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Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
007 INSC 1313
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • The Societies Registration Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
007 INSC 1313
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • The Societies Registration Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, a society running an educational institution, applied to the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) for allotment of four acres of land to establish a senior secondary school. The Institutional Allotment Committee recommended allotment of the requested four acres on 23-10-1998, but DDA later adopted a policy decision (October 1999) limiting allotments for senior secondary schools to two acres. While another applicant—Shri Venkateshwara Educational Society—had already received four acres on 25-08-1999, the appellant was offered only two acres and was required to produce updated financial information. Its writ petition challenging the decision was dismissed by a Single Judge of the Delhi High Court, and that dismissal was upheld by a Division Bench on 07-09-2005. The present appeal challenges the Division Bench decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether DDA could lawfully restrict land allotment for senior secondary schools to two acres when the Delhi Master Plan contemplated an allotment of four acres.
  2. Whether the appellant was subjected to discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis Shri Venkateshwara Educational Society, which had obtained four acres prior to the October 1999 policy.
  3. Whether the Central Government’s approval of DDA’s recommendations involved excessive delegation of its statutory authority.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The Master Plan required allotment of four acres; DDA’s two-acre policy is ultra vires.
  • Recommendations for four acres were made both for the appellant and for Shri Venkateshwara Educational Society, yet only the latter received the full allotment, amounting to discrimination.
  • Shri Venkateshwara Educational Society was not a necessary party to the writ petition because no relief was sought against it, and therefore its absence could not justify dismissal.
  • The Central Government had indicated that land size for senior secondary schools should not be reduced.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The High Court judgment contained no error; the two-acre policy was validly adopted and approved.
  • No concrete or specific plea of discrimination was raised in the writ petition, leaving the respondent with nothing to rebut.
  • Official Central Government records showed due consideration and final approval of DDA’s recommendations, negating any claim of excessive delegation.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s decision on several grounds:

  • Validity of the Two-Acre Policy: The policy limiting allotments to two acres was adopted in October 1999. There was no evidence of any allotment of four acres made after that date. Thus, the policy applied uniformly and lawfully.
  • Discrimination Claim: The allegation that the appellant was treated differently from Shri Venkateshwara Educational Society was deemed “absolutely vague.” The writ petition contained only a general statement, lacking particulars of the alleged discrimination; consequently, the High Court could not adjudicate the point, and the respondent had no opportunity to answer it.
  • Procedural Default: The appellant did not advance the discrimination argument before the Single Judge, nor did it seek review. The Court emphasized that a judge’s record “must be accepted as correct,” and the absence of an affidavit or other evidence prevented the appellate court from revisiting factual findings.
  • Central Government Approval and Delegation: File notings demonstrated that the Central Government considered and approved DDA’s recommendations; hence, there was no excessive delegation of authority.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED WITH COSTS.

The appellant remains entitled only to the two-acre allotment offered by DDA, and must pay costs assessed at ₹25,000. The decision leaves intact DDA’s October 1999 policy and imposes no new legal precedent, its impact being confined to the parties in this case.

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    Mount Carmel School Society v. Dda .

    S.B Sinha, J.— Leave granted.

    2. This appeal is directed against a judgment and order of a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court dated 7-9-2005 passed in LPA No. 404 of 2003.

    3. The appellant is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act. It runs an educational institution. It applied for allotment of four acres of land for running a senior secondary school before the Delhi Development Authority. The Institutional Allotment Committee which was constituted by the Authority made recommendations for allotment of four acres of land. Indisputably, the competent authority of DDA took a policy decision only to allot two acres of land.

    4. Several writ petitions were filed which by reason of the impugned judgment have been dismissed by a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court. Before embarking on the questions raised before us, we may place on record that except the present appeal, other appeals were heard and dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court (coram — Hon'ble B.P Singh and P.K Balasubramanyam, JJ.). The said order, however, is not a reasoned one.

    5. Mr K.K Rai, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, submitted that the factual scenario obtaining in the present appeal is different from the others, inasmuch as recommendations of allotment of four acres of land were made both in its favour as also in favour of one Shri Venkateshwara Educational Society; but whereas in the case of the latter society four acres of land was directed to be allotted, the appellant was denied of a similar grant.

    6. The High Court, learned counsel argued, misdirected itself in passing the impugned judgment insofar as it failed to take into consideration that the said Shri Venkateshwara Educational Society was not a necessary party in the writ petition as no relief was claimed against it, inasmuch as if the writ petition were to be allowed, the said society would not have suffered any prejudice.

    7. Mr V.B Saharya, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, on the other hand, supported the impugned judgment.

    8. The question which arose for consideration before the High Court was as to whether the Delhi Master Plan having provided for allotment of four acres of land for running of a secondary school, the Delhi Development Authority could take a policy decision of allotment only of two acres of land.

    9. We have noticed hereinbefore that a large number of societies applied for allotment of land for setting up senior secondary schools. A recommendation had been made in favour of the appellant by the Institutional Allotment Committee on or about 23-10-1998. Indisputably, similar recommendations had been made in favour of other societies as well, including the said Shri Venkateshwara Educational Society. Recommendations of the Committee, however, do not appear to have been approved by the Authority. It furthermore appears that the appellant was asked to send its latest bank balance certificate and/or financial status.

    10. The Lt. Governor, who is the Chairman of the Society, had also asked for certain clarifications pertaining to constructions of the school building. On or about 9-3-2000, a provisional allotment was made but, allegedly, the appellant Society failed to furnish an undertaking within the period stipulated therefor.

    11. Indisputably, the Vice-Chairman of the Delhi Development Authority made recommendations for allotment of only two acres of land in favour of the appellant. Shri Venkateshwara Educational Society, however, was allotted a land measuring four acres way back on 25-8-1999.

    12. The policy decision of the Authority which was impugned in the writ petition was taken in October 1999. It has not been shown before us that any allotment has been made in favour of any society allotting land having an area of four acres after October 1999.

    13. We may furthermore notice that the plea of discrimination raised in the writ petition was absolutely vague as it was merely averred:

    “The petitioner also wrote to Respondent 1 on 24-3-2000 requesting for allotment of 1.6 hectares of land at the prevailing rate of Rs 30 lakhs per acre in 1996 when the application for land was made and other similarly situated institutions were allotted land….”

    14. Grounds taken in the writ petition in this behalf also did not specify that the appellant had been discriminated against vis-à-vis the said Shri Venkateshwara Educational Society or any other allottee. Details of the grant in favour of the said society were not furnished. In absence of any specific contention having been raised, it was not possible for the respondent to furnish any reply thereto.

    15. No argument also appears to have been advanced in this behalf before the learned Single Judge. The memo of appeal of the appellant was not supported by any affidavit affirmed either by one of its authorised representatives who was present in Court or by the advocate appearing on its behalf, stating that the contention in regard to the discriminatory treatment was raised before the learned Single Judge but was not dealt with.

    16. A judge's record, as is well known, must be accepted as correct. The appellant, thus, could have filed an application for review before the learned Single Judge. The same was not done.

    17. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court cannot be said to have committed any error in passing the impugned judgment.

    18. A feeble attempt was made by Mr Rai to contend that the Central Government also was of the opinion that the area to be allotted for senior secondary school cannot be reduced. The High Court, in this regard held:

    “Equally importantly, the learned Single Judge has noted that the official records of the Central Government dealing with the communications of DDA were produced before him. The notings in the file, which were apparently perused by the learned Single Judge, show that the recommendations of DDA were considered by the Central Government and thereafter finally approved for implementation. In view of this factual position, we are quite satisfied that the land rates were determined by the Central Government and were not fixed by DDA. There was no excessive delegation of power or responsibility on the part of the Central Government and so this contention must be rejected.”

    19. In view of the said findings of the High Court which, as noticed hereinbefore, have been accepted by this Court, we are not inclined to take a different view therefrom.

    20. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this appeal. It is dismissed accordingly with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs 25,000 (Rupees twenty-five thousand only).

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    Comments

    Mount Carmel School Society v. Dda .
    (Dec 14, 2007)