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2008 INSC 18
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
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Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 20 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993
  • Article 226 of the Constitution
  • Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002
  • Section (not specified), Statute (not specified)
  • Section not specified, Subsection not specified, of the 1983 Income Tax Act is not mentioned but it's implied that there are some other acts or articles which are not cited here.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2008 INSC 18
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 20 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993
  • Article 226 of the Constitution
  • Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002
  • Section (not specified), Statute (not specified)
  • Section not specified, Subsection not specified, of the 1983 Income Tax Act is not mentioned but it's implied that there are some other acts or articles which are not cited here.
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondents, Sunder Lal Jain and another, were sanctioned a credit facility of Rs 20 lakhs by the appellant, Oriental Bank of Commerce, on 12 December 1996. After the respondents defaulted, the Bank classified the account as a non-performing asset (NPA) on 31 March 2001 and, on 21 February 2002, filed OA No. 21 of 2002 before Debts Recovery Tribunal-III, Delhi. On 14 November 2003, DRT decreed the suit for Rs 20,27,862 with interest; a recovery certificate followed on 8 December 2003. The respondents did not appeal the decree but instead filed writ petitions (WP(C) Nos. 559 of 2005 and 560 of 2004) in the Delhi High Court seeking a direction that their account be treated as NPA from 31 March 2000 and that the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) Guidelines on one-time settlement be applied. By order dated 17 August 2005, the High Court directed the Bank to so declare the account, apply the Guidelines, and stay execution if payments were made. The Bank challenged that order before the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a writ of mandamus could compel the Bank to declare the respondents’ account as NPA from 31 March 2000 and apply the RBI’s revised compromise-settlement guidelines of 29 January 2003.
  2. Whether those RBI guidelines were applicable to the respondents’ account in light of its classification history.
  3. Whether the High Court could stay execution proceedings and cancel the DRT recovery certificate when no statutory appeal had been filed against the decree.
  4. Whether the High Court’s order could be defended as a consent order binding on the Bank.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • The DRT decree dated 14 November 2003 attained finality because the respondents never appealed; therefore the writ petition was not maintainable.
  • No consent was ever given by the Bank’s counsel to re-date the NPA classification; the High Court mis-construed a statement that the Bank would “consider” the request.
  • The RBI guidelines apply only to accounts classified as sub-standard as on 31 March 2000; the respondents’ account was performing during that period.
  • RBI guidelines are internal, non-statutory instructions that do not confer an enforceable legal right warranting mandamus.

Respondents’ Arguments

  • The High Court order was passed on the consent of both parties; consequently, the Bank is estopped from challenging it.
  • The RBI guidelines should govern the settlement because the account ought to have been classified as NPA from 31 March 2000.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen Coop. Society Ltd. v. Sipahi Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 145 Mandamus issues only where a statutory duty exists and the applicant possesses a legal right. Relied on to hold that no mandamus can compel the Bank because no statutory duty requires it to apply the RBI guidelines.
Lekhraj Sathramdas Lalvani v. N.M. Shah, AIR 1966 SC 334 Same principle on limits of mandamus. Referenced as part of the chain of authority limiting mandamus to statutory duties.
Rai Shivendra Bahadur v. Nalanda College, AIR 1962 SC 1210 Scope of writ jurisdiction and mandatory duties. Cited in support of the requirement of a legal duty for mandamus.
Umakant Saran v. State of Bihar, (1973) 1 SCC 485 Mandamus cannot enforce purely contractual or discretionary obligations. Used to reinforce that RBI guidelines, being non-statutory, do not create enforceable duties.

Court’s Reasoning and Analysis

1. Alleged consent: The Supreme Court found no actual consent by the Bank. The High Court merely recorded that the Bank “agreed to consider” re-dating the NPA, which amounts only to an undertaking to examine the possibility, not to consent.

2. Applicability of the 29 January 2003 RBI Guidelines: The Guidelines cover accounts that were sub-standard or doubtful/loss as on 31 March 2000. The respondents’ account was a performing account between 1 April 2000 and 31 March 2001 and was declared NPA only on 31 March 2001. Therefore, the Guidelines could not apply.

3. Nature of the Guidelines: The Court emphasised that the guidelines are executive instructions without statutory force. Borrowers have no vested right to their application; hence, mandamus cannot be issued to enforce them.

4. Principles governing mandamus: Citing established case law, the Court reiterated that mandamus lies only to enforce a statutory duty where the claimant has a legal right. No statute obliges the Bank to reclassify the account or extend one-time settlement benefits.

5. Effect on execution proceedings: Because the DRT decree was final and unchallenged, the High Court lacked authority in a writ petition to stay execution or cancel the recovery certificate. The respondents’ statutory remedy lay in an appeal under Section 20 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993.

6. Deviation from the Guidelines’ recovery terms: Even assuming applicability, the High Court’s direction for a two-year instalment plan conflicted with the Guidelines, which allow only one year.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED; HIGH COURT ORDER SET ASIDE.

Consequently, the DRT decree and recovery certificate remain fully enforceable, and execution proceedings may continue. The decision re-affirms that RBI’s compromise-settlement guidelines are non-statutory and cannot be enforced through mandamus, offering no new rule but reinforcing existing jurisprudence on the limited scope of writ jurisdiction against banks.

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    Oriental Bank Of Commerce v. Sunder Lal Jain And Another

    G.P Mathur, J.— Leave granted.

    2. This appeal, by special leave, has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 17-8-2005 of the Delhi High Court, by which a direction was issued to the appellant, Oriental Bank of Commerce to declare the respondents' account as non-performing asset (NPA) from 31-3-2000 and to apply the Reserve Bank of India Guidelines to their case and communicate the outstandings which shall be recoverable by quarterly instalments over a period of two years.

    3. The respondents, Sunder Lal Jain and another were sanctioned credit facility for Rs 20 lakhs on 12-12-1996. The respondent defaulted in repayment of the amount and their account was declared as NPA on 31-3-2001. On 21-2-2002, the appellant Oriental Bank of Commerce filed a petition against the respondents being OA No. 21 of 2002 before the Debts Recovery Tribunal III, Delhi (for short “DRT”). DRT passed a decree in favour of the appellant for recovery of Rs 20,27,862 along with interest on 14-11-2003. The appellant initiated execution proceedings for recovery of the amount from the respondents and a recovery certificate was issued on 8-12-2003. The respondents did not file any appeal challenging the decree passed by DRT. Instead, the respondents filed WP (C) No. 559 of 2005 and WP (C) No. 560 of 2004 before the Delhi High Court praying that a direction be issued to the appellant Oriental Bank of Commerce, to declare their account as NPA from 31-3-2000 and apply RBI Guidelines for reconciliation and settling the accounts with them.

    4. The petitions were disposed of by a short order on 17-8-2005 which reads as under:

    “The petitioners have a remedy available to them of filing an appeal against the recovery proceedings to DRT which remedy has not been taken and for which this petition is liable to be rejected. However, since this petition has been pending for quite some time before this Court and the first respondent has agreed to consider declaring the account as NPA from 31-3-2000, there is no impediment in disposing of this petition by the following order:
    First respondent Bank is directed to declare the petitioners' account as NPA from 31-3-2000 and apply the RBI Guidelines to their case and then to communicate the outstandings, which shall be recoverable by quarterly instalments over a period of two years.
    In case, this course works out and the petitioners after reconciling their accounts do not commit any default, the execution proceedings against them pending before the Recovery Officer shall be stayed and the recovery certificate passed against them shall stand cancelled. However, in case of default it shall be open to the first respondent Bank to activate the recovery proceedings against them. In that event, it shall be open to the petitioners to take any appropriate remedy, which they may have against the recovery certificate or its execution in law.”

    Feeling aggrieved by the abovenoted order, the appellant Oriental Bank of Commerce, has preferred this appeal.

    5. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the Bank had filed a suit for recovery of the amount and the same had been decreed on 14-11-2003 and thereafter a recovery certificate had also been issued on 8-12-2003 in the execution proceedings initiated by the appellant. The respondents did not file any appeal to challenge the decree passed by DRT and, therefore, the same attained finality. In these circumstances, the writ petition filed by the respondents to declare their account as NPA from 31-3-2000 and to apply the RBI Guidelines to their case was not at all maintainable and the order passed by the High Court is clearly erroneous in law. Learned counsel for the respondents has, on the other hand, tried to support the order passed by the High Court and has submitted that the same had been passed on consent of the parties and, therefore, it is not open to the appellant to challenge the same.

    6. Regarding the submission of learned counsel for the respondents that the order under challenge has been passed on consent of the parties, it may be noted that the High Court has recorded that “the first respondent has agreed to consider declaring the account as NPA from 31-3-2000”. Learned counsel for the appellant Bank has vehemently submitted that no consent had been given by the counsel for the Bank to declare the account as NPA from 31-3-2000, nor had any such instructions been given to the counsel by the appellant Bank. That apart, the order of the High Court mentions “has agreed to consider”. It only means that the Bank will examine and consider. “Consider” means to look at closely and carefully; to think or deliberate on; to take into account. There was thus no consent on the part of the appellant Bank to declare the account as NPA from 31-3-2000. A statement by a counsel for a party that his client will consider a particular suggestion given by the other side would not amount to a consent by the party concerned and an order passed on such a statement of the counsel cannot be said to be an order passed on consent. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the contention raised by learned counsel for the respondents that the impugned order of the High Court has been passed on the consent of the appellant Bank and consequently the present appeal is not maintainable.

    7. Before considering the submission made by learned counsel for the parties on merits of the case, it is necessary to take note of the essential features of the revised guidelines issued by Reserve Bank of India on 29-1-2003 regarding non-performing assets of public sector banks which read as under:

    “Revised guidelines for compromise settlement of chronic non-performing assets (NPAs) of public sector banks

    DBOD.BP.BC.65/21.04.117/2002-2003January 29, 2003
    Chairman and Managing Directors
    of all public sector banks
    Dear Sir,
    Please refer to our circular DBOD.BP.BC.11/21.01.040/99-00 dated 27th July, 2000, setting out the guidelines for compromise settlements of chronic NPAs up to Rs 5.00 crore.
    2. A review of compromise settlements of NPAs through the above scheme has revealed that the progress of recovery of NPAs through this mechanism has been moderate. In consultation with the Government of India, it has been decided to give one more opportunity to the borrowers to come forward for settlement of their outstanding dues. Hence fresh guidelines are now issued, which will provide a simplified, non-discretionary and non-discriminatory mechanism for compromise settlement of chronic NPAs below the prescribed value ceiling. All public sector banks should uniformly implement these guidelines, so that maximum realisation of dues is achieved from the stock of NPAs within the stipulated time.
    3.***
    (A) Guidelines for compromise settlement of chronic NPAs up to Rs 10.00 crore
    (i) Coverage
    (a) The revised guidelines will cover all NPAs in all sectors irrespective of the nature of business which have become doubtful or loss as on 31st March, 2000 with outstanding balance of Rs 10.00 crore and below on the cut-off date.
    (b) The guidelines will also cover NPAs classified as substandard as on 31st March, 2000, which have subsequently become doubtful or loss.
    (c) These guidelines will cover cases on which the banks have initiated action under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 and also cases pending before courts/DRTs/BIFR, subject to consent decree being obtained from the courts/DRTs/BIFR.
    (d) Cases of wilful default, fraud and malfeasance will not be covered.
    (e) The last date for receipt of applications from borrowers would be as at the close of business on 30th April, 2003. The processing under the revised guidelines should be completed by 31st October, 2003.
    (ii) Settlement formula — amount and cut-off date
    (a) NPAs classified as doubtful or loss as on 31st March, 2000
    The minimum amount that should be recovered under the revised guidelines in respect of compromise settlement of NPAs classified as doubtful or loss as on 31st March, 2000 would be 100% of the outstanding balance in the account as on the date of transfer to the protested bills account or the amount outstanding as on the date on which the account was categorised as doubtful NPAs, whichever happened earlier, as the case may be;
    (b) NPAs classified as substandard as on 31st March, 2000 which became doubtful or loss subsequently
    The minimum amount that should be recovered in respect of NPAs classified as substandard as on 31st March, 2000 which became doubtful or loss subsequently would be 100% of the outstanding balance in the account as on the date of transfer to the protested bills account or the amount as on the date on which the account was categorised as doubtful NPAs, whichever happened earlier, as the case may be, plus interest at existing prime lending rate from 1st April, 2000 till the date of final payment.
    (iii) Payment
    The amount of settlement arrived at in both the above cases, should preferably be paid in one lump sum. In cases where the borrowers are unable to pay the entire amount in one lump sum, at least 25% of the amount of settlement should be paid upfront and the balance amount of 75% should be recovered in instalments within a period of one year together with interest at the existing prime lending rate from the date of settlement up to the date of final payment….”

    8. A perusal of the aforesaid revised guidelines issued by Reserve Bank of India on 29-1-2003 for compromise settlement of chronic non-performing assets (NPAs) of public sector banks will show that the same will be applicable and will cover NPAs classified as substandard as on 31-3-2000 which have subsequently become doubtful or loss. The revised guidelines have no application where the NPAs have not been classified as substandard as on 31-3-2000. It is not in dispute that the account of the respondents was a performing account between 1-4-2000 and 31-3-2001. According to the records of the Bank, the account was consigned to protest bill account on 15-10-2001 and was declared as NPA as per prudential norms of RBI on 31-3-2001. The respondents contested the case before DRT and did not admit their liability. No such plea was raised that their account had become NPA as on 31-3-2000 before DRT. Therefore, the revised guidelines issued by Reserve Bank of India on 29-1-2003 for compromise settlement of chronic non-performing assets (NPAs) of public sector banks were not at all applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case and no direction could be issued to declare the respondents' account as NPA from 31-3-2000.

    9. The guidelines further provide that in case where borrowers are unable to pay the entire amount in lump sum, at least 25% of the amount of settlement should be paid upfront and the balance amount of 75% should be recovered in instalments within a period of one year together with interest. The High Court, in the impugned order, has directed that the amount should be recovered by the appellant Bank in quarterly instalments over a period of two years. This is again contrary to the revised guidelines, which provide a period of one year only for recovery of the entire amount.

    10. It is important to note that the revised guidelines issued by Reserve Bank of India on 29-1-2003 are only in the nature of internal guidelines for the banks and financial institutions. They are purely executive instructions and have no statutory force. They do not create any right in favour of the borrowers. In order to avail relief under the guidelines, the eligibility criteria must be strictly fulfilled and one of them is that the account must be an NPA as on 31-3-2000. What the respondents want is that a writ of mandamus be issued commanding the appellant Bank to declare the respondents' account as NPA from 31-3-2000 and apply the RBI Guidelines to their case whereby their liability towards the appellant Bank will be considerably reduced by way of one-time settlement.

    11. The principles on which a writ of mandamus can be issued have been stated as under in The Law of Extraordinary Legal Remedies by F.G Ferris and F.G Ferris, Jr.:

    “Note 187.—Mandamus, at common law, is a highly prerogative writ, usually issuing out of the highest court of general jurisdiction, in the name of the sovereignty, directed to any natural person, corporation or inferior court within the jurisdiction, requiring them to do some particular thing therein specified, and which appertains to their office or duty. Generally speaking, it may be said that mandamus is a summary writ, issuing from the proper court, commanding the official or board to which it is addressed to perform some specific legal duty to which the party applying for the writ is entitled of legal right to have performed.
    Note 192.—Mandamus is, subject to the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, the appropriate remedy to enforce a plain, positive, specific and ministerial duty presently existing and imposed by law upon officers and others who refuse or neglect to perform such duty, when there is no other adequate and specific legal remedy and without which there would be a failure of justice. The chief function of the writ is to compel the performance of public duties prescribed by statute, and to keep subordinate and inferior bodies and tribunals exercising public functions within their jurisdictions. It is not necessary, however, that the duty be imposed by statute; mandamus lies as well for the enforcement of a common law duty.
    Note 196.—Mandamus is not a writ of right. Its issuance unquestionably lies in the sound judicial discretion of the court, subject always to the well-settled principles which have been established by the courts. An action in mandamus is not governed by the principles of ordinary litigation where the matters alleged on one side and not denied on the other are taken as true, and judgment pronounced thereon as of course. While mandamus is classed as a legal remedy, its issuance is largely controlled by equitable principles. Before granting the writ the court may, and should, look to the larger public interest which may be concerned—an interest which private litigants are apt to overlook when striving for private ends. The court should act in view of all the existing facts, and with due regard to the consequences which will result. It is in every case a discretion dependent upon all the surrounding facts and circumstances.
    Note 206.— … The correct rule is that mandamus will not lie where the duty is clearly discretionary and the party upon whom the duty rests has exercised his discretion reasonably and within his jurisdiction, that is, upon facts sufficient to support his action.”

    12. These very principles have been adopted in our country. In Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen Coop. Society Ltd. v. Sipahi Singh (1977) 4 SCC 145, AIR 1977 SC 2149 after referring to the earlier decisions in Lekhraj Sathramdas Lalvani v. N.M Shah AIR 1966 SC 334, Rai Shivendra Bahadur (Dr.) v. Nalanda College AIR 1962 SC 1210 and Umakant Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar (1973) 1 SCC 485, AIR 1973 SC 964 this Court observed as follows in para 15 of the Reports (SCC): (Sipahi Singh case (1977) 4 SCC 145, AIR 1977 SC 2149)

    “15. … There is abundant authority in favour of the proposition that a writ of mandamus can be granted only in a case where there is a statutory duty imposed upon the officer concerned and there is a failure on the part of that officer to discharge the statutory obligation. The chief function of a writ is to compel performance of public duties prescribed by statute and to keep subordinate tribunals and officers exercising public functions within the limit of their jurisdiction. It follows, therefore, that in order that mandamus may issue to compel the authorities to do something, it must be shown that there is a statute which imposes a legal duty and the aggrieved party has a legal right under the statute to enforce its performance. … In the instant case, it has not been shown by Respondent 1 that there is any statute or rule having the force of law which casts a duty on Respondents 2 to 4 which they failed to perform. All that is sought to be enforced is an obligation flowing from a contract which, as already indicated, is also not binding and enforceable. Accordingly, we are clearly of the opinion that Respondent 1 was not entitled to apply for grant of a writ of mandamus under Article 226 of the Constitution and the High Court was not competent to issue the same.”

    Therefore, in order that a writ of mandamus may be issued, there must be a legal right with the party asking for the writ to compel the performance of some statutory duty cast upon the authorities. The respondents have not been able to show that there is any statute or rule having the force of law which casts a duty on the appellant Bank to declare their account as NPA from 31-3-2000 and apply RBI Guidelines to their case.

    13. The High Court, therefore, erred in issuing a writ of mandamus directing the appellant Bank to declare the respondents' account as NPA from 31-3-2000 and to apply the RBI Guidelines to their case and communicate the outstandings which shall be recoverable by quarterly instalments over a period of two years. The later part of the order passed by the High Court wherein a direction has been issued to stay the recovery proceedings and the recovery certificate issued against the respondents has been cancelled is also wholly illegal as the decree passed by DRT had attained finality and proceedings for execution of decree could not be stayed in an independent writ petition when the respondents had not chosen to assail the decree by filing an appeal, which is a statutory remedy provided under Section 20 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993.

    14. In view of the discussions made above, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment and order dated 17-8-2005 passed by the High Court is set aside. The appellant will be entitled to its costs.

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    Oriental Bank Of Commerce v. Sunder Lal Jain And Another
    (Jan 8, 2008)