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citation codes
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Disposition
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Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • the 1976 Act
  • Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
  • Section 27 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • the 1976 Act
  • Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
  • Section 27 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant–plaintiff, a tenant of 1200 sq. yards of land at Musheerabad, Hyderabad, entered into an agreement to purchase the property from the land-owner (Respondent 1) on 15-10-1977 for Rs 1,70,070, paying Rs 25,000 as earnest money. The sale was contingent upon the vendor obtaining permissions under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, income-tax clearance and municipal subdivision approval.

Alleging that the vendor attempted to sell portions of the land to others despite the subsisting agreement, the appellant published public notices (April 1980) and instituted OS No. 30 of 1984 for specific performance. A cross-suit (OS No. 135 of 1984) for injunction was filed by a subsequent purchaser (Respondent 3).

The trial court (22-3-1991) decreed specific performance in favour of the appellant for the entire land except 65 sq. yds purchased by a bona fide purchaser (Defendant 6) and dismissed the cross-suit. On appeal, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh (10-6-2003) reversed the finding on readiness and willingness, limited relief to unsold portions at Rs 750 per sq. yard, and declined to examine other issues. Review was dismissed on 20-2-2004. The present civil appeals challenge the High Court’s judgment and the review order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellant-plaintiff proved continuous readiness and willingness to perform the 1977 agreement to sell, as required for specific performance under Indian law.
  2. Whether the High Court, while hearing a first appeal under Section 96 CPC, complied with Order 41 Rule 31 CPC by addressing all issues and evidence.
  3. The legal competence of a power-of-attorney holder to depose in place of the principal land-owner.
  4. If the appellant was ready and willing, whether subsequent purchasers were bona fide purchasers for value without notice.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant-Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The High Court violated Order 41 Rule 31 CPC by addressing only one issue and ignoring pleadings and evidence on others.
  • Readiness and willingness were demonstrated through public notices and the prompt deposit of the balance consideration within three weeks of the trial court’s decree.
  • The GPA holder lacked authority to depose for Respondent 1; her failure to appear in the witness box weakens the defence.
  • The High Court erred in declining to decide whether subsequent purchasers had notice of the prior agreement.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The High Court correctly evaluated evidence and found the appellant inactive for over four years, indicating lack of readiness.
  • Requisite statutory permissions were obtained and communicated; appellant offered no explanation for delay in filing suit.
  • Part of the land was acquired for road widening; appellant wrongfully withdrew compensation without title.
  • Findings of fact by the High Court should not be disturbed in second appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao (1999) 3 SCC 573 A power-of-attorney holder cannot depose regarding acts that only the principal can personally testify to. Used to hold that Respondent 1’s GPA holder was not competent to testify on matters within the personal knowledge of the land-owner.
Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani v. IndusInd Bank Ltd. (2005) 2 SCC 217 Limits on testimony by power-of-attorney holders; personal knowledge requirement. Reinforced the inadmissibility of GPA testimony for substantive facts relating to readiness and willingness.
Shankar Finance & Investments v. State of A.P. (2008) 8 SCC 536 Delineates “acts” that a GPA holder may perform under Order 3 Rules 1–2 CPC. Cited to underline that “acts” do not include deposing in substitution of the principal.
Man Kaur (Dead) v. Hartar Singh Sangha (2010) 10 SCC 512 Further clarification on evidentiary limitations of power-of-attorney holders. Supported the court’s view that Respondent 1 needed to testify personally for contested factual assertions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court scrutinised the trial court’s findings and the High Court’s appellate judgment.

  • It noted that the appellant pleaded and proved readiness and willingness through pleadings (para 7 of plaint), replication, his own testimony (PW-1) and corroboration from PWs 2 and 3 regarding financial capacity.
  • The High Court’s contrary finding was branded “perverse” for overlooking this evidence and for relying on inadmissible testimony of the GPA holder.
  • The Court emphasised that Order 41 Rule 31 CPC obliges a first appellate court to frame and decide every material issue; the High Court failed to examine critical issues such as notice to subsequent purchasers.
  • Applying the cited precedents, the Court held that Respondent 1’s GPA holder could not depose on matters exclusively within the principal’s knowledge, thereby vitiating the evidentiary basis of the High Court’s conclusions.
  • The trial court’s decree was found to be well-reasoned and supported by evidence; consequently, restoration of that decree was warranted.
  • On the compensation withdrawn by the appellant, the Court directed refund with interest as the appellant had no title when the land was acquired.

Holding and Implications

APPEALS ALLOWED. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgment and restored the trial court’s decree granting specific performance to the appellant for the remaining suit land (excluding area acquired for road widening and 65 sq. yds sold to Defendant 6). The appellant must refund Rs 29,47,112 compensation to Respondent 1 within three months with 9% interest.

Implications: The decision re-affirms (a) the appellate court’s duty under Order 41 Rule 31 CPC to decide all issues; and (b) the evidentiary limitation on power-of-attorney holders, strengthening precedent that principals must personally testify to matters within their knowledge. No new broad precedent was set, but the ruling directly affects the parties by compelling execution of the sale deed and repayment of compensation.

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    S. Kesari Hanuman Goud v. Anjum Jehan And Others

    Dr B.S Chauhan, J.—

    Civil Appeals Nos. 2885-87 of 2005

    1. These appeals have been preferred against the judgment and order dated 10-6-2003 by the High Court of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Anjum Jehan v. K. Hanuman Goud CCCA No. 34 of 1991, by way of which the appeals filed by the respondents against the common judgment and decree dated 22-3-1991, in OS No. 30 of 1984 and OS No. 135 of 1984, passed by the Court of the Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, have been partly allowed, by modifying the said judgment and order of the trial court.

    2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to these appeals are that: The appellant-plaintiff was carrying on business prior to 1-1-1978 in the appurtenant land as a tenant, and had made an offer to purchase the said premises, along with two other premises belonging to the landlady Ms Anjum Jehan, Respondent 1-Defendant 1 (hereinafter referred to as “R-1”). The parties entered into an agreement dated 15-10-1977, for the sale of land admeasuring 1200 sq yd situated at Musheerabad, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, for a total consideration of Rs 1,70,070. Out of which a sum of Rs 25,000 was paid as earnest money. The said agreement to sell, provided that the sale deed was to be executed within a period of six months from the date of agreement, or upon intimation by the vendor, as she had to obtain permission from the competent authority under Section 27 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1976 Act”), the necessary income tax clearances and the sub-division permission from the municipal corporation. The aforesaid suit land was also in the possession of the landlady, and had partly been occupied by Defendant 2-respondent (Narsoji).

    3. After the execution of the said agreement to sell, the appellant-plaintiff paid non-agricultural assessment tax. A legal notice dated 18-6-1979 was received by the appellant from R-1 Ms Anjum Jehan, stating that she had obtained requisite permission from the statutory authorities under the 1976 Act, from the income tax authorities, and also from the sub-divisional authorities. The appellant-plaintiff asked R-1 vide letter dated 2-7-1979, to send the copies of the aforesaid permissions, as well as a copy of the general power of attorney (hereinafter referred to as “the GPA”), that had been executed by her.

    4. Instead of executing the sale deed in favour of the appellant-plaintiff, R-1 tried to sell the suit property to other persons. Therefore, the appellant-plaintiff got a public notice published in local newspapers on 29-4-1980 and 30-4-1980, in respect of the suit property, stating that an agreement to sell had been executed between the parties as regards the said land, and that therefore, no other person must purchase the same. Despite the said notice, the GPA-holder of R-1 entered into two different agreements to sell with Respondent 2-Defendant 3 (K.S.R Murthy) on 29-4-1980/30-4-1980, for open land admeasuring 510 sq yd.

    5. The appellant-plaintiff filed a suit bearing OS No. 30 of 1984 on 23-6-1983 for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 15-10-1977, directing R-1 to execute a registered sale deed in favour of the appellant-plaintiff, and ignoring the agreement to sell in favour of respondent/Defendants 3, 6 and 7.

    6. Respondent 3-Defendant 7 (K.Y Rajaiah) filed Original Suit No. 135 of 1984 on 27-12-1983, for perpetual injunction, restraining the appellant-plaintiff from interfering with the construction of a theatre building, including the compound wall of the same, which was in close proximity to his land.

    7. During the pendency of these two suits, R-1 executed a sale deed, and she got the same registered on 29-4-1985, in favour of Respondent 2-Defendant 3 with respect to the part of the suit property admeasuring 260 sq yd, and the recital of the sale deed acknowledged the agreement between the appellant-plaintiff and R-1.

    8. The GPA-holder registered another sale deed in favour of Respondent 2-Defendant 3 on 30-4-1985, with respect to the suit property admeasuring 260 sq yd.

    9. The trial court, vide judgment and decree dated 22-3-1991 decreed the suit of the appellant-plaintiff except for a small area admeasuring 65 sq yd, which had been purchased by Defendant 6 (represented by legal representatives Defendants 6 to 10), observing that the said defendant had no knowledge of any agreement to sell between the appellant-plaintiff and R-1. The trial court also dismissed Suit No. 135 of 1984 that had been filed by Respondent 3-Defendant 7 (K.Y Rajaiah). The appellant-plaintiff was directed to deposit the balance consideration amount in the trial court within a period of four weeks, and the same was duly deposited by the appellant-plaintiff on 6-4-1991.

    10. Both sides preferred appeals before the High Court, and all the appeals were disposed of by a common judgment dated 10-6-2003 CCCA No. 34 of 1991, as referred to hereinabove.

    11. The High Court held, that the appellant-plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, thus, in view of the same, there was no occasion to decide issues regarding whether the subsequent purchasers were in fact, bona fide purchasers for consideration without notice of the agreement to sell between the appellant-plaintiff and R-1. However, the Court further held, that the appellant-plaintiff would be entitled to get the sale deed executed in respect of the said land, excluding the land sold to Defendants 3, 6 and 7 at the rate of Rs 750 per square yard, adjusting the amount that had already been paid.

    12. R-1 filed a review petition before the High Court. During the pendency of the said review petition, both the sides have preferred these appeals. The review petition filed by R-1 stood dismissed vide order dated 20-2-2004. The said order is also under challenge before us in connected Appeals Nos. 2888 and 4459 of 2005. Hence, these appeals.

    13. Shri Anoop G. Chaudhari, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant-plaintiff, has submitted that the High Court, while dealing with the first appeal, has decided the same under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “CPC”), giving strict adherence to Order 41 Rule 31 CPC, and thus that it ought to have dealt with each and every issue, and appreciate all the evidence on record. It was under an obligation to record findings on each issue separately. The High Court has committed an error in appreciating the evidence on record, and coming to the conclusion that the appellant-plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, as the appellant-plaintiff had in fact been issuing public notices, with the intention of making other people aware of the fact that they must not indulge in any kind of transaction in respect of the suit property, as the same belonged to him. He also had the financial capacity to pay, which stood proved by the fact that within a period of three weeks from the date of the judgment and decree of the High Court, he deposited the entire amount. Furthermore, the High Court ought to have appreciated the evidence on record, with respect to whether the other defendants/subsequent bona fide purchasers had purchased the land without notice. Merely saying that the same was not necessary, would mean that the Court itself has violated the mandate of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC. R-1 (Ms Anjum Jehan) never appeared in the witness box and never filed a written statement. The same was filed by her GPA-holder. The said GPA was in respect of various other properties, and the GPA-holder was not authorised to pursue suits in respect of the suit property. Under no circumstance is the GPA-holder competent to enter the witness box and to give evidence as a substitute for the original party. Thus, the appeals deserve to be allowed, and the judgment and decree of the High Court is liable to be set aside.

    14. Per contra Shri A.T.M Rangaramanujam, Senior Advocate, Shri R. Anand Padmanabhan, Shri Sohan Singh Rana and Shri A.V Rangam, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, have opposed the appeals contending that the High Court has appreciated the evidence on record and has reached the correct conclusion. The findings of the fact recorded by the High Court are based on evidence, and do not warrant any interference by this Court. The appellant-plaintiff, has not furnished any explanation for the delay, as he was duly informed by R-1 of the fact that she had obtained the required sanctions/permissions. Had the appellant-plaintiff been in a position to perform his part of the contract, he could not have waited for a period of more than 4 years to file the suit. During the pendency of the cases, a part of the suit land stood acquired for widening the road. The appellant without having any title over the land, has claimed and withdrawn a huge amount of compensation unauthorisedly/fraudulently. Thus, the appeals are liable to be dismissed.

    15. We have considered the rival submissions made by the parties, and perused the record.

    16. The trial court, after appreciating the evidence on record came to the following conclusions:

    16.1 The evidence adduced on behalf of the defendants does not conclusively establish their plea to the effect that the plaintiff himself had cancelled the agreement to sell (Ext. A-1), in view of his inability to pay the balance of the sale consideration.

    16.2 The plaintiff had the capacity to raise and pay the balance of the sale consideration under Ext. A-1. Thus, the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract.

    16.3 There were inconsistent versions with regard to the extent of the land alleged to have been sold to Defendants 3 and 7.

    16.4 The plaintiff had paid the amount towards non-agricultural assessment tax and property tax for the suit property.

    16.5 The plaintiff had not rescinded the suit contract, and had not informed the first defendant that he was not in a position to complete the sale transaction, and that therefore, Defendant 1 was at liberty to sell the suit land to any other person, as has been contended by Defendant 1.

    16.6 Defendants 3 and 6 were subsequent purchasers for consideration without notice. Defendant 6 is a bona fide purchaser for value, without notice of the agreement to sell (Ext. A-1).

    17. The High Court while deciding the first appeal filed under Section 96 CPC, did not consider all the issues as is required under Order 41 Rule 31 CPC. On the other hand, it dealt with only one issue elaborately, without making any reference to the pleadings taken by the parties. The High Court held:

    17.1 No steps were taken by the appellant-plaintiff in establishing his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract.

    17.2 Only a nominal sum was paid by the appellant-plaintiff in 1977 and till the date that the suit was filed, no effort was made by the appellant-plaintiff to pay the balance amount.

    17.3 There has been inordinate delay on the part of the appellant-plaintiff in filing the suit. Had he been ready and willing, he ought to have approached the court at the earliest.

    17.4 As per the evidence of Defendant 7, the power-of-attorney holder (DW 1), did not call the appellant-plaintiff and ask him to get the sale deed executed, in pursuance of the agreement dated 15-10-1977. The appellant-plaintiff expressed his inability to get the sale deed executed as he had no ready cash.

    17.5 There was no requirement in law to obtain permission for separate sub-division and thus, R-1 was not required to obtain any such sanction. Furthermore, the said property had already been sub-divided, and bore different numbers.

    17.6 R-1 had obtained the requisite permission from the Urban Land Ceiling Authorities in December 1977, and the appellant-plaintiff had handed over the draft sale deed to R-1.

    17.7 It was because the appellant-plaintiff was not willing and ready to perform his part of the contract, and was resorting to dilatory tactics, that R-1 had entered into two agreements to sell with Respondents 3 and 7.

    17.8 In view of the above, there was no occasion to examine the other issues, particularly those with respect to whether the other respondents were bona fide purchasers for consideration without notice, and the appeals were hence disposed of, as has been referred to hereinabove.

    18. The plaint contained a specific averment in Para 7 as under:

    “The plaintiff is and had always been ready and willing to perform his part of the suit agreement and it is the first defendant, who evaded to perform her part of the suit agreement and finally committed to refusal of the terms of the suit agreement amounting to refusal on her part to so perform her part of the suit agreement.”

    19. In the written statement, R-1 simply denied the said averment, and further averred that:

    “The allegation in Para 7 of the plaint that the plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of the suit agreement being incorrect is denied. The allegation that the defendant committed breach of the agreement and failed to perform her part of the agreement being incorrect is denied. The defendant submits on the contrary that the plaintiff failed to perform his part of the agreement thereby committed a breach of the agreement. The defendant, submits that the defendant performed her part of the agreement and was ready to perform her part of the agreement. It is submitted that finally when the plaintiff failed to raise necessary money towards the sale price the plaintiff informed the defendant that she is at liberty to sell the property to anyone.”

    20. A replication was filed by the appellant-plaintiff under Order 8 Rule 9 CPC, wherein it has been submitted in Para 6 thereof as under:

    “The plaintiff is a big businessman having a business turnover of more than Rs 5 lakhs per year. He is always capable of providing and raising the necessary finances to complete the sale transaction.”

    21. These are the only pleadings taken by the parties so far as the issue of readiness and willingness to perform part of the contract by the appellant-plaintiff is concerned. The appellant-plaintiff examined himself as PW 1, and in his cross-examination he has denied any suggestion made to him to the effect that he had ever informed the power-of-attorney holder of R-1, namely, Shri S.S Noor Ali, that he would be unable to raise the balance of the sale consideration. Nor had he ever told Defendant 7 that he wanted to sell the agricultural land to raise money to purchase the suit property. No question was put to him in the cross-examination, in response to which he could establish that he was a man of means, which he has thus stated in the replication, though he has admitted that he has certain outstanding dues towards the bank. He has denied the suggestion that he had neither a house, nor agricultural land, and that he had no capacity to pay the sale consideration, and further, that he had falsely deposed in respect of the same.

    22. The allegation made in the written statement stating that the appellant-plaintiff had told R-1 that she was free to sell the land, was not established by leading any evidence. Additionally, R-1 lives in USA. It is nobody's case that the appellant-plaintiff had any communication with her. It was not mentioned in the averments raised in the written statement, that she had been informed by anyone of the same through the power-of-attorney holder. Further, with respect to the issue regarding financial capacity to pay, the appellant-plaintiff examined K. Narayana Reddy (PW 2) and Laxman Gore (PW 3). They fully supported his case, deposing that he was a man of means, and that he had sufficient properties and the means to purchase the said suit property. Thus, the finding recorded by the High Court on this issue is perverse being contrary to the evidence on record.

    23. It is a settled legal proposition that the power-of-attorney holder cannot depose in place of the principal. The provisions of Order 3 Rules 1 and 2 CPC empower the holder of the power of attorney to “act” on behalf of the principal. The word “acts” employed therein is confined only to “acts” done by the power-of-attorney holder, in exercise of the power granted to him by virtue of the instrument. The term “acts”, would not include deposing in place and instead of the principal. In other words, if the power-of-attorney holder has preferred any “acts” in pursuance of the power of attorney, he may depose for the principal in respect of such acts, but he cannot depose for the principal for acts done by the principal, and not by him. Similarly, he cannot depose for the principal in respect of a matter, as regards which, only the principal can have personal knowledge and in respect of which, the principal is entitled (sic liable) to be cross-examined. (See Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao (1999) 3 SCC 573, AIR 1999 SC 1441, Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani v. Indusind Bank Ltd. (2005) 2 SCC 217, Shankar Finance and Investments v. State of A.P (2008) 8 SCC 536, AIR 2009 SC 422 and Man Kaur v. Hartar Singh Sangha (2010) 10 SCC 512.)

    24. So far as the notice of the agreement between the appellant and R-1 is concerned, the trial court after taking note of the recital of the said agreement in the agreement to sell and sale deed also, has held, that, so far as the land sold to the respondents other than Respondent 6, the parties had been fully aware of the same. Only Respondent 6 had no such notice. Shri A.G Chaudhari, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, has submitted that the same being a very small area, the appellant is not willing to disturb the possession of Defendant 6.

    25. In the facts and circumstances of the case, as the appellant has not yet acquired any title over the land, he has no right to receive compensation to the tune of Rs 29,47,112. However, he withdrew the said amount by giving an undertaking to return the said amount to R-1 in case any such order was passed by the court in this regard.

    26. In view of the above, the appeals are allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the High Court is set aside, and the same passed by the trial court is restored. As a consequence, the appellant is entitled to get the sale deed executed and registered, with respect to all the suit land available now (minus the land acquired and the land purchased by Respondent 6).

    27. The appellant is directed to refund the amount of compensation received by him to R-1 within a period of three months, along with 9% interest from the date of receipt till the date of payment.

    Civil Appeals Nos. 2888 and 4459 of 2005

    28. In view of the judgment and order in Civil Appeals Nos. 2885-87 of 2005, these appeals are dismissed.

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    S. Kesari Hanuman Goud v. Anjum Jehan And Others
    (Apr 10, 2013)