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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2007 INSC 515
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 302/120-B of the Indian Penal Code
  • Sections 148, 302/149, 460 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Sections 147, 149 and 302 of the Penal Code (for short “IPC”)
  • Sections 460, 148 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 302 read with Sections 149, 148, 120-B and 460 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2007 INSC 515
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 302/120-B of the Indian Penal Code
  • Sections 148, 302/149, 460 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Sections 147, 149 and 302 of the Penal Code (for short “IPC”)
  • Sections 460, 148 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 302 read with Sections 149, 148, 120-B and 460 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On 1 September 1989, Ram Kishan Khandelwal was stabbed to death at his brother-in-law’s residence in Jaipur by a group of 10–12 assailants armed with knives, swords and pickaxes. His son, Uttam Prakash (PW-4), lodged an FIR the same night naming several neighbours with whom the family had a property-related enmity. Investigation led to the arrest of multiple accused, including the present appellant, Raju Naik @ Raj Kumar, from whom weapons and blood-stained clothes were recovered.

The Additional District & Sessions Judge, Jaipur, tried the matter in Sessions Case No. 49 of 2001. By judgment dated 2004, the appellant was convicted only under Section 148 IPC (rioting with a deadly weapon) and sentenced to three years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs 200. Other co-accused were convicted under Sections 460 or 302 IPC. The State did not appeal seeking the appellant’s conviction for murder.

On 13 January 2006 the Rajasthan High Court (Jaipur Bench) dismissed the appellant’s criminal appeal, confirming the conviction under Section 148 IPC. The appellant sought special leave before the Supreme Court, which granted leave and heard the present criminal appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the concurrent findings of the courts below justified the appellant’s conviction under Section 148 IPC on the merits.
  2. Whether, in the absence of an appeal by the State, the Supreme Court could convert the conviction from Section 148 IPC to Section 302 IPC and impose a life sentence.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • He had already completed the three-year sentence for the Section 148 conviction on 8 March 2007 and was therefore entitled to release.
  • The trial court had not convicted him under Section 302 IPC; consequently, in the present appeal filed by him, the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to enhance the conviction or sentence.

State's Arguments

  • The evidence, particularly PW-4’s testimony and the medical findings, established that the appellant actually stabbed the deceased; therefore, no prejudice would be caused by convicting him under Section 302 IPC.
  • The reasoning of the trial court effectively found the appellant guilty of murder, and the omission to formally record a conviction under Section 302 IPC should be rectified by the Supreme Court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Satbir v. Surat Singh, (1997) 4 SCC 192; AIR 1997 SC 1160 When an accused is sentenced under Sections 302/148 IPC, imposition of a separate sentence under Section 148 may be unnecessary. Cited to illustrate that Section 148 is a distinct offence; hence, a court must separately address each conviction and sentence.
Nanda Kishore Mohanty v. State of Orissa, AIR 1961 Orissa 29 A trial court must explicitly convict or acquit on every charged offence; an appellate court cannot convert an implied acquittal into a conviction without a State appeal. Relied upon to hold that, because the State had not appealed, the Supreme Court could not convert the appellant’s conviction from Section 148 to Section 302 IPC.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

On the merits, the Court found the eyewitness testimony of PW-4 reliable and corroborated by the post-mortem report showing a knife injury to the chest and the recovery of a blood-stained knife and clothes. These findings justified the appellant’s presence in the unlawful assembly armed with a deadly weapon, sustaining the conviction under Section 148 IPC.

Turning to the State’s request for a conviction under Section 302 IPC, the Court emphasized that:

  • Section 148 IPC (rioting with a deadly weapon) is a distinct offence from Section 302 IPC (murder).
  • The trial court’s omission to convict the appellant under Section 302 IPC amounted at most to an implied acquittal on that charge.
  • Under Nanda Kishore Mohanty, an appellate court cannot overturn such an acquittal or enhance the conviction in the absence of a State appeal.
  • The High Court had merely affirmed the Section 148 conviction; the State had filed no appeal for enhancement either before the High Court or the Supreme Court.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court declined the State’s request to convict the appellant under Section 302 IPC.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED IN PART: The Supreme Court upheld the appellant’s conviction under Section 148 IPC but acknowledged that he had already completed the three-year custodial sentence (9 March 2004 – 8 March 2007). The Court ordered his immediate release upon payment of the Rs 200 fine, or in default, to undergo one additional month’s imprisonment.

Implications: The decision reiterates that an appellate court cannot enhance a conviction from Section 148 IPC to Section 302 IPC without a State-initiated appeal, underscoring the procedural safeguards against unilateral enhancement of criminal liability. No new substantive precedent was created, but the ruling reinforces existing principles on appellate jurisdiction and separation of offences.

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    Raju Alias Raj Kumar v. State Of Rajasthan .

    S.H Kapadia, J.— Leave granted.

    2. This criminal appeal by grant of special leave is directed against impugned judgment dated 13-1-2006 delivered by the Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur in DB Criminal Appeal No. 660 of 2004 confirming the conviction under Section 148 IPC imposed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Jaipur, in Sessions Case No. 49 of 2001.

    3. On 1-9-1989 at 9.20 p.m Uttam Prakash (PW 4) lodged an FIR at Police Station Ashok Nagar, Jaipur, in which he claimed that he and his father Ram Kishan Khandelwal (since deceased) had left their house, situated at A-10, Sikar House Area, for his uncle's house at C-10, Madan Kunj, Prithvi Raj Road, Jaipur, when at 9 p.m while the deceased was sitting on the bed talking with PW 4's aunt and uncle, 10 to 12 persons entered the room and surrounded the deceased. These 10 to 12 persons were armed with knives, swords and pickaxes. PW 4 was threatened and told not to shout. PW 4 in his FIR stated that in his presence the accused (the appellant herein) stabbed his father Ram Kishan Khandelwal. According to the FIR, when PW 4's uncle raised an alarm the appellant herein along with others fled. Ram Kishan Khandelwal died. According to the FIR, there was enmity between Ram Kishan Khandelwal on one hand and Hanuman, Haneef, Chhitar and Ramesh Shanker on the other hand. On the basis of the said report investigation commenced. The case was registered for offences under Sections 147, 149 and 302 of the Penal Code (for short “IPC”).

    4. On the basis of the information given by the appellant herein, weapons of offence and blood soaked clothes were recovered. PW 25, a Judicial Magistrate, conducted identification parade of the appellant herein and others. The police thereafter submitted their charge-sheet, inter alia, against the appellant herein. 31 witnesses were examined. 74 documents were produced by the prosecution. During the course of the trial it was revealed that Ram Kishan Khandelwal and his family used to live at Sikar House Area in Jaipur. Hanuman and Chhitar were his neighbours. They were on inimical terms. There was property dispute. The bathroom of Hanuman and Chhitar was demolished by Jaipur Development Authority. Hanuman and Chhitar were under the impression that the bathroom was demolished on the complaint of Ram Kishan Khandelwal. Hanuman and Chhitar sold their house to Haneef (one of the co-accused). Prior to his death, Ram Kishan Khandelwal had lodged an FIR with Police Station Shastri Nagar, Jaipur, in which he had asked for police protection. Ram Kishan Khandelwal was also an accused in many criminal cases. These cases were pending. According to the prosecution, Hanuman, Chhitar and Haneef entered into a criminal conspiracy for the murder of Ram Kishan Khandelwal. According to the prosecution, however, the appellant herein along with Aziz, Iqbal, Mahendra Singh, Hamid and Feroz committed the actual murder. Therefore, according to the prosecution there were two groups of persons, the first set/group of persons entered into a criminal conspiracy but the actual murder was done by Iqbal, Aziz, Raju Naik (the appellant herein), Mahendra Singh, Hamid and Feroz.

    5. In this case, we are concerned with the conviction of Raju Naik (the appellant herein). He was charged for offences under Sections 302, 120-B, 148, 149 and 460 IPC.

    6. Two issues arise for determination in this criminal appeal. The first concerns the merits of the case and the second concerns an argument advanced on behalf of the appellant that the appellant has completed the sentence of three years on 8-3-2007 as he was convicted for offence under Section 148 IPC which has been disputed by the State on the ground that the appellant stood convicted under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment.

    7. On the merits of the case, we find that there is no reason to disbelieve Uttam Prakash (PW 4), the son of Ram Kishan Khandelwal (the deceased). The incident took place on 1-9-1989 around 9 p.m when the deceased was sitting on the bed. Uttam Prakash (PW 4) and his father, Ram Kishan Khandelwal, had gone for dinner at his uncle's place at C-10, Madan Kunj, Prithvi Raj Road, Jaipur. When the deceased was sitting on the bed Uttam Prakash (PW 4) saw 10 to 12 persons entering the room and surrounding Kishan Khandelwal. They were armed with knives, swords and pickaxes. Uttam Prakash (PW 4) saw the deceased being stabbed. Uttam Prakash (PW 4) has deposed that it was dinner time, that the deceased was sitting on the bed whereas he was in conversation with his aunt. Both the courts below have come to the conclusion, placing reliance on the post-mortem report, that there was an injury on the chest of the deceased and that the knife and the clothes recovered vide Ext. P-32 had human blood. The cause of the death, as given in the post-mortem report, was syncope. There was one more witness Rattan Devi (PW 20) but she could not identify the appellant in the identification parade. However, both the courts below have come to the conclusion, on the basis of the evidence of PW 4 that the appellant herein (Raju @ Raj Kumar) was a member of the unlawful assembly; that he carried the knife; that he had entered the room where the deceased was sitting on the bed and that Ram Kishan Khandelwal (the deceased) was stabbed to death by the appellant herein. In the circumstances, we do not find any infirmity to the extent of the conviction of the appellant herein under Section 148 IPC.

    8. The question is: Whether this Court in special leave petition could convict the appellant under Section 302 IPC without any appeal from the State?

    9. Now coming to the second issue, we find that in this case seven out of ten accused were convicted by the Additional District and Sessions Judge, No. 1 (Fast Track), Jaipur City, Jaipur, for different offences. The appellant herein was charged under Sections 148, 302, 120-B and 460 IPC. However, he has been convicted under Section 148 IPC. According to the trial court the cause of death is syncope. According to Butterworths Medical Dictionary, “Syncope” is a temporary loss of consciousness caused by a fall in blood pressure.

    10. We also quote hereinbelow paras 65 and 66 of the said judgment which read as follows:

    “65. From the above decision I have reached the conclusion that out of all the accused, Accused 1, Abdul Aziz, s/o Salamuddin, Accused 2, Raju @ Raj Kumar, s/o Mali Ram, Accused 3, Durga Das @ Bhaya, s/o Bhanwar Lal have committed punishable crime under Sections 460, 148 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code for which their crime is hereby proved and Accused 4, Feroz @ Shreya, s/o Babu Khan has committed punishable crime under the Indian Penal Code, Sections 148, 302/149, 460 for which their crime is hereby proved and Accused 5, Hanuman Sahai, s/o Mahadev Prasad, Accused 6, Chhitar Mal, s/o Mahadev Prasad, Accused 7, Mohd. Haneef, s/o Abdul Hakim have committed punishable crime under Sections 302/120-B of the Indian Penal Code for which their crime is hereby proved and Accused 8, Sayeed, s/o Abdul Rasheed is acquitted from the allegations of punishable crime under Section 302 read with Sections 149, 148, 120-B and 460 of the Indian Penal Code.
    66. This case is a matter of murder, conspiracy to murder and cooperation in murder for which it would be justified to punish the accused with the minimum punishment and for rest of the crime the accused were heard, for which they are punished with rigorous imprisonment as mentioned below:

    Sentence

    Therefore, the accused mentioned below on being found guilty under section as mentioned against each under the Indian Penal Code are punished as below:
    Sl. No. Name of the accused Section Punishment Penalty Illegible (sic) 1. Abdul Aziz 460 Ten years 500 3 months 2. Raju @ Raj Kumar 148 Three years 200 1 month 3. Durga Das @ Bhaya 302 Life imprisonment 1000 6 months 4. Feroz @ Shreya 460 Ten years 500 3 months 148 Three years 200 1 month 302/149 Life imprisonment 1000 6 months 5. Hanuman Sahai 302/120-B Life imprisonment 1000 6 months 6. Chhitar Mal - do - - do - - do - - do - 7. Mohd. Haneef - do - - do - - do - - do -
    The accused in this case are on bail, hence for getting the punishment they are being taken in the judicial custody. The punishment warrant of the accused may be prepared as per above and sent to the Central Jail, Jaipur. Punishment of all the crimes will be simultaneous. In this case, the seized item of proof will be destroyed after expiry of six months of the appeal period. The file after recording of the decision may be admitted in the office. The accused with the proven crime may be provided with a copy of the decision without any cost.”

    11. If one reads para 65 with para 66, we find that Abdul Aziz has been Accused 1 and he is convicted under Section 460 IPC. This is clear from para 65. It is in consonance with the chart in para 66. Similarly, the appellant (Raju @ Raj Kumar) was Accused 2 and he has been convicted under Section 148 IPC. This is clear from para 65. To this extent, para 65 is in consonance with para 66 (chart annexed thereto). Durga Das was Accused 3 and he has been convicted under Section 302 IPC both under paras 65 and 66. It appears from the reading of para 65 that Accused 1 was convicted under Section 460 IPC, Accused 2 was convicted under Section 148 IPC and Accused 3 was convicted under Section 302 IPC respectively. The word “respectively” is omitted. Be that as it may, the State did not go in appeal against the order of the trial court convicting Raju @ Raj Kumar (the appellant herein) for convicting him under Section 302 IPC in addition to his conviction by the trial court under Section 148. Even the High Court, by the impugned judgment, has merely dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant herein upholding the conviction of Raju @ Raj Kumar under Section 148 IPC. It is argued before us, on behalf of the State, that we should convict the appellant herein under Section 302 IPC, particularly, when the reasoning given in the concurrent findings indicate that the appellant herein had stabbed the deceased in the chest with the knife. In our view, such a request cannot be granted. Offence under Section 148 IPC is distinct and separate from the offence under Section 302 IPC. The State should have filed an appeal seeking conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC apart from his conviction under Section 148 IPC. This has not been done in the present case. The offence of rioting with deadly weapon under Section 148 IPC is separate and distinct from the offence under Section 302 IPC. Moreover, according to the trial court, the cause of death is syncope.

    12. In Satbir v. Surat Singh (1997) 4 SCC 192, AIR 1997 SC 1160 the accused was sentenced under Sections 302/148 IPC and, therefore, this Court took the view that separate sentence under Section 148 was not necessary.

    13. In Nanda Kishore Mohanty v. State of Orissa AIR 1961 Orissa 29 it has been held that once a charge under Section 148 IPC is framed the Magistrate must say whether the person charged is convicted or acquitted. In that case, though the petitioner was charged under Section 148 IPC, the judgment of the Magistrate was silent as to whether the petitioner was guilty or not. The Additional Sessions Judge assumed that the petitioner stood convicted under Section 148 IPC and altered the conviction to Section 147 IPC. In that case, the petitioner was also charged under Sections 455/149 IPC and under Sections 323/149 IPC. In that connection, it was held as under: (AIR pp. 30-31, paras 6-10)

    “6. Another serious mistake committed by the Magistrate was his omission to mention expressly in his judgment as to whether he convicted the petitioner under Section 148 IPC, or not. Once a specific charge under that section was framed, the Magistrate must expressly say whether he convicts the accused of that offence or whether he acquits him of that offence. Though the petitioner was charged under Section 148, the judgment of the Magistrate is silent as to whether that charge was proved or not. The learned Sessions Judge also committed an error by overlooking this mistake on the part of the trying Magistrate and assuming that there was a conviction under that section by the Magistrate and that he would be justified in altering it to a conviction under Section 147 IPC. It is indeed unfortunate that in cases of this type where sentences of imprisonment have been passed the two lower courts should have committed such obvious mistake, presumably through negligence.
    7. The net result therefore is that though the petitioner was charged under Section 148 IPC, the trying Magistrate has not passed any order, either of conviction or acquittal in respect of that charge and the Sessions Judge has convicted him under Section 147 IPC. The omission of the trying Magistrate to convict the petitioner under Section 148 IPC, must in the circumstances be held to mean that he was acquitted of that charge. It is immaterial whether this omission was due to oversight or any other reason. Once there is, thus, an acquittal of the petitioner of the charge under Section 148 IPC, the Sessions Judge has no jurisdiction to alter the conviction to one under Section 147 IPC. The State should have moved the High Court for setting aside the order of acquittal in respect of the charge under Section 148. But this they did not do.
    8. The acquittal of the petitioner in respect of the offence under Section 148 IPC, will also affect his conviction under Sections 455/149 IPC and 323/149 IPC. The conviction for these two offences is based on the assumption that the petitioner was a member of the unlawful assembly but his acquittal in respect of the charge under Section 148 IPC, must necessarily lead to the inference that he was not a member of such an assembly. Hence, his conviction under Sections 455 and 323 IPC, read with Section 149 IPC, must be set aside.
    9. There seems some force in the contention of the learned Standing Counsel for the State of Orissa, that the initial mistake was committed by the trying Magistrate through oversight, and he suggested that the case might be remanded to the trying Magistrate for recording a proper order either of conviction or of acquittal in respect of the charge against the petitioner under Section 148 IPC.
    But I am not satisfied that at this stage it will be proper to remand the case for the aforesaid purpose. The incident took place more than four years ago i.e on 6-10-1955, and the petitioner has been sufficiently harassed because the appeal was first heard by the Additional Sessions Judge but the judgment was set aside by the High Court in criminal revision and the appeal was reheard by the Sessions Judge of Cuttack.
    It will not be proper at this belated stage to revive the whole proceeding and subject the petitioner to further harassment of a conviction by the trying Magistrate and also possibly of an appeal before the Sessions Judge. The mistake was partly that of the trying Magistrate and partly that of the prosecuting officers. The latter should have noticed the omission in the judgment of the trying Magistrate and then taken steps either by way of revision to this Court or by means of an appeal against acquittal, to get the mistake rectified.
    10. For the aforesaid reasons, I would allow this revision petition, set aside the conviction and sentence passed on the petitioner by the learned Sessions Judge, and acquit him. He should be set at liberty forthwith.”

    14. Before concluding we may state that one of the arguments advanced on behalf of the State was that no prejudice would be caused to the appellant if he was to be convicted under Section 302 IPC. It was contended on behalf of the State that if one goes through the entire judgment of the trial court it is clear from the reasoning that the trial court had found the appellant guilty of murder under Section 302 IPC and that the appellant has never made any grievance against the said finding. It is submitted on behalf of the State that even in the special leave petition, before this Court, this particular ground has not been taken by the appellant. We find no merit in this contention. We cannot convict the appellant under Section 302 IPC in the appeal preferred by the appellant herein. If we were to do so it would amount to travesty of justice. We cannot convict the accused under Section 302 without the State filing an appeal in that regard. In the present case, the State did not move the High Court in appeal against the conviction under Section 148 and nor did the State seek enhancement of punishment before the High Court in appeal.

    15. For the above reasons, we find that the appellant herein was convicted under Section 148 IPC; that, he was not convicted under Section 302 IPC; that he was sentenced for three years with fine in addition, one month sentence in default of fine; and that Raju @ Raj Kumar (the appellant herein) has served sentence for three years commencing from 9-3-2004 and ending on 8-3-2007. We are not sure as to whether he has paid the fine of Rs 200, if not, he shall pay the fine forthwith. On payment of fine he should be set at liberty forthwith. If he fails to pay Rs 200 as fine then he will have to serve the sentence of one month in default.

    16. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed.

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    Comments

    Raju Alias Raj Kumar v. State Of Rajasthan .
    (May 3, 2007)