to prove the allegations against the respondent. It is true that the evidence of P. W, 1 Sharif Hussain is corroborated by the report Ex. P2 but as none of the other witnesses have been found reliable, we find it difficult to rely on the uncorroborated testimony of P.W 1 Sharif Hussain particularly for the reason that we have already given while dealing with the evidence of P.W 1 Sharif Hussain.

13. I would now take up the other part of the statement made by the respondent in his speech which relates to scandalising the Sub-Judge at Reasi and describing Tek Chand Kotwal the then Sub-Judge at Reasi as a dishonest and corrupt officer. In this connection I might mention that it is admitted by the respondent himself in his affidavit that he had described Tek Chand Kotwal the then Sub-Judge, Reasi as a corrupt person. Moreover the evidence of P.W 1 Sharif Hussain as also the report Ex. P2 is substantially corroborated by the evidence of the witness produced by the respondent Jiimself. (After discussing evidence of these witnesses their Lordships held).

14. It is, therefore, clear from the evidence produced by the respondent that the respondent did in his speech state that Kotwal Tek Chand, who was posted as Sub-Judge during that period was dishonest, corrupt and used to take bribes in deciding cases. In other words, the evidence of the defence witnesses clearly corroborates the evidence of Sharif Hussain as also the report Ex. P2 on this point in this state of the evidence, it is not open to the respondent now to say that whatever he said was against the person of Sub-Judge and not in his capacity as a Judge. It is well settled that scandalising a judge by casting aspersions on his honesty and integrity or by hurling scurrilous abuses on him or by attributing improper motives to him certainly amounts to a serious contempt of court. In the Case of The Queen v. Gray, (1900) 2 QB 36, his Lordship Ruseli of Killowen C.J, observed as follows:

“Any act done or writing published calculated to bring a court or a judge of the court into contempt or to lower his authority, is a contempt of court. That is one class of contempt.”

15. This case has been followed in India by a number of High Courts. In Editor, Printer and Publisher “Times of India” (Daily) Bombay and Delhi, In the matter of, AIR 1953 SC 75, their Lordships pointed out that where an article not only transgressed the limits of fair and bona fide criticism but had a clear tendency to affect the dignity and prestige of the court, it amounted to gross contempt of court. Their Lordships in that case observed as follows:

“No objection could have been taken to the article had it merely preached to the court of law the sermon of divine detachment. But when it proceeded to attribute improper motives to the judges, it not only transgressed the limits of fair and bona fide criticism but had a clear tendency to affect the dignity and prestige of this court. The article in question was thus a gross contempt of court.

16. In the present case, it cannot be said that the conduct of the respondent in making this statement was within the limits of bona fide or genuine criticism; by characterising the Sub-Judge in this case as a dishonest person and as a person who decided cases only after taking bribe, improper motives were alleged to him which, undoubtedly, poisoned the fountain of justice and adversely affected the administration of justice. The effect of the speech of the respondent on this point was, no doubt, to destroy the confidence of the people in the judiciary.

17. The respondent had admitted in his own evidence that he hart no material before him to show that the judge was corrupt and he had himself no experience of that. Under these circumstances, therefore, it cannot be argued with any show of force that the speech amounted to a bona fida criticism of the judge. The matter was again considered by the Supreme Court in 1. Brahma Prakash Sharma v. 2. Sham Lal, AIR 1954 SC 10, where their Lordships observed the distinction between a case where an act could amount to defamation of a Judge and also contempt of court. In this connection their Lordships observed as follows:

“The position, therefore, is that a defamatory attack on a judge may be a libel so far as the judge is concerned and it would be open to him to proceed against the libellor in a proper action if he so chooses. If, however, the publication of the disparaging statement; is calculated to interfere with the clue course of justice or proper administration of law by such court, it can be punished summarily a contempt. One is a wrong done to the Judge personally while the other is a wrong done to the public. It will be an injury to the public if it tends to create an apprehension in the minds of the people regarding the integrity, ability or fairness of the Judge or to deter actual and prospective litigants from placing complete reliance upon the court's administration of justice, or if is likely to cause embarrassment in the mind of the Judge himself in the discharge of his judicial duties. It is well established that it is not necessary to prove affirmatively that there has been an actual interference with the administration of justice by reason of such defamatory statement, it is enough if it is likely or tends in any way to interfere with the proper administration of law.”

18. In this particular case, the facts proved leave no room for doubt that the speech of the respondent on this point did in fact tend to cause an injury to the public by Creating an apprehension in the minds of the people regarding the integrity and fairness of the judge concerned and deterring the litigants from placing reliance on the courts administration of justice. In our opinion, the test laid down in the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court is clearly applicable to the facts of the present case. To the same effect is the decision of Supreme Court reported in Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy v. State Of Madras, AIR 1952 SC 149, in para (11) page 152. In Government Pleader, Andhra v. A.R Vajiravelu Chetty, AIR 1956 Andhra 84, a division bench of the Andhra High Court consisting of Subba Rao C.J and Bhimasankaram, J., observed as follows:

“The law of contempt, therefore, has armed the High Court of Justice with power and imposed upon it the duty of preventing any attempt by any person to interfere with the due course of justice or the proper administration of law by any court subordinate to it. But the jurisdiction to commit for contempt is an extra-ordinary one and, therefore, should be sparingly and circumspectly used. While the High Court should not be over sensitive to well-meant Criticism, it shall not shirk its duty to maintain the dignity of the court and to preserve the majesty of law. The jurisdiction is exercised not to vindicate any personal interest of the judge but only the general administration of law which is the public concern. The test is whether the allegations made are of such a character or are made under such circumstances as to tend to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice or the proper administration of law.”

19. The facts of the present case seem to be very much similar to the facts of the case before the Andhra High Court. To the same effect are the decisions reported in Emperor v. Murli Manohar Prasad, AIR 1929 Pat 72 (FB) and Tushar Kanti Ghosh, In the matter of, AIR 1935 Cal 419.

20. On a consideration of the evidence in this case and the statement given by the respondent we are fully satisfied that the respondent committed contempt of court by wilfully scandalising the then Sub-Judge, Reasi.

21. We would now deal with, certain contentions raised by Mr. Bhalgotra counsel for the respondent. In the first place, he submitted that as the notice by this court was issued merely on the report of P.W 1 Sharif Hussain and without any affidavit the proceedings are without jurisdiction, In support of his contention, learned counsel for the respondent has relied on a decision of the Punjab High Court reported in Piara Singh v. State, AIR 1958 Punj 141. We have gone through that decision and we find that the present case is dearly distinguishable from that rase. In that case, it appears, that the court was moved by a private party and a preliminary objection was taken by the respondent that the notice given to him should be vacated. In the present case, however, the Proceedings have been instituted by the court suo motu on its attention being drawn to the report of the Registrar High Court. Moreover, we could perhaps have appreciated this argument if the objection was taken when the respondent appeared in pursuance of the notice.

22. The respondent did not raise this question at all but remained content with contesting the proceedings and actually adduced evidence in support of his case. This objection was raised for the first time only when final arguments were being addressed in the case. It also appears from the order sheets that the respondent was supplied with the entire copy of the speech on 27-4-1959, that is, long before the evidence started. The respondent, therefore, in this case was not at all prejudiced by this course. Moreover, the allegations against the respondent is that he had described Tek Chand Kotwal, the then sub-Judge Reasi as corrupt which is admitted by the respondent in his own affidavit dated 24-4-59 and this is sufficient to repel the argument of learned counsel for the respondent.

23. In M.G Kadir v. Kesri Naraiix Jaitly, AIR 1945 All 67, it was pointed out that there is no rule of law which prevents the High Court from proceeding against a person without first obtaining an affidavit from some person. In this connection their Lordships of the Allahabad High Court observed as follows:

“If doubtful questions of fact were involved it might be that we should refuse to issue notice to a person charged with contempt without satisfying ourselves by means of an affidavit that there was reasonable ground for thinking that an offence of contempt had been committed, but there is no rule of law which prevents us from Proceeding against a person who has been guilty of contempt without first obtaining an affidavit from some person.”

24. We find ourselves in respectful agreement with the observations of the learned judges.

25. It was next contended that even if the respondent had made these statements, he was justified in doing so as the allegations were correct and the speech was made for public good and benefit. We are, however, unable to agree with this contention. In the first place, the respondent had not taken this stand in his evidence but clearly stated that he could not say whether the learned Sub-Judge was corrupt or not, nor was he in a position to say why the people were not happy with the Sub-Judge. In the face of this statement made by the respondent himself in the court, it cannot be argued that the allegations made by the respondent against the subordinate judge were true or justified. Moreover, it is well settled that any attempt to justify a contempt as being based on correct facts would itself amount to a fresh contempt. A full Bench of the Lahore High Court in K.L Gauba, Lahore, In re, AIR 1942 Lah 105, their Lordships made the following observations in this connection:

“The respondent filed a list of 25 witnesses whom he wished to examine with the object of proving that the allegations made by him in the book were true. This application is entirely misconceived and is based on the assumption that where a person has scandalised the court or the judges by broadcasting a publication imputing injustice, dishonesty, corruption, or improper motives to them in their judicial capacity, it is open to him to show that the allegations are true. I have no doubli that this course is not open to the respondent and that any attempt to justify a libel on a judge by attempting to show that the libel was justified would itself be a fresh contempt. A contemner who has been called upon to show why he should not be punished for an attack on the court or its judges does not occupy the position of a defendant in a libel action where he may plead or prove justification or the position of an accused person in a prosecution for defamation.”

26. It is manifest that where a judge is openly scandalised by being depicted as a corrupt officer before a huge gathering in the course of a speech, such a speech is bound to poison the fountain of justice by shaking the confidence of the people in the administration of the law. It is, therefore, clear that such a speech would naturally obstruct the course of justice or at any rate, would have a tendency to do so and would, therefore, amount to contempt of Court irrespective of the question as to whether the allegations made in the speech against the judge are correct or not. Under these circumstances, where a judge is libelled or defamed in the eye of the public, it is the bounden duty of the Court to remove a potential menace to the confidence of the public in their judges by punishing the contemner.

27. The view taken by Full Bench of the Lahore High Court referred to above, finds ample support from Ram Mohan Lal Agarwala, In the matter of, AIR 1935 All 38, where their Lordships have observed as follows:—

“In these circumstances, had the leading of evidence in these proceedings been open to Mr. Ram Mohan Lal, we should have refused to summon the witnesses whose names he mentioned in his application to the Court, Clearly there can be no justification of contempt of Court even assuming that the writer of the manifesto believed all he stated therein to be true. If anything in the manifesto amounts to contempt of Court, he is not permitted to lead evidence to establish the truth of his allegations. Contempt of Court is saying or writing anything about the Court which may lower the prestige of the Court or bring it into contempt.”

“Learned counsel was unable to cite any case in which evidence had been permitted in justification of an offence in a case for contempt. Not only therefore was the advocate not entitled to lead evidence in support of his allegations but from his affidavit it was abundantly plain that he had no reason for believing that the witnesses he named would support him in the very grave and sweeping allegations he had made against the Subordinate judiciary.”

28. To the same effect is a decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in AIR 1945 All 67, where their Lordships observed as follows:—

“Nobody is allowed to scandalise a Court and make allegations against it even if they are true. The truth of the allegations is no defence in Proceedings for contempt. The. Court cannot allow any attempt to justify the allegations by insisting upon their truth. Every attempt to justify the allegations constitutes a new offence of contempt committed in the very face of the Court.”

29. Reliance was, however, placed by Mr. Bhalgotra on some observations made by the Supreme Court in AIR 1952 SC 149 where their Lordships have held as follows:—

“A libellous reflection upon the conduct of a judge in respect of his judicial duties may certainly come under Sec. 499 Penal Code and it may be open to the Judge to take steps against the libeller in the ordinary way for vindication of his character and personal dignity as a judge, but such libel may or may not amount to contempt of Court…..

When the act of defaming a judge is calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice or proper administration of law, it would certainly amount to contempt. The offence of contempt is really a wrong done to the public by weakening the authority and influence of Courts of law which exists for their good.”

30. We are, however, unable to agree with the counsel for the respondent that the effect of these observations is to exonerate a person from the charge of contempt of Court merely because there is a libellous reflection on the conduct of the Judge which may be true. In fact, towards the close of the same passage their Lordships have clearly observed as reproduced above. In the Present case, we have clearly come to the conclusion that by defaming the Sub-Judge, the act of the respondent was calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice or to destroy the confidence of the people in the judiciary and, therefore, amounted to a serious contempt of Court.

31. Mr. Bhalgotra contended that as the respondent had made these allegations in course of a speech only with a view to seek redress of his grievances against the Sub-Judge, his act does not amount to contempt of Court. In support of his contention he has relied on a decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in State of U.P v. Shyam Sundar Lal, AIR 1954 All 308. We have carefully Perused that case and we find that the case is clearly distinguishable from the present case. In fact, in that case the allegations against the officer concerned were contained in a private letter sent to the Prime Minister.

32. Their Lordships in that case came to a clear finding that there was nothing to show that the act of the contemner was likely to interfere with the due administration of justice or undermine the confidence of the public. The following observation of their Lordships in that case is sufficient to repel the argument of learned counsel for the respondent on the point:—

“A letter sent to the Prime Minister and not intended to be broadcast to the public, or any section of the public cannot create an apprehension in the minds of people to use the language of Mr. Justice Mukerjee “regarding the integrity, ability or fairness of the Judge”. Further it could not deter actual and prospective litigants from placing complete reliance upon the Court's administration of justice for the obvious reason that they would know nothing about it, it not having been published to them.”

33. This case was fully considered and distinguished by a decision of Andhra Pradesh reported in AIR 1956 Andhra 84 which we have referred to above. In fact, the object of contempt proceedings is not to afford protection to Judges personally from imputations to which they may he exposed as individuals, but is intended as a protection to the public, who interests would be very much affected if by the act or conduct of any party this authority of the Court is lowered and the confidence which the people have in the administration of justice is shaken. It is really from this angle of vision that we have to approach a case like the present one.

34. Finally, reliance was placed on a decision of Board of Judicial Advisors reported in 4 J and K LR 175. We have carefully gone through that case and we find that the facts of that case are distinguishable from the facts of the present case. In that case, the allegations were made against an officer who was not a judicial officer at all and moreover the allegations were made with respect to his administrative capacity. That case, therefore, does not seem to be of any assistance to the respondent.

35. On a careful consideration of the evidence and circumstances of the case, we find the respondent to be guilty of serious contempt of Court. As indicated above, it is clear from the statement of the respondent himself that there was absolutely no justification for him to have made allegations of corruption against the subordinate judge. The materials in this case, therefore, do not disclose any extenuating circumstance and the contempt committed by the respondent is wanton and wilful. The respondent has not shown even a trace of contrition for his action during this long period of trial.

36. In these circumstances, therefore, we would convict the respondent for contempt of Court and sentence him to three months' simple imprisonment. The Respondent shall Pay Rs. 300/- as costs of the present proceedings to the Advocate-General. The rule is accordingly made absolute.

GE/D.

37. Rule made absolute.