Har Parshad Wali And Anr. v. Naranjan Nath Mattoo And Ors.

Wazir C.J.:-

This is a letters patent appeal against the order of a single Judge of this Court holding that the defendants are not agriculturists for the pur­pose of the Agriculturists' Relief Act.

(2) The plaintiffs brought a suit under O. 37, R. 1, C. P. C., for the recovery of Rs. 3,132 on the 'basis of a pronote against Had Prashad defen­dant No. 1 and Sham Lal defendant No. 2. The defendants pleaded that they were agriculturists and the suit .ought to be tried under the Agricul­turists' Relief Act. An issue was framed by the learned Single Judge whether or not the defen­dants were agriculturists and the onus of proof was placed on the defendants. After examining the evidence the trial Judge decided the issue against the defendants. Against that decision the defen­dants have appealed under cl. 12 of the Letters Patent.

(3) A preliminary objection is raised on behalf of the plaintiffs respondents "that the order appeal­ed against was not a judgment within the meaning of Cl. 12 of the Letters Patent. It is argued by the counsel for the respondents that the order is an interlocutory order not finally disposing of the suit or proceedings in the suit and, therefore, it was not a "judgment" within the meaning of cl. 12 of the Letters Patent.

Reliance is placed on Tuljaram v. Alagappa, ILR 35 Macl 1 (FB), in which it has been held that an order of a single Judge on the original side refusing to frame an issue asked for is not a judg­ment within Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent and is not appealable. Reliance is also placed on a Sup­reme Court decision Asrumati Debi v. Rupendra Deb, AIR 1953 SC 198, in which it has been held that an order for transfer of a suit made under cl. 13 of Letters Patent Act is not a judgment within the meaning of cl. 15 and, therefore, is not appealable.

(4) The learned counsel for the appellants has relied upon the same judgments and has argued that the order appealed against fulfils all the tests of a judgment laid -down in the Supreme Court case and the order under appeal comes within the purview of the word "judgment" as used in Cl. 12 of the Letters Patent.

(5) There is no doubt a wide divergence of judicial opinion among different High Courts in regard to the true meaning and scope of the word 'ludgmenf as it occurs in Cl. 12 of our Letters Patent which corresponds to cl. 15 of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High Court, but the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in ILR 35 Mad 1 (FB), formulated a definition of "judgment" in a comprehensive manner, in which Sir. Arnold White C. J., observed as follows:

"The test seems to me to be not what is the form of the adjudication, but what is its effect on the suit or proceeding in which it is made. If its effect, whatever its form may be, and whatever may be the nature of the application on which it is made, is- to put an end to the suit or proceed­ing so far as the Court before which the suit or proceeding is pending is concerned, or if its effect, if it is non complied with, is to put an end to the suit or proceeding, I think the adjudication is a judgment within the meaning of the clause."

(6) In AIR 1953 SC 198, their Lordships have not framed an exhaustive definition of the word "judgment" as used in cl. 15 of the Letters Patent. They have, however, indicated what the essential features of a judgment are according to both the Calcutta and Madras High Courts. It was re­marked by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as follows:

"It cannot be said, therefore, that according to Sir Richard Conch every judicial pronouncement on a right or liability between the parties is to be re­garded as a 'judgment' for in that case there would be any number of judgments in the course of a suit or proceeding, each one of which could be challenged by way of appeal. The judgment must be the final pronouncement which puts an end to the proceeding so far as the Court dealing with it is concerned. It certainly involves the determina­tion of some right or liability, though it may not be necessary that there must be a decision On the merits.

This view, which is implied in the observation of Sir Richard Couch C. J., quoted above, has been really made the basis of the definition of 'judgment' by Sir Arnold White C. J., in the Full Bench deci­sion of the Madras High Court to which reference has been made: vide ILR 35 Mad 1 (FB) (E). According to White C. J., to find out whether an order is a 'judgment' or not, we have to look to-its effect upon the particular suit or proceeding in which it is made. If its effect is to determine the suit or proceeding, the decision would be a 'judg­ment' but not otherwise.

As this definition covers not only decisions in suit or actions but 'orders' in other proceedings as-well which start with applications, it may be said that any final order passed on an application in the course of a suit, e. g., granting or refusing party's prayer for adjournment of a suit or for examination of a witness would also come within the definition. This seems to be the reason why the learned Chief Justice qualifies the general pro­position laid down above by stating that an ad­judication on an application, which is nothing more than a step towards obtaining a final adjudication in the suit, is not a judgment within the mean­ing of Letters Patent."

(7) In Mansata Film Distributors Calcutta v. Sorab Merwanji Modi:, (S) AIR 1955 Bom 266, it is held as follows:

"It is well settled that interlocutory orders can also he judgments and it is not necessary that a Court should pass a final decree or a final order that an appeal should lie. Now, when you have an interlocutory order which is purely procedural in character, or, as it has been said, which is noth­ing more than a step towards obtaining a final adjudication in the suit then undoubtedly such an order would not constitute a judgment within the meaning of cl. 15.

But if an interlocutory order determines the right of a party even 'pro tanto' then the party whose right has been affected would have the right to appeal against that order."

(8) Relying upon these principles it is clear that an order passed by the trial Judge finally ad­judicating upon the status of a party, whether he is an agriculturist or not, which substantially affects the jurisdiction of the Court would, in our opinion,] be a judgment within the meaning of cl. 12 of the Letters Patent.

(9) The preliminary objection raised by the plaintiff respondent has no force and is overruled.

(10) Now the question for determination is whether or not the defendants are agriculturists.

(11) As regards Sham Lal there is evidence to show that he is not an agriculturist for the purpose of Agriculturists' Relief Act and the learned coun­sel for the appellant has not argued his case. (After discussing the evidence as regards Hari Par-shad defendant in Paras 12-15, the judgment con­cluded:)

(16) The defendant appellant has not proved satisfactorily that he is an agriculturist for the pur­pose of the Agriculturists' Relief Act and we do not find any good ground to interfere in this ap­peal with the order passed by the trial Judge. This appeal is, therefore, dismissed; but the parties are left to bear their own costs in this Court.

(17) G. K. NAIR J. : I agree.

V.B.B. Appeal dismissed.