AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2009 INSC 445
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Article 54 of the Schedule to the Act
  • Article 54 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 (the Act)
  • Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (the old Act)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2009 INSC 445
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Article 54 of the Schedule to the Act
  • Article 54 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 (the Act)
  • Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (the old Act)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This judgment arises out of a reference made on 21-4-2008 to a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court of India. The reference sought authoritative clarification of the meaning of the words “date fixed for the performance” appearing in Article 54 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. No factual dispute between private parties was decided; the Bench was convened solely to settle the interpretative question so that the matter could thereafter return to the Division Bench for adjudication on the merits.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the expression “date fixed for the performance” in Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963 requires the existence of a specific, identifiable calendar date, or whether that date may be inferred from surrounding circumstances or contingent events.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants’ Arguments

  • The phrase “the date fixed” should receive a purposive interpretation, permitting courts to deduce the date from the terms and context of the contract rather than insisting on a single calendar date expressly stated.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
S. Brahmanand v. K.R. Muthugopal (2005) 12 SCC 764 Earlier Supreme Court decision where the present issue was left open. Cited to show that the interpretative question remained unresolved.
Kashi Prasad v. Chhabi Lal, AIR 1933 All 410 High Court view on Article 113 (old Act) regarding “date fixed”. Quoted as part of divergent High Court approaches.
Alopi Parshad v. Court of Wards, AIR 1938 Lah 23 Interpretation of “date fixed” under Article 113. Illustrative of differing judicial opinions.
Lala Ram Sarup v. Court of Wards, AIR 1940 PC 19 Privy Council view on limitation for specific performance. Included among cases showing lack of uniformity.
Kruttiventi Mallikharjuna Rao v. Vemuri Pardhasaradhirao, AIR 1944 Mad 218 Meaning of “date fixed” under the old Act. Referenced to depict conflicting High Court stances.
R. Muniswami Goundar v. B.M. Shamanna Gouda, AIR 1950 Mad 820 Article 113 interpretation. Cited as part of comparative survey.
Hutchegowda v. H.M. Basaviah, AIR 1954 Mys 29 Same as above. Used to evidence diversity of views.
Purshottam Sava v. Kunverji Devji, AIR 1954 Sau 104 Same as above. Referenced for divergent approaches.
Lakshminarayana Reddiar v. Singaravelu Naicker, AIR 1963 Mad 24 Interpretation of “date fixed”. Part of the survey of High Court cases.
Shrikrishna Keshav Kulkarni v. Balaji Ganesh Kulkarni, AIR 1976 Bom 342 Limitation for specific performance. Cited for comparative analysis.
P. Sivan Muthiah v. John Sathiavasagam (1990) 1 MLJ 490 High Court ruling on Article 113. Included in list of divergent authorities.
Ramzan v. Hussaini (1990) 1 SCC 104 Held that “date fixed” may be ascertainable upon occurrence of a contingent event. Considered but distinguished as fact-specific.
Tarlok Singh v. Vijay Kumar Sabharwal (1996) 8 SCC 367 Supreme Court ruling applying Article 54. Discussed; found not to resolve current interpretative doubt.
Styles v. Wardle (1825) 4 B & C 908 English authority on the technical meaning of “date”. Quoted in lexical discussion of the term.
Bement & Dougherty v. Trenton Locomotive Co. (N.J.) Defines “date” as a time specified rather than abstract time. Used to support requirement of a specific calendar day.
Armitt v. Breame (1704) 2 Ld Raym 1076 Meaning of “date” in conveyancing. Cited in dictionary extracts.
Pewtress v. Annan (1841) 9 Dowl 828 Clarified distinction between “date” and “day of delivery”. Part of lexical analysis.
Simpson v. Marshall (citation not supplied) Observation that “date” commonly denotes a day. Quoted to emphasise ordinary meaning.
Howard Case, 91 ER 1219 “Date” as time when an instrument is executed. Included in definitional survey.
Cartwright v. MacCormack (1963) 1 WLR 18; (1963) 1 All ER 11 (CA) “Date” refers to a day rather than part of a day. Reinforces the requirement of a calendar date.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by contrasting the two limbs of Article 54. The first limb speaks of “the date fixed for the performance,” while the second uses the trigger “when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused.” Both, in the Court’s view, point to a definite, identifiable point in time. Drawing on multiple dictionary definitions and common-law authorities, the Bench noted that “date” ordinarily signifies a specific day on the calendar and that “fixed” connotes a crystallised, immutable point in time. Accordingly, the phrase “date fixed for the performance” must be confined to cases where the contract itself stipulates a particular calendar date. Where no such date exists, limitation commences only when the plaintiff is notified of the defendant’s refusal to perform.

The Court rejected the argument that the intent could be inferred from surrounding circumstances, finding such an approach incompatible with the statutory language. Earlier Supreme Court cases—Ramzan and Tarlok Singh—were read as fact-specific and not determinative of the present interpretative question.

Holding and Implications

REFERENCE ANSWERED: The expression “date fixed for the performance” in Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963 refers to a specific, definite calendar date.

Consequently, limitation for a suit seeking specific performance begins: (a) on the exact calendar date stipulated for performance, if such a date exists; or (b) when the plaintiff first receives notice of refusal, if no date was fixed. The matter is remitted to the Division Bench to decide the appeal on the merits in light of this authoritative interpretation. The ruling harmonises conflicting High Court views and furnishes clear guidance for future suits under Article 54 but does not otherwise create new substantive rights.

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    Ahmadsahab Abdul Mulla (2) (Dead) By Proposed Lrs. v. Bibijan And Others

    Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J.— A reference was made to a three-Judge Bench by reference order dated 21-4-2008 (2008) 5 SCC 361.

    2. The relevant question is: whether the use of the expression “date” used in Article 54 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 (in short “the Act”) is suggestive of a specific date in the calendar?

    3. In S. Brahmanand v. K.R Muthugopal (2005) 12 SCC 764 a Bench of this Court did not go into this issue. It decided the appeal on the factual scenario applicable. It was however noticed that several High Courts have dealt with the matter differently. In all these cases, for example, in Kashi Prasad v. Chhabi Lal AIR 1933 All 410 (2), Alopi Parshad v. Court of Wards AIR 1938 Lah 23, Lala Ram Sarup v. Court of Wards AIR 1940 PC 19, (1939-40) 67 IA 50, Kruttiventi Mallikharjuna Rao v. Vemuri Pardhasaradhirao AIR 1944 Mad 218, R. Muniswami Goundar v. B.M Shamanna Gouda AIR 1950 Mad 820, Hutchegowda v. H.M Basaviah AIR 1954 Mys 29, Purshottam Sava v. Kunverji Devji AIR 1954 Sau 104, Lakshminarayana Reddiar v. Singaravelu Naicker AIR 1963 Mad 24, Shrikrishna Keshav Kulkarni v. Balaji Ganesh Kulkarni AIR 1976 Bom 342 and P. Sivan Muthiah v. John Sathiavasagam (1990) 1 MLJ 490, the High Courts had decided the issue in the background of Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “the old Act”). Article 113 of the old Act is in pari materia with Article 54 of the Schedule to the Act.

    4. Some of the High Courts took the view that “the force of the word ‘fixed’ implies that the date should be fixed definitely and should not be left to be gathered from the surrounding circumstances of the case”. Some other High Courts, however, took a different view. There are two decisions of this Court i.e Ramzan v. Hussaini (1990) 1 SCC 104 and Tarlok Singh v. Vijay Kumar Sabharwal (1996) 8 SCC 367.

    5. In Tarlok Singh case (1996) 8 SCC 367 the factual scenario was noticed and the case was decided after referring to Article 54 of the Schedule to the Act. Ramzan case (1990) 1 SCC 104 related to the specific performance of contingent contract. It was held that the expression “date fixed for the performance” “need not be ascertainable in the face of the contract deed and may be ascertainable on the happening of a certain contingent event specified in the contract”.

    6. Article 54 of the Schedule to the Act reads as follows:

    “Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run

    54. For specific performance of a contract. Three years The date fixed for the performance, or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused.”

    7. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that purposive interpretation has to be given to the expression “the date fixed”.

    8. The judgments in Ramzan (1990) 1 SCC 104 and Tarlok Singh (1996) 8 SCC 367 cases were rendered in a different factual scenario and the discussions do not throw much light on the controversy at hand.

    9. According to Advanced Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 3rd Edn., 2005, the word “date” means as follows:

    “Date.—(As a noun) The point of time at which a transaction or event takes place; time given or specified; time in some way ascertained and fixed; in a deed, that part of the deed or writing which expresses the day of the month and year in which it was made, (2 Bl. Commn. 304; Tomlin). In Bement & Dougherty v. Trenton Locomotive, etc., Co. (NJ Law at p. 515) it is said: ‘The primary signification of the word date, is not time in the abstract, nor time taken absolutely but, as its derivation plainly indicates, time given or specified time in some way ascertained and fixed; this is the sense in which the word is commonly used. When we speak of the date of a deed, we do not mean the time when it was actually executed but the time of its execution, as given or stated in the deed itself.’
    ‘Where a deed bears no date, or an impossible date, and in the deed reference is made to the “date”, that word must be construed “delivery”; but if the deed bears a sensible date, the word “date”, occurring in the deed, means the day of the date, and not that of the delivery’ (Elph. 123, citing Styles v. Wardle (1825) 4 B & C 908, 107 ER 1297; …).
    ‘Date’, though sometimes used as the shortened form of ‘day of the date’, is not its synonym; but means the particular time on which an instrument is given, executed, or delivered (Howard case 91 ER 1219; Armitt v. Breame (1704) 2 Ld Raym 1076 and Pewtress v. Annan (1841) 9 Dowl 828, Dowl at pp. 834-35). …
    ‘The word “date” is much more commonly descriptive of a day than of any smaller division of time’ (per Stormonth Darling, L.O, Simpson v. Marshall).
    Date means day, so that where a cover note providing for temporary insurance of a motor car expires ‘15 days after date of commencement’ it runs for the full 15 days after the day on which it was to commence (Cartwright v. MacCormack (1963) 1 WLR 18, (1963) 1 All ER 11 (CA)).”

    10. “Fixed” in essence means having final or crystallised form or character not subject to change or fluctuation.

    11. The inevitable conclusion is that the expression “date fixed for the performance” is a crystallised notion. This is clear from the fact that the second part “time from which period begins to run” refers to a case where no such date is fixed. To put it differently, when date is fixed it means that there is a definite date fixed for doing a particular act. Even in the second part the stress is on “when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused”. Here again, there is a definite point of time, when the plaintiff notices the refusal. In that sense both the parts refer to definite dates. So, there is no question of finding out an intention from other circumstances.

    12. Whether the date was fixed or not the plaintiff had notice that performance is refused and the date thereof are to be established with reference to materials and evidence to be brought on record. The expression “date” used in Article 54 of the Schedule to the Act definitely is suggestive of a specified date in the calendar. We answer the reference accordingly. The matter shall now be placed before the Division Bench for deciding the issue on merits.

    13. The reference is disposed of accordingly.

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    Comments

    Ahmadsahab Abdul Mulla (2) (Dead) By Proposed Lrs. v. Bibijan And Others
    (Apr 1, 2009)