Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2009 INSC 296
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 482 and 483 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • The Partnership Act, 1932
  • Sections 420, 467 and 468 of the Penal Code, 1860
  • Article 142 of the Constitution of India
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2009 INSC 296
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 482 and 483 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • The Partnership Act, 1932
  • Sections 420, 467 and 468 of the Penal Code, 1860
  • Article 142 of the Constitution of India
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant was a partner in M/s Saraswati Exports and a Director of Saraswati Exim Pvt. Ltd. Respondent 2, Vikram Kapoor, is a partner in M/s S.N. Kapoor Exports (“the firm”), which is engaged in manufacturing and exporting carpets. On 1 April 2001 the two firms executed an agreement under which the firm supplied technical know-how and was to receive a 10% commission on all sales. This agreement lasted until 31 March 2003. A fresh agreement effective 1 April 2003 required the appellant to pay the firm ₹17 lakh per month for two years.

The firm alleges that commissions amounting to ₹4,49,85,581 became due, of which only ₹3,21,06,910 was paid. On 13 August 2004 a complaint was filed before the Judicial Magistrate, Jaipur, alleging criminal breach of trust, cheating and forgery on the ground that the appellant diverted sales worth roughly ₹9 crore to a sister concern without paying commission. The Magistrate ordered registration of an FIR; after investigation a detailed charge-sheet dated 8 January 2007 was filed.

On 9 January 2007 the Chief Judicial Magistrate took cognisance of offences under Sections 420, 467 and 468 IPC. The appellant’s petition to quash the proceedings under Section 482 CrPC was dismissed by the Rajasthan High Court, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the allegations in the FIR and charge-sheet, taken at face value, disclose the commission of offences under Sections 420, 467 and 468 IPC or merely a civil dispute over commission payments.
  2. Whether the High Court erred in refusing to quash the criminal proceedings under Section 482 CrPC.
  3. Whether the Supreme Court should exercise its powers, including under Article 142 of the Constitution, to grant relief such as bail or facilitate settlement.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • The contractual arrangement continued up to 31 March 2003 and over ₹3.21 crore in commission was already paid; even if the charge-sheet is accepted in full, the ingredients of Sections 420, 467 and 468 IPC are not made out.
  • The charge-sheet centres on a discrepancy of about US $200, making it implausible that serious offences would be committed for such a negligible amount.
  • The dispute is contractual and should be resolved through arbitration or another civil forum rather than criminal prosecution.

Respondent’s Arguments

  • The appellant wrongfully diverted business to a sister concern, depriving the firm of substantial commission and thereby committing cheating.
  • The charge-sheet establishes forgery of invoices (valuable security); hence the Court should not interfere at the threshold.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kamaladevi Agarwal v. State of W.B. (2002) 1 SCC 555 Quashing should be exercised sparingly; allegations must, on their face, disclose no offence before proceedings are quashed. Relied upon to affirm that even if a dispute has civil aspects, criminal proceedings need not be quashed where forgery or fraud is alleged.
B. Suresh Yadav v. Sharifa Bee (2007) 13 SCC 107 For cheating, fraudulent intent must exist at the time of the promise; civil and criminal liabilities can coexist. Cited to illustrate that mere civil litigation does not preclude criminal liability if the ingredients of cheating are met.
R. Kalyani v. Janak C. Mehta (2009) 1 SCC 516 Parameters for exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash FIRs: power to be used sparingly, considering whether prima facie a cognisable offence is revealed. Used to support refusal to quash because the charge-sheet prima facie disclosed cognisable offences.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court reiterated the settled principles governing quashing under Section 482 CrPC: the allegations must, on their face, fail to disclose any offence for quashing to be justified, and courts ordinarily do not rely on documents produced by the defence at that stage. It accepted that entitlement to higher commission is a civil dispute, but noted that the charge-sheet also alleges forgery of invoices and fraudulent under-reporting of sales, which constitute criminal offences.

The investigation was described as fair and the charge-sheet “detailed.” Consequently, the Magistrate’s cognisance order was held free of legal infirmity. The Court declined to interfere with the High Court’s dismissal of the quashing petition. Nonetheless, acknowledging the appellant’s willingness to settle, it invoked Article 142 to craft equitable relief regarding bail.

Holding and Implications

Appeal DISMISSED.

Implications: Criminal proceedings will continue before the Magistrate. The appellant may obtain bail if he appears within four weeks and satisfies conditions set by the Magistrate, and may seek exemption from personal appearance. The decision does not create new substantive precedent but reinforces existing limits on the power to quash criminal cases at the preliminary stage while allowing equitable relief under Article 142.

To access the original judgment, please Sign In or Subscribe.

    Mahesh Chaudhary v. State Of Rajasthan And Another

    S.B Sinha, J.— Leave granted.

    2. The appellant was a partner of a firm known as M/s Saraswati Exports. He is also Director of a company known as “Saraswati Exim Pvt. Ltd.” (for short “the company”). M/s S.N Kapoor Exports is a firm registered under the Partnership Act, 1932 (for short “the firm”). The complainant, Vikram Kapoor (Respondent 2 herein) is a partner thereof. The firm was engaged in manufacturing, selling and export of carpets, mats, etc. It developed various types of hand-knotted new designs of carpets and acquired special skill therein.

    3. Indisputably, the two firms entered into a contract on or about 1-4-2001 in terms whereof, inter alia, the firm agreed to help and assist the appellant with regard to production i.e designing, colouring, dyeing, finishing, etc. The firm also agreed to provide knowledge and know-how for the carpet production by the appellant for making their products readily saleable and more marketable. The firm for the said purpose was to receive 10% commission on the invoice value of each and every invoice and total sales made directly or indirectly by the firm. Some of the clauses of the said agreement are as under:

    “9. That the second party shall have an office provided by the first party to carry out supervising of all the work of designing, etc. and auditing/checking of account records/books.
    14. That the second party shall have right to auditing, checking of accounts books/records, etc. through their auditor at any time and the first party will cooperate in this regard.
    15. That if the sum due on account of 10% commission is not paid promptly as soon as the sum due becomes Rs 3 lakhs, the second party shall on the strength of this agreement alone, file a law suit for the recovery of dues and bringing a stay from the law court of the business and its total activity till the full payment has been made along with 15% interest for the period of delay and full cost of law suit has been cleared and paid in full by the first party.
    23. That the first party has an assurance from the second party that sales (export sales of hand-knotted carpet) will be done with the help of the second party.
    24. That the first party is singly taking up to produce only hand-knotted carpets without any compromise in execution of quality. Any defective carpets produced by the first party shall be entirely the first party's responsibilities.
    25. That neither the first party nor the second party can enter into such an agreement with anyone else.”

    The said agreement continued till 31-3-2003.

    4. Indisputably again with effect from 1-4-2003, another agreement has been entered into by and between the parties thereto whereby and whereunder it was agreed that the appellant would pay a sum of Rs 17 lakhs per month to the firm for a period of two years. It is furthermore not in dispute that whereas the firm claims a sum of Rs 4,49,85,581 towards commission payable to it towards export but only a sum of Rs 3,21,06,910 has been paid.

    5. Inter alia alleging that the appellant herein has committed the offences of criminal breach of trust and/or of cheating and forgery, on the premise that he had made sale of about Rs 9 crores in the year 2002-2003 through a sister concern wherefor no commission was paid although the technical know-how was made available by the firm, a complaint petition was filed in Court of the Judicial Magistrate No. 22, Jaipur City, Jaipur on or about 13-8-2004. The learned Magistrate directed the officer in charge of the Brahmpuri Police Station to lodge a first information report (FIR). Pursuant thereto or in furtherance thereof, an FIR was lodged.

    6. On completion of the investigation, a detailed charge-sheet has been submitted on or about 8-1-2007. In the said charge-sheet, it was, inter alia, opined that no manipulation in the records has been committed for showing sale of carpet through the sister concern, stating:

    “Even if it is assumed that the sale made by Saraswati Exim is the indirect sale of Saraswati Export, yet no commission is payable to Shri Kapoor on the sale of tufted carpets and hand-knotted carpets purchased from other firms. No such fact has come into light from the entire records of sale made by Saraswati Export and Saraswati Exim that sale made by Saraswati Export has been shown to be the sale made by Saraswati Exim by committing any manipulation in the records.”

    7. Analysing the terms of the contract, it was stated that the complainant did not raise any protest from time to time with regard to the purported breaches thereof on the part of the appellant and in any event, the same gives rise to a civil dispute. It was, however, found that different invoices were presented to the bank showing different amounts and quantities vis-à-vis the firm, stating:

    “… Thus, partners of Saraswati Export by showing the amount of commission in the invoices falsely and wrongly and by deducting the amount of commission from the total sale value in wrong and false manner have shown the less sale turnover and consequently, an offence under Sections 420, 467 and 468 IPC is found proved for paying less commission than the actual due commission to Shri Kapoor and commission of breach of trust.
    3. Invoice No. 1610/23-4-2002 which has been submitted by Saraswati Export with the bank, rate of carpets is shown at a higher rate and the rate of carpet in the invoice given to the complainant is shown lower. Thus, no satisfactory explanation regarding difference in the sale rate of carpet in the copies of the above invoices is available on record. However, in comparison to the annual sale turnover of Saraswati Export, difference of total sale value of US $34,096.00 of the above one bill and difference amount US $2005 is ignorable, but it is proved that Shri Mahesh Chaudhary by making the false entry in the invoices has saved the commission of US $200.5 payable to Shri Kapoor and has not paid the same to Shri Kapoor against which offence punishable under Sections 420, 467 and 468 IPC is found proved.”

    8. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate took cognizance of the offences against the appellant by an order dated 9-1-2007. The appellant thereafter filed an application for quashing of the said order before the Rajasthan High Court which has been dismissed by reason of the impugned judgment.

    9. Mr Jagdeep Dhankar, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, would submit:

    (i) The transaction in terms of the aforementioned agreement dated 21-2-1973 having continued up to 31-3-2003 and a sum of Rs 3,21,06,910 having been paid by way of commission to the firm, the charge-sheet even if given face value and taken to be correct in its entirety does not constitute offences punishable under Sections 420, 467 and 468 of the Penal Code, 1860.
    (ii) The observations made in the charge-sheet against the appellant being related to about US $200 only, it is absurd to think that the appellant would commit such an offence.
    (iii) In any event, the disputes and differences between the parties being pertaining to breach of contract resulting in civil dispute, the same should be directed to be resolved through arbitration or any other dispute resolution mechanism.

    10. Mr L.N Rao, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, on the other hand, would contend:

    (i) The appellant illegally and wrongfully diverted the business to its sister concern and, thus, cheated Respondent 2 of a huge amount of commission.
    (ii) In any event, a charge-sheet having been filed upon arriving at a finding that the accused had committed an offence of forgery in respect of invoices, which are valuable security, this Court should not interfere with the impugned order.

    11. The principle providing for exercise of the power by a High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash a criminal proceeding is well known. The Court shall ordinarily exercise the said jurisdiction, inter alia, in the event the allegations contained in the FIR or the complaint petition even if on face value are taken to be correct in their entirety, does not disclose commission of an offence.

    12. It is also well settled that save and except in very exceptional circumstances, the Court would not look to any document relied upon by the accused in support of his defence. Although allegations contained in the complaint petition may disclose a civil dispute, the same by itself may not be a ground to hold that the criminal proceedings should not be allowed to continue. For the purpose of exercising its jurisdiction, the superior courts are also required to consider as to whether the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint petition fulfil the ingredients of the offences alleged against the accused.

    13. Indisputably, the question as to whether the complainant was entitled to a higher amount of commission in terms of the agreement dated 21-2-1973 is essentially a civil dispute. The complainant in terms of the said agreement was not only entitled to inspect the documents maintained by the accused but also to get the same audited. It is, therefore, difficult to hold as has rightly been opined by the investigating officer that a case for imposing a criminal liability on the accused on that score has been made out.

    14. While saying so, we are not unmindful of the limitations of the Court's power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which is primarily for one either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The Court at that stage would not embark upon appreciation of evidence. The Court shall moreover consider the materials on record as a whole. In Kamaladevi Agarwal v. State of W.B (2002) 1 SCC 555 this Court opined:

    “7. This Court has consistently held that the revisional or inherent powers of quashing the proceedings at the initial stage should be exercised sparingly and only where the allegations made in the complaint or the FIR, even if taken at their face value and accepted in entirety, do not prima facie disclose the commission of an offence. Disputed and controversial facts cannot be made the basis for the exercise of the jurisdiction.”

    It was furthermore observed that the High Court should be slow in interfering with the proceedings at the initial stage and that merely because the nature of the dispute is primarily of a civil nature, the criminal prosecution cannot be quashed because in cases of forgery and fraud there would always be some element of civil nature.

    15. This Court in B. Suresh Yadav v. Sharifa Bee (2007) 13 SCC 107 opined as under:

    “13. For the purpose of establishing the offence of cheating, the complainant is required to show that the accused had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making promise or representation. In a case of this nature, it is permissible in law to consider the stand taken by a party in a pending civil litigation. We do not, however, mean to lay down a law that the liability of a person cannot be both civil and criminal at the same time. But when a stand has been taken in a complaint petition which is contrary to or inconsistent with the stand taken by him in a civil suit, it assumes significance. Had the fact as purported to have been represented before us that the appellant herein got the said two rooms demolished and concealed the said fact at the time of execution of the deed of sale, the matter might have been different. As the deed of sale was executed on 30-9-2005 and the purported demolition took place on 29-9-2005, it was expected that the complainant/first respondent would come out with her real grievance in the written statement filed by her in the aforementioned suit. She, for reasons best known to her, did not choose to do so.”

    16. Recently in R. Kalyani v. Janak C. Mehta (2009) 1 SCC 516, (2008) 14 Scale 85 this Court laid down the law in the following terms:

    “15. Propositions of law which emerge from the said decisions are:
    (1) The High Court ordinarily would not exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash a criminal proceeding and, in particular, a first information report unless the allegations contained therein, even if given face value and taken to be correct in their entirety, disclosed no cognizable offence.
    (2) For the said purpose, the Court, save and except in very exceptional circumstances, would not look to any document relied upon by the defence.
    (3) Such a power should be exercised very sparingly. If the allegations made in the FIR disclose commission of an offence, the Court shall not go beyond the same and pass an order in favour of the accused to hold absence of any mens rea or actus reus.
    (4) If the allegation discloses a civil dispute, the same by itself may not be a ground to hold that the criminal proceedings should not be allowed to continue.
    16. It is furthermore well known that no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down. Each case has to be considered on its own merits. The Court, while exercising its inherent jurisdiction, although would not interfere with a genuine complaint keeping in view the purport and object for which the provisions of Sections 482 and 483 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had been introduced by Parliament but would not hesitate to exercise its jurisdiction in appropriate cases. One of the paramount duties of the superior courts is to see that a person who is apparently innocent is not subjected to persecution and humiliation on the basis of a false and wholly untenable complaint.”

    17. The charge-sheet, in our opinion, prima facie discloses commission of offences. A fair investigation was carried out by the investigating officer. The charge-sheet is a detailed one. If an order of cognizance has been passed relying on or on the basis thereof by the learned Magistrate, in our opinion, no exception thereto can be taken. We, therefore, do not find any legal infirmity in the impugned orders. We, however, must place on record that before us Mr Dhankar stated that the appellant is ready and willing to get the disputes and differences between the parties settled.

    18. In that view of the matter and keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case and with a view to do complete justice to the parties, we, in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, direct that in the event the appellant appears before the learned Magistrate within a period of four weeks from date and files an application for grant of bail, he shall be released on bail on such terms and conditions as the learned Magistrate may deem fit and proper. In the event, the appellant files an application for exemption from his personal appearance, the same may also be considered on its own merits. It would be open to the complainant to consider the offer of the appellant.

    19. Subject to the aforementioned directions, the appeal is dismissed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Mahesh Chaudhary v. State Of Rajasthan And Another
    (Mar 3, 2009)