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Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2007 INSC 716
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code, 1860
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2007 INSC 716
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code, 1860
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Rubina was married to Appellant 1, Sk. Bakshu, approximately eight days before the incident of 19 August 2001. On that day, at about 4 p.m., she sustained severe burn injuries in her matrimonial home and was taken to Civil Hospital, Parbhani, where she died at 8:30 p.m. Two dying declarations were recorded on the same evening—one by a police officer (PW 3) between 6:00 p.m. and 6:10 p.m. (Exhibit 31) and another by the Naib Tahsildar (PW 1) between 7:15 p.m. and 7:30 p.m. (Exhibit 26).

The investigation led to the arrest of the appellants on 20 August 2001. After trial, the I-st Additional Sessions Judge, Parbhani, convicted all three appellants for murder under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and for cruelty under Section 498-A read with Section 34 IPC. On appeal, the Bombay High Court upheld the murder convictions but set aside the convictions under Section 498-A. The present appeal before the Supreme Court challenges the High Court’s judgment affirming the murder convictions.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the two dying declarations (Exhibits 26 and 31) were reliable and sufficient to sustain the appellants’ conviction for murder under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC.
  2. Whether inconsistencies and procedural irregularities in recording the dying declarations cast reasonable doubt on the prosecution’s case.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The dying declarations were unreliable due to contradictory details about the place of occurrence and the persons involved in taking the deceased to hospital.
  • The chronology was implausible: the first declaration was allegedly recorded before the police even received intimation of the incident.
  • There was no explanation for recording a second dying declaration, suggesting fabrication or tutoring.
  • Material evidence—such as the station diary entry and the letter instructing the Naib Tahsildar—was suppressed.

State's Arguments

  • The dying declarations were recorded promptly and were endorsed by the attending Medical Officer as being made while the deceased was conscious and oriented.
  • Both the trial court and High Court had carefully analysed the evidence and correctly found the declarations credible and cogent.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court scrutinised the credibility of the two dying declarations and found multiple infirmities:

  • Timing contradiction: Exhibit 31 was said to be recorded between 6:00 p.m.–6:10 p.m., yet the police officer acknowledged receiving information about the incident only at 6:30 p.m., making the earlier recording impossible.
  • Unexplained duplication: The prosecution offered no satisfactory reason for creating a second dying declaration if a valid first declaration already existed.
  • Missing documentary support: The letter allegedly requesting the Naib Tahsildar to record the dying declaration was never produced; neither was a copy.
  • Place of occurrence discrepancy: The deceased stated the burns occurred in the bedroom, but the spot panchnama revealed burn marks only in the kitchen.
  • Transport to hospital: The dying declaration mentioned a neighbour taking the deceased to hospital, whereas hospital records named Accused 2, the sister-in-law.
  • Assumption about reading over: There was no record that either declaration was read back to the deceased; the lower courts merely presumed this had been done.
  • Tutoring possibility dismissed without basis: The High Court’s dismissal of potential tutoring was deemed speculative.

Collectively, these deficiencies undermined the reliability of the dying declarations, and with no other substantive evidence, the prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED; CONVICTIONS SET ASIDE. The Supreme Court acquitted all appellants of the charges under Section 302/34 IPC and ordered their release unless required in another case.

The decision directly affects only the parties, leading to their immediate liberation. The Court did not articulate any broader legal principle, and no new precedent was set.

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    Shaikh Bakshu And Others v. State Of Maharashtra .

    Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J.— Leave granted.

    2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, Aurangabad Bench. Conviction of the appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code, 1860 (in short “IPC”) was confirmed while setting aside the conviction and sentence relatable to offence punishable under Section 498-A IPC read with Section 34 IPC. All the appellants were convicted by learned Ist Additional Sessions Judge, Parbhani in Sessions Trial No. 214 of 2001.

    3. Prosecution version as unfolded during trial is as under:

    Rubina (hereinafter referred to as “the deceased”) was married to Appellant 1, Sk. Bakshu about 8 days prior to the alleged incident, which took place on 19-8-2001 at about 4 p.m in the house of the appellants. While the deceased was staying in the house of her in-laws, Appellant 2, Janubai Shakur, sister-in-law of the deceased and Appellant 3, Safirabi Sk. Wahed, mother-in-law of the deceased caught hold of her and her husband, Appellant 1 Sk. Bakshu by pouring kerosene on her person, set Rubina on fire. The deceased suffered burn injuries. While she was burning, her father-in-law extinguished the fire by pouring water on her. Thereafter, the neighbours had brought the deceased to Civil Hospital, Parbhani. Court witness Dr. Bhagwan Dhutmal was on duty and after examining the patient, he started treatment. Radhakishan Katare (PW 3), who was working as ASI in Police Outpost in General Hospital, Parbhani, secured MLC Certificate from the Medical Officer concerning the deceased Rubina, which is at Exhibit 13. After ascertaining from the Medical Officer regarding consciousness of the patient to make a declaration, Radhakishan (PW 3) recorded statement of the deceased on the same day i.e 19-8-2001 at 6 p.m The said dying declaration is at Exhibit 31. Thereafter, a letter was addressed to PW 1, Naib Tahsildar for recording dying declaration of Rubina and on receipt of intimation, Narhari Pandit, Naib Tahsildar (PW 1), proceeded to the hospital. After ascertaining the physical and mental condition of the patient from the Medical Officer, the Naib Tahsildar recorded statement of Rubina at 7.15 p.m which is at Exhibit 26. The Medical Officer Dr. Bhagwan endorsed on both the dying declarations to the effect that the patient was conscious, oriented in time and space and was able to make a statement. The first dying declaration (Ext. 31) was recorded between 6 p.m to 6.10 p.m and the second dying declaration (Ext. 26), which was recorded by Naib Tahsildar was between 7.15 to 7.30 p.m on the same day i.e 19-8-2001. The deceased died at 8.30 p.m on 19-8-2001.

    4. According to the post-mortem report, the deceased had suffered 67% burn injuries. The post-mortem of the deceased was conducted by Dr. Ashok Janapurkar (PW 2). The post-mortem report is at Exhibit 28. The cause of death, according to the Medical Officer, was due to cardio-respiratory failure due to superficial deep 66% burns. Anil Gaikwad (PW 6) conducted the investigation of the case. He had drawn spot panchnama and recorded statements of witnesses. All the appellants were arrested on 20-8-2001. The clothes of the appellants were also seized. The seizure panchnamas are at Exhibits 42, 43 and 44. On 21-8-2001, viscera and articles seized on the spot were sent to Chemical Analyser, whose report is Exhibit 15. In viscera, no poison was detected. Kerosene was detected on the clothes of the accused, which were seized. After completion of investigation, the charge-sheet was filed. The case was committed by JMFC, Parbhani, to the Court of Session for trial. The charges in Exhibit 10 were framed and the appellants were tried before the court, to which they pleaded not guilty and came to be tried.

    5. The prosecution examined 6 witnesses. In their statement under Section 313 CrPC the appellants denied the incident in question and alleged that the witnesses were demanding money and for that reason, they are deposing falsely. The prosecution examined 6 witnesses and Dr. Bhagwan Dhutmal was examined as court witness.

    6. Placing reliance on the dying declarations purported to have been made by the deceased, the trial court found the appellants guilty and convicted them and imposed imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs 100 for the offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. In respect of offence relatable to Section 498-A read with Section 34 IPC custodial sentence of 3 years and fine of Rs 100 with default stipulation were imposed.

    7. In appeal, it was urged that the dying declarations are totally unreliable. The alleged place of occurrence has been differently stated. No explanation has been offered as to why there was necessity of recording two dying declarations. Though there was clear evidence of tutoring, the trial court did not attach any importance and there has been suppression of the station diary entry. All these go to show that prosecution has concocted a false case. The State's response was that after analysing the evidence in detail conviction has been recorded.

    8. The High Court confirmed the view of the trial court holding that the dying declaration was credible and cogent. Therefore, conviction for offence relatable to Section 302 read with Section 34 was maintained. But acquittal was recorded under Section 498-A read with Section 34 IPC.

    9. Stands taken before the High Court were reiterated in this appeal.

    10. The dying declarations have been marked as Ext. 26 and Ext. 31. Ext. 26 was claimed to have been recorded by the Naib Tahsildar (PW 1) between 7.15 and 7.30 p.m while Ext. 31 was purported to have been recorded by the police officer (PW 3) at 6.00 p.m In Ext. 26, it was stated that the deceased did not know name of the mother-in-law and that A-2 and A-3 were residents of Ramabai Nagar whereas the place where the alleged incident took place was Panchsheel Road. It was stated that the neighbour had taken the deceased to hospital. Police officer (PW 3) stated that intimation regarding occurrence was received at 6.30 p.m vide Ext. 30. Strangely, the dying declaration was recorded even before the intimation had reached i.e at 6.10 p.m There was a point raised about the number of marriages of the deceased. Interestingly, the mother of the deceased supported the defence version. PW 3 in his evidence stated that he had accompanied Naib Tahsildar (PW 1).

    11. According to trial court and the High Court the basic question was who recorded the dying declaration first. So far as the dying declaration purported to have been recorded by Naib Tahsildar (PW 1) is concerned, he has stated that one constable accompanied him to the hospital. He did not say that police inspector, PW 3, accompanied him though PW 3 claimed it to be so.

    12. With reference to the panchnama it appears that no burn marks were found in the bedroom on the other hand burn marks were found in the kitchen. As noted above, Ext. 30 shows that ASI had received intimation at 6.30 p.m Dying declaration shows it was recorded between 6.00 to 6.10 p.m If the intimation was received at 6.30 p.m question of recording the dying declaration before that time does not arise. The trial court accepted this position to be correct from the record. But it made a new case that the time recorded to be 6.30 p.m appears to be a mistake made by ASI. That was not the case of the prosecution and, in fact, PW 3 accepted that the intimation was received at 6.30 p.m and the dying declaration was recorded later by the Naib Tahsildar. It has not been explained as to what was the necessity of a second dying declaration, if there was already a dying declaration in existence recorded by PW 3, who stated that he had accompanied PW 1.

    13. PW 1 in his statement stated that on 19-8-2001, on the basis of a letter requiring him to record dying declaration of the person who was admitted to the hospital, he went to the hospital at 7.00 p.m, met the Medical Officer in the hospital and thereafter he requested the Medical Officer to show the person to him. The letter in question was not produced by him. The trial court came to the conclusion that PW 3, the Medical Officer and the constable reached the Burns Ward at about 7.10 p.m As noted above, it was the evidence of PW 3 that he had accompanied the Naib Tahsildar, PW 1. Even if it is accepted as noted by the trial court that the Naib Tahsildar has not produced the letter because it may be misplaced but nothing prevented the prosecution to produce the copy of the letter which was purportedly written to the Naib Tahsildar. No effort in that regard has been made. The trial court and the High Court noted that the condition of the deceased was very poor as was stated by the Medical Officer and the condition was deteriorating since 6.10 p.m The trial court, however, held the dying declaration to be credible because the Medical Officer was present when the dying declaration was recorded. There was no mention in the dying declaration that it was read over and explained to the deceased. The trial court and the High Court concluded that even though it is not so stated, it has to be presumed that it was read over and explained. The view is clearly unacceptable.

    14. So far as the presence of the relatives and the tutoring aspect is concerned, the High Court held that there cannot be a possibility of tutoring Rubina for falsely implicating the appellants in the offence because of the promptness in recording the dying declaration by PW 1 and PW 3. The conclusion is clearly based on surmises and conjectures. Another fallacy in the conclusions of the High Court and the trial court was that mere change in the place of occurrence as borne out in the dying declaration, as projected by the prosecution with reference to the spot panchnama was not material. According to the deceased, the occurrence took place in the bedroom. It is to be noted that no mark of burn injury was noticed in the bedroom and they were noticed in the kitchen. The High Court noted, even if spot of occurrence has not been correctly stated by the deceased same is of no consequence. That certainly has effect on the credibility of the dying declaration, contrary to what the High Court has observed. Another aspect which assumes great importance is that in the dying declaration the deceased stated that she was brought to the hospital by a neighbour but the official records show that she was brought to the hospital by Accused 2 i.e sister-in-law. It was categorically asked to the doctor whether in the admission register it was recorded that the injuries were due to the accidental burns. He stated that the witness has not gone through the register of that date.

    15. In view of the aforesaid infirmities the inevitable conclusion is that the accusations of prosecution have not been established.

    16. The judgment of the High Court cannot be maintained and the same is set aside. The appeal is allowed. The appellants are acquitted of the charges. They be set forth at liberty if not required in any other case.

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    Shaikh Bakshu And Others v. State Of Maharashtra .
    (Jun 21, 2007)