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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
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Disposition
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Acts
  • Section 141 of the Act, Section 138 of the Act
  • Section 141 of the Companies Act, 1956
  • Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act
  • Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act
  • Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 141 of the Act, Section 138 of the Act
  • Section 141 of the Companies Act, 1956
  • Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act
  • Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act
  • Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Gujarat State Fertilizer Co. Ltd. (the complainant) filed multiple complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (“the Act”) against Esslon Synthetics Ltd., its Chairman, Managing Director and other Directors, including A.K. Singhania and Vikram Prakash. The complaints alleged that the company’s cheques were dishonoured and that all Directors were responsible for the company’s financial affairs.

The Magistrate took cognizance and issued process to all accused. Vikram Prakash sought quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 CrPC; the Gujarat High Court allowed his applications and quashed his prosecution. A.K. Singhania filed similar quashing petitions, but the High Court dismissed them. The complainant challenged the quashing of Vikram Prakash, while A.K. Singhania challenged the refusal to quash his prosecution. The Supreme Court granted leave, heard all matters together, and delivered the present judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the complaints contained the essential averment that A.K. Singhania and Vikram Prakash were “in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company” at the time the offence was committed, as required by Section 141 of the Act.
  2. Consequently, whether the continuation (or quashing) of their prosecution under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Act was legally sustainable.

Arguments of the Parties

Accused (A.K. Singhania & Vikram Prakash)

  • The complaints merely state that they were Directors; they do not aver that they were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the company’s business at the relevant time.
  • Mere consultation with other Directors, as alleged in the complaints, is insufficient to attract vicarious liability under Section 141.
  • Because similar allegations against Vikram Prakash were held insufficient by the High Court, the same reasoning should apply to A.K. Singhania.

Complainant (Gujarat State Fertilizer Co. Ltd.)

  • The complaints do state that the accused Directors were in charge of and responsible for the company’s business and day-to-day affairs.
  • No particular form of words is necessary; the substance of the accusation brings the Directors within Section 141.
  • The High Court’s order quashing prosecution of Vikram Prakash is erroneous and should be set aside.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
S.M.S Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla (2005) 8 SCC 89 A complaint must specifically aver that the accused was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the company’s business at the time of the offence. Relied upon to hold that absence of such averment is fatal to the prosecution of Directors.
National Small Industries Corpn. Ltd. v. Harmeet Singh Paintal (2010) 3 SCC 330 Summarised principles on vicarious liability of Directors under Section 141. Applied to reaffirm that liability cannot be presumed and must be specifically pleaded.
N. Rangachari v. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. (2007) 5 SCC 108 Clarified scope of liability under Section 141. Cited as part of the chain of authorities confirming the need for specific averments.
K.K. Ahuja v. V.K. Vora (2009) 10 SCC 48 Further discussion on when Directors can be prosecuted under Section 138/141. Referred to in support of the requirement of pleading managerial responsibility.
Harshendra Kumar D. v. Rebatilata Koley (2011) 3 SCC 351 Reiterated that Directors not in charge of the company at the relevant time cannot be prosecuted. Used to buttress the conclusion that the complaints lacked necessary averments.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. The Court examined the exact language of the complaints. It found that the pleadings state that Accused 1–5 managed the company’s affairs and that other Directors, including the two respondents, were merely consulted.

2. Consultation, without more, does not satisfy Section 141, which mandates that the accused must be “in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company.”

3. Relying on S.M.S Pharmaceuticals and subsequent authorities, the Court reiterated that a specific averment of such responsibility is an essential ingredient. Vicarious liability cannot be inferred merely from the fact of directorship.

4. Applying these principles, the Court held that the complaints lacked the requisite averment; therefore, the continuation of prosecution against A.K. Singhania and Vikram Prakash was impermissible.

5. Consequently, the High Court’s order quashing Vikram Prakash’s prosecution required no interference, while its refusal to quash proceedings against A.K. Singhania had to be set aside.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Supreme Court dismissed the complainant’s appeals and allowed A.K. Singhania’s appeals, thereby quashing the prosecution of both A.K. Singhania and Vikram Prakash in all pending complaints.

Implications: The decision reaffirms that, under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, a complaint must contain a clear averment that a Director was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the company’s business at the relevant time; absence of such an averment is fatal. The judgment applies established precedent and does not create new legal doctrine, but it underscores the rigorous pleading standard necessary to sustain prosecutions against company Directors.

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    A.K Singhania v. Gujarat State Fertilizer Company Limited And Another

    Chandramauli Kr. Prasad, J.— In all these special leave petitions common question of law and facts arises and, therefore, they have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. Leave granted.

    2. In all these cases we are concerned with accused A.K Singhania and Vikram Prakash. Several complaints were filed by Gujarat State Fertilizer Co. against Esslon Synthetics Ltd., its Chairman, Managing Director and other Directors including the aforesaid A.K Singhania and Vikram Prakash alleging commission of an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”).

    3. In Complaint Case No. 331 of 1996 the allegations which are relevant for the decision of these appeals read as follows:

    “3. Accused 14 is a limited company registered under the Companies Act, 1956 and are doing business of chemicals, synthetics, etc. Accused 1 is Managing Director of the accused Company 14 and Accused 2 is Deputy Managing Director, Accused 3 is Chairman, Accused 4 is whole-time Director, Accused 5 is Finance Director, Accused 6 to 12 are the Directors and Accused 13 was Senior Manager (Finance) of the accused Company 14 Esslon Synthetics Ltd.
    4. All the business and financial affairs of the accused Company 14 are decided, organised and administered by Accused 1 being Managing Director and Accused 2 being Deputy Managing Director, Accused 3 Chairman, Accused 4 whole-time Director, Accused 5 Finance Director with consultation of other Directors from Accused 6 to 12 and Accused 13 was Senior Manager (Finance) of the accused Company 14. So Accused 1 to 12 and Accused 13 are also responsible for all the transactions and business affairs done on behalf of the accused Company 14 and are responsible for all the financial affairs and administration of the accused Company 14.”

    A.K Singhania is Accused 7 and Vikram Prakash is Accused 9 in this complaint.

    4. In Complaint Case No. 1293 of 1996, the allegations with which we are concerned in these appeals read as follows:

    “4. All the business and financial affairs of the accused Company 1 are decided, organised and administered by Accused 2 being Managing Director and Accused 3 being Managing Director, Accused 4 Chairman, Accused 5 whole-time Director, Accused 6 Finance Director with consultation of other Directors from Accused 7 to 13 and Accused 14 was Senior Manager (Finance) of Accused 1. At the time the offence was committed, they were in charge of and were responsible to the Company for the conduct of the business of the accused Company. Therefore, they are responsible for day-to-day affairs and all the transactions and business done on behalf of the accused Company 1 and they are also responsible for all the financial affairs and administration of the accused Company 1.”

    A.K Singhania and Vikram Prakash have been arrayed as Accused 8 and 10 in this complaint and in all other complaints, the allegations against A.K Singhania are identical to what have been alleged in Complaint Case No. 331 of 1996.

    5. Taking into account the allegations made in the respective complaints, the learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offence, issued process to the accused aforesaid besides other accused to face trial for commission of the offence under Section 138 of the Act.

    6. Vikram Prakash, aggrieved by the order issuing summons to face trial under Section 138 of the Act in different complaints, filed applications under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the order taking cognizance and issuing process. The applications filed by said Vikram Prakash were registered as Criminal Miscellaneous Applications Nos. 13393-99 of 2007. The High Court by its common order dated 20-1-2012 allowed all the applications and quashed his prosecution. While doing so, the High Court held as follows:

    “7. … It is to be noted that as such there are general allegations and averments against the applicant in the complaints, however there are no specific allegations and averments in the complaint against the applicant with respect to transaction for which the cheques were issued by Accused 14 Company. Under the circumstance, on the ground that the applicant was non-executive Director of the Company on the Board of the Company, which is not disputed by the complainant, the applicant cannot be prosecuted for the offence under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and cannot be held vicariously liable for the offence alleged to have been committed by Accused 14 Company. Under the circumstance, this Court is of opinion that this is a fit case to exercise the powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and to quash and set aside the impugned complaint/criminal case qua applicant original Accused 9….”

    It is this common order which has been assailed by Gujarat State Fertilizer Co. Ltd. in the special leave petitions filed by it.

    7. A.K Singhania also, aggrieved by the order issuing process under Section 138 of the Act, filed separate applications for quashing the entire prosecution including the aforesaid order under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. All the applications filed by A.K Singhania were taken together by the High Court for consideration and by the impugned order the applications filed by him have been dismissed. While doing so, the High Court observed as follows:

    “9. As the paragraphs of the complaint reproduced in the earlier part of the decision specifically Para 4 and subsequent paragraphs would reveal that the applicant in the capacity of Director was responsible for business affairs and he was in charge of the Company. Not only that but nowhere can it be said that the applicant was non-executive Director and even if it is so the said argument is in realm of defence to be decided by the Court trying the case under the Negotiable Instruments Act. Since sufficient averments attracting Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act are the foundation of the complaint and it is further averred that cheques were issued with mischievous, dishonest intention, knowingly and willingly to cheat the complainant Company. Arguments canvassed by the learned advocate for the applicant do not require any further deliberation in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code since quashing the complaint would not secure end of justice but would result into miscarriage of justice….”

    A.K Singhania, aggrieved by the aforesaid common order, has preferred these special leave petitions. Leave granted.

    8. We have heard Mr Ranjit Kumar, learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the accused A.K Singhania and Mr Ashok Kumar Srivastava, learned Senior Counsel on behalf of Vikram Prakash whereas the complainant, Gujarat State Fertilizer Co. Ltd. is represented by Mr Jayant Bhushan, learned Senior Counsel.

    9. Mr Ranjit Kumar appearing on behalf of the accused submits that necessary averments that at the time the offence was committed, the accused were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the Company have not been averred, which is sine qua non for proceeding against the Directors of the company. He has drawn our attention to the averments made in the complaints, which we have reproduced in the preceding paragraphs of this judgment and submits that mere assertion that these accused persons were the Directors of the Company is not sufficient to make them liable under Section 141 of the Act.

    10. Mr Jayant Bhushan, however, submits that there is clear averment in the complaint that these accused persons were the Directors of the Company and, in fact, in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the Company and, hence, they were rightly summoned to face the trial. He points out that the judgment and order of the High Court quashing the prosecution of accused Vikram Prakash is under challenge in this batch of appeals and accused A.K Singhania cannot take benefit of the said order and the fate of both the accused shall depend upon the decision in all these appeals. Mr Ranjit Kumar submits that on same set of facts when the prosecution of the accused Vikram Prakash has been quashed, there does not seem any justification to decline the prayer of the accused A.K Singhania.

    11. In view of the rival submissions, we proceed to consider the exact allegations made against the accused A.K Singhania and accused Vikram Prakash. It is not in dispute that allegations against both the accused in different complaints are one and the same:

    11.1 In Complaint Case No. 331 of 1996, the allegation is that “all business and financial affairs of the accused Company are decided, organised and administered by Accused 1 to 5”. It has further been alleged that Accused 1 to 5 do so with consultation of other Directors, namely, Accused 6 to 12. In view of the aforesaid, according to the complainant, Accused 1 to 13 are also responsible for all the transactions and business affairs, financial affairs and administration done on behalf of the accused Company. It is relevant here to state that A.K Singhania and Vikram Prakash are Accused 7 and 9 in this complaint. The averments made in the complaint nowhere suggest that these two accused, at the time the offence was committed, were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the Company. According to the complainant itself, it was Accused 1 to 5 who were taking decisions and the allegation that in taking the decisions they used to consult these accused also will not mean that these two accused were at the time the offence was committed, in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the Company.

    11.2 In Complaint Case No. 1293 of 1996 and all other complaints with which we are concerned in the present appeals the allegation is that “all business and financial affairs of the accused Company 1, are decided, organised, administered by Accused 2 to 6 and in consultation of other Directors i.e from Accused 7 to 13”. It has further been averred that at the time the offence was committed “they were in charge of and responsible to the Company for the conduct of the business” and, therefore, “they are responsible for day-to-day affairs and transaction, business and all financial affairs of the accused Company”.

    11.3 Mr Ranjit Kumar submits that the aforesaid averments are not sufficient and from that it cannot be inferred that accused A.K Singhania and accused Vikram Prakash have been alleged to be in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the Company at the time the offence was committed. He points out that A.K Singhania is Accused 8 whereas accused Vikram Prakash is Accused 10 in these complaints. Mr Jayant Bhushan, however, joins issue and submits that the substance of the accusation clearly indicates that the two accused were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the Company at the time of the offence.

    12. We have perused the complaints and, in fact, the relevant portions of the allegations have been reproduced in the foregoing paragraphs of the judgment. From that it is difficult to infer that there is any averment that these two accused were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the Company at the time the offence was committed. The allegations in the complaints in sum and substance mean that business and financial affairs of the Company used to be decided, organised and administered by Accused 2 to 6 and while doing so, other Directors including the two accused herein were consulted. The inference drawn by the complainant on that basis that these two accused, therefore, are in charge of and responsible to the Company for the conduct of its business, is absolutely misconceived. We are, therefore, of the opinion that essential averment in the complaints is lacking.

    13. In case of offence by a company for dishonour of cheque, the culpability of the Directors has to be decided with reference to Section 141 of the Act, same reads as follows:

    “141. Offences by companies.—(1) If the person committing an offence under Section 138 is a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly:
    Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any person liable to punishment if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge, or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence:
    Provided further that where a person is nominated as a Director of a company by virtue of his holding any office or employment in the Central Government or State Government or a financial corporation owned or controlled by the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, he shall not be liable for prosecution under this Chapter.
    (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where any offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to, any neglect on the part of, any Director, Manager, Secretary or other officer of the company, such Director, Manager, Secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.
    Explanation.—For the purposes of this section—
    (a) ‘company’ means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals; and
    (b) ‘director’, in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm.”

    14. From a plain reading of the aforesaid provision it is evident that every person who at the time the offence was committed was in charge of and responsible to the company shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence under Section 138 of the Act. In the face of it, will it be necessary to specifically state in the complaint that the person accused was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company? In our opinion, in the case of offence by the company, to bring its Directors within the mischief of Section 138 of the Act, it shall be necessary to allege that they were in charge of and responsible to the conduct of the business of the company. It is a necessary ingredient which would be sufficient to proceed against such Directors. However, we may add that as no particular form is prescribed, it may not be necessary to reproduce the words of the section. If reading of the complaint shows and the substance of accusation discloses necessary averments, that would be sufficient to proceed against such of the Directors and no particular form is necessary. However, it may not be necessary to allege and prove that, in fact, such of the Directors have any specific role in respect of the transaction leading to issuance of cheque. Section 141 of the Act makes the Directors in charge of and responsible to the company “for the conduct of the business of the company” within the mischief of Section 138 of the Act and not particular business for which the cheque was issued. We cannot read more than what has been mandated in Section 141 of the Act.

    15. A large number of authorities of this Court have been cited by the counsel representing the party to bring home their point. We deem it inexpedient to refer to all of them. Suffice it to say that this question has been answered eloquently by a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in S.M.S Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla (2005) 8 SCC 89, in the following words:

    “19. In view of the above discussion, our answers to the questions posed in the reference are as under:
    (a) It is necessary to specifically aver in a complaint under Section 141 that at the time the offence was committed, the person accused was in charge of, and responsible for the conduct of business of the company. This averment is an essential requirement of Section 141 and has to be made in a complaint. Without this averment being made in a complaint, the requirements of Section 141 cannot be said to be satisfied.”

    16. This Court in National Small Industries Corpn. Ltd. v. Harmeet Singh Paintal (2010) 3 SCC 330, after reviewing all its earlier judgments summarised the legal position as follows:

    “39. From the above discussion, the following principles emerge:
    (i) The primary responsibility is on the complainant to make specific averments as are required under the law in the complaint so as to make the accused vicariously liable. For fastening the criminal liability, there is no presumption that every Director knows about the transaction.
    (ii) Section 141 does not make all the Directors liable for the offence. The criminal liability can be fastened only on those who, at the time of the commission of the offence, were in charge of and were responsible for the conduct of the business of the company.
    (iii) Vicarious liability can be inferred against a company registered or incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 only if the requisite statements, which are required to be averred in the complaint/petition, are made so as to make the accused therein vicariously liable for offence committed by the company along with averments in the petition containing that the accused were in charge of and responsible for the business of the company and by virtue of their position they are liable to be proceeded with.
    (iv) Vicarious liability on the part of a person must be pleaded and proved and not inferred.
    (v) If the accused is a Managing Director or a Joint Managing Director then it is not necessary to make specific averment in the complaint and by virtue of their position they are liable to be proceeded with.
    (vi) If the accused is a Director or an officer of a company who signed the cheques on behalf of the company then also it is not necessary to make specific averment in the complaint.
    (vii) The person sought to be made liable should be in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time. This has to be averred as a fact as there is no deemed liability of a Director in such cases.”

    17. In Harshendra Kumar D. v. Rebatilata Koley (2011) 3 SCC 351, after referring to its earlier decisions in S.M.S Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (2005) 8 SCC 89, National Small Industries Corpn. Ltd. (2010) 3 SCC 330, N. Rangachari v. BSNL (2007) 5 SCC 108 and K.K Ahuja v. V.K Vora (2009) 10 SCC 48, this Court reiterated the same view.

    18. We have found on fact that there is no averment that the two accused herein were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the Company at the time the offence was committed. Hence, there is no essential averment in the complaints. In view of what we have observed above, the prosecution of accused A.K Singhania and accused Vikram Prakash cannot be allowed to continue. Accordingly, the order of the High Court quashing the prosecution of the accused Vikram Prakash is not fit to be interfered with. For the same reason the order passed by the High Court declining the prayer of A.K Singhania for quashing of the prosecution cannot be sustained and the appeals preferred by him deserve to be allowed.

    19. In the result, we dismiss the appeals preferred by the complainant Gujarat State Fertilizers Co. Ltd. and allow the appeals preferred by A.K Singhania and quash his prosecution in all these cases.

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    A.K Singhania v. Gujarat State Fertilizer Company Limited And Another
    (Oct 17, 2013)