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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 11(4) of the Act
  • Section 2(1) of the Act
  • the Privy Council Act
  • Section 11(2) of the Act
  • Section 11(3) of the Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • the Kerala High Court Act
  • Sections 11(2) and 11(3) of the Act
  • Sections 11(2), 11(3) and 11(4)(i) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 11(4) of the Act
  • Section 2(1) of the Act
  • the Privy Council Act
  • Section 11(2) of the Act
  • Section 11(3) of the Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • the Kerala High Court Act
  • Sections 11(2) and 11(3) of the Act
  • Sections 11(2), 11(3) and 11(4)(i) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The original landlord, Akkali Purushothaman, orally let out a single-room premises to the appellant-tenants on 1 January 1984 for three months. On 23 April 1991, Purushothaman gifted the premises to his two sisters. The room lies in front of another residential building owned by the sisters.

Alleging arrears of rent, unauthorised sub-lease and a need to demolish the room to widen the 3½-foot pathway to their rear building, the brother and sisters filed an eviction petition under Sections 11(2), 11(3) and 11(4)(i) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965.

The Rent Controller (29 June 1995) ordered eviction under Sections 11(2) and 11(3). The Appellate Authority (5 June 1998) noted that arrears were cleared and reversed the eviction under Section 11(3), holding that bona fide need was unproved. The High Court, in revision, restored the order of eviction, accepting the landlords’ bona fide requirement. The tenants obtained special-leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the expression “bona fide need for own use and occupation” in Section 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act covers demolition of the tenanted building to widen access to another building belonging to the landlords.
  2. Whether the tenants were entitled to protection under the second proviso to Section 11(3) because the business conducted from the premises was their sole livelihood and no suitable alternative accommodation was available.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants’ (Tenants’) Arguments

  • “Use and occupation” in Section 11(3) requires the landlord’s physical occupation after eviction and cannot include demolition for widening a passage.
  • The tenants have no other suitable premises; their only source of income is the business run from the single room, engaging the statutory protection in the second proviso.

Respondents’ (Landlords’) Arguments

  • Judicial precedent recognises that “occupation” under Section 11(3) includes demolition to facilitate better use of another building of the landlord.
  • The definition of “building” in Section 2(1) is wide enough to include appurtenant grounds such as pathways.
  • The tenant failed to prove exclusive dependence on the rented premises or any genuine effort to secure alternative accommodation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ramniklal Pitambardas Mehta v. Indradaman Amratlal Sheth, AIR 1964 SC 1676 “Occupation” can include demolition preparatory to reconstruction for the landlord’s use. Relied on to affirm that widening a pathway through demolition falls within Section 11(3).
Sarada v. M.K Kumaran, 1969 KLT 133 Kerala High Court view that Section 11(3) covers demolition to improve access. Cited as consistent local authority supporting the landlords.
McKenna v. Porter Motors Ltd., 1956 AC 688 (Privy Council) Landlord’s requirement may encompass demolition for better enjoyment of property. Invoked to show international judicial concurrence with the broader interpretation.
Krishna Menon v. District Judge, (1988) 1 KLT 131 The term “building” includes appurtenant land, enabling flexible application of the Act. Used to buttress the view that a pathway forms part of the “building.”
Molar Mal v. Kay Iron Works (P) Ltd., (2000) 4 SCC 285 Court may revisit long-standing but erroneous interpretations. Distinguished; Court found the existing interpretation correct, so reconsideration unnecessary.
Francis v. Sreedevi Varassiar, (2003) 2 KLT 230 (FB) Onus lies on tenant to prove livelihood dependence and lack of alternative premises. Applied to hold that the appellants failed to discharge this burden.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court reaffirmed the consistent judicial position that “use and occupation” in Section 11(3) is not confined to residential or direct physical use; it extends to demolition enabling better ingress and egress to another property of the landlord. The Court found the interpretation logical, longstanding, and supported by decisions of the Supreme Court, Privy Council and Kerala High Court.

Addressing the second proviso, the Court held that the tenant bears the burden of proving (a) dependence on the business income from the premises and (b) absence of suitable alternative accommodation. Evidence showed the tenant was an autorickshaw driver, owned at least one vehicle, and had not credibly explored other premises. Consequently, the statutory protection was unavailable.

The Court also noted that earlier arrears of rent had been cleared, making Section 11(2) academic, but the eviction under Section 11(3) remained justified.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED. The eviction order under Section 11(3) stands affirmed.

Implications: The judgment reinforces the settled interpretation that a landlord’s bona fide requirement can include demolition of the tenanted premises to facilitate better use of adjacent property. It upholds the evidentiary burden on tenants seeking protection under the second proviso and does not create new precedent but strengthens existing jurisprudence on Section 11(3) of the Kerala Act.

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    Kunhamma Alias Lakshmi Ammas Children And Another v. Akkali Purushothaman And Others

    H.S Bedi, J.— This appeal by special leave arises out of the following facts:

    The petitioners before the Rent Controller (brother and sisters respectively) are the owners of the premises in question. On 1-1-1984 by an oral agreement, the premises were rented out to the appellant tenants herein for a period of three months, by the original sole landlord, Akkali Purushothaman. On 23-4-1991 Akkali Purushothaman gifted the demised premises to his two sisters. These premises consisted of just one room situated in front of another residential building belonging to the two sisters.

    2. The three landlords thereafter filed a petition for the ejectment of the tenant(s) under Sections 11(2), 11(3) and 11(4)(i) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (hereinafter called “the Act”) alleging therein that the tenant was in arrears of rent, that he had sub-leased the premises without the knowledge or consent of the landlords and finally that the sisters needed the premises for their own use and occupation as it had to be demolished to widen the pathway leading to the building that was situated behind the demised premises.

    3. The issues raised by the landlords were controverted by the tenant, who pleaded that the room had been let out to him on 1-1-1982, that there were no arrears of rent as claimed, that no sub-lease had been created, that there was no other suitable place to which he could shift his business as his only source of income was generated from the demised premises and, finally, that the landlord's plea that the premises had to be demolished to widen the pathway did not constitute personal necessity.

    4. On the pleadings of the parties, the Rent Controller framed the following points for determination:

    1. Whether the petitioners are entitled for an eviction as prayed under Section 11(2) of the Act?
    2. Whether the petitioners are entitled for an eviction as prayed under Section 11(3) of the Act?
    3. Whether the petitioners are entitled for an eviction as prayed for under Section 11(4) of the Act?
    4. Relief and costs.

    5. The Rent Controller in his judgment dated 29-6-1995 held that the tenant was in arrears of rent and was therefore liable to ejectment under Section 11(2) of the Act. On Point 2, the Rent Controller observed that the two sisters were residing in a rented building at Kannur and that they intended to shift to their own residential house situated behind the demised premises and that for their convenient and beneficial stay the existing pathway, which was only 3½ ft wide, had to be widened and that Section 11(3) of the Act would also apply to a case where the landlord bona fide required the rented building for its demolition so as to facilitate the ingress and egress to another residential building belonging to him.

    6. The Rent Controller rejected the plea of the tenant that he was solely dependent on the income derived from the business conducted from the demised premises observing that he was, in fact, an autorickshaw driver and owned at least one if not two such vehicles. His plea that the autorickshaws belonged to one Anil was rejected by observing that he had not been examined as a witness. The tenant's ancillary submission that he had been unable to find suitable accommodation for relocating himself on account of very high rents was also not accepted as he had been unable to show as to the enquiries that he had made in this regard. Point 3 was given up by the landlord but as a result of the discussion on Points 1 and 2, the Rent Controller allowed the petition and ordered ejectment under Sections 11(2) and 11(3) of the Act.

    7. The tenant thereupon filed an appeal before the appellate authority which in its order dated 5-6-1998 observed that the entire arrears of rent till date had, in the meanwhile, been paid and as such the only issue that now survived was with regard to the ejectment ordered under Section 11(3). The appellate authority on a reassessment of the evidence held that the plea of bona fide personal necessity was not made out as the residential building to which the sisters wanted to shift had been rented out to college students and that there was no suggestion that the landlords had taken any steps to secure its vacant possession. It was also observed that the two sisters had not even appeared as witnesses to depose as to their bona fide personal need as only their brother, the original landlord, had appeared as PW 1. The appellate authority accordingly allowed the appeal and dismissed the ejectment application. The landlords thereupon preferred a revision petition before the High Court which has been allowed with the finding that the landlords had been able to prove their bona fide need as envisaged under Section 11(3) of the Act. The tenants are in appeal before us.

    8. The learned counsel for the appellants has urged that a bare perusal of Section 11(3) of the Act would show that the bona fide need visualised therein had to be equated with physical occupation of the premises by the landlord after ejectment and would therefore not include its demolition for the purpose of widening a passage to another property belonging to the landlord. It has also been pleaded that the appellant had no alternative accommodation available to him which was suitable to his needs and that his only source of income was generated from the business conducted from the solitary room which constituted the demised premises and for this reason too the order under challenge was not sustainable.

    9. The learned counsel for the respondents has however supported the judgment and order of the High Court and has placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in Ramniklal Pitambardas Mehta v. Indradaman Amratlal Sheth AIR 1964 SC 1676, a judgment of the Kerala High Court (Sarada v. M.K Kumaran 1969 KLT 133) and the judgment of the Privy Council (McKenna v. Porter Motors Ltd. 1956 AC 688, 1956 All ER 262) to contend that the “use and occupation” envisaged under Section 11(3) would include a demolition of the demised premises so as to widen a pathway for another building belonging to the landlord. The learned counsel has also referred to Krishna Menon v. Distt. Judge (1988) 1 KLT 131 to submit that the word “building” occurring in Section 2(1) of the Act included gardens, grounds, etc. which were appurtenant to a building and that the definition had been kept flexible in order to meet the numerous and varied exigencies which may arise in individual cases.

    10. We have considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel in the light of the law and the facts brought out before us. It is virtually the accepted position since long that the personal necessity envisaged under the Act would include repossession of the demised premises by the landlord for the purposes of its demolition so as to widen the entrance to another building belonging to the landlord in the immediate vicinity. In Ramniklal Pitambardas Mehta case AIR 1964 SC 1676 it was observed as under: (AIR p. 1680, para 20)

    “20. … ‘Occupation’ of the premises in Clause (g) does not necessarily refer to occupation as residence. The owner can occupy a place by making use of it in any manner. In a case like the present, if the plaintiffs on getting possession start their work of demolition within the prescribed period, they would have occupied the premises in order to erect a building fit for their occupation.”

    11. The observations of the Privy Council are much to the same effect. In K. Menon case (1988) 1 KLT 131 the Court reinforced its opinion by an analogy and by putting a hypothetical question to itself: (KLT p. 134, para 5)

    “Can he not use the space occupied by the old building as car park, or as passage to the new building? If he cannot do so, the entire rear portion may become practically useless. This would be one of the hard consequences if Section 11(3) of the Act is given a narrow or strict interpretation. Such consequences can be averted if Section 11(3) is given a wider interpretation,…”

    The Court thereafter reiterated the judgment of the High Court in Sarada case 1969 KLT 133. The Court also observed that the preponderance of opinion of the Court was in favour of the above construction and that:

    “If two constructions are possible upon the language of the statute, the Court must choose the one which is consistent with good sense and fairness, and eschew the other which makes its operation unduly oppressive, unjust or unreasonable, or which would lead to strange, inconsistent results or otherwise introduce an element of bewildering uncertainty and practical inconvenience in the working of the statute.”

    12. The learned counsel for the appellants has, however, argued that even if a particular declaration of law had stood the test of time it was still open to a party to contend that the law needed to be reconsidered, as to ignore this aspect would be a transgression of the law itself, more particularly if the Court were to hold that though the law had been wrongly interpreted, it had nevertheless to be maintained on the plea that it had been followed since long. In this connection, the learned counsel has placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in Molar Mal v. Kay Iron Works (P) Ltd. (2000) 4 SCC 285

    13. We have considered this argument as well and we find that it does not arise on the facts of the case and on the contrary the matter appears to be settled by this Court, the Privy Council and the Kerala High Court, as alluded to above. We are of the opinion that the interpretation given to Section 11(3) has not only stood the test of time but is even otherwise a correct enunciation of the law. In Molar Mal case (2000) 4 SCC 285 this Court observed that:

    “15. … We will be failing in our duty if we do not declare an erroneous interpretation of law by the High Court to be so, solely on the ground that it has stood the test of time. Since in our opinion, in regard to the interpretation of the above proviso, no two views are possible, we are constrained to hold that the law declared by the Punjab and Haryana High Court with reference to the proviso is not the correct interpretation and hold that the said judgment is no more a good law.”
    (emphasis supplied)

    It would be clear from the above quote that the Court had held that as the decision of the High Court was erroneous and unsustainable it was obligatory that it be set aright. The judgment in question therefore does not advance the case of the tenants.

    14. It has finally been argued by the learned counsel for the tenants that the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act envisaged that no ejectment could be ordered if the tenant was earning his livelihood from the business conducted from the demised premises and that there was no other suitable place to which he could shift his business. We find no merit in these pleas as well. From a perusal of the judgment of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in Francis v. Sreedevi Varassiar (2003) 2 KLT 230 (FB) we observe that the onus lies on the tenant to prove that he was dependent on the income derived from the business being carried on from the demised premises and that there was no other suitable building to which he could shift his business.

    15. We have perused the evidence on this aspect and are of the opinion that this onus has not been discharged and on the contrary the evidence shows that he was not using the premises for his business as he was an autorickshaw driver and, had, in addition, made absolutely no attempt to ascertain the availability of another suitable building to which he could shift his business as his statement in the Court was that it was not possible to relocate on account of the high rents without giving any details of the enquiry, etc. that he might have made in this regard.

    16. We are, accordingly, of the opinion that there is no merit in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed.

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    Kunhamma Alias Lakshmi Ammas Children And Another v. Akkali Purushothaman And Others
    (Apr 12, 2007)