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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
009 INSC 1142
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 6 of the Act
  • Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 18 of the Act
  • Section 28-A(1) of the Act
  • Section 4 of the Act
  • Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
  • Section 11 of the Act
  • Act 68 of 1984
  • The Land Acquisition Act (no specific section or subsection mentioned)
  • Section 28-A of the Act, Amendment Act, 1987
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
009 INSC 1142
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 6 of the Act
  • Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 18 of the Act
  • Section 28-A(1) of the Act
  • Section 4 of the Act
  • Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
  • Section 11 of the Act
  • Act 68 of 1984
  • The Land Acquisition Act (no specific section or subsection mentioned)
  • Section 28-A of the Act, Amendment Act, 1987
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

A large tract of land in the State of Orissa was notified for acquisition on 1 January 1973 under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for establishing the Central Institute of Fresh Water Aqua-Culture (CIFWA). A declaration under Section 6 followed on 9 July 1973 and was published in the Official Gazette two days later.

With respect to the present Respondent 1, the Land Acquisition Collector passed an award on 31 July 1975 fixing compensation at Rs 2,500 per acre. Respondent 1 did not seek a reference under Section 18. Other landowners, however, did so, and by award dated 5 January 1995 the Reference Court enhanced compensation to Rs 10,000 per acre.

Within three months of that reference award, on 21 March 1995, Respondent 1 filed an application under Section 28-A seeking redetermination of compensation. The Land Acquisition Collector rejected the application on 11 March 1997. Respondent 1’s writ petition challenging that rejection was allowed by the Orissa High Court on 23 February 1999, which directed the Collector to reconsider the application if it were otherwise maintainable.

The State of Orissa (appellant) filed the present civil appeal. During the appeal, CIFWA/ICAR filed I.A. No. 3 seeking impleadment; the Supreme Court allowed the application and added them as Respondents 2 and 3.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the application under Section 28-A was barred by limitation.
  2. Whether, apart from limitation, the application was maintainable in law having regard to the scope and object of Section 28-A.
  3. Whether the High Court erred in directing the Land Acquisition Collector to decide the application “provided it is found to be maintainable” while simultaneously ruling out consideration of limitation.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant State of Orissa

  • The Section 28-A application was filed more than twenty years after the original Section 11 award and was therefore time-barred.
  • Maintainability of the application depends entirely on limitation; by foreclosing that question the High Court issued a contradictory and erroneous direction.
  • The writ petition ought to have been dismissed outright.

Respondent 1

  • The application was filed within three months of the Reference Court award dated 5 January 1995 and was therefore within limitation as interpreted by this Court.
  • The High Court’s direction was correct and called for no interference.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of A.P. v. Marri Venkaiah (2003) 7 SCC 280 Limitation for filing a Section 28-A application is three months from the date of the Reference Court award, excluding time to obtain a copy; knowledge of the award is irrelevant. Used as the primary authority to uphold that Respondent 1’s application, filed within three months of the 1995 reference award, was in time.
Tota Ram v. State of U.P. (1997) 6 SCC 280 Strict computation of limitation under Section 28-A. Reinforced the limitation analysis adopted from Marri Venkaiah.
Union of India v. Mangatu Ram (1997) 6 SCC 59 Same limitation principle; exclusion of “knowledge” concept. Cited with approval in Marri Venkaiah; followed.
Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodriguese v. Collector (L.A.) (1996) 6 SCC 746 Limitation under Section 28-A runs strictly from the award date. Relied upon to reject the “date of knowledge” argument.
Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Land Acquisition Officer AIR 1961 SC 1500 & State of Punjab v. Qaisar Jehan Begum AIR 1963 SC 1604 Earlier cases where “knowledge” was relevant to limitation. Distinguished; not applicable after the statutory amendment and later case law.
Bhagti v. State of Haryana (1997) 4 SCC 473 Only those who did not seek a Section 18 reference can invoke Section 28-A; redetermination based on Reference Court award, not High Court judgment. Cited to define the class entitled to the benefit.
Union of India v. Bant Ram (1996) 4 SCC 537 Same principle as Bhagti. Followed to delineate eligible applicants.
Union of India v. Karnail Singh (1995) 2 SCC 728 Section 28-A prospective; limitation runs from earliest award. Later overruled in part; discussed for completeness.
Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari (1995) 2 SCC 736 Application may be based on a subsequent Reference Court award; limitation to be counted from that award. Forms the basis for accepting the timeliness of Respondent 1’s application.
State of Tripura v. Roopchand Das (2003) 1 SCC 421 Clarified Pradeep Kumari on limitation. Cited in support of limitation analysis.
Mewa Ram v. State of Haryana (1986) 4 SCC 151 Object of Section 28-A is to protect “poor, illiterate, inarticulate” owners who did not seek Section 18 references. Invoked to underline that the Collector must assess maintainability beyond limitation, including whether the applicant belongs to the intended beneficiary class.
Scheduled Caste Coop. Land Owning Society Ltd. v. Union of India (1991) 1 SCC 174 Confirmed the narrow beneficiary class under Section 28-A. Referred to when directing the Collector to examine maintainability on that ground.
Babua Ram v. State of U.P. (1995) 2 SCC 689 Distinction between “poor and inarticulate” and “comparatively affluent”; legislative intent of Section 28-A. Used to clarify that maintainability turns on more than limitation.
G. Krishna Murthy v. State of Orissa (1995) 2 SCC 733; D. Krishna Veni v. State of Orissa (1995) 2 SCC 734; U.P. State Industrial Development Corpn. Ltd. v. State of U.P. (1995) 2 SCC 766 Person who invoked Section 18 reference cannot later seek Section 28-A benefit. Sets parameters the Collector must apply.
Union of India v. Shivkumar Bhargava (1995) 2 SCC 427 Subsequent purchasers are not entitled to Section 28-A benefits. Cited to emphasise scrutiny of applicant’s status.
Kendriya Karamchari Sehkari Grah Nirman Samiti Ltd. v. State of U.P. (2009) 1 SCC 754 Affirmed exclusion of ineligible classes from Section 28-A. Reinforces the Collector’s duty of inquiry.
Des Raj v. Union of India (2004) 7 SCC 753 Application under Section 28-A is barred if the claimant has already pursued Section 18 reference. Guides the Collector on maintainability.
Union of India v. Munshi Ram (2006) 4 SCC 538 Benefit of enhanced compensation extends only to owners who never sought Section 18 references. Cited as the most recent restatement of the principle.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court first addressed the limitation objection. Relying on Marri Venkaiah and a line of consistent authority, the Court held that limitation under Section 28-A runs for three months from the date of the Reference Court award relied upon. Because Respondent 1 filed the application within that period, the Collector’s rejection could not be sustained on limitation grounds.

The appellant’s contention that the High Court’s order was self-contradictory was rejected. The Court reasoned that, although limitation is one component of maintainability, other grounds—derived from the very object of Section 28-A—remain open. Citing Mewa Ram and subsequent cases, the Court emphasised that Section 28-A is an exception crafted for “poor, illiterate, and inarticulate” owners who did not pursue a Section 18 reference. Accordingly, the Land Acquisition Collector must still examine whether Respondent 1 falls within that protected class and whether any other statutory bar applies (e.g., prior invocation of Section 18, status as subsequent purchaser, etc.).

The Court dismissed as “preposterous” the State’s suggestion that, once limitation is satisfied, the Collector is ipso facto bound to enhance compensation without further inquiry.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Dismissed. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s direction, clarifying that:

  • The Land Acquisition Collector must reconsider Respondent 1’s Section 28-A application on all aspects of maintainability except limitation, which is now settled in the applicant’s favour.
  • The newly impleaded respondents—ICAR and CIFWA—are entitled to participate in those proceedings.

Immediate effect: the matter returns to the Collector for a fresh decision. The judgment reiterates settled principles on limitation and the beneficiary scope of Section 28-A but does not introduce a new legal doctrine.

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    State Of Orissa And Others v. Chitrasen Bhoi .

    Order

    IA No. 3

    1. An application i.e IA No. 3 has been filed by the Central Institute of Fresh Water Aqua-Culture (Cifwa), Bhubaneshwar under the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) for their impleadment as respondents. Mr V.K Rao, learned counsel appearing for the applicants has submitted that the land in dispute in fact had been acquired for the said applicants, therefore, the applicants be impleaded as parties in this appeal. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the non-applicants have no objection in this regard. Consequently, the applicants are impleaded as Respondents 2 and 3 in this appeal. The IA is accordingly allowed and disposed of.

    Appeal No. 1271 of 2002

    2. This appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order of the Division Bench of the Orissa High Court dated 23-2-1999 allowing the writ petition filed by the respondent for seeking direction to the Land Acquisition Collector to consider his application under Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter called “the Act”).

    3. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, as stated in the petition, are that a huge area of land was notified under Section 4 of the Act in the Official Gazette of the State of Orissa dated 1-1-1973 (Annexure 5). The acquisition was sought for the establishment of the Central Institute of Fresh Water Aqua-Culture i.e a fish farm. Declaration under Section 6 of the Act in respect of the said land was made on 9-7-1973 and was published in the Official Gazette dated 11-7-1973.

    4. The Land Acquisition Collector made an award, so far as the land of the present Respondent 1 is concerned on 31-7-1975 assessing the market value of the land @ Rs. 2500 per acre. Respondent 1 did not agitate the matter further, however, other persons whose lands stood notified by the same notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 of the Act filed the reference under Section 18 of the Act and the same was decided vide award dated 5-1-1995 assessing the market value of the land @ Rs. 10,000 per acre while deciding Miscellaneous Case No. 362 of 1994. The respondent filed an application under Section 28-A of the Act on 21-3-1995 claiming the same market value for his land. The Land Acquisition Collector vide order dated 11-3-1997 rejected the said application. Being aggrieved the respondent filed the writ petition which has been allowed by the High Court. Hence, this appeal.

    5. Shri J.S Attri, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant State of Orissa has raised a large number of issues contending that the application under Section 28-A of the Act had rightly been rejected by the Collector as the same was not maintainable. It had been filed at a belated stage i.e after more than 20 years of the date of the award made under Section 11 of the Act. The High Court has held that the application under Section 28-A had been filed within limitation, however, the Collector has been directed to decide the said application, provided it is found to be maintainable. The order itself is contradictory as the issue of maintainability solely depends upon the issue of limitation and no other issue can be examined by the Collector. Therefore, the High Court ought to have dismissed the petition.

    6. On the other hand, Shri M. Samantaray, learned counsel appearing for Respondent 1 has vehemently opposed the petition contending that the High Court has rightly held that the application had been filed within limitation and therefore, no interference is required. The appeal is liable to be dismissed.

    7. We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

    8. Grievance has been raised by the learned counsel for the appellant State that the application under Section 28-A of the Act was filed after 20 years and therefore it was not maintainable. Law requires that the application be filed by the eligible person within three months from the date of the reference award, on the basis of which the application is being filed. The issue of limitation in this regard is no more res integra.

    9. In State of A.P v. Marri Venkaiah (2003) 7 SCC 280, AIR 2003 SC 2949 this Court has dealt with the issue of limitation and held as under:(&10)

    “7. Plain language of the aforesaid section would only mean that the period of limitation is three months from the date of the award of the court. It is also provided that in computing the period of three months, the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining the copy of the award is to be excluded. Therefore, the aforesaid provision crystallises that application under Section 28-A is to be filed within three months from the date of the award by the court by only excluding the time requisite for obtaining the copy. Hence, it is difficult to infer further exclusion of time on the ground of acquisition of knowledge by the applicant.
    10. In our view, with regard to the first contention that Section 28-A is a beneficial provision, there cannot be any dispute. However, the advantage of the benefit which is conferred is required to be taken within the stipulated time. A landowner may be poor or illiterate and because of that he might not have filed reference application but that would not mean that he could be negligent in not finding out whether other landowners have filed such applications. Whosoever wants to take advantage of the beneficial legislation has to be vigilant and has to take appropriate action within the prescribed time. He must at least be vigilant in making efforts to find out whether the other landowners have filed any reference application and if so, what is the result. If that is not done then the law cannot help him.”
    (emphasis added)

    10. While deciding Marri Venkaiah case (2003) 7 SCC 280, AIR 2003 SC 2949 the Court placed reliance upon its earlier judgments in Tota Ram v. State of U.P (1997) 6 SCC 280, Union of India v. Mangatu Ram (1997) 6 SCC 59, AIR 1997 SC 2704 and Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodriguese v. Collector (L.A) (1996) 6 SCC 746, AIR 1997 SC 1915. The Court further rejected the contention that limitation would run from the date of knowledge distinguishing its earlier judgments on facts and law in Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Land Acquisition Officer AIR 1961 SC 1500 and State of Punjab v. Qaisar Jehan Begum AIR 1963 SC 1604.

    11. In Bhagti v. State of Haryana (1997) 4 SCC 473 this Court held that a claimant can seek redetermination of compensation on the basis of the award of the Reference Court and not the judgment of the High Court and further held that only those claimants who had failed to apply for a reference under Section 18 of the Act are conferred with the right to apply for redetermination under Section 28-A(1) of the Act. The same view has been reiterated in Union of India v. Bant Ram (1996) 4 SCC 537.

    12. In Union of India v. Karnail Singh (1995) 2 SCC 728 a Bench of two Hon'ble Judges of this Court held that provisions of Section 28-A of the Act, as inserted by Act 68 of 1984, are prospective in nature and do not apply to an award made by a civil court prior to 24-9-1984. The limitation of three months for making an application for redetermination of compensation is to be computed from the date of earliest award made by the civil court. However, a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari (1995) 2 SCC 736, AIR 1995 SC 2259 overruled the judgment in Union of India v. Karnail Singh (1995) 2 SCC 728 to the extent that an application for redetermination may be filed within three months from the date of the first award of the Reference Court observing that intention of the legislature was not to restrict the benefit of the amended law, to the extent that a claimant has to apply within limitation from the date of the first award of the Reference Court. Thus, it is permissible even to make an application on the basis of a subsequent Reference Court award. However, it must be within the limitation from the date of making of the said subsequent award. This view was further clarified by this Court in State of Tripura v. Roopchand Das (2003) 1 SCC 421.

    13. In the instant case, admittedly the application was filed within three months from the date of the reference award, the applicant Respondent 1 had relied upon. The appellant had not laid down any factual position as to under what circumstances the application was time-barred. Therefore, no interference is required on this ground.

    14. Admittedly, the High Court has directed the Land Acquisition Collector to decide the application under Section 28-A of the Act provided it is found to be maintainable, however, the issue of limitation would not be agitated/considered. In such a fact situation the question does arise as to whether the Land Acquisition Collector can still examine the maintainability of the application and if so, on what grounds?

    15. The scope of the provisions of Section 28-A of the Act was considered by this Court in Mewa Ram v. State of Haryana (1986) 4 SCC 151, AIR 1987 SC 45 and the Court placed emphasis particularly on Para 2(ix) of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Act, 1987 which provided for a special provision for inarticulate and poor people to apply for redetermination of the compensation amount on the basis of the court award in a land acquisition reference filed by comparatively affluent landowner. The Court observed as under:

    “4. … Section 28-A in terms does not apply to the case of the petitioners…. … they do not belong to that class of society for whose benefit the provision is intended and meant i.e inarticulate and poor people who by reason of their poverty and ignorance have failed to take advantage of the right of reference to the civil court under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.”
    (emphasis added)

    This Court approved and reiterated the law laid down in Mewa Ram (1986) 4 SCC 151, AIR 1987 SC 45 in Scheduled Caste Coop. Land Owning Society Ltd. v. Union of India (1991) 1 SCC 174, AIR 1991 SC 730.

    16. In Babua Ram v. State of U.P (1995) 2 SCC 689, the Apex Court again reiterated the law laid down in Mewa Ram (1986) 4 SCC 151, AIR 1987 SC 45 observing as under: (Babua Ram case (1995) 2 SCC 689)

    “36. … Legislature made a discriminatory policy between the poor and inarticulate as one class of person to whom the benefit of Section 28-A was to be extended and comparatively affluent who had taken advantage of the reference under Section 18 and the latter as a class to which the benefit of Section 28-A was not extended. Otherwise, the phraseology of the language of the non obstante clause would have been differently worded…. …
    37. … It is true that the legislature intended to relieve hardship to the poor, indigent and inarticulate interested persons who generally failed to avail the reference under Section 18 which is an existing bar and to remedy it, Section 28-A was enacted giving [a] right and remedy for redetermination…. … The legislature appears to have presumed that the same state of affairs continue to subsist among the poor and inarticulate persons and they generally fail to avail the right under sub-section (1) of Section 18 due to poverty or ignorance or avoidance of expropriation.”
    (emphasis added)

    17. Thus, it is apparent that the legislature has carved out an exception in the form of Section 28-A and made a special provision to grant some relief to a particular class of society, namely, poor, illiterate, ignorant and inarticulate people. It is made only for “little Indians”. The provisions of Section 28-A refer to the “person interested” which means the original owner and that original owner interested must further be a person aggrieved by the award of the Collector.

    18. In G. Krishna Murthy v. State of Orissa (1995) 2 SCC 733, D. Krishna Veni v. State of Orissa (1995) 2 SCC 734, Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari (1995) 2 SCC 736, AIR 1995 SC 2259 and U.P State Industrial Development Corpn. Ltd. v. State of U.P (1995) 2 SCC 766 it has been held by this Court that a person who prefers Section 18 reference cannot maintain an application under Section 28-A of the Act. The benefit of such an exceptional rule cannot be extended to such persons as it would be against the public policy.

    19. In Union of India v. Shivkumar Bhargava (1995) 2 SCC 427, AIR 1995 SC 812 this Court observed that the benefit of the State policy which confers certain beneficial rights on a particular class of person is meant only for the person whose land was acquired and by necessary implication “the subsequent purchaser was elbowed out from the policy and became disentitled to the benefit of” the State policy.

    20. Placing reliance upon the aforesaid judgments a similar view has also been taken by this Court in Kendriya Karamchari Sehkari Grah Nirman Samiti Ltd. v. State of U.P (2009) 1 SCC 754

    21. In Des Raj v. Union of India (2004) 7 SCC 753 it was held by this Court that if a person has applied under Section 18 of the Act and pursued the matter further, he is not entitled to maintain the application under Section 28-A for redetermination of compensation. The Court further held that it is mandatory to file the application within prescribed limitation, which runs from the date of the award under Section 18 of the Act. While deciding the said case the Court placed reliance upon its earlier judgments, including Scheduled Caste Coop. Land Owning Society Ltd. (1991) 1 SCC 174, AIR 1991 SC 730

    22. In Union of India v. Munshi Ram (2006) 4 SCC 538, AIR 2006 SC 1716 this Court has laid down the law that such an application is maintainable provided a person has not filed an application under Section 18 of the Act. The Court held that Section 28-A seeks to confer the benefit of enhanced compensation on those owners who did not seek reference under Section 18 of the Act. In fact, under the said provision they are entitled for enhanced compensation decreed by the Reference Court and further as the decreed amount stands modified in appeal by the higher courts.

    23. Therefore, it is evident that an application under Section 28-A has to be dealt with by the Land Acquisition Officer keeping in mind the aforesaid settled legal propositions.

    24. Thus, it is evident that the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant that the Land Acquisition Collector is bound to enhance the compensation without considering any other fact, as the application has been held to have been filed within limitation, is preposterous.

    25. In view of the above, we do not find any force in the appeal. The appeal stands dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

    26. The Land Acquisition Collector shall consider the issue of maintainability of the application filed by the respondent in the light of the aforesaid settled legal proposition expeditiously without considering the issue of limitation. Needless to say that the newly added respondents, namely, Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) and Central Institute of Fresh Water Aqua-Culture (Cifwa) shall also be heard at the time of the disposal of the application filed by Respondent 1. No costs.

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    State Of Orissa And Others v. Chitrasen Bhoi .
    (Sep 16, 2009)