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Citation Codes
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2008 INSC 944
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
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Acts
  • Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
  • Section 13(1)(e) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2008 INSC 944
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
  • Section 13(1)(e) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent, an Engineer-in-Chief in the Rural Development Engineering Department, Karnataka, was accused of possessing assets disproportionate to his known sources of income, constituting an offence under Section 13(1)(e) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. On 12 June 2000 the Superintendent of Police (S.P.), Karnataka Lokayukta, authorised an Inspector to register and investigate the case. A house search on 15-16 June 2000 led to seizure of documents relating to the respondent and close family members.

Within a month, the respondent invoked Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the Karnataka High Court seeking to quash the S.P.’s order, the investigation, and the resulting FIR. In 2006 the High Court allowed the petition, holding (i) that the six-year delay in filing a charge-sheet vitiated the proceedings, and (ii) that the S.P. had not recorded reasons while delegating investigation to an Inspector. The State appealed to the Supreme Court, leading to the present decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the criminal proceedings on the ground of a six-year delay in completion of investigation and filing of the charge-sheet.
  2. Whether the authorisation issued by the Superintendent of Police to an Inspector, under Section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, was legally deficient for want of recorded reasons.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (State/Lokayukta) Arguments

  • The High Court misapplied its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC; when the petition was filed there was no delay, and subsequent delay was partly attributable to the respondent.
  • Delay alone is not a sufficient ground to quash proceedings, particularly where the respondent contributed to it.
  • The S.P.’s order did, in fact, disclose reasons and satisfied the requirements of Section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

Respondent Arguments

  • The alleged disproportionate assets figure had substantially reduced after investigation, supporting the inference that the case lacked merit.
  • Prolonged delay itself warrants quashing, as it infringes the right to a speedy trial.
  • The S.P.’s order failed to record adequate reasons, making the delegation to an Inspector invalid as per State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 Requirement that a Superintendent of Police record reasons when delegating investigation under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The High Court relied on it; the Supreme Court distinguished it, noting that unlike in Bhajan Lal, the S.P. here gave detailed reasons.
State of M.P. v. Ram Singh, (2000) 5 SCC 88 Clarified Bhajan Lal; held that an S.P.’s authorisation is valid if reasons are discernible. Used as primary authority to uphold the S.P.’s order in the present case.
P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578 Affirmed that no rigid time-limits exist for criminal trials; delay must be assessed case-by-case. Cited to reject the High Court’s view that delay alone mandates quashing.
Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225 Laid down illustrative guidelines on the right to speedy trial. Re-affirmed through Ramachandra Rao; forms the base for analysing delay.
Common Cause v. Union of India, (1996) 4 SCC 33 & (1996) 6 SCC 775 Earlier observations on delay that created ambiguity. Clarified by Ramachandra Rao; mentioned to show evolution of law on delay.
Raj Deo Sharma (I) & (II), (1998) 7 SCC 507; (1999) 7 SCC 604 Further cases on delay and speedy trial. Listed among cases clarified in Ramachandra Rao.
H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi, AIR 1955 SC 196 Illegality in investigation does not per se vitiate trial unless it causes failure of justice. Quoted extensively to reinforce that defects in investigation are curable.
Parbhu v. Emperor, AIR 1944 PC 73 Support for the principle that trial competence is unaffected by investigation defects. Referred to within H.N. Rishbud quotation.
Lumbhardar Zutshi v. R., AIR 1950 PC 26 Same principle as Parbhu. Referenced within H.N. Rishbud discussion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. Alleged Delay: The Court observed that the FIR was lodged on 12-6-2000 and a Section 482 petition was filed barely a month later, showing no initial delay. It reiterated that no universal rule allows quashing solely for investigative delay; courts must examine whether the delay is deliberate, prejudicial, or attributable to the accused. Relying on the seven-judge decision in P. Ramachandra Rao, the Court held that the High Court erred in treating delay as an automatic ground for quashing. It also noted that the High Court paradoxically authorised a fresh investigation while finding the earlier one too late.

2. Validity of S.P.’s Authorisation: Analysing the text of the 12-6-2000 order, the Court found it “more elaborate” than the authorisation upheld in Ram Singh. Reasons were clearly recorded: the S.P. had examined material, was satisfied of a prima facie case, and invoked specific powers under Sections 17 and 18 of the Act. Hence, the High Court’s reliance on Bhajan Lal was misplaced; the factual matrix differed, and Section 19(3) of the Act (prejudice test) had been overlooked.

Because both grounds relied on by the High Court were unsustainable, the Supreme Court concluded that the quashing order could not stand.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED; HIGH COURT ORDER SET ASIDE.

Consequences: The criminal proceedings, including the charge-sheet already filed, are revived and directed to be tried expeditiously—preferably by the end of February 2009. The judgment does not announce a new legal principle but re-affirms existing law on (i) the limited role of delay in quashing proceedings and (ii) the sufficiency of reasoned authorisation by a Superintendent of Police under the Prevention of Corruption Act.

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    Superintendent Of Police, Karnataka Lokayukta And Another v. B. Srinivas .

    Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J.— Leave granted.

    2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court accepting the petition filed by the respondent under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short “the Code”). Prayer in the petition was to quash the order dated 12-6-2000 passed by the Superintendent of Police, Karnataka Lokayukta and investigation pursuant to the said order, including lodging of the first information report.

    3. At the relevant point of time the respondent was working as an Engineer-in-Chief of the Rural Development Engineering Department, Bangalore. Lokayukta Police had registered a case in respect of offences punishable under Section 13(1)(e) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (in short “the Act”).

    4. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

    Search was conducted in the house of the respondent on 15-6-2000/16-6-2000 and certain records and documents were seized. Documents relating to the respondent, his son-in-law, his daughter and son were seized. The Superintendent of Police had authorised the Inspector of Police to conduct investigation. The petition was filed essentially on three grounds; firstly, the authorisation given by the Superintendent of Police to conduct the investigation was contrary to the view expressed by this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335. The basis for such stand was that no reason had been indicated as to why it was entrusted to the Inspector. When the petition was finally heard in the year 2006, second stand taken was that there was inordinate delay of 6 years in filing the charge-sheet. The High Court accepted both the stands and quashed the proceedings. The third stand was that exaggerated figures were shown in the charge-sheet. This aspect does not appear to have been dealt with by the High Court. It, however, permitted the prosecution to take action on the facts afresh keeping in view certain aspects referred to in the judgment.

    5. In support of the appeal, Mr Sanjay Hegde, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the High Court erroneously exercised jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. When the petition was initially filed, there was no question of any delay. An amendment had been sought for in the petition and prayer was to quash the order passed by the Superintendent of Police and further part of the investigation done by the Inspector of Police, Respondent 2. It is pointed out that the High Court erroneously observed that there was delay in filing the charge-sheet. In any event, the delay was occasioned on account of the part played by the respondent and delay, if any, alone cannot be a ground to quash the legitimate proceedings.

    6. Further, it is pointed out that the High Court has erroneously held that no reasons were indicated. Reference is made in the order passed by the Superintendent of Police to contend that reasons in fact had been indicated.

    7. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that though the High Court has not specifically referred to this aspect, the fact that after completing investigation the amount of alleged disproportionate assets which was initially stated to be more than rupees one crore has been sealed down substantially, cannot be lost sight of.

    8. Further, it is submitted that delay itself can be a ground to quash the proceedings. It is also submitted that the High Court has rightly observed that reasons are not discernible from the order passed by the Superintendent of Police while authorising investigation by the Inspector.

    9. We shall first deal with the question of alleged delay. It is of some significance to note that an FIR was lodged on 12-6-2000 and few days thereafter the petition under Section 482 was filed. On the basis of the FIR the house of the respondent was searched on 15th and 16th June. The petition was filed on 11-7-2000. Application seeking permission to substitute additional grounds was filed in the year 2005. It is not a case where charge-sheet had not been filed or that there was no explanation for the delay.

    10. There is no general and wide proposition of law formulated that whenever there is delay on the part of the investigating agency in completing the investigation, such a delay can be a ground for quashing the FIR. It would be difficult to formulate inflexible guidelines or rigid principles in determining as to whether the accused has been deprived of fair trial on account of delay or protracted investigation; it would depend on various factors including whether such a delay was reasonably long or caused deliberately or intentionally to hamper the defence of the accused or whether the delay was inevitable in the nature of things or whether it was due to dilatory tactics adopted by the accused. It would depend upon certain peculiar facts and circumstances of each case i.e the volume of evidence collected by the investigating agency, the nature and gravity of the offence for which the accused has been charge-sheeted in a given case. The nexus between whole and some of the above factors is of considerable relevance. Therefore, whether the accused has been deprived of fair trial on account of protracted investigation has to come on facts. He has also to establish that he had no role in the delay. Every delay does not necessarily occur because of the accused.

    11. A seven-Judge Bench of this Court in P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka (2002) 4 SCC 578 affirmed the view taken in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S Nayak (1992) 1 SCC 225 and clarified confusion created by certain observations in Common Cause, A Registered Society v. Union of India (1996) 4 SCC 33, Common Cause, A Registered Society v. Union of India (1996) 6 SCC 775, Raj Deo Sharma v. State of Bihar (1998) 7 SCC 507 and Raj Deo Sharma (II) v. State of Bihar (1999) 7 SCC 604. It was observed that the decision in A.R Antulay case (1992) 1 SCC 225 still holds the field and the guidelines laid down in the said case are not exhaustive but only illustrative. They are not intended to operate as hard-and-fast rules or to be applied like a straitjacket formula. Their applicability would depend on the factual situations of each case. It is difficult to foresee all situations and no generalisation can be made. It has also been held that it is neither advisable nor feasible nor judicially permissible to draw or prescribe an outer limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings. Whenever there is any allegation of violation of right to speedy trial the court has to perform by balancing the act by taking into consideration all attending circumstances and to decide whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case. As noted above, one month after the order relating to investigation and lodging of FIR, a petition under Section 482 of the Code was filed before the High Court.

    12. It is interesting to note that while the High Court quashed the proceedings because of alleged delayed investigation, it permitted the authorities to take decision to continue the proceedings. Therefore, the first ground on which the High Court interfered cannot be maintained.

    13. The other question relates to the alleged deficiency in authorisation made by the Superintendent of Police authorising the Inspector to investigate the case. The High Court placed strong reliance on Bhajan Lal case 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, more particularly, in para 134. Though the High Court referred to certain decisions of this Court, the decision in State of M.P v. Ram Singh (2000) 5 SCC 88 was not followed. It is to be noted that in Ram Singh case (2000) 5 SCC 88 the view expressed in Bhajan Lal case 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 has been explained after referring to the relevant para.

    14. The order passed by the Superintendent of Police reads as follows:

    “Karnataka LokayuktaSuperintendent of Police
    No: KLA/PW/SP/City.Dn/1999-2000City Division,
    M.S Buildings,
    Dr. Ambedkar Veedhi,
    Bangalore 560 001.
    Dated: 12-6-2000.
    Sub.: Possession of disproportionate assets to the known source of income by Shri B. Srinivas, Engineer-in-Chief, Rural Development Engineering Department-reg.
    Ref.: Report of Shri M.D Khalander, presently working as Police Inspector, Police Wing, City Division, Karnataka Lokayukta.
    I have gone through the report of Shri M.D Khalander, presently working as Police Inspector, Police Wing, City Division, Karnataka Lokayukta, Bangalore relating to inquiry report (IE) receipt of credible information that Shri B. Srinivas at present working as Engineer-in-Chief, Rural Development Engineering Department has acquired properties disproportionate to his known source of income to the extent of about Rs 1,13,000,00 and thereby committed offence under Section 13(1)(e) r/w Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
    From the materials placed before me with the application of my mind I am satisfied that a prima facie case is made against Shri B. Srinivas under Section 13(1)(e) r/w Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
    Therefore by virtue of the power vested in me, S.G Ramesh, Superintendent of Police, Police Wing, City Division, Karnataka Lokayukta, Bangalore, order under the provisions of Section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, Shri M.D Khalander, Police Inspector, Police Wing, City Division, Karnataka Lokayukta, Bangalore to register a case under Section 13(1)(e) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against Shri B. Srinivas, Engineer-in-Chief, Rural Development Engineering Department, Bangalore and investigate the said case.
    Further under Section 18 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, Shri M.D Khalander is authorised to inspect the bankers' books, so far as it relates to money on behalf of such person and take or cause to be taken certified copies of the relevant entries therefrom and the bank concerned shall be bound to assist the Police Inspector, Police Wing, City Division, Karnataka Lokayukta, Bangalore in the exercise of his powers under this section.
    To:sd/-
    M.D Khalander,Superintendent of Police,
    Police Inspector,City Division,
    Police Wing, City Division,Office of the Lokayukta,
    BangaloreBangalore”

    15. In Ram Singh case (2000) 5 SCC 88 this Court indicated the position lucidly after referring to Bhajan Lal case 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 in para 14. The same reads as follows: (Ram Singh case (2000) 5 SCC 88)

    “14. It may be noticed at this stage that a three-Judge Bench of this Court in H.N Rishbud v. State of Delhi AIR 1955 SC 196 had held that a defect or illegality in investigation, however serious, has no direct bearing on the competence or the procedure relating to cognizance or trial. Referring to the provisions of Sections 190, 193, 195 to 199 and 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 in the context of an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, the Court held: (AIR pp. 203-04, para 9)
    ‘9. … A defect or illegality in investigation, however serious, has no direct bearing on the competence or the procedure relating to cognizance or trial. No doubt a police report which results from an investigation is provided in Section 190 CrPC as the material on which cognizance is taken. But it cannot be maintained that a valid and legal police report is the foundation of the jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance. Section 190 CrPC is one out of a group of sections under the heading “Conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings”. The language of this section is in marked contrast with that of the other sections of the group under the same heading i.e Sections 193 and 195 to 199.
    These latter sections regulate the competence of the court and bar its jurisdiction in certain cases excepting in compliance therewith. But Section 190 does not. While no doubt, in one sense, clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 190(1) are conditions requisite for taking of cognizance, it is not possible to say that cognizance on an invalid police report is prohibited and is therefore a nullity. Such an invalid report may still fall either under clause (a) or (b) of Section 190(1) (whether it is the one or the other we need not pause to consider) and in any case cognizance so taken is only in the nature of error in a proceeding antecedent to the trial. To such a situation Section 537 CrPC which is in the following terms is attracted:
    “537. Finding or sentence when reversible by reason of error or omission in charge or other proceedings.—Subject to the provisions hereinbefore contained, no finding, sentence or order passed by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered … on appeal or revision on account—
    (a) of any error, omission or irregularity in the complaint, summons, warrant, charge, proclamation, order, judgment or other proceedings before or during trial or in any inquiry or other proceedings under this Code,
    (b)-(c) ***
    (d) … unless such error, omission, irregularity, or misdirection has in fact occasioned a failure of justice.”
    If, therefore, cognizance is in fact taken, on a police report vitiated by the breach of a mandatory provision relating to investigation, there can be no doubt that the result of the trial which follows it cannot be set aside unless the illegality in the investigation can be shown to have brought about a miscarriage of justice. That an illegality committed in the course of investigation does not affect the competence and the jurisdiction of the court for trial is well settled as appears from the cases in Parbhu v. Emperor AIR 1944 PC 73 and Lumbhardar Zutshi v. R. AIR 1950 PC 26’
    It further held: (H.N Rishbud case AIR 1955 SC 196, AIR p. 205, para 10)
    ‘10. … In our opinion, therefore, when such a breach is brought to the notice of the court at an early stage of the trial, the court will have to consider the nature and extent of the violation and pass appropriate orders for such reinvestigation as may be called for, wholly or partly, and by such officer as it considers appropriate with reference to the requirements of Section 5-A of the Act. It is in the light of the above considerations that the validity or otherwise of the objection as to the violation of Section 5(4) of the Act has to be decided and the course to be adopted in these proceedings, determined.’
    In Bhajan Lal case 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 this Court had found on facts that the SP had passed the order mechanically and in a very casual manner regardless of the settled principles of law. The provisions of Section 17 of the Act had not been complied with. As earlier noticed the SP while authorising the SHO to investigate had made only an endorsement to the effect ‘Please register the case and investigate’. The SP was shown to be not aware either of the allegations or the nature of the offences and the pressure of the workload requiring investigation by an Inspector. There is no denial of the fact that in cases against the respondents in these appeals, even in the absence of the authority of the SP the investigating officer was in law authorised to investigate the offence falling under Section 13 of the Act with the exception of one as is described under sub-section (1)(e) of the Act. After registration of the FIR the Superintendent of Police in the instant appeals is shown to be aware and conscious of the allegations made against the respondents, the FIR registered against them and pending investigations. The order passed by the SP in the case of Ram Singh on 12-12-1994 with respect to a crime registered in 1992 was to the effect:
    ‘In exercise of powers conferred by the provisions on me, under Section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, I, P.K Runwal, Superintendent of Police, Special Police Establishment, Division I, Lokayukta Karyalaya, Gwalior Division, Gwalior (M.P), authorise Shri D.S Rana, Inspector (SPE), Lak-Gwl (M.P) to investigate Crime No. 103 of 1992 under Sections 13(1)(e) and 23(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against Shri Ram Singh, DO, Excise, Batul (M.P).’
    Similar orders have been passed in the other two cases as well. The reasons for entrustment of investigation to the Inspector can be discerned from the order itself. The appellant State is, therefore, justified in submitting that the facts of Bhajan Lal case 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 were distinguishable as in the instant case the Superintendent of Police appears to have applied his mind and passed the order authorising the investigation by an Inspector under the peculiar circumstances of the case. The reasons for entrustment of investigation were obvious. The High Court should not have liberally construed the provisions of the Act in favour of the accused resulting in closure of the trial of the serious charges made against the respondents in relation to commission of offences punishable under an Act legislated to curb the illegal and corrupt practices of the public officers. It is brought to our notice that under similar circumstances the High Court had quashed the investigation and consequent proceedings in a case registered against Shri Ram Babu Gupta against which Criminal Appeal No. 1754 of 1986 was filed in this Court which was allowed on 27-9-1986 by setting aside the order of the High Court with a direction to the trial court to proceed with the case in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made therein.”

    16. If one looks at the order passed, which formed the subject-matter of challenge in Ram Singh case (2000) 5 SCC 88 it is crystal clear that the order passed in the present case by the Superintendent of Police is more elaborate and as rightly submitted by learned counsel for the appellant, the reasons are clearly discernible. Even otherwise, the effect of Section 19(3) of the Act relating to prejudice has been completely lost sight of by the High Court. The second reason indicated by the High Court to quash the proceedings also has no substance.

    17. The inevitable conclusion is that the order passed by the High Court is indefensible and is set aside. However, it would be in the interest of justice if the trial is completed on the basis of the charge-sheet filed as early as practicable preferably by the end of February 2009.

    18. The appeal is allowed.

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    Superintendent Of Police, Karnataka Lokayukta And Another v. B. Srinivas .
    (Aug 18, 2008)