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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Koshi, C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion concerns two Second Appeals directed against a decree of the District Judge of Alleppey which reversed the trial Court's decree. The trial court had dismissed a suit for redemption of an "otri" (a mortgage form), and the District Judge granted the plaintiffs a decree for redemption as prayed in their plaint.

The plaint schedule property had three successive mortgages created by the owners: (1) in 1090 a hypothecation in favour of a church; (2) in 1100 an "otti" in favour of defendant 1 (the ottidar), contemporaneous with a leaseback to the mortgagors; and (3) in 1102 a "melotti" in favour of plaintiff 2 (melottidar). Following the melotti, the hypothecatee-church sued to realise its bond; plaintiff 2 (the melottidar) and the mortgagors were made defendants in that suit, but defendant 1 (the ottidar) was not impleaded. In execution of the decree in the hypothecatee's suit the property was sold (court sale in 1105) and the predecessor-in-interest of defendant 2 purchased it, but did not obtain possession before defendant 1 recovered possession in execution of a decree on the leaseback.

Despite the court sale, in 1118 plaintiff 2 executed a sale deed in favour of plaintiff 1 covering most of the plaint property, and plaintiffs 1 and 2 brought the present suit for redemption of the mortgage in favour of defendant 1. The trial court dismissed that suit on the ground that the court sale had cut off plaintiff 2's rights and consequently plaintiffs 1 and 2 lacked locus standi. On appeal the District Court reversed and granted the plaintiffs redemption; those appellate decrees are the subject of the two Second Appeals (S.A. No. 477 by defendant 1, and S.A. No. 511 by defendants 5 to 9, legal heirs of defendant 4, successors to defendant 2's rights).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, despite an earlier court sale (execution sale), the plaintiffs (plaintiff 1 and plaintiff 2) had a subsisting title and locus standi to maintain a suit for redemption of the otti in favour of defendant 1.
  2. Whether the title of an auction purchaser (court-auction-purchaser) is perfected only by delivery of possession, such that absence of delivery would prevent the auction purchaser from acquiring the equity of redemption.
  3. Whether the prior mortgagee's or auction-purchaser's institution of a suit for the auction amount (or hypothecation amount) against an omitted party has the effect of abandoning or divesting the auction-purchaser of his rights as auction purchaser and thus revives the equity of redemption in the original mortgagors or their assignees.
  4. Whether a decree for redemption obtained by a prior mortgagee (or by defendant 1 in that capacity) has the effect of divesting an auction-purchaser's title and revesting the equity of redemption in the original mortgagors where no actual payment discharged the prior mortgage.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents' Arguments (as presented by Mr. N. Varadaraja Iyengar)

  • Mr. Varadaraja Iyengar conceded that the execution sale in favour of the predecessor-in-interest of defendant 2 had effectively cut off all rights of plaintiff 2 (whether as melottidar or purchaser) pending the hypothecation decree.
  • To sustain the plaintiffs' title to redeem defendant 1, he relied on two circumstances:
    • The suit instituted by defendant 2 against defendant 1 for the auction amount (or the hypothecation money) — argued to have the effect of reviving the equity of redemption in the original owners or their assignees.
    • The suit brought by defendant 1 for redemption of the hypothecation and the decree obtained therein — argued similarly to divest the auction-purchaser's title and revest the equity of redemption in the original owners or their assignees.

Appellants' Contentions (as recorded)

  • Both second appeals questioned the plaintiffs' title to redeem.
  • In S.A. No. 511 there was the additional contention that, if redemption were allowed, the plaintiffs should be required to redeem defendants 5 to 9 by paying the sale price at the execution sale or the hypothecation amount and interest thereon.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Dhana Koeri v. Ram Rewat, AIR 1930 Pat 570 The case addressed the effect of redemption by a subsequent mortgagee of a prior mortgagee-auction-purchaser and held that when the subsequent mortgagee redeemed the prior purchaser by payment, the equity of redemption revived in favour of the original mortgagor; the prior mortgage (and consequent sale) is discharged only by actual payment. The court held this authority inapplicable to the present facts because in the present case there was no actual payment discharging the prior mortgage. The court emphasised that revival of the equity of redemption follows actual payment (redemption) and not merely the obtaining of a decree; hence Dhana Koeri does not assist the respondents here.
Cherian v. Manacheekhan, AIR 1951 Trav C 101 Principle that a prior mortgagee who omitted to implead a puisne mortgagee or equity-owner in his suit may bring a subsequent suit against the omitted party within the prescribed period, because the omitted party had no opportunity to redeem in the first suit. The court relied on this authority to reject the argument that the institution of a suit by defendant 2 against defendant 1 for the mortgage money operated to divest defendant 2 of his rights as auction purchaser. The court explained that bringing such a suit in the capacity of a prior mortgagee does not amount to abandoning or divesting the title the person holds as auction purchaser.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analysed and rejected the grounds advanced by the lower appellate court and the respondents to uphold the plaintiffs' claim to redeem defendant 1. The principal lines of reasoning were:

  1. The lower appellate court had relied upon multiple grounds for reversing the trial court: (a) that the equity of redemption had not effectively passed to the auction-purchaser because he had not reduced the property to possession (the learned Judge had observed that the title of a court-auction-purchaser becomes perfected only by delivery of possession); (b) that the hypothecation decree had become time-barred; and (c) that by a subsequent suit by defendant 2 (in 1115) against defendant 1 for the auction amount, the right of the auction-purchaser had dwindled to a mere right to recover the amount from the property.
  2. Before the court, counsel for the respondents conceded that the execution sale had cut off plaintiff 2's rights. The court therefore did not accept any argument that an auction purchaser must have taken possession to perfect title so as to prevent the sale cutting off third-party rights; Mr. Varadaraja Iyengar did not press that position before the Court.
  3. On the contention based on defendant 1's suit and decree for redemption of the hypothecation: the court considered Dhana Koeri v. Ram Rewat and observed that the revival of the equity of redemption in that case was consequent upon actual redemption (payment) by the subsequent mortgagee of the prior mortgage; it was not the mere institution of a suit or obtaining of a decree that caused revival. The court therefore concluded that because in the present case there was no discharge of the prior mortgage by actual payment, there was no scope for any revival or revesting of the equity of redemption in the original owners. Consequently, the lower appellate court's decree could not be sustained on that ground.
  4. On the alternate ground that defendant 2's suit against defendant 1 for the sale amount operated to abandon or divest defendant 2's rights as auction purchaser: the court held this argument unsound. It explained that where a prior mortgagee omitted to implead a puisne mortgagee in an initial suit, the prior mortgagee could bring a subsequent suit against the omitted party within the prescribed period (citing Cherian v. Manacheekhan). The subsequent suit was a suit on the prior mortgage aimed to foreclose it and did not mean that by instituting such a suit the prior mortgagee ceased to be the auction-purchaser. Unless payment was actually received pursuant to that decree, the auction-purchaser's title to the equity of redemption remained intact.
  5. The court further addressed the doctrine of election: it explained that the question of election did not arise because the two remedies relied upon (remedy as prior mortgagee and remedy as owner of the equity of redemption) are in different capacities. Conduct in choosing one remedy in one capacity does not automatically bar pursuing a remedy in another capacity. Since no payment was made that would effect the divestment, there was no election or abandonment that could revive the equity of redemption in others.
  6. Because neither of the respondent's principal contentions (redemption decree of defendant 1 as causing revesting, nor the institution of the suit by defendant 2 as causing abandonment/divestment) were supported on the facts or law, the court concluded that the lower appellate court's reversal of the trial court could not stand.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Second Appeals are allowed; the lower appellate court's decree is set aside; and the trial court's decree dismissing the plaintiffs' suit for redemption is restored.

Consequences and direct effects:

  • The plaintiffs' action for redemption of the mortgage in favour of defendant 1 remains dismissed as per the trial court's decree reinstated by this judgment.
  • In the special circumstances of the case the parties are to bear their own costs throughout.
  • The respondent's memorandum of objections against the lower appellate court's refusal to award him costs is dismissed.

Broader implications: The Court declined to apply the decision in Dhana Koeri v. Ram Rewat to the facts because it emphasised that revival of the equity of redemption follows actual payment (redemption) rather than merely obtaining a decree. The opinion does not purport to establish a new general precedent beyond its application to the facts; its practical effect is to affirm that absent actual payment or other fact-specific divestment, a prior auction-purchaser's equity of redemption is not divested by the mere institution of a suit for the mortgage money.

Order accordingly.

    Giriyamman Narasimhan Empran v. Ramachandran Venkitarayan Empran And Others .

    Koshi, C.J:— These Second Appeals are directed against an appellate decree of the District Judge of Alleppey by which the learned Judge reversed the trial Court's decree dismissing a suit for redemption of an otri and granted to the plaintiffs a decree as prayed for in their plaint.

    2. The owners of the plaint schedule property created three successive mortgages in respect thereof in favour of three different persons. The first one was in 1090 and was by way of a hypothecation in favour of a church. The second mortgage was in 1100 and was in the form of an ‘otti’ in favour of defendant 1. On the self-same date as the otti deed, the mortgagors took back the properties under a lease arrangement. While thus in possession the mortgagors executed the third mortgage, in 1102, a ‘melotti’ in favour of plaintiff 2. The melotti was soon followed by a suit by the hypothecatee-church to realise the amounts due under the bond in its favour. To this suit the melcttidar (plaintiff 2) and the mortgagors were made defendants, but not defendant 1, the ottidar. In execution of the decree passed in the suit, the plaint property was brought to sale and the predecessor-in-interest of defendant 2 purchased the same. The purchaser was however not able to obtain possession as in the meanwhile defendant 1 brought a suit on foot of the leaseback and in execution of the decree passed therein recovered possession from plaintiff 2, who by that time had also taken a sale deed from the mortgagors.

    3. The Court sale in the suit brought by the hypothecatee church was in 1105. Notwithstanding that sale, in 1118 plaintiff 2 executed a sale deed in favour of plaintiff 1 in respect of the bulk of the plaint property and the two together brought the present suit for redemption of the mortgage in favour of defendant 1. The trial court dismissed it on the ground that the court sale in the hypothecatec's suit had effectively cut off the rights of plaintiff 2 over the plaint property and that he had therefore no subsisting title to the property on the date of the sale in favour of plaintiff 1, or on the date of the institution of the suit. Plaintiffs 1 and 2 were therefore held to have no ‘locus standi’ to maintain the action. On appeal by them the District Court reversed the decision and hence these two second appeals.

    4. Second Appeal No. 477 is by defendant 1 and Second Appeal 511 by defendants 5 to 9, the legal heirs of defendant 4, on whom the rights on defendant 2 had come to vest. While the plaintiffs' title to redeem is questioned in both the second appeals, in S.A No. 511 there is a further contention that in case redemption is allowed the plaintiffs should be asked to redeem defendants 5 to 9 also by paying off the sale price at the execution sale or the hypothecation amount and interest thereon.

    5. The lower appellate court reversed the trial court's decree on the ground that the equity of redemption had not effectively passed to the predecessor-in-interest of defendant 2 inasmuch as he had not reduced the property to possession pursuant to the sale certificate. According to the learned Judge the title of a court-auction-purchaser becomes perfected only by delivery of possession. The Judge also pointed out that the hypothecation decree had become time-barred. A further ground mentioned is that by reason of a subsequent suit by defendant 2 (in 1115) against defendant 1 for the auction amount and the decree obtained therein, the right of the auction purchaser had dwindled into a mere right to recover the said amount from the property.

    6. On these grounds it was held that the equity of redemption remained vested in the original owners or their assignees. The learned Judge would have it that as the auction-purchaser's title was not perfected by delivery of possession, when the decree became time-barred or when defendant 2 sued for the auction amount, the equity of redemption became revested or revived in the original owners or their assignees. Hence the decision that the plaintiffs were competent to redeem the mortgage in favour of defendant 1.

    7. Before us Mr. N. Varadaraja Iyengar, who appeared for the respondents did not seek to support the position that without delivery of possession the auction-purchaser would not get a proper title. He conceded that the execution sale in favour of the predecessor-in-interest of defendant 2 had effectively cut off all the rights of plaintiff 2, whether as ‘melottidar’ or as purchaser of the property pending the hypothecation decree.

    8. However to sustain the title of the plaintiffs to redeem defendant 1, learned counsel depended upon two facts. One was what the lower appellate Court had referred to as the second ground viz. the institution of a suit by defendant 2 against defendant 1 for the auction amount or the hypothecation money, as the case may be. The other was the circumstance of defendant 1 having brought a suit and obtained a decree for redemption of the hypothecation. The rights of the church had, of course, passed to defendant 2. According to Mr. Varadaraja Iyengar each one of these two circumstances had the effect of reviving the equity of redemption in the original owners, the mortgagors or their assignees.

    9. It is convenient to deal first with the second circumstance mentioned above, viz., the suit for redemption of the hypothecation by defendant 1 and the decree therefor. The suit was brought in 1106 and the decree was passed in 1110. Defendant 1 however allowed that decree to get barred by time. Evidently after dispossessing defendant 2 in execution of the decree obtained on foot of the lease-back he did not want to spend any money to redeem defendant 2, the auction-purchaser. Be that as it may, the contention raised by Mr. Varadaraja Iyengar about this aspect was that the passing of a decree to redeem the auction-purchaser had the effect of divesting the tatter's title to the equity of redemption and revesting it in those in whom it vested prior to the auction sale.

    10. Reliance was placed in support of this argument upon the decision in — ‘Dhana Koeri v. Ram Rewat, AIR 1930 Pat 570 (A). We cannot however agree that case is an authority for the position contended for. There, like here, in the prior mortgagee's suit the subsequent mortgagee was not a party and the prior mortgagee-pur-chaser was obliged to bring a suit calling upon the subsequent mortgagee in possession to redeem him or in the alternative to permit him to redeem the subsequent mortgagee. The decree gave the option as asked for, but the subsequent mortgagee chose to redeem the prior mortgagee-purchaser and actually redeemed him. Thereafter the legal heirs of the original owner (mortgagor) brought the suit giving rise to the decision to redeem the usufructuary mortgage by payment of the amount due thereunder and the amount the usufructuary mortgagee had paid to the prior mortgagee-purchaser.

    11. The learned Judges held that when the subsequent mortgagee redeemed the prior mortgagee-auction-purcuaser, the equity of redemption revived in favour of the original mortgagor and that he was therefore entitled to redeem. The consequence of the redemption was to satisfy the prior mortgage and ‘ipso facto’ the decree and: the sale got vacated. The equity of redemption came back into the hands of the original mortgagor. The second mortgagee paid only the first mortgage. That gave him the rights of the first mortgagee as such and no more.

    12. It is clear from the judgment that the revival of the equity of redemption in favour of the original mortgagor was consequent on the redemption effected of the first mortgage and not because of the suit for redemption or decree therefor. Only by actual payment of the prior mortgage money did that mortgage get discharged. That alone would bring the equity of redemption back into the hands of the mortgagor. Mulla's comments on this case at page 596 of the 3rd Edn. of his Transfer of Property Act may usefully be-referred to here. The case is noticed under footnotes (r) & (s). In the case in hand there is no such discharge and there is therefore no scope for any revival or revesting of the equity of redemption in the original owners.

    13. The authority cited is therefore of no avail to the respondent. While we are in respectful, agreement with the decision given in the case we desire to point out that we cannot see eye to eye with an observation occurring in the middle of column 2 of page 572 of the report. The said observation reads:

    “The decree for redemption by the usufructuary mortgagees was meaningless unless it was based on the assumption that the sale had gone………”

    14. We venture to observe that in that case the decree for redemption by the usufructuary mortgagees was made because there was no sale at all binding them and not because the sale had gone in toto, that is, even as against those with whom on record it was held. When persons not bound by the decree or the sale discharged the mortgage the decree or the sale cannot continue to remain in force. The purchaser cannot have both the mortgage money and the property. Since there was no discharge of the prior mortgage in the present case by one who was not bound by the sale or for that matter, by any body no question of revival arises here. The lower appellate court's decree cannot therefore be sustained on the ground now discussed.

    15. The other ground viz. that by the institution of a suit, by defendant 2 against defendant 1 for the sale amount the former must be deemed to have abandoned his rights under the court purchase is in our opinion equally unsound. A prior mortgagee, who in his suit for the mortgage money omitted to implead a puisne mortgagee or the owner of the equity of redemption can bring a second suit in that behalf against the omitted party provided he brings the suit within the period prescribed, — ‘Cherian v. Manacheekhan’, AIR 1951 Trav C 101 (B). This is because there was no suit at all on the mortgage against the omitted party and he had therefore no opportunity to redeem the mortgage.

    16. As against the omitted party the prior mortgagee was still a mortgagee and not a decree-holder or a court auction purchaser. The suit defendant 2 brought against defendant 1 was a suit on the prior mortgage and its object was to foreclose it. That does not mean that by instituting such a suit he stands to lose his rights as an auction purchaser. No doubt, as in the case in —‘AIR 1930 Pat 570 (A)’, that would have happened if he had received payment pursuant to the decree against the omitted party; but it no payment is received his title as the ultimate owner of the equity of redemption would remain intact. In that capacity he could still redeem defendant 1.

    17. The question of election does not arise at all as the second suit for the mortgage money was in the capacity of a prior mortgagee and the right defendant 2 had to redeem the intermediate mortgage was as the owner of the equity of redemption. As prior mortgagee he could not as of right claim to redeem the puisne mortgage. That he could claim to do only in the other capacity. If in one and the same capacity a person, has two remedies, it may well be that having elected to choose one he may not afterwards be at liberty to seek the other; but if the two remedies open to him are in different capacities, his conduct in choosing the remedy in one right cannot debar him from seeking the remedy in the other right, if that too becomes necessary.

    18. It was admitted that the decree against defendant 1 for the auction amount had become time-barred. We cannot agree that the institution of that suit or the passing of a decree therein in favour of defendant 2 had the effect of divesting him of his right to the equity of redemption. Without such divesting, no question of a revival or revesting of the title in somebody else can possibly arise. When there is no question of any election the question of abandonment does not arise. The result is that the lower appellate Court's decree cannot be sustained on this ground either. The Second Appeals are therefore allowed, the lower appellate court's decree is set aside and the trial court's decree dismissing the suit is restored, In the special circumstances of the case the parties will bear their costs throughout. The respondent's memorandum of objections against the lower appellate court's refusal to award him costs fails automatically and it is dismissed.

    A/V.R.B

    19. Order accordingly.

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    Comments

    Giriyamman Narasimhan Empran v. Ramachandran Venkitarayan Empran And Others .
    (Dec 30, 1953)