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Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
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Acts
  • Article 136 of the Constitution
  • Section 15-Z of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) Act, 1992
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Article 136 of the Constitution
  • Section 15-Z of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) Act, 1992
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners (Khoday Distilleries Ltd.) filed the present Special Leave Petition (SLP) challenging the order dated 09-09-2011 of the High Court of Karnataka in Review Petition No. 96 of 2011 (arising out of RFA No. 427 of 2006). The High Court had dismissed the review petition. Earlier:

  • On 12-11-2008 the High Court delivered its judgment in RFA No. 427 of 2006.
  • The petitioners filed an SLP (C) CC No. 18374 of 2009 against that judgment. On 04-12-2009 this Court condoned delay but dismissed the SLP the same day by a non-speaking order.
  • Subsequently, the petitioners instituted Review Petition No. 96 of 2011 before the High Court, which was dismissed on 09-09-2011 (impugned order).
  • Notice in the present SLP was issued on 20-01-2012; the respondent entered appearance and filed a detailed counter-affidavit raising a preliminary objection to maintainability.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a review petition lies before the High Court after the Supreme Court has dismissed an earlier SLP against the same High Court judgment, particularly when that dismissal is by a non-speaking (or speaking) order.
  2. How the doctrines of merger and res judicata apply where the Supreme Court exercises its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution as opposed to a statutory right of appeal.
  3. Whether conflicting views in prior Supreme Court decisions (notably Abbai Maligai, Kunhayammed, K. Rajamouli, and Gangadhara Palo) require resolution by a larger Bench.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's Arguments

  • The earlier SLP was dismissed by this Court on 04-12-2009; therefore, the High Court judgment merged with the Supreme Court’s order, leaving nothing to review.
  • Relied on Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm v. K. Santhakumaran (1998) 7 SCC 386, which holds that once this Court confirms the High Court decree by dismissing an SLP, a review petition before the High Court is not maintainable.

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The dismissal of the earlier SLP was by a non-speaking order at the admission stage; such dismissal does not attract res judicata nor cause merger.
  • Cited Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala (2000) 6 SCC 359, where this Court held that a non-speaking dismissal of an SLP does not bar a review before the High Court.
  • Contended that the High Court committed an error in refusing to entertain the review petition.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm v. K. Santhakumaran (1998) 7 SCC 386 Dismissing an SLP confirms the High Court decree; a subsequent review is impermissible. Relied on by respondent; Court noted it represents one line of authority causing conflict.
Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala (2000) 6 SCC 359 Non-speaking dismissal of SLP does not create res judicata or merger; review remains open. Relied on by petitioners; Court observed this as the contrary line of authority.
Meghmala v. G. Narasimha Reddy (2010) 8 SCC 383 If review is filed after SLP dismissal, it is an abuse of process; if filed earlier, it may be considered. Cited to illustrate existing crystallisation yet continuing divergence.
Palani Roman Catholic Mission v. S. Bagirathi Ammal (2009) 16 SCC 657 Review can be preferred where no leave has been granted; until then, no appeal exists in law. Shown as another decision favouring review when leave is refused.
Bhakra Beas Management Board v. Krishan Kumar Vij (2010) 8 SCC 701 Dismissal of an SLP at preliminary stage is not a binding precedent. Cited to underscore non-finality of non-speaking dismissals.
K. Rajamouli v. A.V.K.N. Swamy (2001) 5 SCC 37 Review filed before SLP is maintainable; after SLP dismissal may be abuse of process. Noted as following Kunhayammed and distinguishing Abbai Maligai.
Gangadhara Palo v. Revenue Divisional Officer (2011) 4 SCC 602 Even a brief, reasoned dismissal of SLP causes merger; timing of review petition immaterial. Illustrates conflicting view with K. Rajamouli; precipitates need for larger Bench.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court observed a recurring practice wherein parties, after their SLPs are dismissed, pursue review petitions in the High Courts and subsequently return to the Supreme Court. It scrutinised the two principal lines of authority—Abbai Maligai and Kunhayammed—and noted that subsequent decisions such as K. Rajamouli and Gangadhara Palo have taken conflicting positions on:

  • whether dismissal of an SLP (speaking or non-speaking) results in merger of the High Court judgment into the Supreme Court order, and
  • the consequent maintainability of a review petition in the High Court.

The Court further highlighted that Article 136 is a discretionary, extraordinary jurisdiction distinct from statutory appeals, raising questions about the applicability of res judicata and merger principles when the Court acts under Article 136 versus when it hears statutory appeals. Finding that these conflicts create uncertainty and generate substantial litigation, the Bench concluded that an authoritative pronouncement by a larger Bench is necessary.

Holding and Implications

ORDER OF REFERENCE: The matter is referred to a larger Bench of the Supreme Court for an authoritative resolution of the conflicting precedents on the maintainability of review petitions after dismissal of SLPs.

INTERIM DIRECTION: The petitioner is directed to pay Rs 1 crore to the respondent within six weeks; realisation of the remaining disputed amount is stayed until final disposal.

Implications: No final ruling on the substantive issue is rendered. The reference aims to settle divergent interpretations of the doctrines of merger and res judicata, which will guide High Courts and litigants nationwide once the larger Bench decides. The interim order affords partial monetary relief but sets no new precedent.

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    Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Mahadeswara S.S.K. Ltd.

    Order

    1. This special leave petition has been filed against the order of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore dated 9-9-2011 in Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Sri Mahadeswara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Ltd. Review Petition No. 96 of 2011 in RFA No. 427 of 2006 On 20-1-2012, notice was issued on the special leave petition as well as on the prayer of interim relief. The respondent entered appearance and filed a detailed counter-affidavit and raised a preliminary objection about the maintainability of the special leave petition.

    2. Shri Rajesh Mahale, learned counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that the petitioner had earlier challenged the judgment and order dated 12-11-2008 in Sri Mahadeswara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Ltd. v. Khoday Distilleries Ltd. RFA No. 427 of 2006 before this Court. The same came up for hearing before this Court on 4-12-2009 and the respondent entered appearance and opposed the petition. This Court, while condoning the delay in filing SLP, dismissed SLP (C) CC No. 18374 of 2009 the SLP on the same day. Later the petitioners filed Review Petition No. 96 of 2011 for reviewing the judgment dated 12-11-2008 in Sri Mahadeswara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Ltd. v. Khoday Distilleries Ltd. RFA No. 427 of 2006 before the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore. The review petition was dismissed by the High Court by the impugned order dated 9-9-2011 Review Petition No. 96 of 2011 in RFA No. 427 of 2006. The learned counsel placed considerable reliance on the three-Judge Bench judgment of this Court in Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm v. K. Santhakumaran (1998) 7 SCC 386 and contended that that decision would squarely apply to the facts of this case and the High Court has rightly dismissed the review petition by holding that when the judgment and decree passed by the High Court was confirmed by the Supreme Court by dismissing the SLP, there was no question of entertaining the review petition.

    3. Mr Gopal Jain, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that the High Court has committed an error in dismissing the review petition since the earlier SLP was dismissed by this Court on 4-12-2009 SLP (C) CC No. 18374 of 2009 without stating any reason. Reliance was placed on a three-Judge Bench judgment of this Court in Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala (2000) 6 SCC 359. The learned counsel pointed out that since the SLP was dismissed at the admission stage by a non-speaking order, it would not constitute res judicata and does not culminate in merger of the impugned judgment Review Petition No. 96 of 2011 in RFA No. 427 of 2006 and the High Court has committed a grave error in dismissing the review petition.

    4. We notice that a large number of review petitions are being filed by the parties even after dismissal of the SLPs by this Court, either by non-speaking orders or on merits, and depending upon the outcome of the review petitions, again SLPs are being filed before this Court and both sides place reliance on the reasoning of the three-Judge Bench judgment in Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm (1998) 7 SCC 386 or Kunhayammed (2000) 6 SCC 359, in respect of their rival contentions on maintainability.

    5. We notice that applying the ratio of the judgments in Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm (1998) 7 SCC 386 or Kunhayammed (2000) 6 SCC 359 conflicting views are being expressed in a few of the subsequent judgments of this Court.

    6. In Meghmala v. G. Narasimha Reddy (2010) 8 SCC 383 this Court after referring to Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm (1998) 7 SCC 386 and Kunhayammed (2000) 6 SCC 359 expressed the following view: (Meghmala case (2010) 8 SCC 383)

    “25. Thus, the law on the issue stands crystallised to the effect that in case a litigant files a review petition before filing the special leave petition before this Court and it remains pending till the special leave petition stands dismissed, the review petition deserves to be considered. In case it is filed subsequent to dismissal of the special leave petition, the process of filing review application amounts to abuse of process of the court.
    26. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that filing of such a review application by the respondents at a belated stage amounts to abuse of process of the court and such an application is not maintainable. Thus, the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petition against the order of dismissal of the review application by the Special Court and the order of the High Court to that extent is liable to be set aside.”

    7. In Palani Roman Catholic Mission v. S. Bagirathi Ammal (2009) 16 SCC 657 this Court has taken the view that review petition can be filed if no leave has been granted to file an appeal and until there is no appeal in the eye of the law in the superior court, review can be preferred in the High Court under Order 47 Rule 1. This Court, in that case, set aside the judgment of the High Court and directed the High Court to consider the review petition in accordance with law.

    8. Again in Bhakra Beas Management Board v. Krishan Kumar Vij (2010) 8 SCC 701 this Court held that:

    “19. … the mere dismissal of a special leave petition at a preliminary stage does not constitute a binding precedent, and accordingly, any order passed by the High Court placing reliance on earlier order, can still be challenged subsequently.”

    9. In K. Rajamouli v. A.V.K.N Swamy (2001) 5 SCC 37 following the judgment in Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm (1998) 7 SCC 386 and Kunhayammed (2000) 6 SCC 359 this Court further explained the principle of res judicata and held as follows: (K. Rajamouli case (2001) 5 SCC 37)

    “4. Following the decision in Kunhayammed (2000) 6 SCC 359 we are of the view that the dismissal of the special leave petition against the main judgment of the High Court would not constitute res judicata when a special leave petition is filed against the order passed in the review petition provided the review petition was filed prior to filing of special leave petition against the main judgment of the High Court. The position would be different where after dismissal of the special leave petition against the main judgment a party files a review petition after a long delay on the ground that the party was prosecuting remedy by way of special leave petition. In such a situation the filing of review would be an abuse of the process of the law. We are in agreement with the view taken in Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm (1998) 7 SCC 386 that if the High Court allows the review petition filed after the special leave petition was dismissed after condoning the delay, it would be treated as an affront to the order of the Supreme Court. But this is not the case here. In the present case, the review petition was filed well within time and since the review petition was not being decided by the High Court, the appellant filed the special leave petition against the main judgment of the High Court. We, therefore, overrule the preliminary objection of the counsel for the respondent and hold that this appeal arising out of special leave petition is maintainable.”

    10. A different note was struck by this Court in Gangadhara Palo v. Revenue Divisional Officer (2011) 4 SCC 602 and after referring to the judgment in K. Rajamouli (2001) 5 SCC 37 it was held as follows: (Gangadhara case (2011) 4 SCC 602)

    “5. We regret, we cannot agree. In our opinion, it will make no difference whether the review petition was filed in the High Court before the dismissal of the special leave petition or after the dismissal of the special leave petition. The important question really is whether the judgment of the High Court has merged into the judgment of this Court by the doctrine of merger or not.
    6. When this Court dismisses a special leave petition by giving some reasons, however meagre (it can be even of just one sentence), there will be a merger of the judgment of the High Court into the order of the Supreme Court dismissing the special leave petition. According to the doctrine of merger, the judgment of the lower court merges into the judgment of the higher court. Hence, if some reasons, however meagre, are given by this Court while dismissing the special leave petition, then by the doctrine of merger, the judgment of the High Court merges into the judgment of this Court and after merger there is no judgment of the High Court. Hence, obviously, there can be no review of a judgment which does not even exist.”

    11. We notice that in K. Rajamouli (2001) 5 SCC 37 this Court has followed Kunhayammed (2000) 6 SCC 359 and distinguished Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm (1998) 7 SCC 386 and in Gangadhara Palo (2011) 4 SCC 602 the later Bench did not accept the view expressed in K. Rajamouli (2001) 5 SCC 37. To this extent, there is some conflict between the judgments in Gangadhara Palo (2011) 4 SCC 602 and K. Rajamouli (2001) 5 SCC 37 which calls for resolution by a larger Bench.

    12. We may also point out in this connection that Article 136 of the Constitution does not confer any right of appeal on any party but it confers a discretionary power on the Supreme Court to interfere in suitable cases. Clause (1) of Article 136 of the Constitution confers very wide and extensive powers on the Supreme Court. The article commences with a non obstante clause, the words are of overriding effect and clearly indicate the intention of the Framers of the Constitution that it is a special jurisdiction and residuary power unfettered by any statute or other provisions of Chapter IV of Part V of the Constitution. The jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution, of course, cannot be barred by statute since it is extraordinary power under Article 136. Article 136 is an extraordinary power which cannot be taken away by legislation.

    13. We also notice that several statutes confer on aggrieved parties right of appeal to the Supreme Court in contradistinction with the powers conferred on the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution, for instance, Section 15-Z of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) Act, 1992 confers a right of appeal to any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Securities Appellate Tribunal. So also various regulatory legislations provide for statutory right of appeal. To what extent the principle of res judicata and merger would apply in respect of a decision rendered by this Court while exercising its statutory power of appeal as well as the one rendered while entertaining an appeal invoking Article 136 is not seen considered by the larger Bench either in Abbai Maligai (1998) 7 SCC 386 or Kunhayammed (2000) 6 SCC 359 case, which is also, in our view, an issue to be considered by the larger Bench.

    14. We notice that considerable arguments are being raised before this Court as well as before various High Courts in the country on the maintainability of review petitions after the disposal of the special leave petition without granting leave but with or without assigning reasons on which also conflicting views are being expressed by the two-Judge Benches of this Court. In order to resolve those conflicts and for proper guidance to the High Courts, we feel it would be appropriate that this matter be referred to a larger Bench for an authoritative pronouncement.

    Order in SLP (C) No. 490 of 2012

    15. The counsel for the petitioner pressed for an interim stay of the judgment of the High Court. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that he has paid the entire amount and the dispute is only with regard to the interest portion which roughly would come to Rs 1.62 crores. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case we are inclined to give a direction to the petitioner to pay Rs 1 crore to the respondent within a period of six weeks from today. There will be stay of realisation of balance amount till the issue is decided finally.

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    Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Mahadeswara S.S.K. Ltd.
    (Oct 19, 2012)