A.K Ganguly, J.— Leave granted. Assailing the judgment of the High Court dated 5-2-2009 rendered in Criminal Revision No. 552 of 2000 this appeal was filed. The main contention of the appellants before this Court is that without any colour of right the respondent herein repeatedly filed complaints on same facts and the High Court without proper appreciation of the facts and the legal position allowed the revision petition of the respondent and caused a grave failure of justice.
2. The material facts are that a complaint was filed by the respondent in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nuh on or about 10-6-1992 alleging therein that the appellants who own and possess their own house at Faridabad came into contact with the respondent and ultimately won the confidence of the respondent. In the complaint it was alleged that the respondent is an illiterate, innocent person with a poor village background and he was induced to purchase some land at Village Mohammedpur for and on behalf of the appellants. Thus, the respondent entered into an agreement to sell different plots of land of about 60 acres at Mohammedpur Village.
3. The said complaint further alleges that various sale deeds were executed and registered and the respondent was given the impression that those deeds were registered in the names of the appellants and the respondent jointly. It is further alleged that the respondent was asked to put his thumb impression on the sale deeds and he was further assured that the land situated in Village Mohammedpur, Nuh will be transferred in the joint names of the appellants and the respondent.
4. According to the complaint, fraud was thus played on the respondent by the appellants and when the respondent realised the same he allegedly filed a complaint in Chittaranjan Park Police Station on 28-6-1991 but that police station failed to take any action inter alia on the ground that the entire thing took place beyond their territorial jurisdiction.
5. The further case in the complaint is that the respondent wanted to file a complaint before the local police station but as the police failed to take any step, the complaint was filed before the Magistrate complaining of offences under Sections 420/120-B/426 IPC. On such complaint the matter was taken up by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nuh and ultimately after a detailed analysis of factual and legal position, the Judicial Magistrate, First Class came to a conclusion on 13-1-1994 to the following effect:
“Thus the whole story of the complainant is a bundle of falsehood and is liable to be discarded forthwith without going further in the investigation of the allegations. Hence the complaint is dismissed under Section 420 IPC also qua Accused 1. Record be consigned.”
6. Challenging the order of the Magistrate, a revision petition was filed in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana by the respondent. The said revision petition was also dismissed by order dated 12-2-1996 and while dismissing the petition the High Court recorded the following finding:
“Having gone through the judgment of the trial court and hearing the counsel for the parties, I am of the view that the case is not for interference. Dismissed.”
7. The High Court's finding was not challenged and attained finality. It may be noted that the respondent also filed a civil suit on inter alia the same allegations. The said civil suit was numbered as 599 of 1992 and was dismissed for default by the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Nuh. The said order of dismissal of the suit became final since no attempt was made to challenge the same.
8. In the meantime, the appellants filed several suits some of which were filed by several companies against the respondent for permanent injunction and other relief. These suits were numbered as follows:
“(i) Suit No. 241 of 1989 filed by SPML India Ltd. v. Fazru.
(ii) Suit No. 242 of 1989 dated 28-11-1989 titled SPML India Ltd. v. Fazru.
(iii) Suit No. 243 of 1989 dated 21-11-1989 titled Poonam Chand Sethi v. Fazru.
(iv) Suit No. 244 of 1989 titled M/s SPML India Ltd. v. Fazru.”
9. All the suits which were filed against the respondent were clubbed as common questions were involved and there was an analogous hearing. All the four suits succeeded with costs and the defendants including the respondents were prevented from dispossessing the plaintiffs over the suit land except in the process established by law. Before passing the final decree the civil court came to the following finding:
“23. From the oral as well as documentary evidence led by the plaintiffs, it is proved that the plaintiffs have purchased the suit land from its original owners and Usman, Hanif and Abdul Rahim are in cultivating possession of the suit land as a lessee. Defendant 1 has himself admitted that he is not in possession of the suit land. Defendant 2 has already admitted the claim of the plaintiffs. Therefore, it is concluded that the plaintiffs are entitled to the decree of permanent injunction as prayed for. Hence, this issue is decided in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants.”
The aforesaid decree passed on 27-10-1997 was not challenged by the respondent and therefore became final.
10. After the civil suits were decreed on 27-10-1997, just a month thereafter on 25-11-1997 another complaint was filed by the respondent in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate on virtually the same facts. In fact, Paras 4, 6, 7 and 9 of the subsequent complaint has a striking similarity with the previous one. It may be mentioned that in the second complaint the fact of filing of the first complaint and its dismissal was totally suppressed. On such complaint the Magistrate passed an order summoning Appellants 1 and 2.
11. Challenging the said order of summoning the appellants, the appellants moved a criminal revision before the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Gurgaon and the Additional Sessions Judge, Gurgaon allowed the revision and the summoning order was set aside by an order dated 9-7-1999. Against that order the respondent moved a criminal revision being Criminal Revision No. 552 of 2000 before the High Court and the Hon'ble High Court reversed the order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge and directed the appellants to appear before the trial court where the appellants were given liberty to raise all the points and seek reconsideration of the order in accordance with Section 245 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
12. Against that order the appellants filed a special leave petition before this Court wherein leave was granted and it was numbered as Criminal Appeal No. 371 of 2004. In the said criminal appeal this Court remanded the matter to the High Court for recording positive findings on relevant issues. This Court while remanding the matter was of the opinion that the High Court has not considered the legality of the order directing issuance of summon keeping in view the law laid down by this Court. The exact directions given by this Court in its concluding portion vide order dated 15-10-2004 in the aforesaid criminal appeal is as follows:
“As the High Court has not considered the legality of the order directing issuance of process keeping in view the law laid down by this Court, we feel it would be proper to remit the matter to the High Court to record positive findings on the relevant issues.”
13. After the matter was remanded to the High Court, the High Court passed the impugned judgment holding therein that the Magistrate's order dated 9-1-1999 whereby the appellants have been summoned is restored and the appellants were asked to face trial.
14*. In the background of these facts, the question which crops up for determination by this Court is whether after an order of dismissal of complaint attained finality, the complainant can file another complaint on almost identical facts without disclosing in the second complaint the fact of either filing of the first complaint or its dismissal.
15. Almost similar questions came up for consideration before this Court in Pramatha Nath Talukdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar AIR 1962 SC 876, (1962) 1 Cri LJ 770. The majority judgment in Pramatha Nath AIR 1962 SC 876, (1962) 1 Cri LJ 770 was delivered by Kapur, J. His Lordship held that an order of dismissal under Section 203 of the Criminal Procedure Code (for short “the Code”) is, however, no bar to the entertainment of a second complaint on the same facts but it can be entertained only in exceptional circumstances. This Court explained the exceptional circumstances as:
(a) where the previous order was passed on incomplete record, or
(b) on a misunderstanding of the nature of the complaint, or
(c) the order which was passed was manifestly absurd, unjust or foolish, or
(d) where new facts which could not, with reasonable diligence, have been brought on the record in the previous proceedings.
16. This Court in Pramatha Nath AIR 1962 SC 876, (1962) 1 Cri LJ 770 made it very clear that interest of justice cannot permit that after a decision has been given on a complaint upon full consideration of the case, the complainant should be given another opportunity to have the complaint enquired into again. In para 50 of the judgment the majority judgment of this Court opined that fresh evidence or fresh facts must be such which could not with reasonable diligence have been brought on record. This Court very clearly held that it cannot be settled law which permits the complainant to place some evidence before the Magistrate which are in his possession and then if the complaint is dismissed adduce some more evidence. According to this Court, such a course is not permitted on a correct view of the law. (para 50, p. 899)
17**. This question again came up for consideration before this Court in Jatinder Singh v. Ranjit Kaur (2001) 2 SCC 570, AIR 2001 SC 784. There also this Court by relying on the principle in Pramatha Nath AIR 1962 SC 876, (1962) 1 Cri LJ 770 held that there is no provision in the Code or in any other statute which debars a complainant from filing a second complaint on the same allegation as in the first complaint. But this Court added when a Magistrate conducts an enquiry under Section 202 of the Code and dismisses a complaint on merits a second complaint on the same facts could not be made unless there are “exceptional circumstances”. This Court held in para 12, if the dismissal of the first complaint is not on merit but the dismissal is for the default of the complainant then there is no bar in filing a second complaint on the same facts. However, if the dismissal of the complaint under Section 203 of the Code was on merit the position will be different.
18. Saying so, the learned Judges in Ranjit Kaur (2001) 2 SCC 570, AIR 2001 SC 784 held that the controversy has been settled by this Court in Pramatha Nath AIR 1962 SC 876, (1962) 1 Cri LJ 770 and quoted the observation of Kapur, J. in para 48 of Pramatha Nath AIR 1962 SC 876, (1962) 1 Cri LJ 770: (AIR p. 899, para 48)
“48. … An order of dismissal under Section 203 of the Criminal Procedure Code, is, however, no bar to the entertainment of a second complaint on the same facts but it will be entertained only in exceptional circumstances e.g where the previous order was passed on an incomplete record or on a misunderstanding of the nature of the complaint or it was manifestly absurd, unjust or foolish or where new facts which could not, with reasonable diligence, have been brought on the record in the previous proceedings, have been adduced. It cannot be said to be in the interest of justice that after a decision has been given against the complainant upon a full consideration of his case, he or any other person should be given another opportunity to have his complaint enquired into.”
19. Again in Mahesh Chand v. B. Janardhan Reddy (2003) 1 SCC 734, a three-Judge Bench of this Court considered this question in para 19 at p. 740 of the Report. The learned Judges of this Court held that a second complaint is not completely barred nor is there any statutory bar in filing a second complaint on the same facts in a case where a previous complaint was dismissed without assigning any reason. The Magistrate under Section 204 of the Code can take cognizance of an offence and issue process if there is sufficient ground for proceeding. In Mahesh Chand (2003) 1 SCC 734 this Court relied on the ratio in Pramatha Nath AIR 1962 SC 876, (1962) 1 Cri LJ 770 and held if the first complaint had been dismissed the second complaint can be entertained only in exceptional circumstances and thereafter the exceptional circumstances pointed out in Pramatha Nath AIR 1962 SC 876, (1962) 1 Cri LJ 770 were reiterated. Therefore, this Court holds that the ratio in Pramatha Nath AIR 1962 SC 876, (1962) 1 Cri LJ 770 is still holding the field. The same principle has been reiterated once again by this Court in Hira Lal v. State of U.P (2009) 11 SCC 89, AIR 2009 SC 2380 In para 14 of the judgment this Court expressly quoted the ratio in Mahesh Chand (2003) 1 SCC 734 discussed hereinabove.
20***. Following the aforesaid principles which are more or less settled and are holding the field since 1962 and have been repeatedly followed by this Court, we are of the view that the second complaint in this case was on almost identical facts which was raised in the first complaint and which was dismissed on merits. So the second complaint is not maintainable. This Court finds that the core of both the complaints is the same. Nothing has been disclosed in the second complaint which is substantially new and not disclosed in first complaint. No case is made out that even after the exercise of due diligence the facts alleged in the second complaint were not within the of the first complainant. In fact, such a case could not be made out since the facts in both the complaints are almost identical. Therefore, the second complaint is not covered within exceptional circumstances explained in Pramatha Nath AIR 1962 SC 876, (1962) 1 Cri LJ 770. In that view of the matter the second complaint in the facts of this case, cannot be entertained.
21. Unfortunately, the High Court fell into an error in not appreciating the legal position in its correct perspective while allowing the revision petition of the respondent. The order passed by the High Court in revision jurisdiction cannot be sustained and is quashed.
22. This appeal succeeds. There shall be no order as to costs.