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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
  • Workmen's Compensation Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
  • Workmen's Compensation Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, a 32-year-old Product Design Engineer employed by Utility Engineers (India) Ltd., sustained a traumatic amputation of his right arm near the shoulder in a motor vehicle accident on 2-9-1987. The employer had hired a chartered bus (Registration No. DBP 805) to transport its employees. While returning from the factory, the bus—driven by respondent 1, Pritam Singh—collided with a truck because of rash and negligent driving. The appellant’s right arm was severed, requiring multiple hospitalisations.

He filed a claim under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 seeking ₹12 lakh. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal found the driver negligent and awarded ₹3,20,000 with 12% interest. On appeal, the Punjab & Haryana High Court marginally enhanced the compensation to ₹7,04,800 (calculating 70% loss of earning capacity, applying the Sarla Verma multiplier of 16, and adding limited sums for other heads). Dissatisfied, the claimant appealed to the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the permanent disability—and consequent loss of earning capacity—should be assessed at 100% instead of the 70% fixed by the High Court.
  2. Whether the amount awarded for the cost of a prosthetic arm was inadequate.
  3. Whether the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages awarded by the lower courts were unreasonably low.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • The loss of the dominant arm renders him totally (100%) disabled for his specialised profession of designing refrigeration and air-conditioning projects.
  • The High Court awarded only ₹50,000 towards a prosthesis despite evidence of actual cost ranging from ₹75,000 to ₹1,60,000.
  • Pecuniary heads such as loss of income during treatment, future medical expenses, travel and attendant charges, as well as non-pecuniary heads like pain and suffering, loss of amenities and expectation of life were grossly under-compensated.

Respondent-Insurer’s Arguments

  • The High Court had already granted the claimant more compensation than justified by law and facts.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sarla Verma v. DTC (2009) 6 SCC 121 Addition of future prospects to actual salary and selection of appropriate multiplier. High Court used 50% addition for future prospects and multiplier 16; Supreme Court upheld these parameters.
Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar (2011) 1 SCC 343 Distinction between percentage of physical disability and economic loss; need to gauge impact on earning capacity. Guided Supreme Court in affirming 70% loss of earning capacity, noting claimant could undertake desk jobs despite amputation.
Arvind Kumar Mishra v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (2010) 10 SCC 254 Illustrates circumstances where physical disability equals economic disability. Cited in Raj Kumar passage; considered while evaluating whether 70% adequately reflected economic loss.
Yadava Kumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. (2010) 10 SCC 341 Same context as above—assessment of functional disability vis-à-vis earning capacity. Referenced indirectly via Raj Kumar dictum supporting differential assessment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Justice S.J. Mukhopadhaya, writing for the Supreme Court, undertook a two-stage analysis:

  1. Percentage of Loss of Earning Capacity
    • Observed that medical evidence did not specify whole-body disability but accepted that claimant could no longer perform specialised design work.
    • Applying the principles in Raj Kumar, held that while the physical loss was grave, the claimant’s educational qualifications enabled alternative desk employment; therefore 70% loss of earning capacity fixed by the High Court was appropriate.
  2. Re-assessment of Pecuniary and Non-Pecuniary Damages
    • Noted absence of compensation for several legitimate heads—loss of income during treatment, full cost of prosthesis, recurring medical expenses, adequate pain and suffering, loss of amenities and expectation of life.
    • Itemised each head, arriving at:
      • Medical & allied expenses (including ₹75,000 for prosthesis) – ₹1,05,000
      • Loss of earnings during treatment – ₹4,500
      • Future loss of earnings (70% × ₹54,000 annual income × 16 multiplier) – ₹6,04,800
      • Future medical expenses – ₹50,000
      • Pain and suffering – ₹1,00,000
      • Loss of amenities – ₹2,00,000
      • Loss of expectation of life – ₹1,00,000
    • Computed total compensation at ₹11,64,300.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed; Compensation Enhanced.

The Court modified the awards of both the Tribunal and High Court, directing the insurer to pay ₹11,64,300 (after deducting sums already paid) with 12% interest within three months. While affirming 70% loss of earning capacity, the Court set a higher benchmark for assessing ancillary pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. The ruling primarily affects the parties, without creating new legal doctrine, but it reinforces the Supreme Court’s guidance on holistic compensation assessment in personal injury cases.

To access the original judgment, please Sign In or Subscribe.

    Neerupam Mohan Mathur v. New India Assurance Company .

    S.J Mukhopadhaya, J.— Leave granted. The present appeal is filed by the appellant claimant against the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh in Neerupam Mohan Mathur v. Pritam Singh FAO No. 693 of 1989, FAO No. 758 of 1989, whereby the High Court granted a meagre enhancement in the amount of compensation awarded to him by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as “the Tribunal”).

    2. The facts involved in the present case are as follows: the claimant was employed as a “Product Design Engineer” in M/s Utility Engineers (India) Ltd., Dharuhera, District Mohindergarh, Haryana. The employer had arranged for a chartered bus belonging to M/s National Tours and Travels, F-4, East of Kailash, New Delhi, the second respondent before the Tribunal, for carrying the employees to the factory at Dharuhera and back; one Pritam Singh, the first respondent before the Tribunal was the driver of the said bus. On 2-9-1987 the claimant along with his colleagues was coming back from Dharuhera in the said chartered bus bearing Registration No. DBP 805. At about 6 p.m when the said bus reached near the turning of Village Shikohpur on Gurgaon-Jaipur Highway, it came across a truck coming from the opposite direction which was crossing a camel cart in front of it. Pritam Singh, who was driving the bus at a very high speed, carelessly, rashly and negligently attempted to cross the abovesaid truck without keeping the bus to the extreme left hand side. This resulted in a collision of right hand side of the bus with the truck, which resulted in severance of the right hand of the claimant who was sitting in the right side of the bus. The said accident and the mishappenings thereto were witnessed by the occupants of the bus.

    3. One Anil Kumar, PW 3, who was also travelling in the said chartered bus at the time of the said accident, took the claimant to Civil Hospital, Gurgaon from where he was given medical first aid and he was referred to Safdarjang Hospital, New Delhi. The claimant was later on transferred to “Dr Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital”, New Delhi and thereafter he was also treated in different hospitals at various stages. The matter was also reported to the police by Anil Kumar, PW 3.

    4. The claimant filed a petition under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 claiming Rs 12 lakhs as the compensation for the loss of the right hand which was amputated near the shoulder, on various counts. The respondents contested the claim of the claimant. The Tribunal after perusing the oral and documentary evidence held that the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving by Driver Pritam Singh of Bus No. DBP 805. Issue 1 was thus decided in favour of the claimant. While assessing the compensation under Issue 2, the Tribunal awarded a compensation of Rs 3,20,000 with interest at the rate of 12% per annum.

    5. In the appeal preferred by the claimant the High Court had taken the loss of earning capacity to 70% in view of permanent disability of the right hand. Based on the salary of Rs 3000 per month as claimed by the claimant, adding 50% on the same for future prospects of increase and applying multiplier of 16, compensation amount was raised to Rs 4500 with interest at 6% from the date of petition. The High Court made the following observation while granting compensation against different heads:

    “4. In my view, the issue relating to death or injury would have no serious difference in the choice of multiplicand or the multiplier. If at all, case of injury that completely disables a person for life is more poignant than a case of death and that is why courts do not always provide for deductions for personal expenses in case of claims for injuries. Indeed, the deduction itself will be meaningless for unlike a case of death, we need to make provision for his own living as well as the living of persons, who are dependent on the injured person. For the loss in case of injury where there is an amputation and there is a high percentage of loss of earning capacity, in my view, the principle laid down in Sarla Verma (2009) 6 SCC 121 providing for a prospect of future increase in salary cannot be ruled out. I would, therefore, take the multiplicand to be Rs 4500 which is the salary of Rs 3000 per month plus 50% of the same for future prospects of increase. For a person who was aged 32 years, the appropriate multiplier ought to have been 16 and not 15 and I would, therefore, take the annual income to be Rs 54,000 and adopting a multiplier of 16, I would take the income to be Rs 8,64,000. Having regard to the fact that I have taken the loss of earning capacity to be 70%, the amount that would bear to 70% of Rs 8,64,000 is the amount that shall become payable for loss of earning capacity. The loss of income will be Rs 6,04,800. I shall retain the medical expenses of Rs 10,000, Rs 15,000 for attendant's charges and Rs 25,000 as provided for pain and suffering by the Tribunal. If the same are retained, the amounts will add to Rs 6,54,800.
    The learned counsel would contend that although there was evidence placed before the Tribunal that the cost of prosthesis was Rs 75,000, no amount had been granted towards the same. The learned counsel would also state across the bar that the present cost is Rs 1,60,000. There is no definite evidence on the same and I would take the cost to be Rs 50,000 which although the Tribunal did not provide for, I would provide as necessary equipment that he may require for fending himself. The learned counsel states that if the prosthesis were to be fixed, the disability would even be less. In my view, it will make a minimal difference for a prosthesis is more for cosmetic value than a major functional adjunct. Sense of touch, ability to pinch, ability to push, ability to pick up, are all factors which go into the making of disability, all of which do not get improved by a prosthesis. All told, the amount that shall become payable in the manner worked out by me would add to Rs 7,04,800. The Tribunal has already awarded Rs 3,20,000 and the amount in excess of what is awarded by the Tribunal shall be paid by the insurer with interest at 6% from the date of the petition till the date of realisation.”

    6. The claimant has challenged the order passed by the High Court on three counts, namely:

    (i) The permanent disability has been wrongly assessed at 70% which should have been 100% in the case of the claimant;
    (ii) The lower amount has been paid towards cost of prosthesis; and
    (iii) Lesser amounts have been allowed towards pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages.

    7. Per contra according to the learned counsel for the insurer, the High Court allowed higher amount than the amount of compensation to which the claimant was entitled.

    8. In the case of the claimant, the High Court for determining the earning capacity adopted the percentage of loss of earning capacity as per the Workmen's Compensation Act and has taken a loss of earning capacity to 70% for amputation of the arm above the elbow.

    9. Admittedly, the claimant is a graduate in Science from Agra University and postgraduate diploma-holder in Mechanical Engineering with specialisation in Refrigeration and Air conditioning. He was a young man of 32 years at the time of the accident. Before the Tribunal, the claimant appeared as PW 4 and stated that he had worked with many companies like Blue Star, etc. and has extensive experience. Ultimately he joined M/s Utility Engineers (India) Ltd. on 1-9-1986 as Product and Development Engineer and was promoted from middle management group to senior management group on the basic pay of Rs 1400 to Rs 1500 plus other incidental benefits like special increment of Rs 100. At the time of accident, he was drawing basic pay of Rs 1900 plus other incidental benefits total amounting to about Rs 3000 per month. His job was designing of air conditioning projects.

    10. According to the claimant the normal expectancy of life is 70 years and he was expected to earn up to the said age as a specialist in designing, refrigeration and air conditioning. After the loss of the right arm due to the accident he has become 100% disabled as his earning capacity has gone down to zero in doing the specialised work like designing, refrigeration and air conditioning. The accident has completely jeopardised his mastery on the subject and his chances of future promotion and professional engagements have been virtually vanished.

    11. The question regarding “assessment of future loss of earnings due to permanent disability” was considered by this Court in Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar (2011) 1 SCC 343 wherein this Court held as follows:

    “8. Disability refers to any restriction or lack of ability to perform an activity in the manner considered normal for a human being. Permanent disability refers to the residuary incapacity or loss of use of some part of the body, found existing at the end of the period of treatment and recuperation, after achieving the maximum bodily improvement or recovery which is likely to remain for the remainder life of the injured. Temporary disability refers to the incapacity or loss of use of some part of the body on account of the injury, which will cease to exist at the end of the period of treatment and recuperation. Permanent disability can be either partial or total. Partial permanent disability refers to a person's inability to perform all the duties and bodily functions that he could perform before the accident, though he is able to perform some of them and is still able to engage in some gainful activity. Total permanent disability refers to a person's inability to perform any avocation or employment related activities as a result of the accident. The permanent disabilities that may arise from motor accident injuries, are of a much wider range when compared to the physical disabilities which are enumerated in the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (‘the Disabilities Act’, for short). But if any of the disabilities enumerated in Section 2(i) of the Disabilities Act are the result of injuries sustained in a motor accident, they can be permanent disabilities for the purpose of claiming compensation.
    9. The percentage of permanent disability is expressed by the doctors with reference to the whole body, or more often than not, with reference to a particular limb. When a disability certificate states that the injured has suffered permanent disability to an extent of 45% of the left lower limb, it is not the same as 45% permanent disability with reference to the whole body. The extent of disability of a limb (or part of the body) expressed in terms of a percentage of the total functions of that limb, obviously cannot be assumed to be the extent of disability of the whole body. If there is 60% permanent disability of the right hand and 80% permanent disability of left leg, it does not mean that the extent of permanent disability with reference to the whole body is 140% (that is 80% plus 60%). If different parts of the body have suffered different percentages of disabilities, the sum total thereof expressed in terms of the permanent disability with reference to the whole body cannot obviously exceed 100%.
    10. Where the claimant suffers a permanent disability as a result of injuries, the assessment of compensation under the head of loss of future earnings would depend upon the effect and impact of such permanent disability on his earning capacity. The Tribunal should not mechanically apply the percentage of permanent disability as the percentage of economic loss or loss of earning capacity. In most of the cases, the percentage of economic loss, that is, the percentage of loss of earning capacity, arising from a permanent disability will be different from the percentage of permanent disability. Some Tribunals wrongly assume that in all cases, a particular extent (percentage) of permanent disability would result in a corresponding loss of earning capacity, and consequently, if the evidence produced show 45% as the permanent disability, will hold that there is 45% loss of future earning capacity. In most of the cases, equating the extent (percentage) of loss of earning capacity to the extent (percentage) of permanent disability will result in award of either too low or too high a compensation.
    11. What requires to be assessed by the Tribunal is the effect of the permanent disability on the earning capacity of the injured; and after assessing the loss of earning capacity in terms of a percentage of the income, it has to be quantified in terms of money, to arrive at the future loss of earnings (by applying the standard multiplier method used to determine loss of dependency). We may however note that in some cases, on appreciation of evidence and assessment, the Tribunal may find that the percentage of loss of earning capacity as a result of the permanent disability, is approximately the same as the percentage of permanent disability in which case, of course, the Tribunal will adopt the said percentage for determination of compensation. (See for example, the decisions of this Court in Arvind Kumar Mishra v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (2010) 10 SCC 254 and Yadava Kumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. (2010) 10 SCC 341)”

    12. In the present case, the percentage of permanent disability has not been expressed by the doctors with reference to the full body or with reference to a particular limb. However, it is not in dispute that the claimant suffered such a permanent disability as a result of injuries that he is not in a position of doing the specialised job of designing, refrigeration and air conditioning. For the said reason, the claimant's services were terminated by his employer but that does not mean that the claimant is not capable to do any other job including the desk job. Having qualification of BSc degree and postgraduate diploma in Mechanical Engineering, he can perform any job where application of mind is required than any physical work.

    13. In view of the forgoing discussion we find no grounds made out to interfere with the finding of the High Court which determined the percentage of loss of earning capacity to 70% adopting the percentage of loss of earning capacity as per the Workmen's Compensation Act. The total loss of income was thus rightly calculated by the High Court at Rs 6,04,800.

    14. However from the award passed by the Tribunal and judgment rendered by the High Court, we find no ground shown by the Tribunal or the High Court in providing pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages at a lower rate. Against some of the heads even no amount has been allowed.

    15. The Tribunal in its award has noticed that the claimant had to go to the hospital every 10 days for treatment. He was admitted in different hospitals and was under treatment as indoor patient for about one-and-a-half months. The claimant's hand was amputated and skin was grafted. In spite of the same, no amount has been allowed towards loss of earning during the period of treatment nor any amount allowed towards future medical expenses.

    16. From the High Court's judgment FAO No. 693 of 1989, FAO No. 758 of 1989 and award passed by the Tribunal it is clear that the claimant placed evidence to suggest that the cost of prosthesis was Rs 75,000. It was accepted at the Bar that the cost of prosthesis was Rs 1,60,000. In spite of the same the Tribunal did not chose to allow any amount towards prosthesis and the High Court allowed a petty amount of Rs 50,000 for the same. No separate amount has been allowed towards travelling to the hospitals though the claimant was required to go to attend the hospital every 10 days for treatment. We further find that a meagre sum of Rs 25,000 has been allowed by the High Court towards pain and suffering.

    17. Having regard to the fact that the Tribunal and the High Court have not allowed reasonable amount for different pecuniary and the non-pecuniary damages, we, therefore, with a view to do complete justice to the claimant redetermined the amount of compensation on the following terms:

    Pecuniary damages (special damages)
    (i) Expenses relating to treatment, hospitalisation, medicines, transportation, nourishing food, and miscellaneous expenditure (medical expenses Rs 15,000 + attendant Rs 15,000 + cost of prosthesis Rs 75,000) Rs 1,05,000 (ii) Loss of earnings (and other gains) which the injured would have made had he not been injured, comprising: (a) Loss of earning during the period of treatment; Rs 4500 (b) Loss of future earnings (on account of 70% permanent disability taking multiplier of 16) Rs 6,04,800 (iii) Future medical expenses Rs 50,000
    Non-pecuniary damages (general damages)
    (iv) Damages for pain, suffering and trauma as a consequence of the injuries Rs 1,00,000 (v) Loss of amenities Rs 2,00,000 (vi) Loss of expectation of life (shortening of normal longevity) Rs 1,00,000 Total Rs 11,64,300

    18. The respondent Insurance Company is directed to pay the appellant claimant a sum of Rs 11,64,300 minus the amount already paid pursuant to the order passed by the Tribunal within three months from the date of judgment with interest @ 12%. The order passed by the High Court and the Tribunal stands modified to the extent above. The appeal filed by the claimant is allowed with the above observation and direction. No separate order as to costs.

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    Comments

    Neerupam Mohan Mathur v. New India Assurance Company .
    (Jul 1, 2013)