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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973
  • Section 498-A, Section 304-B, and Section 306 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code, 1860 (for short “IPC”)
  • Sections 3, 4, and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961
  • The Constitution of India
  • Section 498-A and 306 IPC, Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short “the Code”)
  • Section 313 of the Code, Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 113-A of the Evidence Act, 1872
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973
  • Section 498-A, Section 304-B, and Section 306 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code, 1860 (for short “IPC”)
  • Sections 3, 4, and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961
  • The Constitution of India
  • Section 498-A and 306 IPC, Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short “the Code”)
  • Section 313 of the Code, Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 113-A of the Evidence Act, 1872
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Accused-2 (“the appellant”) married Girija on 17-12-2001. After the marriage the couple lived partly in Mumbai, where the appellant ran a jewellery shop, and partly at the appellant’s parental home in Habbuwada, Karwar. According to Girija’s family, she was subjected to repeated physical and mental cruelty, including beatings for money and being forced to wake at 5 a.m. to perform household chores. On 13-06-2002 Girija was found unconscious in her matrimonial home and was declared dead shortly thereafter; post-mortem indicated cyanide poisoning and multiple injuries inflicted while she was alive.

The appellant, his father (A-1) and mother (A-3) were tried in Sessions Case No. 59/2002 for offences under Sections 498-A, 304-B & 306 read with Section 34 IPC and Sections 3, 4 & 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. By judgment dated 30-03-2007, the Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-II, Karwar, acquitted all three accused.

The State of Karnataka appealed. The High Court (Crl. A. No. 1567/2007) upheld the acquittal of A-1 and A-3 but reversed the appellant’s acquittal, convicting him under Sections 498-A & 306 IPC and sentencing him to five years’ imprisonment (Section 306) and three years (Section 498-A) with concurrent sentences and a fine of ₹1,10,000 payable to Girija’s parents.

The appellant sought special leave; leave was granted and the present Supreme Court judgment decides his appeal against the High Court’s reversal of acquittal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court erred in reversing the trial court’s acquittal of the appellant when the trial court’s view was allegedly “reasonably possible”.
  2. Whether the prosecution proved, beyond reasonable doubt, that the appellant subjected Girija to cruelty that abetted her suicide within seven years of marriage, thereby attracting the presumption under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act.
  3. Whether delay in lodging the FIR and reliance on witnesses related to the deceased rendered the prosecution case unreliable.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • The trial court’s acquittal was based on a plausible appreciation of evidence and should not have been disturbed on appeal.
  • Key prosecution witnesses (parents and siblings of Girija) were “interested”, and their testimonies should be viewed with suspicion.
  • Six-hour delay in lodging the FIR (despite police presence at the scene) indicates that the complaint was “doctored”.
  • High Court itself found dowry demand unproved; without proof of dowry-related cruelty, conviction under Sections 498-A and 306 IPC cannot stand.
  • The appellant’s statement under Section 313 CrPC, together with photographs and a Valentine’s Day card, demonstrated a harmonious marital relationship.

State’s Arguments

  • Supported the High Court’s assessment that medical and ocular evidence established sustained cruelty culminating in suicide.
  • Emphasised that Section 113-A presumption stands unrebutted; appellant’s explanations were false and contrived.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Nilakantha Pati v. State of Orissa, 1995 Cri LJ 2472 (Ori) Held that a few isolated incidents of assault, without direct evidence of persistent cruelty, may not justify conviction for abetment of suicide. Sessions Judge relied on it to downplay wife-beating; Supreme Court noted the quotation was inaccurate and rejected the approach as insensitive and perverse.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. Statutory Presumption: Girija’s suicide occurred within seven years of marriage; therefore Section 113-A of the Evidence Act permits the court to presume abetment if cruelty is shown. The burden shifted to the appellant to rebut this presumption.

2. Medical Evidence: Dr Sailaja (PW-7) conducted the post-mortem, finding cyanide poisoning and multiple ante-mortem injuries—including swelling, clotted blood, and weals—consistent with assault. The possibility of accidental injuries from a fall was expressly denied.

3. Prior Injuries & Pattern of Abuse: Dr Kolvekar (PW-20) treated Girija on 30-05-2002 for contusions on thighs and back; Girija reported that her husband had beaten her. PW-3 Shruti corroborated visiting the doctor with Girija and hearing complaints of beating. The Sessions Judge’s dismissal of this evidence as “insufficient” was characterised as a misappreciation.

4. Credibility of Relatives: The Supreme Court held that labelling parents and siblings as “interested” could not by itself justify rejection of their testimony, especially when independent or neutral witnesses are unlikely to witness domestic cruelty occurring inside the matrimonial home.

5. Delay in FIR: A six-hour delay by a grieving father was deemed natural; treating it as fatal to the prosecution was “totally unwarranted.”

6. Appellant’s Explanation: His narrative of Girija’s alleged pre-marital eye problems, depressive behaviour, and daily pill consumption was found concocted, unsupported by evidence, and inconsistent with objective findings (she was a graduate with normal eyesight before marriage; eye injury occurred post-marriage due to assault).

7. Assessment of Trial Court Judgment: The Sessions Judge’s remarks suggesting that “one or two beatings” are insignificant were condemned as insensitive and reflective of a flawed mindset. This, coupled with overlooked evidence, rendered the acquittal “perverse.”

8. Conclusion on Guilt: Sustained physical and mental cruelty by the appellant directly contributed to Girija’s decision to take cyanide. The appellant failed to rebut the statutory presumption; the High Court’s conviction was therefore sound.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: Appeal Dismissed; conviction and sentences imposed by the High Court on Accused-2 under Sections 498-A and 306 IPC are affirmed.

Implications: The appellant remains liable to serve five years’ imprisonment (concurrent with three-year term) and to pay fines totalling ₹1,10,000 to Girija’s parents. While the judgment does not craft new legal doctrine, it reinforces the judiciary’s obligation to view domestic-violence evidence sensitively and emphasises the proper application of Section 113-A of the Evidence Act in protecting women from cruelty leading to suicide.

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    Vajresh Venkatray Anvekar v. State Of Karnataka .

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    Ranjana P. Desai, J.— Leave granted. The appellant (original Accused 2—A-2) was tried along with his father, Venkatray Narayan Anvekar (original Accused 1—A-1) and his mother, Smt Vidyabai Venkatray Anvekar (original Accused 3—A-3) for the offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 304-B and 306 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code, 1860 (for short “IPC”) and Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 by the Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court II at Karwar in Sessions Case No. 59 of 2002. By his judgment dated 30-3-2007 the learned Sessions Judge acquitted all the accused.

    2. The State of Karnataka carried an appeal to the High Court of Karnataka, Circuit Bench at Dharwad from the said judgment. The High Court by the impugned judgment Crl. A. No. 1567 of 2007 confirmed the acquittal of A-1 and A-3. The High Court, however, reversed the acquittal of the appellant and convicted him for the offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 306 IPC. For the offence punishable under Section 306 IPC, the appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for five years and to pay a fine of Rs 1,00,000 and in default of payment of fine, to undergo further imprisonment for one year. For the offence punishable under Section 498-A the appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs 10,000 and in default of payment of fine, to undergo further imprisonment for six months. The substantive sentences were ordered to run concurrently. Fine amount was directed to be paid to the parents of deceased Girija. The appellant was acquitted of the other charges. Being aggrieved by the said judgment Crl. A. No. 1567 of 2007, the appellant has filed the present appeal.

    3. Admittedly, PW 1, Suresh, father of Girija stays at Nandangadda, Karwar. The appellant's family stays at Habbuwada, Karwar. Girija was married to the appellant on 17-12-2001 at Karwar. The gist of the prosecution case can be gathered from the FIR lodged by PW 1 Suresh. It is stated in the FIR that one month after the marriage the appellant along with Girija went to Mumbai where he has a jewellery shop. About two months prior to the date of the FIR Girija had developed eye problem. Instead of taking her to a doctor the appellant took her to one swamiji. When the eye ailment could not be cured, she was brought to Karwar for check-up. When she came to Karwar she told PW 1 Suresh that the appellant, her sister-in-law and A-1 used to torture her and her sister-in-law used to assault her. They used to wake her up at 5 a.m and pressurise her to work. At the instigation of her sister-in-law and A-1, the appellant used to assault her. They used to ask her to get money from her parents.

    4. On 11-6-2002, PW 1 Suresh, his son, Girija and the appellant went to Hubli and got Girija's eyes checked from the eye specialist, Dr Anant Revankar. On 12-6-2002 Girija informed them that she was being tortured. She stated that when she requested the appellant to take her for a honeymoon, he refused and told her that if she continues with the demand, she will have to go to her parents' house. She stated that the appellant tortures her mentally and when she visits Karwar the torture increases.

    5. On 12-6-2002, at 4.00 p.m, PW 1 Suresh, his son and wife took Girija to the appellant's house at Hubbuwada and informed them that they would take her back next day evening. On 13-6-2002, at 12 noon, he called up Girija and told her that he would visit her matrimonial home and speak to A-1 about the harassment and torture meted out to her. Girija told him that if he visits her house, her in-laws would torture her more and, therefore, he should not come. On 13-6-2002, at 2.30 p.m, the appellant phoned and told him that Girija was not speaking anything. He went to the appellant's house along with his wife and sons. His son Sandeep saw Girija in the bedroom situated on the upper floor. She was not able to speak. Sandeep lifted her and brought her downstairs in order to show her to the doctor. The moment the doctor checked her, he pronounced her dead.

    6. PW 1 Suresh stated that Girija had committed suicide by consuming poison or some tablets because the appellant, A-1 and A-3 tortured her. The complaint was lodged at 2215 hrs. PW 1 Suresh stated that because he had gone to inform about the death of Girija to his relatives there was some delay in lodging the complaint.

    7. In support of its case the prosecution examined 24 witnesses. Prominent amongst them are PW 1 Suresh and PW 18, Anuradha, the parents of the deceased; PW 19, Jayant, the brother of the deceased; PW 2, Manjunath and PW 12, Sripad Anvekar, who attended the appellant's marriage; PW 11, Digvijay; PW 16, Prasanna Revankar and PW 17, Dr Raj Kumar, the sons-in-law of PW 1 Suresh and PW 3, Shruti, friend of Girija. The appellant denied the prosecution case and submitted a written explanation. We shall soon advert to it.

    8. Assailing the impugned judgment Crl. A. No. 1567 of 2007 of the High Court Smt Suri, learned counsel for the appellant, contended that the view taken by the trial court while acquitting the accused was a reasonably possible view which ought not to have been interfered with by the High Court. The counsel submitted that the High Court erred in relying on the evidence of the interested witnesses. The counsel submitted that though the evidence shows that several police officers were there at the scene of offence, PW 1 did not lodge the complaint immediately. He lodged the complaint at 2215 hrs, though he got to know about Girija's death at 2.30 p.m The complaint is, therefore, doctored.

    9. The counsel submitted that the High Court has held that demand of dowry is not proved. The High Court, therefore, could not have proceeded to convict the appellant under Sections 498-A and 306 IPC by reversing the order of acquittal. There was no credible evidence on the basis of which the appellant could be held guilty of the said offences. The counsel requested us to go through the explanation offered by the appellant in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short “the Code”) which according to her establishes his innocence.

    10. The learned counsel for the State strenuously supported the impugned order.

    11. Two most vital circumstances which must be kept in mind while dealing with this case are that Girija had committed suicide in the matrimonial home and her death took place within seven years of her marriage. Presumption under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act, 1872 springs into action which says that:

    “113-A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman.—When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband … and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband.”

    The question is whether the appellant has been able to rebut this presumption.

    12. Medical evidence is of great importance in this case. PW 7, Dr Sailaja had done Girija's post-mortem. She found the following injuries on Girija:

    “1. On the right side of head there was little swelling and wound on the forehead.
    2. On the right eye lower eyelid and on the neck there were weals of specific area and the eye was bleeding.
    3. There was swelling on the right side of neck.
    4. On the right hand thumb bottom there was a blue mark having an area of 3′ × 2½′.
    5. To the inner side of the arm the blood was clotted having an area of 2′ × 1′.
    6. To the inner side of the wrist the skin was blackened having an area of 1′ × ½′.
    7. Below the thumb the blood was clotted covering an area of 2′ × 1′.”

    Dr Sailaja opined that cyanide poisoning was the cause of death. She stated that all the external wounds were caused prior to post-mortem. According to her, the wounds on the right side of head can be sustained if a person is beaten with hands. According to her report, they could be caused by a hard and blunt object when the deceased was alive. In the cross-examination, it was suggested to her that if the dead body falls on rough surface, the wounds, which she had seen, could be caused. She denied the suggestion.

    13. Thus, it is clear that Girija was beaten up prior to the death. In the facts of this case, it is difficult and absurd to come to a conclusion that the injuries were self-inflicted. Pertinently, Girija died in her matrimonial home. We have no hesitation, therefore, in concluding that prior to taking cyanide, Girija was assaulted in her matrimonial home. PW 6, Laxman Kudani, the then Tahsildar and Taluka Magistrate, Karwar who drew the inquest panchnama also referred to blackening of the skin at the wrist and on the left and right side of the cheeks of the dead body. He denied the suggestion that because of the pressure exerted by PW 1 Suresh, it was so stated in the inquest panchnama.

    14. It would be appropriate at this stage to go to the evidence of PW 20, Dr Anil Kolvekar. This evidence takes us a little backwards. Dr Kolvekar stated that on 30-5-2002 Girija had visited his nursing home for treatment with her brother. He found following injuries on her body:

    “(1) Contusion on right inner thigh aspect and ⅓rd circular, 3 cm in diameter;
    (2) Contusion of left inner thigh aspect and ⅓rd circular zoom diameter;
    (3) Contusion over back right side, 6 cm injuries.”

    She told him that she sustained those injuries because her husband had beaten her. Dr Kolvekar stated that those injuries were caused within 24 hours and they could be caused due to beating by sticks and pinching. Dr Kolvekar identified his signature on the injury certificate (Ext. P-66). Strangely, the learned Sessions Judge has given no importance to this evidence and has observed that from the evidence of this witness one can only conclude that on 30-5-2002 when Girija visited him, she had three injuries on her body which were caused 24 hours prior to the treatment and it is for the prosecution to prove that the accused had caused those injuries. The learned Sessions Judge has not disbelieved Dr Kolvekar. Girija was brought to him by her brother. She told him that her husband had caused those injuries. We fail to understand what more evidence the prosecution could have adduced to prove that those injuries were caused by the appellant. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, only this conclusion can be drawn from Dr Kolvekar's evidence.

    15. It is pertinent to note that PW 3, Shruti Vernekar, a friend of Girija, has supported the case of PW 20 Dr Kolvekar that the deceased had visited him in May 2002. PW 3 Shruti stated that she met Girija at Dr Kolvekar's nursing home in May 2002. Girija appeared to be disturbed and she complained of body ache. According to PW 3 Shruti, she told her that the appellant and members of his family were beating her and that she was fed up. The learned Sessions Judge discarded the evidence of this witness on the ground that there is a delay in recording her statement.

    16. So far as delay is concerned, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the investigation of this case was entrusted to PW 24, A.K Sidamma, Deputy Superintendent of Police in COD in Dowry Prohibition Cell on 21-6-2002. Thereafter, she appears to have recorded certain vital statements. In the peculiar facts of this case delay in recording statements of the witnesses cannot be taken against the prosecution. So far as PW 3 Shruti is concerned, despite the delay in recording her statement we find her to be a reliable witness. The High Court has rightly relied upon her evidence.

    17. The learned Sessions Judge has refused to rely upon the evidence of the parents, brother and brothers-in-law of Girija primarily on the ground that they are interested witnesses. We find this approach to be very unfortunate. When a woman is subjected to ill-treatment within the four walls of her matrimonial house, ill-treatment is witnessed only by the perpetrators of the crime. They would certainly not depose about it. It is common knowledge that independent witnesses like servants or neighbours do not want to get involved. In fact, in this case, a maid employed in the house of the appellant who was examined by the prosecution turned hostile.

    18. It is true that chances of exaggeration by the interested witnesses cannot be ruled out. Witnesses are prone to exaggeration. It is for the trained judicial mind to find out the truth. If the exaggeration is of such nature as to make the witness wholly unreliable, the court would obviously not rely on him. If attendant circumstances and evidence on record clearly support and corroborate the witness, then merely because he is an interested witness he cannot be disbelieved because of some exaggeration, if his evidence is otherwise reliable. In this case, we do not find any such exaggeration qua the appellant. The witnesses have stood the test of cross-examination very well. There are tell-tale circumstances which speak volumes. Injuries suffered by Girija prior to the suicide cannot be ignored. The pathetic story of Girija's woes disclosed by her parents, her brother and her brothers-in-law deserves to be accepted and has rightly been accepted by the High Court. A-1 and A-3 have been acquitted by the Sessions Court. That acquittal has been confirmed by the High Court. The State has not appealed against that order. We do not want to therefore go into that aspect. But, we must record that we are not happy with the manner in which the learned Sessions Judge has ignored vital evidence.

    19. PW 1 Suresh, the father of Girija stated how Girija was harassed mentally and physically. The learned Sessions Judge has recorded a finding that Girija did not receive eye injury prior to marriage. PW 1 Suresh stated that the appellant assaulted Girija on her face and she received eye injury. This evidence inspires confidence. The story that the appellant had taken her to Dr Kumta appears to have been created to get over PW 1 Suresh's version. In any event, taking Girija to a doctor after assaulting her does not absolve the appellant of the crime.

    20. PW 11, Digvijay Kudtarkar, brother-in-law of Girija resides in Bombay. He stated that when Girija had come to his house along with the appellant she appeared to be frightened. She was not able to talk properly. When she came alone she told him that she was scared of living in the appellant's house. He noticed that her left cheek had become red and the right portion of her face had become dark. PW 17, Rajkumar Diwakar, another brother-in-law of Girija spoke about the ill-treatment meted out to Girija, the eye injury received by her and the assault on her left cheek. PW 19, Jayant, brother of Girija also deposed as to how Girija was ill-treated. Despite all this the learned Sessions Judge acquitted the appellant.

    21. Surprisingly, six hours' delay in lodging the FIR is taken against the prosecution. The learned Sessions Judge also finds the FIR cryptic. The learned Sessions Judge's observation needs to be quoted:

    “… When the death of the deceased had come to the knowledge of PW 1, it was around 2.30 p.m and that house of the accused in which the deceased committed suicide was hardly 2 km away from the police station. I feel that PW 1, reaching the police station as late at 2215 hrs, is a delay and this delay is not explained. The possibility of PW 1 Suresh discussing with his relatives also to net in the in-laws as A-1 and A-3 with oblique motive cannot be ruled out. Therefore, this delay of 5 to 6 hours which is unexplained is fatal to the case of the prosecution….”

    We are amazed at this observation. When a man loses his daughter due to cyanide poisoning, he is bound to break down. He would take time to recover from the shock. Six hours' delay cannot make his case untrue. It is also not proper to expect him to give all minute details at that stage. The FIR contains sufficient details. It is not expected to be a treatise. We feel that the comments on alleged delay in lodging the FIR and its contents are totally unwarranted. For the same reasons, we also reject the submission of the counsel for the appellant that because PW 1 Suresh did not tell the police officers who were present at the scene of offence that the appellant was responsible for the suicide, his FIR lodged after six hours is suspect.

    22. We have carefully gone through the explanation offered by the appellant in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code as requested by his counsel. It confirms our view that the appellant is not innocent. After denying the allegations of ill-treatment, cruelty and demand of dowry, the appellant goes on to paint a rosy picture of his married life. He refers to certain photographs and a Valentine day's card sent by Girija to him in 2002. Valentine day's card sent by Girija to the appellant does not help him to probabilise his alleged good conduct. In the facts of this case it appears to us to be an effort made by Girija to please the appellant. The photographs were produced in the court to show that Girija was taken to religious places and hill stations. The trial court has rightly not placed reliance on them. As regard the photographs it has observed that in the photographs Girija is seen standing alone and, therefore, on the basis of these photographs it cannot be said that the appellant had taken her to religious places or for honeymoon.

    23. Perhaps to create an impression that Girija was suffering from depression, the appellant comes out with a story that Girija used to consume pills every day and when he enquired about it she used to give evasive answers. According to him she used to lead a life of an introvert and she preferred loneliness. She never watched TV, she never read any newspapers or books. When he asked her about it she stated that she had an eye problem. He has further gone on to say that he blamed Girija's parents that they had suppressed her eye trouble from him and got her married to him. He further goes on to say that for this reason she was not willing to give birth to a child. This story is palpably false and is a crude attempt to create an impression that Girija was mentally unstable. No such evidence is brought on record.

    24. In this connection, at the cost of repetition, it must be stated that the trial court has rejected the defence of the appellant that Girija had lost her eyesight even before her marriage and that this fact was concealed from him. The trial court has observed that Girija was a graduate. If she had really lost eyesight, the appellant and his parents would have noticed the defect earlier. Further part of the explanation which refers to the appellant's alleged conduct of getting Girija examined by Dr Kumta, an eye specialist and allegedly giving her money for operation will have to be understood against the background of above facts. We are not inclined to believe that the appellant took Girija to an eye specialist and if he did take Girija to an eye specialist we have no manner of doubt that it was too late in the day. The evidence on record clearly indicates that Girija received injury on her cheek and to her eye after marriage. She had no eye trouble before marriage. The injury was certainly not self-inflicted. Circumstances on record clearly establish that Girija received the eye injury in the matrimonial home and the appellant was responsible for it.

    25. We are wary of passing comments against the subordinate courts because such comments tend to demoralise them. But, in this case, we will be failing in our duty if we ignore the insensitivity shown by the learned Sessions Judge to a serious crime committed against a hapless woman. We need to quote certain extracts from the learned Sessions Judge's judgment which will show why we are so anguished:

    “The other allegation in Ext. P-1 complaint is that the deceased was asked to get up at 5.00 a.m early in the morning and she was asked to attend to household work. Even the accused had asked the deceased to attend to household chores, that is not the act of cruelty, so as to drive the deceased to commit suicide. … Conduct of the accused in reprimanding the deceased for her lethargic habits, strongly advising her to be more compatible with members of the family and to evince interest in the domestic chores cannot be considered as acts of cruelty.”

    It is pertinent to note that even in this case Girija was asked to wake up at 5.00 a.m and start work. These kinds of orders may not always be innocuous.

    26. The learned Sessions Judge further observes as under:

    “In Nilakantha Pati v. State of Orissa 1995 Cri LJ 2472 (Ori) it is held that; mere statement that the deceased wife was not happy with the accused husband, is not sufficient. Particularly in the absence of any direct evidence, oral or documentary about ill-treatment one or two incidents of assault by the accused husband are not likely to drive the wife to commit suicide. Therefore, the Hon'ble High Court held that the conviction of the husband was not proper.”
    (emphasis supplied)

    Reproduction of the Orissa High Court's judgment does not appear to be accurate.

    27. The learned Sessions Judge further observes as under:

    “PW 11 has not stated the particular day of noticing the face of the deceased turning brownish and right eye upper portion blackening. He has not stated the particular day on which he found the deceased to be in panic. He has not stated the particular day on which he found the deceased physically weak. Therefore, again these imputations are all general allegations. As I said earlier even if upper eye portion or face of Girija had changed their colour because of A-2 giving beatings, that alone as I said earlier is not the act of cruelty driving the deceased to commit suicide.
    As I said earlier A-1 and A-3 are ordinarily the residents of Karwar. In between the date of the marriage and the death of the deceased on 13-6-2002 she was very much staying with her husband A-2 in Bombay. Therefore, giving one or two beatings is not cruelty to drive the deceased to commit suicide.
    The learned Public Prosecutor has argued that blackening of skin on various parts of the body of the deceased is proved. Therefore, the Court has to believe those injuries to hold the accused responsible. For the sake of argument, if it is assumed that those injuries were inflicted by the accused, they are not sufficient to bring death in the ordinary course. One or two beatings are not sufficient in the ordinary course for a woman to commit suicide.”
    (emphasis supplied)

    28. The tenor of the judgment suggests that wife-beating is a normal facet of married life. Does that mean giving one or two slaps to a wife by a husband just does not matter? We do not think that that can be a right approach. It is one thing to say that every wear and tear of married life need not lead to suicide and it is another thing to put it so crudely and suggest that one or two assaults on a woman is an accepted social norm. Judges have to be sensitive to women's problems. Perhaps the learned Sessions Judge wanted to convey that the circumstances on record were not strong enough to drive Girija to commit suicide. But to make light of slaps given to Girija which resulted in loss of her eyesight is to show extreme insensitivity. Assault on a woman offends her dignity. What effect it will have on a woman depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. There cannot be any generalisation on this issue. Our observation, however, must not be understood to mean that in all cases of assault suicide must follow. Our objection is to the tenor of the learned Sessions Judge's observations. We do not suggest that where there is no evidence the court should go out of its way, ferret out evidence and convict the accused in such cases. It is of course the duty of the court to see that an innocent person is not convicted. But it is equally the duty of the court to see that perpetrators of heinous crimes are brought to book. The abovequoted extracts add to the reasons why the learned Sessions Judge's judgment can be characterised as perverse. They show a mindset which needs to change. There is a phenomenal rise in crime against women and protection granted to women by the Constitution of India and other laws can be meaningful only if those who are entrusted with the job of doing justice are sensitised towards women's problems.

    29. In the ultimate analysis we are of the opinion that the appellant has not been able to rebut the presumption under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act. Girija committed suicide within seven years from the date of her marriage in her matrimonial home. Impact of this circumstance was clearly missed by the trial court. The evidence on record establishes that Girija was subjected to mental and physical cruelty by the appellant in their matrimonial home which drove her to commit suicide. The appellant is guilty of abetment of suicide. The High Court has rightly reversed the judgment of the trial court acquitting the appellant. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

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    Vajresh Venkatray Anvekar v. State Of Karnataka .
    (Jan 3, 2013)