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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, a clerk-cum-cashier with MGB Gramin Bank, Pali, had been in service since 17-2-1984. He remained absent from duty between 11-12-1989 and 24-10-1990 without prior permission. A memorandum dated 5-10-1991 levelled four charges centring on this absence and alleged violation of the Marwar Gramin Bank (Staff) Service Regulations, 1980. After a departmental inquiry—during which five of the seven defence witnesses requested by the appellant were not summoned—the inquiry officer held the appellant guilty. The disciplinary authority issued a show-cause notice and, on 17-10-1994, removed him from service; the appellate authority dismissed his departmental appeal on 26-12-1994.

The appellant challenged these orders in Writ Petition No. 1702 of 1995 before the Rajasthan High Court. A learned Single Judge (31-3-2009) quashed the removal, citing violation of natural justice, and ordered reinstatement with all consequential benefits. On appeal, a Division Bench (10-5-2012) agreed the inquiry was vitiated but set aside the reinstatement, directing a de-novo inquiry. The present Supreme Court appeal arises from that Division Bench judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Division Bench erred in setting aside the Single Judge’s direction to reinstate the appellant once the disciplinary orders had been quashed.
  2. Whether the departmental inquiry was vitiated for denial of reasonable opportunity by refusing to summon key defence witnesses, thereby violating principles of natural justice.
  3. Whether, in the absence of findings that the appellant’s absence was wilful or the medical certificates were fabricated, the punishment of removal was sustainable or disproportionate.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • The inquiry was conducted in violation of natural justice because five defence witnesses were unjustifiably refused.
  • The learned Single Judge correctly ordered reinstatement; once the termination order was quashed, reinstatement followed automatically.

Respondent Bank’s Arguments

  • The Division Bench rightly directed a fresh inquiry instead of reinstatement, given the vitiated inquiry.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court observed that the Division Bench itself accepted the inquiry was vitiated due to denial of the appellant’s request to summon remaining defence witnesses. Consequently, the termination (17-10-1994) and appellate (26-12-1994) orders were rightly quashed by the Single Judge. Once those orders were set aside, the appellant, in law, stood reinstated; a further inquiry could only follow after reinstatement. The Division Bench therefore lacked justification to deny reinstatement while simultaneously annulling the inquiry report.

On merits, the Court noted:

  • The principal charge was unauthorised absence for about 10½ months.
  • The appellant produced medical certificates; neither the inquiry officer nor the disciplinary authority found the absence to be wilful or the certificates to be forged.
  • Disbelieving medical evidence solely because it was submitted after a 24-day delay was unwarranted.

Given these findings, continuing punitive action without reinstatement would offend natural justice and proportionality.

Holding and Implications

Held: The Supreme Court set aside the Division Bench judgment dated 10-5-2012 and restored the Single Judge’s order dated 31-3-2009 directing reinstatement of the appellant with all consequential benefits. The Bank must implement the Single Judge’s directions within four weeks. The appeal was allowed; no costs were awarded.

Implications: The decision reinforces that when disciplinary orders are quashed for procedural illegality, reinstatement is the logical consequence unless specific reasons justify otherwise. It underscores the obligation to provide a delinquent employee full opportunity to lead evidence and reiterates that absence unexplained as wilful cannot automatically warrant dismissal. No new legal precedent was expressly established beyond applying settled principles of natural justice and proportionality.

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    Chhel Singh v. Mgb Gramin Bank, Pali And Others

    Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya, J.— Leave granted. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 10-5-2012 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan at Jodhpur whereby the Division Bench allowed the appeal preferred by the respondent MGB Gramin Bank, Pali (hereinafter referred to as “the Bank”) and set aside the order WP (C) No. 1702 of 1995 passed by the learned Single Judge.

    2. The factual matrix of the case is as follows: the appellant was working with the respondent Bank since 17-2-1984 as clerk-cum-cashier. While in service he remained absent from duty from 11-12-1989 to 24-10-1990 (approximately 10½ months) without obtaining prior permission of the competent authority. For the said reason he was served with a memorandum on 5-10-1991 alleging contravention of the provisions of the Marwar Gramin Bank (Staff) Service Regulations, 1980, for the following charges:

    (i) He remained absent from duty from 11-12-1989 to 24-10-1990 without obtaining prior permission from the competent authority;
    (ii) He failed to comply with the orders and directions given to him which were the letters issued asking him to join duty;
    (iii) He remained absent from duty without any reason.
    (iv) On the day of joining he failed to submit medical certificate and submitted the same after much delay.

    3. The appellant by his reply dated 23-11-1991 disputed the allegations and informed that he was seriously ill between 11-12-1989 and 24-10-1990, therefore, the absence was beyond his control; he never intended to contravene any of the provisions of the service regulations. The explanation submitted by the appellant was not accepted by the disciplinary authority, who decided to inquire into the charges and appointed one Shri P.R Agarwal as the inquiry officer.

    4. During the inquiry the appellant submitted a list of seven defence witnesses. However, the inquiry officer called only two witnesses and refused to call rest of the five witnesses on the ground that the presenting officer of the Bank was ready to answer the questions on behalf of them as may be raised by the appellant. After inquiry the inquiry officer submitted report dated 3-1-1994, rejecting the testimony of two witnesses as “untrustworthy” and held the appellant guilty of the charges.

    5. The disciplinary authority, having gone through the report, issued a show-cause notice enclosing the copy of the inquiry report as to why the appellant should not be punished for the charges mentioned therein. Finally, after hearing the appellant, the disciplinary authority held the charges to be proved and removed the appellant from service by order dated 17-10-1994. The appeal preferred against the order of the removal was dismissed by the appellate authority vide order dated 26-12-1994.

    6. The said orders of the disciplinary authority and appellate authority were challenged by the appellant before the High Court in Writ Petition No. 1702 of 1995. One of the grounds taken was that the entire inquiry stood vitiated having conducted in violation of principles of natural justice. The inquiry officer without having any justifiable reason disallowed the prayer of the appellant to summon five important witnesses. The other ground was that the penalty imposed was disproportionate to the gravity of charges.

    7. The learned Single Judge by judgment dated 31-3-2009 WP (C) No. 1702 of 1995 allowed the writ petition, quashed the order of removal and directed the respondent to reinstate the appellant in service with all consequential benefits with the following observation:

    “In the instant case the reason given for not calling the witnesses named by the delinquent employee is absolutely vague and irrelevant. It does not and cannot appeal to the measures and standards of a quasi-judicial inquiry that ultimately resulted into removal of the delinquent employee from service. The refusal to call defence witnesses in the manner existing in present case is apparent denial of reasonable opportunity to the charged employee for defending himself. A definite prejudice, therefore, is caused by not calling the witnesses named by the petitioner without examining their relevance and ultimately holding him guilty for the charges in defence of which he indicated his desire to examine those witnesses.”

    The Court also observed:

    “In the instant matter the inquiry officer simply mentioned that the defence witnesses Kalyan Singh and Ganpat Singh are not trustworthy. No reason is given by the inquiry officer to disbelieve those persons. Pertinent to note here that Ganpat Singh as well as Kalyan Singh extensively narrated facts about serious ailment of the petitioner. The inquiry officer while disbelieving those persons should have given definite reasons to justify his conclusion. Merely saying that the persons are not found trustworthy, is not at all sufficient. The basic principle is that every person coming forward as a witness in evidence states trust except proved otherwise, therefore, onus was upon the inquiry officer to establish by adequate discussion relating to conduct and character of Kalyan Singh and Ganpat Singh to disbelieve them or to say that they were not trustworthy.”

    8. The aforesaid judgment WP (C) No. 1702 of 1995 passed by the learned Single Judge was challenged by the Bank in a writ appeal. The Division Bench though accepted that the inquiry stood vitiated but set aside the order of reinstatement with the following observation:

    “Therefore, we are of the consigned opinion that even while the order as passed by the learned Single Judge quashing the orders of the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority need not be interfered with, the other part of the order calls for interference and it appears in the interest of justice that the matter be restored for reconsideration of, and re-reporting by, the inquiry officer after concluding the inquiry proceedings in conformity with the requirements of principles of natural justice.
    In view of the above, this appeal succeeds and is allowed in the manner that the order passed by the learned Single Judge insofar quashing of the impugned orders dated 17-8-1994 and 26-12-1994 is concerned, the same is affirmed, but the other part of the order of the learned Single Judge, declaring the petitioner entitled to be reinstated in service with all consequential benefits, is set aside. Instead, we consider it proper and hence order that the report as made by the inquiry officer dated 3-1-1994 shall stand annulled and the matter shall stand restored for reconsideration of, and re-reporting by, the inquiry officer.
    It goes without saying that if the inquiry officer who had earlier conducted the inquiry is not available, or for any other sufficient reason, it shall always be permissible for the disciplinary authority to appoint any other officer to inquire into the matter. For looking further instructions in the matter, the parties shall stand as noted to appear before the disciplinary authority on 18-6-2012.”

    9. The learned counsel for the appellant while placing reliance on the inquiry report and finding of the learned Single Judge submitted that the inquiry was conducted in violation of principles of natural justice and hence the learned Single Judge rightly directed the reinstatement of the appellant. Whereas according to the learned counsel for the respondent Bank, the Division Bench rightly set aside the order of reinstatement and remitted the matter for fresh enquiry.

    10. After giving our careful consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case and the submission made by the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the view that the Division Bench was wrong in setting aside the order of reinstatement. The Division Bench has accepted that the inquiry stood vitiated by disallowing the request of the appellant to summon the rest of the five witnesses. For the said reason, the Division Bench has not interfered with such part of the finding and order passed by the learned Single Judge whereby the impugned order of termination dated 17-10-1994 and the appellate authority order dated 26-12-1994 were quashed. The order of termination being quashed by the High Court, in absence of any observation and grounds to refuse the reinstatement, the appellant automatically stood reinstated. Without reinstatement in service, the question of further inquiry does not arise. There was no occasion for the Division Bench of the High Court to direct further inquiry without reinstatement of the appellant.

    11. The following charges were levelled against the appellant, as mentioned in the inquiry report:

    “Charge 1
    According to Rule 22(1) of the Marwar Gramin Bank Employee Association Rules, 1980 no officer or employee would absent himself without the prior permission from competent authority and in case of disease and accident no one would absent himself without providing medical certificate, but you flouted the instructions of competent authority and without permission you remained absent from 11-12-1989 to 24-10-1990 and you got the medical certificate issued in connection with your illness you submitted the medical certificate on 20-10-1990 with so much of delay.
    Charge 2
    According to Rule 22(2) of the Marwar Gramin Bank Employee Association Rules, 1980 if any officer or employee remains absent without leave or remains absent after the expiry of leave (leaving the circumstances which is beyond their control and for that he has to give satisfactory clarification), then he would not be entitled for payment of such absence or the period after the absence and would be liable for such action which would be charged by competent authority. But you violated these instructions:
    ***
    (d) You remained on medical leave from 11-12-1989 to 24-10-1990 and you did not submit leave application as per the Rule.
    (e) You had been instructed by the head office by its Letter No. K/7901 dated 23-8-1990 to present yourself on duty within 7 days and also to give clarification for being absent without leave but you did not submit any reply. Thereafter also, you were again given instruction by headquarter Letter No. K/10076 dated 22-9-1990, you were instructed to be present on duty by 5-10-1990 and also to submit the clarification. The said letter was received by you on 4-10-1990. Then also you did not send any information to the Bank about your absence.
    (f) In your clarification you have stated that you could not give information since you were suffering from incurable disease but in medical certificate submitted by you there is no mention of any incurable disease, where it was not possible for you to send the leave information. Thus, you gave wrong information to the Bank.
    Charge 3
    You not being seriously ill, produced the evidence of illness from various doctors whereas:
    (a) You travelled during your alleged serious illness. According to medical certificate issued by Dr S.S Purohit, Navdeep Hospital, Palanpur issued on 25-10-1990, you got treatment from him from 13-8-1990 to 24-10-1990 and rest has been prescribed whereas during that period you were on your permanent residence at Chitalwana. You yourself received the registered Letters No. K/1-0078 dated 22-9-1990 and No. K/11211 dated 11-10-1990 at Chitalwana.
    (b) In Letter No. K/11211 dated 11-10-1990 the instruction given was very clear that join the duty by 27-10-1990 and it was stated in that letter that if you do not join the duty then it would be presumed that you are not interested to work in the Bank. Then you had shown yourself to be healthy and you joined duty on 25-10-1990.
    Charge 4
    In Circular No. 21/78 dated 22-6-1978 it has been instructed that the employees on leave on health reason would submit medical certificate while joining on duty. You violated these instructions and did not present the medical certificate while joining duty. You submitted the said certificate on 20-10-1990 with delay.”

    12. From a plain reading of the charges we find that the main allegation is absence from duty from 11-12-1989 to 24-10-1990 (approximately 10½ months), for which no prior permission was obtained from the competent authority. In his reply, the appellant has taken the plea that he was seriously ill between 11-12-1989 and 24-10-1990, which was beyond his control; he never intended to contravene any of the provisions of the service regulations. He submitted the copies of medical certificates issued by doctors in support of his claim after rejoining the post. The medical reports were submitted after about 24 days. There was no allegation that the appellant's unauthorised absence from duty was wilful and deliberate. The inquiry officer has also not held that the appellant's absence from duty was wilful and deliberate. It is neither a case of the disciplinary authority nor the inquiry officer that the medical reports submitted by the appellant were forged or fabricated or obtained for any consideration though he was not ill during the said period. In absence of such evidence and finding, it was not open to the inquiry officer or the disciplinary authority to disbelieve the medical certificates issued by the doctors without any valid reason and on the ground of 24 days' delay.

    13. In view of the observation made above, the order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court cannot be upheld. We, accordingly, set aside the impugned judgment and order dated 10-5-2012 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court in M.G.B Gramin Bank v. Chhel Singh and upheld the order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 31-3-2009 in Chhel Singh v. M.G.B Gramin Bank WP (C) No. 1702 of 1995. The respondents are directed to implement the direction and order dated 31-3-2009 WP (C) No. 1702 of 1995 issued by the learned Single Judge within four weeks from the date of the receipt of the copy of this judgment.

    14. The appeal is allowed with the aforesaid observations and directions. No costs.

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    Chhel Singh v. Mgb Gramin Bank, Pali And Others
    (Jul 7, 2014)