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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Indian Arbitration Act X of 1940 (hereinafter called the Act)
  • Arbitration Act of 1899 (Indian)
  • Arbitration Act, 1950.12.
  • English Act, 1935.b.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Indian Arbitration Act X of 1940 (hereinafter called the Act)
  • Arbitration Act of 1899 (Indian)
  • Arbitration Act, 1950.12.
  • English Act, 1935.b.
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner and the 1st respondent, by an agreement dated 19-3-1954, referred their partnership account settlement disputes to two arbitrators (respondents 2 and 3). The arbitration agreement did not exclude the applicability of the First Schedule to the Indian Arbitration Act X of 1940, specifically paragraph 2, which requires that if the reference is to an even number of arbitrators, they shall appoint an umpire within one month of their appointment. The arbitrators did not appoint an umpire but delivered their award within the month. The petitioner filed the award for decree in the Thodupuzha Munsiff's Court. The 1st respondent objected on various grounds, including a technical objection that the failure to appoint an umpire rendered the award void. The courts below accepted this objection and dismissed the petition, leading to the present revision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the provision in paragraph 2 of the First Schedule to the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, requiring appointment of an umpire by arbitrators where there is an even number of arbitrators, is mandatory or merely directory in character.
  2. Whether non-appointment of an umpire by arbitrators in such a case renders the arbitration award void or is only an irregularity.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • The provision in paragraph 2 of the First Schedule is merely directory, not mandatory.
  • Non-compliance with the umpire appointment requirement is only an irregularity and does not invalidate the award if no prejudice is caused.

Respondent’s Arguments

  • The provision is mandatory, and failure to appoint an umpire within the stipulated time nullifies the award.
  • Reliance on the courts below which held the non-appointment to be fatal to the award’s validity.
  • Reference to the decision in Jawala Prasad v. Amar Nath supporting mandatory character of the provision.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Howard v. Bodington (1877) 2 P.D 203, 211 Classic statement on whether statutory provisions are mandatory or directory, emphasizing legislative intent and context. Guided the court’s approach to interpret paragraph 2 of the First Schedule by examining legislative intent and purpose.
Liverpool Bank v. Turner (1860) 45 E.R 715 Dictum that no universal rule exists; courts must discern legislative intent considering statute's scope and object. Supported the analytical framework for determining the nature of the provision in question.
Hari Vishnu v. Ahmed Ishaque, A.I.R 1955 S.C 233 Mandatory enactments may be directory in substance; the word "shall" is not conclusive. Affirmed that the court must look to legislative intent and context rather than literal wording.
Ajit Kumar Sen v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R 1954 Cal. 49 Set three fundamental tests to distinguish mandatory from directory provisions: scope and object, justice and convenience, and nature of the provision. Applied these tests to determine that the umpire appointment provision is directory.
Tikaram v. Hansraj, A.I.R 1954 Nag. 241 Held that failure to appoint umpire does not invalidate award if no disagreement or prejudice arises. Followed as authoritative support for the directory nature of the umpire appointment provision.
Jawala Prasad v. Amar Nath, A.I.R 1951 All. 474 Held that the umpire appointment provision is mandatory and failure invalidates the award. Distinguished and not followed due to failure to consider mandatory vs directory distinction.
Shambu Nath v. Hari Shankar, A.I.R 1954 All. 675 Distinguished Jawala Prasad on the ground of waiver and estoppel not being raised. Supported nuanced approach to technical irregularities in arbitration.
United Printing v. Kishori Lal, A.I.R 1956 Cal. 593 Followed Tikaram v. Hansraj, emphasizing that technical non-appointment of umpire is not fatal if arbitrators agreed. Reinforced the directory interpretation and rejection of technical invalidation of award.
The Bombay Company Ltd. v. The National Jute Mills Co., I.L.R 39 Cal. 669 Courts should avoid setting aside arbitration awards on technical grounds if arbitrators have agreed. Supported the principle against invalidating awards for non-appointment of umpire when no disagreement exists.
Union Of India v. M/S Allied Trading Co., A.I.R 1956 Punj. 7 Referenced in support of the court’s reasoning. Used to bolster the directory interpretation of the provision.
D.R Fraser & Co. v. Revenue Minister, A.I.R 1949 P.C 120 When amending a statute, changes in language are deliberate; cited by respondent counsel. Distinguished by the court as involving tax legislation and not comparable to arbitration context.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined whether paragraph 2 of the First Schedule to the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, mandating appointment of an umpire by arbitrators when there is an even number of arbitrators, is mandatory or directory. It relied on the classic jurisprudential tests from Howard v. Bodington and Liverpool Bank v. Turner, emphasizing that the true legislative intent must be discerned by considering the statute’s purpose and context.

The court noted that the Act does not expressly state that failure to appoint an umpire renders the award void. Section 8 empowers the court to appoint an umpire if arbitrators fail to do so. Further, paragraphs 4 and 5 of the First Schedule clarify that the umpire acts only if the arbitrators fail to agree or do not make an award within the time. If arbitrators agree on all points, the umpire need not act.

The court referred to the English Arbitration Act and the corresponding provision, which similarly allows court intervention without invalidating awards. It also reviewed the Nagpur High Court decision in Tikaram v. Hansraj, which held that failure to appoint an umpire is not fatal if no disagreement arises and no prejudice is caused.

The court distinguished the contrary Allahabad High Court decision in Jawala Prasad v. Amar Nath for failing to consider whether the provision is mandatory or directory. The court further relied on subsequent decisions that favored a practical approach avoiding technical invalidations, especially where arbitrators agree.

The court rejected the respondent’s reliance on tax law precedent on deliberate statutory language changes, noting the different legislative contexts.

Accordingly, the court concluded that the umpire appointment provision is directory, not mandatory, and non-compliance does not vitiate the award.

Holding and Implications

The court overruled the finding of the courts below that the failure to appoint an umpire rendered the arbitration award void. It held that the provision in paragraph 2 of the First Schedule to the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, is directory in nature, and non-appointment of an umpire by arbitrators where there is no disagreement does not invalidate the award.

The case was remitted to the learned Munsiff for disposal on merits in accordance with the court’s observations. The court’s decision directly affects the parties by allowing the award to stand despite the procedural irregularity, but it does not establish a new binding precedent beyond the interpretation of this statutory provision.

    Chacko v. Chacko .

    N.V Iyengar, J.:— This revision raises the question as to whether the provision in paragraph 2 of the First Schedule to the Indian Arbitration Act X of 1940 (hereinafter called the Act) is mandatory or merely directory, in character. In view to its importance it was referred by one of us before whom it came on in the first instance, to a Division Bench.

    2. The petitioner and the 1st respondent by agreement dated 19-3-1954, referred their differences in the matter of the settlement of their partnership accounts, to two arbitrators viz., respondents 2 and 3. The arbitration agreement did not, within the meaning of section 3 of the Act, exclude the applicability of the First Schedule to the Act, paragraph 2 of which provided.

    “2. If the reference is to an even number of arbitrators, the arbitrators shall appoint an umpire not later than one month from the latest date of their respective appointments”.

    3. However, respondents 2 and 3 did not appoint an umpire whether before they commenced functioning as arbitrators or during its course and on 31-3-1954, that is, well within the month after their appointment, they brought out their award. Later at the instance of the petitioner they filed the award in the Thodupuzha Munsiff's Court, with prayer for decree being passed in terms thereof. The 1st respondent thereupon took objection to the validity of the award on several grounds both technical and on the merits. We are concerned here with the technical objection, that the non-appointment at all by the arbitrators of an umpire, was a fatal omission which rendered their award void and unacceptable. The courts below accepted this objection and so dismissed the motion before them. Hence this revision. The corresponding provision in the repealed Arbitration Act of 1899 (Indian) ran as follows:—

    “If the reference is to two arbitrators, the two arbitrators may appoint an umpire at any time within the period during which they have power to make an award.”

    4. The change in the present wording, in the opinion of the court below was deliberate and meant that the appointment of the umpire by the arbitrators was mandatory with the consequence that “disobedience implied a nullification.” Learned counsel for the petitioner urges that the concerned provision is merely directory so that non-compliance therewith is only an irregularity and in cases where no prejudice is caused the award cannot be invalidated.

    5. Now on the general rule as to whether a particular statutory provision is mandatory or directory it is unnecessary to go farther than the classic statement of Lord Penzance in Howard v. Bodington, (1877) 2 P.D 203, 211. The learned Judge quoted the dictum of Lord Campbell in Liverpool Bank v. Turner, (1860) 45 E.R 715,

    “No universal rule”, said he, “can be laid down as to whether mandatory enactments shall be considered directory only or obligatory with an implied nullification for disobedience. It is the duty of courts of Justice to try to get at the real intention of the Legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to be construed.”

    6. and then went on

    “I believe, as far as any rule is concerned, you cannot safely go further than that in each case you must look to the subject-matter, consider the importance of the provision and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured by the Act, and upon a review of the case in that aspect decide whether the enactment is what is called imperative or only directory.”

    7. The Supreme Court in Hari Vishnu v. Ahmed Ishaque, A.I.R 1955 S.C 233, has observed:

    “An enactment in form mandatory might in substance be directory. The use of the word “shall” does not conclude the matter. However, these and other rules are only aids for ascertaining the true intention of the legislature which is the determining factor, and that must ultimately depend on the context”.

    8. Three fundamental tests were laid down on this matter in Ajit Kumar Sen v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R 1954 Cal. 49,

    “They are based on considerations of the scope and object sometimes called the scheme and purpose of the enactment in question of consideration of justice and balance of convenience and on a consideration of the nature of the particular provision, namely, whether it affects the performance of a public duty or relates to a right privilege or power; in the former case, the enactment is generally directory, is latter, mandatory.”

    9. Applying these tests, we find to begin with, that there is no declaration in any portion of the Act or the First Schedule that the violation of the provision as to the appointment by the arbitrators of an umpire, whether at all or within the time limited, renders their award to any extent void. On the other hand we have section 8 of the Act investing power in the court to appoint an umpire in case the arbitrators fail in that matter and also paragraphs 4 and 5 of the First Schedule indicating how the umpire's function differs from that of the arbitrators. That is to say while the arbitrators have to sit together to make the award, the umpire is called upon to act only if the arbitrators have allowed the time to expire without making an award or have delivered to any party to the arbitration agreement or to the umpire a notice in writing stating that they cannot agree and the umpire has two months time from then to make his award. It would appear accordingly that if the arbitrators have agreed on all points, the umpire is not called upon to act at all. The failure to appoint an umpire is then not such a breach of the provision in paragraph 2 of the First Schedule as to vitiate an award and might amount merely to an irregularity.

    10. Reference may also be made to Clause (b) of the First Schedule to the corresponding English Act, 1935.

    “b. If the reference is to two arbitrators, the two arbitrators shall appoint an umpire immediately after they are themselves appointed.”

    11. and the only consequence of the failure in this regard is as provided in section 5 of the Principal Act, viz., the intervention of the court in the matter of the appointment. The law is the same under the latest Arbitration Act, 1950.

    12. The question came up for consideration in Tikaram v. Hansraj, A.I.R 1954 Nag. 241, in circumstances almost similar as here, in that the two arbitrators delivered their award within 30 days of their appointment and without nominating an umpire. The trial Judge held that the failure of the arbitrators to appoint an umpire vitiated the award but the High Court held however that paragraph 2 cannot be construed as a prohibition against the arbitrators making the award without appointing an umpire and the provision was only intended to facilitate the smooth progress of the proceedings before the arbitrators. The learned Judges observed:

    “The intention of Sch. 1, Cl. 2 appears to be that the umpire whose function is to decide on a difference between the arbitrators should normally be appointed before any difference arises between them. Whatever may be the result in a case of a disagreement between the arbitrators, where no disagreement arises between the arbitrators and there is no need for an umpire, to regard the omission to appoint him as fatal to the validity of all the proceedings would only result in general inconvenience without promoting any object considered essential by the statute. The statute in such case could be complied with by the arbitrators appointing an umpire just before delivering their award. But such compliance, though punctilious, is purposeless. When the objector cannot point to any prejudice because of the omission to appoint an umpire the omission does not vitiate the award”.

    13. There is no doubt the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Jawala Prasad…Defendant-Applicant; v. Amar Nath…Plaintiff Opposite Party., A.I.R 1951 All. 474 (Lucknow Bench) holding otherwise, in an arbitration pending suit and relied on by the courts below:

    “The provisions of S. 25 of the Act make it clear that S. 3 is applicable to arbitration in suits also, where, therefore, a reference to arbitration is made under S. 21 and the reference is to an even number of arbitrators, then, unless there is an express provision to the contrary in the agreement, the arbitrators are under a statutory obligation under Sch. 1, para 2, to appoint an umpire not later than one month from the latest date of their respective appointments. The provisions of para 2 of Sch. 1 are of a mandatory character and it is clearly the duty of the arbitrators to appoint an umpire in the absence of the appointment of the umpire, the award made will be invalid”.

    14. But the learned Judges did not consider the difference between mandatory and directory construction of the word ‘shall’. This decision was also distinguished in a later decision of that court in Shambu Nath v. Hari Shankar, A.I.R 1954 All. 675 on the ground that the question whether the parties had waived the irregularity and were estopped from questioning the award on that ground was not raised or considered there.

    15. In United Printing v. Kishori Lal, A.I.R 1956 Cal. 593, P.B Mukherji, J., followed the ruling in Tikaram v. Hansraj, A.I.R 1954 Nag. 241 just cited in preference to the ruling in Jawala Prasad…Defendant-Applicant; v. Amar Nath…Plaintiff Opposite Party., A.I.R 1951 All. 474. The learned Judge referred to the observations of Chitty, J., in The Bombay Company, Ltd. v. The National Jute Mills Co., Ltd., I.L.R 39 Cal. 669 at 680 (c) under the earlier Arbitration Law:

    “The Court will, I take it, be averse to setting aside, or pronouncing as illegal, the proceedings of a Tribunal selected by the parties themselves. It certainly should not do so on technical grounds. Here it is conceded that the arbitrations have agreed upon their award. There has therefore been no necessity for the intervention of an Umpire. If one had been nominated, the parties would be in the same position. No further reference could have been made by either side to obtain the Umpire's opinion, or to question the correctness of the arbitrators' award.”

    16. and went on to say

    “In this case the arbitrators have agreed and there was no occasion for any Umpire. It will be more than insensible technicality in such a case as this to hold that the award is bad because no Umpire was appointed who if appointed would have had no function as the arbitrators agreed in this case.”

    17. See also Union Of India… v. M/S Allied Trading Co.…, A.I.R 1956 Punj. 7. Learned counsel for the 1st respondent referred to D.R Fraser & Co. v. Revenue Minister, A.I.R 1949 P.C 120 for the proposition that when an amending Act alters the language of the principal statute, the alteration must be taken to have been made deliberately. But that was a case of tax legislation where as observed by the Board, it was far from uncommon to find amendments introduced at the instance of the Revenue Department to obviate judicial decisions which the Department considered to be attended with undesirable results. In our judgment the instant provision is merely directory and its non-observance has not the result of vitiating the award. We therefore overrule the finding of the courts below in the above regard.

    18. As however other questions on the merits still await to be determined, we remit the case back to the learned Munsiff for disposal in due course of law and in the light of the above observations. We may add that one other technical defect pointed out on behalf of the 1st respondent, viz., that the Award as filed was not stamped, has been cured by payment of the requisite penalty in this court.

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    Comments

    Chacko v. Chacko .
    (Sep 29, 1958)