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  • Section 9(3) of the Travancore-Cochin Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order, 1950
  • Section 5 of the Travancore Emergency Powers Act, 1 of 1122.
  • Rent Control) Order, 1950 a provision
  • Section 9(3)(a)(iii)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 9(3) of the Travancore-Cochin Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order, 1950
  • Section 5 of the Travancore Emergency Powers Act, 1 of 1122.
  • Rent Control) Order, 1950 a provision
  • Section 9(3)(a)(iii)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an application for a writ of certiorari to quash the records of proceedings culminating in the Government order dated 20th June, 1951 (L. Dis. 772/51.P.W.C.). The dispute concerns possession of a building and site.

Chronology (as stated in the opinion):

  • In 1121 the 1st respondent, Gomathi Ammal, purchased the equity of redemption over the properties in dispute from a possessory mortgagee who had earlier leased the premises to the petitioner by a rent deed of 1117 (tenure fixed as five years).
  • The 1st respondent redeemed the mortgage and obtained a release directing her to obtain possession from the petitioner on payment of Rs. 800 towards value of improvements.
  • No "ace" (notice/demand for possession) was issued on expiry of the five-year lease; the 1st respondent filed suit O.S. 1050/1122 in the District Munsiff's Court, Trivandrum, in Medam 1122 for arrears of rent and eviction.
  • The petitioner filed a written statement (Kanni 1123) denying the landlord's title, asserting an agreement to sell in his favour, and claiming Rs. 2,000 as value of improvements; he also relied on the Travancore Rent Control Order, 1122.
  • The 1st respondent applied before the Controller (B.R.C. Case No. 215/1124) under the Rent Control Order alleging arrears of rent; that application was dismissed because the petitioner had deposited the alleged arrears.
  • The 1st respondent then filed Building Rent Control Case No. 248/1124 claiming eviction on two grounds: (a) arrears of rent and (b) requirement of the premises for a jeweller's business run as a family concern by her husband.
  • The petitioner objected before the Controller raising (inter alia) the agreement for sale, improvements claim, and pendency of the civil suit; the Controller initially ordered eviction without taking evidence or considering objections.
  • The petitioner appealed to the Division Peishkar, Trivandrum, which allowed the appeal and remanded for fresh disposal with evidence; the Government dismissed revision and confirmed remand.
  • On remand the proceeding was renumbered B.R.C. Case No. 190/1950; evidence was taken, and by the time of argument the Travancore‑Cochin Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Order, 1950 applied and the Controller decided the case under that Order, directing eviction under Clause 9(3)(a)(iii).
  • The petitioner appealed to the District Collector (Appeal No. 79/1950); the Collector upheld the Controller and rejected the contention that the pending civil suit barred decision under the Rent Control Order; Government revision also failed. Those decisions prompted the present writ application.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Controller, Collector and Government exceeded their jurisdiction in directing eviction under Clause 9(3)(a)(iii) of the Travancore‑Cochin Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order, 1950.
  2. Whether, to justify eviction under Section 9(3)(a)(iii), the business for which the landlord claims the premises must be a business personally carried on by the landlord (as opposed to being carried on by her husband).
  3. Whether the existence of a possessory mortgage and the landlord's prior dealings (including the undertaking to pay Rs. 800 as value of improvements) affect the bona fides of the landlord's claimed requirement and thus the entitlement to eviction.
  4. Whether the Rent Control authorities can order eviction before payment of compensation for improvements to which the tenant is admittedly or potentially entitled, or whether the tenant is entitled to retain possession until such payment is made or adjudicated by a civil court.
  5. Whether the pendency of the civil suit (O.S. 1050/1122) dealing with title and value of improvements bars the Rent Control authorities from deciding the eviction petition.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner contended in the Munsiff's Court and before the Controller that the owner of the equity of redemption had agreed to sell the property to him and that the sale relied on by the 1st respondent was contrary to that agreement and therefore invalid.
  • He claimed that he had spent more than Rs. 2,000 on improvements and that he would lose that value if eviction were ordered; he relied on the landlord's prior undertaking to pay Rs. 800 (in the release of the mortgage).
  • The petitioner argued that eviction could not be granted under the Travancore Rent Control Order, 1122, and that until substantial questions in dispute in O.S. 1050/1122 were decided by the civil court, the Controller had no jurisdiction to pass an order for eviction.
  • In the writ petition he specifically challenged the eviction as “illegal, void and ultra vires” on three grounds stated in the opinion (interpretation of Section 9(3)(a)(iii); possessory mortgage/omission in first application; jurisdiction pending payment and pendency of civil suit).

1st Respondent / Landlord's Position (as reflected in the proceedings)

  • The 1st respondent claimed possession on the grounds that the lessee had left rent in arrears (earlier application) and, in the later application, that the premises were required for the purposes of a jeweller's business carried on as a family concern by her husband ("D. Doraiswamy & Sons").
  • After remand, the 1st respondent produced evidence (including deposition of her husband) supporting the bona fides of the claimed requirement; the Controller and Collector accepted the requirement ground and ordered eviction under Clause 9(3)(a)(iii).

State / Advocate‑General (2nd Respondent) Argument

  • The Advocate‑General contended that, even if the tenant is deprived of possession in enforcement of an eviction order passed by the Controller, the tenant would still be entitled to sue for compensation for improvements after losing possession.
  • The Court recorded that resolution of the conflict of opinion on that point was unnecessary for deciding the present case because the tenant's right to retain possession until payment (not merely to sue later for compensation) was central to the jurisdictional question before the Court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Malkarjun v. Narhari, 25 Bom 337 (PC) That a tribunal having authority has "Jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right" (i.e., jurisdiction once vested can result in wrong decisions but still remains jurisdictional). The Court cited this dictum to emphasize that even an erroneous decision by the Controller/Collector/Government cannot be interfered with by the Court if the authorities had jurisdiction to make the order.
Forbes v. Ecclesiastical Commissioners for England, (1873) 15 EQ 51 (Sir John Wickens, V.C.) Warning that to construe a statute so as to destroy pre-existing public or private rights "by a side wind" is improper; statutes should not be construed as destructive of pre‑existing substantive rights absent express provision. The Court relied on this principle to argue that the Rent Control Order should not be read so as to destroy the pre-existing right of a tenant to retain possession until payment of value of improvements; thus the Order does not authorize eviction before payment where the landlord is liable for improvements.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by analysing jurisdiction and the proper construction of the Travancore‑Cochin Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order, 1950, particularly Section 9 and Clause 9(3)(a)(iii).

Key points of the Court's step‑by‑step reasoning (as stated in the opinion):

  1. The Court first recognized the accepted principle (from Malkarjun) that a tribunal with jurisdiction may reach a wrong conclusion, and where jurisdiction exists the High Court will not ordinarily interfere with the decision merely because it is erroneous.
  2. Section 9(3)(a)(iii) confers jurisdiction on the Controller to order eviction of a tenant from a non‑residential building where the landlord requires possession for purposes of a business "which he is carrying on." The Controller, Collector and Government each have roles: Controller decides, the Collector hears appeals, and Government may revise.
  3. Whether the business being carried on by the landlord's husband could be characterized as a business "the landlord is carrying on" is a question of fact and law for the Rent Control authorities; if they had jurisdiction, their factual conclusion (even if arguable) would bind parties unless jurisdiction were lacking.
  4. The Court distinguished the first two grounds advanced by the petitioner (interpretation of the clause and the mortgage evidence): even if accepted these would amount to erroneous exercise of jurisdiction rather than lack of jurisdiction, and therefore would not suffice for the writ unless jurisdiction were absent.
  5. The Court held that the third ground (the landlord's liability to pay value for improvements and the tenant's asserted right to retain possession until payment) raises a true jurisdictional bar: the Controller has no power under the Order to decide questions of the value of improvements or to direct payment prior to eviction; Section 9 contemplates eviction without any provision for pre‑eviction adjudication or payment of improvements by the Controller.
  6. The right of a tenant to retain possession until payment of value for improvements is an ancient usage recognised by statute in other places; absent express statutory language, the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order, 1950 should not be construed to extinguish that pre‑existing right.
  7. Where liability to pay improvements exists (admitted here as Rs. 800 in the release), the civil court (in the pending O.S. 1050/1122) is competent to adjudicate the quantum and can decree eviction only on payment; it is inconsistent and anomalous to allow a separate jurisdiction (the Controller) to unconditionally deprive the tenant of possession before the civil court decides the compensation and right to retain possession.
  8. The Court therefore confined the Controller's jurisdiction to cases where the landlord is not liable to pay value for improvements as a condition of obtaining possession; otherwise the Controller lacks jurisdiction to order eviction in the circumstances of this case.
  9. The Court noted procedural irregularities: the Controller initially ordered eviction without hearing evidence or considering objections; the Division Peishkar remanded; but ultimately the orders of Controller and Collector (and Government revision) did not address the tenant's denial of title and related jurisdictional consequences. Although omission to raise jurisdiction may sometimes preclude challenge, where an absence of jurisdiction exists, acts are ultra vires and void.

Holding and Implications

Final Holding: The Court allowed the writ application and quashed the Government order dated 20th June, 1951 (L. Dis. No. 772/51.PWC), and quashed the orders passed by the Collector and the Controller directing eviction of the petitioner from the property in question. The respondents were directed to pay the petitioner's costs, including an advocate's fee of Rs. 100/-. The opinion concludes: "Application allowed."

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: the eviction orders made by the Controller, upheld by the Collector and Government, are set aside; the petitioner retains protection against eviction under the circumstances described until the civil court determines entitlement and payment for improvements.
  • Jurisdictional principle: where the landlord is liable to pay value for tenant's improvements as a condition of obtaining possession, the Rent Control authorities (Controller/Collector) lack jurisdiction to order eviction before payment or adjudication of that liability; such matters are for the civil courts to decide where appropriate.
  • No express statement in the opinion that a new binding precedent is being set beyond the application of established principles; the Court's ruling resolves the jurisdictional question in this case and articulates the interpretive principle that the Rent Control Order should not be construed to destroy pre‑existing tenant rights absent express provision.

Disposition

The writ application was allowed; the Government, Collector and Controller orders directing eviction were quashed; respondents ordered to pay costs and advocate's fee Rs. 100/-. Application allowed.

    P. Chinnakannu Pillai v. Ammalu Ammal Gomathi Ammal And Another

    1. This is an application for a writ of ‘certiorari’ to remove the records in the proceeding which ended with the order of the Government dated 20th June, 1951—L. Dis 772/51.P.W.C for its being quashed. The records are here.

    2. The 1st respondent Gomathi Ammal purchased the equity of redemption over certain properties including the building and site in dispute in this case in the year 1121, when they were outstanding with a possessory mortgagee who had leased the subject-matter of this proceeding to the petitioner under a rent deed in the year 1117 while he was already in possession as a lessee. The 1st respondent redeemed the mortgage and took a deed of release from the mortgagee wherein she was directed to obtain possession from the petitioner on payment of Rs. 800/- towards value of improvements. A term of five years had been fixed as the duration of the lease evidenced by the aforesaid document of the year 1117. On the expiry of that period, the 1st respondent issued no ace to the petitioner demanding possession. This was followed up by a suit, O.S 1050/1122 in the District Munsiff's Court, Trivandrum filed by the 1st respondent against the petitioner for arrears of rent as well as eviction. This suit was filed in Medam 1122. The petitioner filed a written statement in Kanni 1123 contending, ‘inter alia’, that the owner of the equity of redemption had agreed to sell it to him, that the sale relied upon by the 1st respondent-plaintiff was in contravention of that agreement and consequently invalid, and that in the event of eviction, he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 2,000/- by way of value of improvements. It was also contended that the prayer for eviction could not be granted on account of the Travancore Rent Control Order, 1122. The 1st respondent thereafter filed an application (B.R.C Case No. 215/1124) before the Controller under the provisions of the said Order, claiming possession on the ground that the lessee had left rent in arrears which would be a ground for eviction. The petitioner had deposited the arrears of rent claimed in the Munsiff's Court and he was also depositing rent that accrued due after the suit. There was thus no arrear of rent as alleged in the application and that being the sole ground relied upon to sustain the prayer for eviction, the application was dismissed.

    3. Soon after this, the 1st respondent started fresh proceedings before the Controller by filing Building Rent Control Case No. 248/1124 claiming eviction on two grounds, firstly arrears of rent, and secondly, requirement of the premises for her own use or purposes of “a jeweller's business run as a family concern” by her husband under the name “D. Doraiswamy & Sons” that was being conducted in a rented building, which had to be surrendered to its owner. It was stated that after such surrender the business was being carried on at her residence.

    4. The petitioner filed written objections contending ‘inier alia’ that the 1st respondent was not the true owner of the property on account of the agreement for sale in his favour and that the only right, of the owner was to enforce that contract. It was also contended that the petitioner had spent more than Rs. 2,000/- for improving the property which he would lose if eviction be ordered by the Controller. It was stated that these two pleas were pending adjudication in the Munsifi's Court and that until those matters are decided by that Court, the Controller had no jurisdiction to pass an order for eviction.

    5. The Controller ordered eviction without taking any evidence and without considering the objections. Against this decision an appeal was preferred by the petitioner before the Division Peishkar, Trivandrum, who allowed it and remanded the case for fresh disposal after taking evidence and after disposing of the several points raised in defence. The 1st respondent sought to have this order revised by the Government. The Government dismissed the revision and confirmed the order of remand.

    6. After remand, the Controller renumbered the proceeding as B.R.C Case No. 190/1950. The 1st respondent's husband was examined on her behalf and some documentary evidence was also adduced. At the stage of argument before the Controller, the Travancore-Cochin Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Order, 1950 had come into force and the matter was disposed of under the provisions of that Order.

    7. At the argument, the first ground relied upon for eviction, viz., the alleged arrears of rent was not pressed and the only question that was considered by the Controller was whether the second ground viz., that the premises were required by the landlord for the purposes mentioned in the petition was true and whether that would justify an order for eviction. The Controller's opinion was in favour of the landlord and he therefore directed that the petitioner “shall be evicted from the building in question under Clause 9(3)(a)(iii) of the said Order.”

    8. Against this, the petitioner filed an appeal No. 79/1950 before the District Collector, Trivandrum. The Collector agreed with the Controller as regards the requirement of the premises by the landlord and observing that:

    “another point raised is that the present case cannot be decided as there is a civil suit pending in respect of the same subject-matter. The civil suit referred to will not be a bar to any decision under the Rent Control Order. This point also therefore fails”,

    dismissed the appeal. The petitioner sought to have that order vacated by the Government in revision which attempt however failed, the Government having dismissed the revision and confirmed the order of the Collector. The aforesaid proceedings have occasioned the application before this Court.

    9. The order for eviction passed as aforesaid is challenged as “illegal, void and ‘ultra vires’” for the following reasons:

    “1. That to justify eviction of a tenant from a non-residential building, under Section 9(3)(a)(iii) it is necessary that the building is required for the purpose of a business which the landlord is personally carrying on;

    2. That the 1st respondent had given a possessory mortgage of the premises on 11-11-1124 which would belie the case of her own requirement for carrying on the jeweller's business and that the non-mention of this requirement in the first application before the Controller leads to the same conclusions; and

    3. That the Rent Control authorities had no jurisdiction to entertain a petition for eviction until the 1st respondent had paid the sum of Rs. 800/- which she had specifically undertaken to pay; and that they had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition and pass orders for eviction until the substantial questions in dispute between the parties in the civil suit, O.S 1050/1122 is disposed of by the Court which is seized of the matter.”

    10. The question therefore is whether the authorities under the Building (Lease and Rent Control) Order have exceeded their jurisdiction or whether they have merely come to an erroneous decision. However erroneous the decision may have been, yet if they had jurisdiction to make the order complained of, this Court cannot interfere. Section 9(3) of the Travancore-Cochin Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order, 1950 provides that:

    “(a) a landlord may apply to the controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession……….

    (i) ***

    (ii) ***

    (iii) in the case of a non-residential building if he is not occupying for purposes of a business which he is carrying on, a non-residential building in the town or village concerned which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled

    11. The rest of the clause is immaterial for this case. The Controller has therefore jurisdiction to consider whether the requirements of this clause are satisfied and if he considers that they are satisfied, the party aggrieved is entitled to have the matter scrutinised by an appellate authority who is the Collector and any party aggrieved by the order of the Collector is entitled to have the matter considered by the Government in revision. The question as to whether the business which is in fact conducted by the husband of the landlord can be said to be a business that the landlord is carrying on, within the meaning of this clause, is a matter which can, and has to be, decided by the authorities concerned and the parties are bound by the final order passed in the proceedings however erroneous it may be. A tribunal having authority has as Land Hobhouse said in Malkarjun's case ‘Malkarjun v. Narhari’, 25 Bom 337 (PC), ‘Jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right.”

    12. The first ground relied upon by the petitioner would not avail him as it would, if upheld, only amount to an erroneous exercise of jurisdiction. The second is not an independent ground & is no more than an aid to appreciate the truth and bona fides of the claim which forms the first-ground.

    13. The third and last ground however stands on a different footing and on that, in my judgment, the petitioner should succeed. The question that is raised by this ground is whether when admittedly the landlord is liable to pay compensation for improvements effected by the tenant, an order could be passed by the Controller for eviction without or before such payment. The right of a tenant to retain possession of the holding until payment of value of improvement has been recognised in this country by usage of High antiquity and this usage has been recognised by statute in State where statutes have supervened. The Travancore-Cochin Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order, 1950 does not authorise the Controller to consider any question of value of improvements or to direct payment thereof. The scope of his investigation is defined in the various clauses of Section 9. The second proviso to the first clause of that section provides that — in a case,

    “Where the tenant denies the title of the landlord or claims right of permanent tenancy, the Controller shall decide whether the denial or claim, is bona fide and if he records a finding to that effect, the landlord shall be entitled to sue for eviction of the tenant in a civil Court and the Court may pass a decree for eviction on any of the grounds mentioned in this clause notwithstanding that the Court finds that such denial does not involve forfeiture of the lease or that the claim is unfounded.”

    14. Clause (I) to Section 9 states that:

    “A tenant shall not be evicted whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of this clause. The Travancore Building Rent Control Order, 1122 under which the proceeding started was promulgated under Section 5 of the Travancore Emergency Powers Act, 1 of 1122. The preamble to Act 1 of 1122, says. Whereas notwithstanding the termination of the war an emergent situation exists which renders it necessary to make provision for regulating certain matters, for securing public peace, for the maintenance of public order, and for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community”;

    and Section 5 provides:

    “5. (1) Our Government, so far as it appears to them to be necessary or expedient for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community, may by notified order provide for regulating the letting and subletting of any accommodation or class of accommodation, whether residential or non-residential, whether furnished or unfurnished and whether with or without board, and in particular……..

    (i) for controlling the rents for such accommodation (either generally or when let to specified persons or class of persons or in specified circumstances);

    (ii) for preventing the eviction of tenants & sub-tenants from such accommodation in specified circumstances.

    (2) An order under sub-section (1) may be made so as to have effect either generally or in any particular area.”

    15. The Travancore-Cochin Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order, 1950 repealed the said Order & re-enacted its provisions with certain changes. It is thus a measure designed to tide over an emergency, to avoid exploitation of the situation, by landlords, to satisfy their legitimate claims and requirements and subject to these to secure to tenants immunity from eviction without affecting their existing rights. It contemplates the immediate implementation of the order for eviction passed under its provisions by execution and does not envisage any investigation, decisions or direction leading to any interception, delay or hindrance. As already stated, there is no provision authorising the Controller to investigate and decide any question of value of improvements or direct payment of any amount in that behalf before delivery of possession, even in a case where the liability may be admitted as in this case. The husband of the 1st respondent in his deposition admits liability to pay Rs. 800/- as directed in the release of the mortgage taken by his wife, the 1st respondent. The tenant, that is the petitioner, claims a larger sum by way of value of improvements & the question of the quantum of the compensation payable is pending adjudication by the Court in O.S 1050/1122 filed by the 1st respondent, the landlord. In that suit it is competent for the Court to decree-that the tenant shall be evicted only on payment of the last pie due to him by way of value of improvements, that is to say, it is competent for, the Court to decide that the tenant is entitled to retain possession of the property until payment of the value of his improvements as fixed by it. The jurisdiction of the Controller and the higher authorities to direct eviction of a tenant from, and to put the landlord in possession of, the holding must therefore be confined to cases where the landlord is not liable to pay value for any improvements to the tenant as a condition of his getting possession of the property. To hold otherwise would be, as observed by Sir John Wickens, V.C in ‘Forbes v. Ecclesiastical Commissioners for England’, (1873) 15 EQ 51, “to destroy by a side wind public rights which were not in the contemplation of the Legislature.” (at page 55).

    16. This dictum would apply to private rights as well. No statute should be construed, as destructive of pre-existing substantive rights of parties in the absence of provisions which expressly or by necessary implication so provide. There does not exist in the Travancore-Cochin Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order, 1950 a provision in any manner affecting pre-existing rights of the tenant. In fact the Legislation is one that benefits the tenant in that it secures him possession notwithstanding even the decree of a civil Court for eviction except pursuant to an order in that behalf to be passed by the Controller. The Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order must be construed as complementary to and not as conflicting with the jurisdiction of the civil Courts. The I second proviso to the first clause of Section 9, already read, directs resort to the civil Court for final adjudication of the merits of a claim for title or of a permanent tenancy raised by a tenant. I have no hesitation in asserting that the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order gives no jurisdiction to the Controller to direct that the tenant be evicted from and the landlord be put in possession of the property under the circumstances of this case. How can the civil Court before which the suit is pending decide in favour of the tenants declaring him entitled to retain possession until the value of improvements be paid to him, if another jurisdiction can meanwhile unconditionally deprive him of possession? I cannot think that the Legislature ever intended a conflict of jurisdiction between the civil Court and the Controller, as such a conflict would lead to anomalous, if not absurd, consequences.

    17. The learned Advocate-General who appeared on behalf of the Travancore-Cochin State impleaded as 2nd respondent, contended that the tenant would be entitled to sue for compensation for improvements due to him, even after he is deprived of possession in enforcement of an order for eviction passed by the Controller. This is a point on which there is conflict of opinion which conflict does not fell to be resolved in this case, even assuming that the tenant has the right to sue as urged by the learned. Advocate-General, that will not solve the question because the right of the tenant is not merely to get compensation, for his improvements but to retain possession of the holding, until such compensation is paid. That right of retention is destroyed and will be lost to the tenant if he is deprived of possession before payment.

    18. I know not why, the petitioner in this Court omitted to challenge the jurisdiction of the Controller to pass the impugned order, as the landlord's title had been denied in the Munsifi's Court and the denial was repeated in his objections before the Controller which plea limited the Controller's jurisdiction in the first instance to considering the bona fide character of the denial. The Controller does not appear to have bestowed attention upon this plea nor have the appellate and revisional authorities done any better in this regard. None of the orders even refer to this plea and its consequences upon the proceedings. Jurisdiction is at the threshold of an action and therefore must when questioned, ordinarily be first decided and entry into the merits; must await a decision in the affirmative. In cases I of inherent absence, omission to raise or press want of jurisdiction or even express consent to its exercise, cannot confer it, and any act done would be ‘ultra vires’ and of no effect. In view of the conclusion reached by me in favour of the petitioner, I have not considered, being unnecessary, the question whether the Court can or need have regard to the point as to jurisdiction if it emerges from the records though not raised by the parties.

    19. In the result I allow this application and quash the order of the Government dated 20th June 1951, L. Dis. No. 772/51.PWC and the order passed by the Collector and the Controller directing eviction of the petitioner from the property in question. The respondents will pay the petitioner's costs; advocate's fee Rs. 100/-.

    20. Application allowed.

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    Comments

    P. Chinnakannu Pillai v. Ammalu Ammal Gomathi Ammal And Another
    (Oct 1, 1951)