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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2006 INSC 361
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, Section 13(1)(a)
  • Section 14(1) proviso (b), Sections 16(2) and (3) of the Delhi Rent Control Act
  • Transfer of Property Act, Section 108(j)
  • U.P Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act
  • Section 13 sub-sections (3), (4) and (6) of the Act
  • Section 19-A of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950
  • Section 13, Subsection (1), Clause (e) of the Act
  • Section 13 of the Act
  • Section 13(1)(e) of the Act
  • Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act (17 of 1950), Section 13(1)(e)
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 13(3) of the Act
  • The Act
  • Section 114-E of the Evidence Act
  • Section 19-A of the Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2006 INSC 361
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, Section 13(1)(a)
  • Section 14(1) proviso (b), Sections 16(2) and (3) of the Delhi Rent Control Act
  • Transfer of Property Act, Section 108(j)
  • U.P Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act
  • Section 13 sub-sections (3), (4) and (6) of the Act
  • Section 19-A of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950
  • Section 13, Subsection (1), Clause (e) of the Act
  • Section 13 of the Act
  • Section 13(1)(e) of the Act
  • Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act (17 of 1950), Section 13(1)(e)
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 13(3) of the Act
  • The Act
  • Section 114-E of the Evidence Act
  • Section 19-A of the Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent-landlord instituted an eviction suit against the appellants-tenants in respect of three shops located on Station Road, Ajmer, Rajasthan, let out at a monthly rent of Rs 300. The landlord alleged (a) wilful default in payment of rent for more than six months and (b) unauthorised sub-letting of the premises to Rajasthan Tourism Development Corporation (RTDC) at Rs 2100 per month.

The tenants denied default, asserting that the landlord had refused to accept rent, leading them to deposit the amount in court under Section 19-A of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (“the Act”). They further contended that RTDC occupied the premises only for 20 days while its own shop was under renovation.

The trial court decreed eviction on the grounds of default and sub-letting (the ground of change of user was not pressed). The Additional District Judge dismissed the tenants’ first appeal, holding the Section 19-A deposit invalid and affirming sub-letting. The High Court, in second appeal, upheld the concurrent findings. The tenants then approached the Supreme Court by special leave; interim stay orders required continued rent deposits. The Supreme Court heard the matter and delivered the present judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether rent deposited by the tenants under Section 19-A of the Act constituted valid payment so as to negate the ground of default under Section 13 of the Act.
  2. Whether the tenants had sub-let the premises to RTDC without the landlord’s permission within the meaning of Section 13(1)(e) of the Act, thereby justifying eviction.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants’ (Tenants’) Arguments

  • The deposit of rent in court after obtaining permission constituted statutory compliance; therefore, they were not defaulters. A presumption of due compliance arises under Section 114-E of the Evidence Act.
  • Because the landlord admitted receipt of rent for 1-4-1991 to 31-12-1994, the tenants were entitled to protection under Sections 13(3), (4) and (6) of the Act, which bar eviction when the tenant is ready and willing to pay rent.
  • The alleged sub-letting was merely a temporary arrangement of about 20 days to accommodate RTDC during renovation; no exclusive possession was transferred, so the ingredients of sub-letting were absent.
  • They relied on several Supreme Court authorities (e.g., Delhi Stationers; Dev Kumar; Jagdish Prasad) emphasising that sub-letting requires proof of parting with exclusive possession for consideration.
  • In the alternative, they requested reasonable time to vacate owing to long occupation since 1970.

Respondent’s (Landlord’s) Arguments

  • All three courts have concurrently found wilful default and sub-letting; these findings should not be disturbed.
  • RTDC was in exclusive possession for four months and paid Rs 2100 per month, clearly satisfying Section 13(1)(e).
  • The authorities cited by the tenants are distinguishable on facts because, unlike those cases, the tenants here surrendered control and received substantial rent.

Table of Precedents Cited

PrecedentRule or Principle Cited ForApplication by the Court
Delhi Stationers and Printers v. Rajendra Kumar, (1990) 2 SCC 331 Mere permissive user of part of premises does not amount to sub-letting absent transfer of exclusive possession. Distinguished; unlike that case, exclusive possession and rent receipt were proved against the tenants.
Dev Kumar v. Swaran Lata, (1996) 1 SCC 25 Sub-letting requires transfer of exclusive possession for consideration; landlord must prove the allegation. Court noted requirement but held evidence of RTDC employee and rent payments satisfied the test.
Jagdish Prasad v. Angoori Devi, (1984) 2 SCC 590 Presence of outsider not enough; control must pass to establish sub-letting. Court found control had passed to RTDC; therefore, precedent did not assist tenants.
Shalimar Tar Products Ltd. v. H.C. Sharma, (1988) 1 SCC 70 Eviction justified where tenant sub-lets without landlord’s written consent; concurrent findings ordinarily not disturbed. Reinforced the Supreme Court’s reluctance to upset concurrent factual findings, applied to uphold eviction.
Goppulal v. Thakurji Shriji Dwarakadheeshji, (1969) 1 SCC 792 Under Section 13(1)(e) of the Rajasthan Act, sub-letting—whether before or after Act—warrants eviction. Cited to affirm that unauthorised sub-letting mandates ejectment and tenants cannot claim statutory protection.
Dipak Banerjee v. Lilabati Chakraborty, (1987) 4 SCC 161 Sub-tenancy requires exclusive possession and payment of compensation/rent. Used to emphasise that both elements were present (exclusive possession and Rs 2100 rent) in favour of landlord.

Court’s Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court first scrutinised the finding of sub-letting. It relied on the testimony of a senior office assistant of RTDC, who stated that RTDC occupied the disputed shop from 11-4-1991 to 15-8-1991 and paid Rs 2100 per month to tenant Gurbachan Singh. No cross-examination undermined this evidence. The Court noted that during this period the tenants exercised no control over the premises, thereby satisfying the statutory requirement of “parting with possession” under Section 13(1)(e).

While the tenants invoked decisions emphasising the need for exclusive possession and consideration, the Court held those authorities inapplicable because exclusive possession and consideration were indeed established here. Accordingly, the concurrent factual findings of the trial court, first appellate court, and High Court on sub-letting were affirmed.

Regarding the alleged rent default and the validity of deposits under Section 19-A, the Court expressly left the interpretative question of Sections 13(3), (4), (6) and 19-A open for decision in an appropriate case, as resolution of the sub-letting ground alone justified eviction.

Holding and Implications

DISPOSED OF — Eviction decree affirmed.

Although the appeal was dismissed on merits, the Court granted the tenants nine months (until end-February 2007) to vacate, subject to: (a) payment of Rs 1500 per month as compensation for use and occupation, (b) filing an undertaking within three weeks, and (c) a bar on further sub-letting during the grace period. The landlord was permitted to withdraw rent deposits without security, and any arrears were to be paid by the tenants within four weeks.

Implications are confined to the parties: the judgment reinforces that even temporary transfer of exclusive possession for consideration constitutes sub-letting under Section 13(1)(e) of the Rajasthan Act, and the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent factual findings. No new precedent was established on the validity of rent deposits under Section 19-A, which remains an open question.

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    Gurubachan Singh And Another v. Ram Niwas .

    Dr. Ar. Lakshmanan, J.— The unsuccessful tenants are the appellants before us in this appeal. The respondent is the landlord. The premises in question are situated at Station Road, Ajmer, Rajasthan on a monthly rent of Rs 300.

    2. The respondent-plaintiff filed a suit for eviction of the tenants on the grounds of default in payment of rent and for change of user and sub-letting. It was alleged that the tenants committed default in payment of rent for more than six months. It has further been averred that the tenants have sub-let the premises to Rajasthan Tourism Development Corporation (in short “RTDC”) for running a beer shop at a rent of Rs 2100 per month without taking prior permission of the landlord.

    3. The appellants filed written statement denying the allegations made in the plaint. The appellants contended that they had not committed any default in payment of rent and the same has been deposited in the court. It was stated that the respondent landlord refused to accept the rent. The same was sent by money order which was also not accepted. Being left with no other choice, the tenants deposited the said rent in court under Section 19-A of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (in short “the Act”). It has also been specifically stated that the premises in question were given to RTDC only for a period of 20 days as RTDC's shop was under construction and renovation.

    4. During the pendency of the suit rent came to be determined under the provisions of Section 13(3) of the Act. The counsel for the respondent landlord admitted the deposit of rent from 1-4-1991 to 31-12-1994 i.e for a period of 45 months at the rate of Rs 300 per month under Section 19-A of the Act. Therefore, it is submitted that there is no dispute regarding deposit of the rent in the court.

    5. The trial court decreed the suit in favour of the landlord on the ground of default in payment of rent and sub-letting. The landlord did not press the ground of change of user. The tenants aggrieved by the above order of the trial court, filed an appeal before the Additional District Judge in Civil Appeal No. 115 of 1997. The appellate court dismissed the appeal and observed that the deposit made under Section 19-A of the Act was not a valid deposit. The appellate court also affirmed the finding of the trial court on the ground of sub-letting.

    6. Being aggrieved by the order of the first appellate court, the tenants filed a second appeal before the High Court being SB Civil Second Appeal No. 234 of 1998. The High Court admitted the appeal and framed the necessary substantial questions of law. The High Court by its judgment dated 26-8-2003 dismissed the second appeal filed by the tenants. Being aggrieved, the tenants have filed the above appeal before this Court by way of special leave. Notice was ordered on the special leave petition on 21-11-2003 and interim stay of the operation of the High Court's order was also granted on the same date. The interim order also continued on 26-4-2004 pending further orders subject to the condition that the arrears of rent shall be deposited to the credit of the proceedings before the trial court within six weeks from that date. On 6-7-2004 leave was granted and the stay was ordered to continue. At the request of both the parties, this Court passed an order on 20-3-2006 and posted the appeal for hearing finally during the summer vacation.

    7. We have heard Mr Sushil Kumar Jain, the learned counsel for the appellant tenants and Mr K.S Bhati, the learned counsel for the respondent landlord. Mr Jain took us through the entire pleadings and the orders passed by all the three courts. So far as the eviction on the ground of deposit of rent in the court is concerned, Mr Jain submitted that when the tenants had deposited the rent by resorting to the provisions of Section 19-A of the Act after permission of the court, there is presumption of compliance with the provisions of Section 19-A of the Act and, therefore, the courts below were not justified in holding that the deposit under Section 19-A of the Act was not legal as the tenants did not follow the proceedings of money order. According to Mr Jain once the rent has been deposited in court after due permission of the court, there is presumption of compliance under Section 114-E of the Evidence Act. He further contends that the present case is not a case of rent default and that the deposit of rent in the court under Section 19-A of the Act and the admission of the landlord for determination of the rent under Section 13(3) of the Act that the amount of rent had already been deposited in the Court from 1-4-1991 to 31-12-1994 at the rate of Rs 300 per month, the appellants are entitled for the benefit of Section 13 sub-sections (3), (4) and (6) of the Act. He further submitted that under the provisions of Section 13 of the Act, a decree for eviction cannot be passed against the tenants when they were always ready and willing to pay rent and have deposited the rent in the court prior to the filing of the suit.

    8. Insofar as the eviction on the ground of sub-letting is concerned, Mr Jain submitted that the tenants had sub-let the premises to RTDC when the premises had been given only for a period of 20 days to accommodate them as their shop was under reconstruction and renovation and, therefore, when the tenants had not sub-let the premises to RTDC and permitted them to have exclusive possession of the shop, there cannot be any sub-letting. Mr K.S Bhati, the learned counsel appearing for the landlord submitted that the contentions put forward by Mr Jain have absolutely no merit and that all the three courts have concurrently found that the tenants have wilfully defaulted in the payment of rent and also sub-let the premises, though temporarily, for a period of four months and collected a sum of Rs 2100 per month. Mr Bhati also invited our attention to the categoric findings rendered by the High Court.

    9. The provisions of clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Act read as under:

    “13. Eviction of tenants.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract, no court shall pass any decree, or make any order, in favour of a landlord, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, evicting the tenant so long as he is ready and willing to pay rent thereof to the full extent allowable by this Act, unless it is satisfied—
    (e) that the tenant has assigned, sub-let or otherwise parted with the possession of, the whole or any part of the premises without the permission of the landlord; or”

    10. The High Court on a consideration of the evidence tendered by the parties herein came to the conclusion that the tenant had clearly sub-let the three shops to RTDC for a period of four months and received Rs 2100 as rent from RTDC. The Court also held that there are concurrent findings that the possession of the suit shop was with RTDC to carry on the business of beer shop and during that period tenants had no control whatsoever over the suit shop. It was also further held that there is no evidence to show that the tenants were continuing in possession of the suit shop during that period. Therefore, the High Court has concluded that the use of the said shop for a period of four months by RTDC on payment of Rs 2100 as rent, certainly amounts to sub-letting within the meaning of clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Act.

    11. Section 13 sub-section (1)(e) deals with sub-letting. The said section says that if the tenant has assigned, sub-let or otherwise parted with the possession of, the whole or any part of the premises without the permission of the landlord, the tenant is liable to be evicted from the premises. In the instant case it has been clearly established by the evidence of the senior office assistant in RTDC from 1982. It is his evidence that RTDC had taken the disputed shop on rent from 11-4-1991 on temporary basis because in the shop in front of KEM, the repair work was going on. He further stated that RTDC remained in possession for four months on payment of rent.

    12. He further deposed that RTDC had given the rent of Rs 2100 per month of the disputed shop from 11-4-1991 to 15-8-1991 and the rent was paid to Gurbachan Singh, the tenant. In the cross-examination nothing has been elicited to discredit his testimony and to disprove their case with regard to sub-letting and the receipt of the rent.

    13. The learned counsel for the tenants has cited Delhi Stationers and Printers v. Rajendra Kumar (1990) 2 SCC 331. This is also a case of sub-letting. In this case, this Court has held that mere user of the appellant tenant's kitchen and latrine by the co-tenant who was residing in the portion let out to him by the respondent landlord cannot mean that the appellant had transferred the exclusive right to enjoy the kitchen and latrine and had parted with the legal possession of the said part of the premises in favour of the co-tenant. This judgment, in our opinion, has no application to the case on hand. In the above case, the tenant had permitted to use the kitchen and latrine on a temporary basis. He had not transferred the exclusive right to enjoy the kitchen and latrine. He had also not parted with the legal possession of the part of the premises in his possession and collected any amount by way of rent. This case, therefore, is distinguishable on facts and law.

    14. Mr Jain has also cited Dev Kumar v. Swaran Lata (1996) 1 SCC 25 (SCC at p. 30, para 9), which reads thus:

    “9. Coming to the second question the expression ‘sub-letting’ has not been defined in the Act. The conclusion on the question of sub-letting is a conclusion on a question of law derived from the findings on the materials on record as to the transfer of exclusive possession and as to the said transfer of possession being for consideration. As to what is the true meaning of the expression ‘sub-letting’, this Court considered the same in Jagdish Prasad v. Angoori Devi (1984) 2 SCC 590 in an eviction proceeding under U.P Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act. The Court held that merely from the presence of the person other than the tenant in the shop, sub-letting cannot be presumed and as long as control over the premises is kept by the tenant and the business run in the premises is of the tenant, sub-letting flowing from the presence of the person other than the tenant in the shop cannot be assumed. It was further held that in an application for eviction of a tenant from a shop which is based on the allegations that the premises has been sub-let, the allegation has to be proved. The question of sub-letting was considered by this Court in Shalimar Tar Products Ltd. v. H.C Sharma (1988) 1 SCC 70 and it was held that in order to construe sub-letting there must be parting of legal possession of the lessee and parting of legal possession means ‘possession with the right to include and also right to exclude others’. ”

    15. It is seen from the above paragraph that sub-letting cannot be presumed as long as control over the premises is kept by the tenant and the business run in the premises is of the tenant. This judgment also says that in an application for eviction of a tenant from a shop which is based on the allegations that the premises has been sub-let, the allegation has to be proved. As already noted in the instant case, the allegation of sub-letting has been clearly established by the evidence of the employee of RTDC and also by payment of rent. This judgment is also of no assistance to the appellants.

    16. Reliance has also been placed on Goppulal v. Thakurji Shriji Shriji Dwarakadheeshji (1969) 1 SCC 792, AIR 1969 SC 1291. This case also deals with the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act (17 of 1950). Section 13(1)(e) was also considered by this Court in the said judgment. This judgment held that in the event of sub-letting without permission of landlord, eviction is the only proper remedy and that the sub-letting of the premises whether before or after the commencement of the Act, is immaterial. If the tenant has sub-let the premises without the permission of the landlord either before or after the coming into the force of the Act, he is not protected from eviction under Section 13(1)(e) of the Act and it matters not that he had right to sub-let the premises under Section 108(j) of the Transfer of Property Act. In this case also, the landlord has established the ground of eviction under Section 13(1)(e) with regard to the two shops on the northern side of the staircase of the temple. This Court on a consideration of Section 13(1)(e) of the Act and of the evidence came to the conclusion that the landlord is entitled to a decree for ejectment of the tenant from the two shops. This Court also held that the concurrent findings of fact cannot be interfered with in a second appeal.

    17. In Jagdish Prasad v. Angoori Devi (1984) 2 SCC 590 this Court has held as under:

    “(1) It is only when a person other than the tenant sits in the shop in exercise of his own right that the presumption of sub-letting can arise. As long as control over the premises is kept by the tenant and the business run in the premises is of the tenant, sub-letting flowing from the presence of a person other than the tenant in the shop cannot be assumed. The Act does not require the court to assume a sub-tenancy merely from the fact of presence of an outsider. The allegation that the premises has been sub-let to a person has to be proved as a fact by the landlord and merely on the basis of a photograph showing presence of that person or his son within the premises, sub-letting cannot be presumed.”

    18. Reliance has also been place on Shalimar Tar Products Ltd. v. H.C Sharma (1988) 1 SCC 70. This is also a case of sub-letting. In this case, this Court has dealt with the provisions of Section 14(1) proviso (b) and Sections 16(2) and (3) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The question posed before this Court for consideration was whether there was a sub-letting and whether for that written consent of landlord had been obtained. This Court held that concurrent findings of fact on those questions of Tribunal and the High Court would normally be accepted by the Supreme Court in appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. This Court also held that the tenant has no right to sub-let a portion of the premises without written consent of the landlord in contravention of the lease deed. Since the premises were let out without the written permission of the landlord, this Court held that the landlord is entitled to eviction decree.

    19. Reliance has also been placed on Dipak Banerjee v. Lilabati Chakraborty (1987) 4 SCC 161. This is yet another instance of sub-letting under the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 and Section 13(1)(a) of the said Act. This Court has categorically held that person alleged to be a sub-tenant must be shown to be in exclusive possession of the premises over which the main tenant has no control. This Court also held that the ingredient to prove the tenancy or sub-tenancy is that the right to occupy the premises must be in lieu of payment of some compensation or rent. In the present case, there was clear evidence as to the sub-letting and also the receipt of the rent by the tenant from the sub-lessee.

    20. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that there is absolutely no warrant to interfere with the concurrent findings of the three courts. However, we leave open the first question argued by Mr Jain on the interpretation of Sections 13(3), (4) and (6) to be decided in an appropriate case and Section 19-A of the Act.

    21. Mr Jain in the alternative prayed for some reasonable time to vacate the premises and hand over peaceful vacant possession to the landlord. It is not in dispute that the tenants are in occupation of the shop in question from the year 1970. The tenants have also deposited the rent in the court as ordered by this Court. Considering the long occupation of the premises in question, we are of the view that a reasonable time should be given to the tenants so that they will be in a position to collect all the dues due to them by third parties. Time is also to be given to enable them to find out a suitable accommodation. We, therefore, grant nine months time to the tenants to vacate the premises and hand over peaceful vacant possession by the end of February 2007. The tenants shall now pay a sum of Rs 1500 not by way of rent but by way of compensation for use and occupation without any default from 1-6-2006 to end of February 2007 on or before 15th of every succeeding month. The tenants shall file an undertaking in this Court within a period of three weeks from today. We also make it clear that the tenants shall not sub-let the premises to any other third party during this period and shall hand over peaceful possession to the landlord on or before 1-3-2007.

    22. The civil appeal is disposed of accordingly. No costs.

    23. The landlord is at liberty to withdraw the rent already deposited as per the orders of this Court without furnishing any security and if there is any arrear of rent, the appellants shall pay the same within four weeks from today.

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    Gurubachan Singh And Another v. Ram Niwas .
    (May 24, 2006)