Dr. B.S Chauhan, J.— Leave granted. This appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 10-9-2007 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Civil Writ Petition No. 14014 of 2007, by which the High Court had dismissed the writ petition for quashing the award dated 3-1-2007 passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court II at Chandigarh (hereinafter called as “the Tribunal”), by which the Tribunal had upheld the dismissal of the appellant from service on the ground of conviction of the appellant in criminal case involving moral turpitude.
2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to the present case are that the appellant was appointed as a Peon in the respondent Bank, Kaithal Branch, on 1-12-1971 and stood confirmed on the said post vide order dated 28-12-1977. The appellant was handed over cash of Rs. 5000 to deposit the same as dues for the telephone bill in the Post Office. However, it was not deposited by the appellant, therefore, the Bank lodged FIR No. 171 under Section 409 of the Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter called “IPC”) against the appellant on 27-4-1982 in Police Station City Kaithal. The appellant was tried for the said offence. After the conclusion of trial, the appellant was convicted by the competent criminal court vide judgment and order dated 28-1-1988.
3. The respondent Bank issued a show-cause notice dated 1-3-1988 to the appellant proposing dismissal from service and asked the appellant to show cause within a period of seven days. The appellant submitted the reply dated 8-3-1988. However, the respondent Bank dismissed the appellant from service vide order dated 9-3-1988.
4. Being aggrieved, the appellant raised an industrial dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the matter was referred to the Tribunal. In the meanwhile, the appeal filed by the appellant against the order of conviction was decided by the appellate court vide judgment and order dated 29-5-1989. The appellate court maintained the conviction, but granted him the benefit of probation under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (hereinafter called as “the 1958 Act”) and released the appellant on probation. The Tribunal made the award dated 3-1-2007, rejecting the claim of the appellant and holding his dismissal from service to be justified and in accordance with law.
5. Being aggrieved, the appellant challenged the said award of the Tribunal by filing Writ Petition No. 14014 of 2007, before the High Court. His petition also stood dismissed vide impugned judgment and order dated 10-9-2007. Hence, this appeal.
6. Shri Pradeep Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, has submitted that once the appellant had been granted the benefit of the 1958 Act, the respondent Bank ought to have considered his case for reinstatement, as the benefit granted by the appellate court under the provisions of the 1958 Act, had taken away “disqualification” by virtue of Section 12 of the 1958 Act. The appeal deserves to be allowed and the judgment and order of the High Court as well as the award of the Tribunal are liable to be set aside.
7. Per contra, Shri Rajesh Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Bank, has vehemently opposed the appeal contending that grant of benefit under the 1958 Act takes away only the punishment (sentence) and not the factum of conviction, therefore, in case an employee of the Bank stands convicted in an offence involving moral turpitude, it is permissible for the respondent Bank to remove him from the service. The appeal lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed.
8. We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. The facts of the case are not in dispute. The trial court has convicted the appellant under Section 409 IPC after recording the finding of fact that the appellant had not deposited the telephone bill in spite of receiving a sum of Rs. 5000 for that purpose on 26-4-1982 and he deposited the said amount with the Bank on 27-7-1982 vide voucher (Ext. PH). The appellant had also taken away the bicycle of the Bank. The appellate court maintained the conviction, however, it granted the appellant the benefit of probation under the 1958 Act.
9. The sole question involved in this case is whether the benefit granted to the appellant under the provisions of the 1958 Act makes him entitled to reinstatement in service.
10. The issue involved herein is no more res integra.
11. In Aitha Chander Rao v. State of A.P 1981 Supp SCC 17, this Court held:
“2. As the appellant has been released on probation, this may not affect his service career in view of Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act.”
The said judgment in Aitha Chander Rao 1981 Supp SCC 17 was not approved by this Court in Harichand v. Director of School Education (1998) 2 SCC 383, observing that due to the peculiar circumstances of the case, the benefit of the provisions of the 1958 Act had been given to him and as in that case there had been no discussion on the words “disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law”, the said judgment cannot be treated as a binding precedent. This Court interpreted the provisions of Section 12 of the 1958 Act and held as under: (Harichand case (1998) 2 SCC 383)
“7. In our view, Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act would apply only in respect of a disqualification that goes with a conviction under the law which provides for the offence and its punishment. That is the plain meaning of the words ‘disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law’ therein. Where the law that provides for an offence and its punishment also stipulates a disqualification, a person convicted of the offence but released on probation does not, by reason of Section 12, suffers the disqualification. It cannot be held that, by reason of Section 12, a conviction for an offence should not be taken into account for the purposes of dismissal of the person convicted from government service.”
(emphasis added)
12. In Southern Railway v. T.R Chellappan (1976) 3 SCC 190, AIR 1975 SC 2216, this Court observed that the conviction of an accused, or the finding of the Court that he is guilty, does not stand washed away because that is the sine qua non for the order of release on probation. The order of release on probation is merely in substitution of the sentence to be imposed by the Court. Thus, the factum of guilt on the criminal charge is not swept away merely by passing the order under the 1958 Act.
13. In Trikha Ram v. V.K Seth 1987 Supp SCC 39, (1987) 4 ATC 208, this Court has held that if a person stands convicted and is given the benefit of the provisions of the 1958 Act, he can be removed from service only on the ground that he stood convicted. But by virtue of the provisions of Section 12 of the 1958 Act, his removal cannot be a “disqualification” for the purposes provided in other statutes such as the Representation of the People Act, 1950. The same view has been reiterated by this Court in Union of India v. Bakshi Ram (1990) 2 SCC 426, (1990) 12 ATC 914, Karam Singh v. State of Punjab (1996) 7 SCC 748 and DIG of Police v. P.R.K Mohan (1997) 11 SCC 571.
14. In Shankar Dass v. Union of India (1985) 2 SCC 358, AIR 1985 SC 772 this Court has held that the order of dismissal from service, consequent upon a conviction, is not a disqualification within the meaning of Section 12 of the 1958 Act. The Court held as under:
“4. … There are statutes which provide that persons who are convicted for certain offences shall incur certain disqualifications. For example, Chapter III of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, entitled ‘Disqualifications for membership of Parliament and State Legislatures’ and Chapter IV entitled ‘Disqualifications for Voting’ contain provisions which disqualify persons convicted of certain charges from being members of legislatures or from voting at elections to legislatures. That is the sense in which the word ‘disqualification’ is used in Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act. [Therefore, it is not possible to accept the reasoning of the High Court that Section 12 of the 1958 Act takes away the effect of conviction for the purpose of service also.]”
15. In State of U.P v. Ranjit Singh (1999) 2 SCC 617, AIR 1999 SC 1201 this Court has held that the High Court, while deciding a criminal case and giving the benefit of the U.P First Offenders' Probation Act, 1938, or similar enactment, has no competence to issue any direction that the accused shall not suffer any civil consequences. The Court has held as under:
“5. We also fail to understand how the High Court while deciding a criminal case, can direct that the accused must be deemed to have been in continuous service without break and, therefore, he should be paid his full pay and [dearness allowance] during the period of his suspension. This direction and observation is wholly without jurisdiction….”
16. In Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (1985) 3 SCC 398, AIR 1985 SC 1416 some part of the judgment in T.R Chellappan (1976) 3 SCC 190, AIR 1975 SC 2216 was overruled by the Constitution Bench of this Court. But the observations cited hereinbefore were not overruled.
17. In Punjab Water Supply Sewerage Board v. Ram Sajivan (2007) 9 SCC 86 this Court explained that the judgment in Aitha Chander Rao 1981 Supp SCC 17 did not lay down any law as no reason has been assigned in support of the order. Thus, the same remained merely an order purported to have been passed under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. This Court allowed the disciplinary authority to initiate the disciplinary proceedings in accordance with law and pass an appropriate order in spite of the fact that in the said case, the Court, after recording the conviction, had granted benefits of the provisions of the 1958 Act to the employee.
18. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that the conviction of an employee in an offence permits the disciplinary authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the employee or to take appropriate steps for his dismissal/removal only on the basis of his conviction. The word “disqualification” contained in Section 12 of the 1958 Act refers to a disqualification provided in other statutes, as explained by this Court in the abovereferred cases, and the employee cannot claim a right to continue in service merely on the ground that he had been given the benefit of probation under the 1958 Act.
19. Shri Gupta, learned counsel for the appellant has placed very heavy reliance on the judgment of this Court in Shankar Dass (1985) 2 SCC 358, AIR 1985 SC 772 and submitted that this Court has held otherwise in that case. We have gone through the entire judgment and found that there is a complete fallacy in the submissions made by Shri Gupta in this regard. In fact, in that case, this Court came to the conclusion that in spite of the fact that the benefit of the provisions of the 1958 Act had been granted by the criminal court, disciplinary proceedings could be initiated against the employee. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case involved therein, the Court asked the management to reconsider the issue of quantum of punishment. This Court had taken note of the observations made by the criminal court while granting the benefit of the 1958 Act, which are as under:
“6. … Misfortune dogged the accused for about a year … and it seems that it was under the force of adverse circumstances that he held back the money in question. Shankar Dass is a middle-aged man and it is obvious that it was under compelling circumstances that he could not deposit the money in question in time. He is not a previous convict.”
20. The Court also took further note of his other problems as under: (Shankar Dass case (1985) 2 SCC 358, AIR 1985 SC 772)
“6. … The appellant was a victim of adverse circumstances; his son died in February 1962, which was followed by another misfortune; his wife fell down from an upper storey and was seriously injured; it was then the turn of his daughter who fell seriously ill and that illness lasted for eight months.”
In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court asked the management to consider whether some other lesser punishment commensurate to the misconduct could be awarded. In fact the punishment of dismissal was found to be disproportionate to the delinquency committed by the appellant therein. Had this Court intended to say that once benefit of the 1958 Act is extended to a delinquent, his conviction also stands washed off, the Court could have directed the management to reinstate the employee rather than asking to impose a lesser punishment. Thus, the submission so advanced by Shri Gupta is preposterous.
21. This Court reconsidered the said case i.e Shankar Dass (1985) 2 SCC 358, AIR 1985 SC 772 in Swarn Singh v. SBI 1986 Supp SCC 566, (1987) 2 ATC 500 and held that the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India conferred the power on the Government to dismiss a person on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge. It is thus clear that it was open to the respondent Bank to initiate the disciplinary proceedings and impose the punishment in view of the provisions of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (hereinafter called as “the 1949 Act”).
22. Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Act, 1949 reads as under:
“10. Prohibition of employment of managing agents and restrictions on certain forms of employment.—(1) No banking company—
(a)***
(b) shall employ or continue the employment of any person—
(i) who is, or at any time has been, adjudicated insolvent, or has suspended payment or has compounded with his creditors, or who is, or has been, convicted by a criminal court of an offence involving moral turpitude;”
(emphasis supplied)
The aforesaid provision makes it clear that the management is under an obligation to discontinue the services of an employee who is or has been convicted by a criminal court for an offence involving moral turpitude.
23. “Moral turpitude” means per Black's Law Dictionary (8th Edn., 2004):
“Conduct that is contrary to justice, honesty, or morality. In the area of legal ethics, offenses involving moral turpitude—such as fraud or breach of trust. … Also termed moral depravity. …
‘Moral turpitude means, in general, shameful wickedness—so extreme a departure from ordinary standards of honest, good morals, justice, or ethics as to be shocking to the moral sense of the community. It has also been defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which one person owes to another, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between people.’ ”
(emphasis in original)
24. In Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana (1996) 4 SCC 17, AIR 1996 SC 3300 this Court has observed as under:
“12. ‘Moral turpitude’ is an expression which is used in legal as also societal parlance to describe conduct which is inherently base, vile, depraved or having any connection showing depravity.”
The aforesaid judgment in Pawan Kumar (1996) 4 SCC 17, AIR 1996 SC 3300 has been considered by this Court again in Allahabad Bank v. Deepak Kumar Bhola (1997) 4 SCC 1 and placed reliance on Baleshwar Singh v. District Magistrate and Collector AIR 1959 All 71 wherein it has been held as under:
“The expression ‘moral turpitude’ is not defined anywhere. But it means anything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. It implies depravity and wickedness of character or disposition of the person charged with the particular conduct. Every false statement made by a person may not be moral turpitude, but it would be so if it discloses vileness or depravity in the doing of any private and social duty which a person owes to his fellow men or to the society in general. If therefore the individual charged with a certain conduct owes a duty, either to another individual or to the society in general, to act in a specific manner or not to so act and he still acts contrary to it and does so knowingly, his conduct must be held to be due to vileness and depravity. It will be contrary to accepted customary rule and duty between man and man.”
25. In view of the above, it is evident that moral turpitude means anything contrary to honesty, modesty or good morals. It means vileness and depravity. In fact, the conviction of a person in a crime involving moral turpitude impeaches his credibility as he has been found to have indulged in shameful, wicked and base activities.
26. Undoubtedly, the embezzlement of Rs. 5000 by the appellant, for which he had been convicted, was an offence involving moral turpitude. The statutory provisions of the 1949 Act, provide that the management shall not permit any person convicted for an offence involving moral turpitude to continue in employment.
27. In Manish Goel v. Rohini Goel (2010) 4 SCC 393, AIR 2010 SC 1099 this Court after placing reliance on large number of its earlier judgments held as under:
“14. … no court has competence to issue a direction contrary to law nor the court can direct an authority to act in contravention of the statutory provisions. The courts are meant to enforce the rule of law and not to pass the orders or directions which are contrary to what has been injuncted by law.”
Thus, in such a fact situation, it is not permissible for this Court to issue any direction as had been issued in Shankar Dass (1985) 2 SCC 358, AIR 1985 SC 772.
28. In view of the above, we reach the conclusion that once a criminal court grants a delinquent employee the benefit of the 1958 Act, its order does not have any bearing so far as the service of such employee is concerned. The word “disqualification” in Section 12 of the 1958 Act provides that such a person shall not stand disqualified for the purposes of other Acts like the Representation of the People Act, 1950, etc. The conviction in a criminal case is one part of the case and release on probation is another. Therefore, grant of benefit of the provisions of the 1958 Act, only enables the delinquent not to undergo the sentence on showing his good conduct during the period of probation. In case, after being released, the delinquent commits another offence, benefit of the 1958 Act gets terminated and the delinquent can be made liable to undergo the sentence. Therefore, in case of an employee who stands convicted for an offence involving moral turpitude, it is his misconduct that leads to his dismissal.
29. Undoubtedly, the appellant was convicted by the criminal court for having committed the offence under Section 409 IPC and was awarded two years' sentence. The appellate court granted him the benefit of the 1958 Act. The Tribunal rejected his claim for reinstatement and other benefits taking note of the fact that the appellant was given an opportunity by the management to show cause as to why he should not be dismissed from service. The appellant submitted his reply to the said show-cause notice. The management passed the order of dismissal in view of the provisions of the 1949 Act. The Tribunal also took into consideration the contents of the Bipartite Settlement applicable in the case and rejected the appellant's claim. The High Court considered the appellant's grievance elaborately as is evident from the impugned judgment. We could not persuade ourselves, in the aforesaid fact situation, that any other view could also be possible.
30. In view of the above, we find no force in the appeal and it is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.