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2006 INSC 633
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
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Disposition
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  • Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2006 INSC 633
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On 30 May 1996, Lakshman was sleeping on a roadside katta outside his home in Village Areshanker, Karnataka, when three neighbouring men (the appellants) allegedly attacked him—one wielding an axe and the others carrying jambiyas. Lakshman died on the spot. His mother (PW 1) and 12-year-old brother (PW 2) claimed to have witnessed the assault; two neighbours (PWs 8 and 9) initially listed as eyewitnesses turned hostile at trial.

PW 1 lodged a first information report (FIR) the same morning, though later testimony revealed inconsistencies about the time, place, and manner in which it was recorded. The Principal Sessions Judge, Bijapur, acquitted the appellants (Sessions Case No. 144/1998) on 14 September 1998, finding prosecution evidence unreliable. The High Court of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 1485/1998) re-evaluated the evidence, accepted PWs 1 and 2 as credible, and on 26 May 2004 convicted the appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, sentencing them to life imprisonment.

The appellants obtained special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, challenging their conviction.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a conviction for murder under Section 302/34 IPC could stand primarily on the testimony of PWs 1 and 2.
  2. Whether contradictions in eyewitness accounts and investigative records created reasonable doubt warranting acquittal.
  3. Whether irregularities surrounding the FIR undermined the prosecution’s case.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants’ Arguments

  • PW 2 was not an eyewitness; his cross-examination showed he awoke only after the attack and merely saw the body.
  • PW 1’s credibility was doubtful: she initially alleged a motive (an illicit affair) but later retracted it; she admitted placing thumb impressions on five blank sheets; and her narrative conflicted with those of PWs 2 and 3.
  • The absence of bloodstains on the clothes of PWs 1 and 2 indicated they were not present during the assault.
  • Contradictory testimony of police witnesses (PWs 10 and 11) regarding the FIR suggested it was fabricated after PW 3 returned from the market.

State’s Position

  • The High Court correctly found PWs 1 and 2 to be truthful eyewitnesses whose evidence was sufficient despite hostile witnesses and lack of proven motive.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

  • Reliability of PW 2: Material contradictions between his examination-in-chief, cross-examination, and prior police statements led the Court to treat him as a non-eyewitness.
  • Scrutiny of PW 1: The Court noted her false assertion of motive, inconsistencies with other witnesses, unexplained thumb impressions on blank papers, absence of bloodstains, and discrepancies in her account of events.
  • FIR Irregularities: Conflicting statements by PW 10 (Havaldar) and PW 11 (Investigating Officer) about when and where the FIR was recorded cast doubt on its authenticity and supported the defence theory of later fabrication.
  • Single-Witness Standard: While a conviction can rest on a solitary eyewitness, the testimony must be of “sterling quality.” The Court found PW 1’s evidence fell short of that standard.

Finding the remaining evidence uncorroborated and riddled with inconsistencies, the Court concluded that reasonable doubt persisted.

Holding and Implications

HELD: The appeal is allowed; the conviction and life sentence are set aside. The appellants are acquitted of the charge under Section 302/34 IPC and ordered to be released unless required in another case.

Implications: The decision reinstates the trial court’s acquittal and re-affirms the Supreme Court’s caution in upholding convictions based solely on a single eyewitness whose testimony is not of unimpeachable quality. No broader precedent is established beyond the immediate parties.

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    Bhimapa Chandappa Hosamani And Others v. State Of Karnataka .

    B.P Singh, J.— The appellants have appealed to this Court by special leave against their conviction and sentence passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore on 26-5-2004 in Criminal Appeal No. 1485 of 1998. The appellants were charged of the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code for having committed the murder of Lakshman at about 6.00 a.m on 30-5-1996 while he was sleeping on the “katta” of his house. The Principal Sessions Judge, Bijapur, who tried the appellants in Sessions Case No. 144 of 1998 acquitted them of the charge by his judgment and order of 14-9-1998. The trial court held that out of the four witnesses examined as eyewitnesses, two, namely, PW 8 and PW 9 turned hostile and did not support the case of the prosecution. The remaining two witnesses were PW 1, Smt Nimbavva, mother of the deceased and PW 2, Ayyappa, the younger brother of the deceased, aged about 12 years. On an appreciation of their evidence the trial court held that PW 2 had not really witnessed the occurrence while PW 1 was not a truthful witness. The High Court on reappreciation of the evidence on record came to the contrary conclusion that PWs 1 and 2 were truthful eyewitnesses and on the basis of their evidence the appellants could be safely convicted of the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. Accordingly the appellants were sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life.

    2. The case of the prosecution is that on 30-5-1996 the deceased was sleeping on the “katta” in the outer portion of the house by the side of the road, while the remaining members of the family were sleeping inside. According to PW 1 on 30-5-1996 her husband Basappa, PW 3 woke up at about 5.00 a.m since he had to go to Muddebihal. PW 1 and PW 2 also woke up with him. PW 3 wanted the deceased to accompany him to Muddebihal but he insisted on sleeping and stated that he will come to Muddebihal with food by 9 o' clock bus. While PW 3 left for Muddebihal, she started washing utensils at a place which was at a distance of about 2 metres from the “katta” where the deceased was sleeping. There is evidence on record to the effect that at about 5.00 a.m it was dark but at about 6.00 a.m there was some light as the sun was about to rise. At about that time she noticed the three accused variously armed coming there. While Appellant 2 was armed with an axe, the other two were armed with “jambiya”. They came saying that they will finish the deceased. In spite of her begging of them not to do so, they started assaulting the deceased. She saw that Appellant 2 gave 2 or 3 blows on the neck of the deceased while the remaining two assaulted him with their weapons on different parts of the body. According to her, the occurrence was witnessed by her younger son, PW 2 and PWs 8 and 9, the neighbours, who had come on hearing her cries.

    3. According to her a police havaldar came to her house after about 4-5 hours and recorded the information given by her. At about 12 noon an Inspector came who held inquest over the dead body of the deceased and took other steps in the course of investigation. The dead body of the deceased was then sent for post-mortem examination.

    4. In the first information report lodged by PW 1, it was stated that about 3 months before the date of occurrence, her son Lakshman, the deceased, who had illicit connection with Renuka (sister of Appellant 2) was seen following Renuka while she was going to wash clothes to the village “nallah”. People of the village had seen him following Renuka and with a view to protect her reputation Renuka complained to her mother and mother-in-law about the deceased dragging her. Thereafter, the mother and mother-in-law of Renuka had come to her house and abused the deceased in filthy language. From that day onwards the appellants were moving about in the village saying that the deceased had insulted their sister and, therefore, they will not spare him and will finish him. In this background the occurrence took place on 30-5-1996. It is stated that her husband got up at 5.00 a.m in the morning since he had to go to Muddebihal. She tried to wake up her son (the deceased) but he insisted on sleeping since it was dark and said that he will get up after sunrise. She thereafter started sweeping and washing utensils. At about 6.00 a.m the appellants came and finding her son sleeping on the “katta” said that they will not spare Lakshman (the deceased). So saying, Appellant 2 assaulted the deceased on his neck twice or thrice with an axe while the remaining accused assaulted him with “jambiyas” on his back and thigh. Her son died on the spot. They then ran away saying that they had finished Lakshman. She further stated in the FIR that her mother-in-law and her son PW 2 came out and witnessed the occurrence. PWs 8 and 9 of the neighbourhood also witnessed the assault. It was alleged that out of anger and to take revenge, for her son having illicit connection with Renuka, the appellants had committed the murder of her son.

    5. The evidence on record discloses that all the three appellants are the neighbours of PW 1.

    6. Since PWs 8 and 9 did not support the case of the prosecution, they were declared hostile. Their evidence was, therefore, of no assistance to the prosecution. Apart from the mother, PW 1, the other witness PW 2 was the younger brother of the deceased. The trial court came to the conclusion that he was not an eyewitness and, therefore, placed no reliance on his testimony. The High Court disagreed with the trial court and held that PW 2, in clear terms, claimed in his examination-in-chief that he had witnessed the incident and had seen all the accused assaulting the deceased with their respective weapons. The High Court observed that even in his cross-examination no material contradiction had been elicited and PW 2 had denied the suggestion that he had not witnessed the incident. What PW 2 stated was that he came from inside the house when his mother PW 1 shouted and by the time he came the assault was over. The High Court was of the view that since PW 1 in her evidence stated that she shouted when the assault was going on and at that time, hearing her shouts her neighbours PWs 8 and 9 had come out, it was but natural that PW 2, who was inside the house would have also come out and witnessed the incident. There was thus no reason to doubt the testimony of PW 2.

    7. We have carefully examined the evidence of PW 2. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that on a mere reading of the evidence it is quite clear that PW 2 is not an eyewitness. In all likelihood he was sleeping inside the house and when he came out of the house later, he only saw the dead body of the deceased. He cannot, therefore, be said to be an eyewitness.

    8. PW 2 stated that on the date of the incident he was sleeping inside the house with his father, mother and grandmother. There was a “katta” in the front portion of the house where the deceased was sleeping. In his examination-in-chief he asserted that he woke up early in the morning when his father and mother woke up. His father had to go to Muddebihal and while leaving for Muddebihal he (the father) tried to awaken the deceased but the deceased insisted that he will come by 9 o' clock bus and will bring meals. The deceased again went to sleep. He was then asked by the deceased to bring “beedi” which he brought from inside the house. The deceased smoked the “beedi” and again went to sleep. When his father left for Muddebihal it was dark. His mother, PW 1, was washing utensils inside the house and at that time he was standing in the front yard. He saw the appellants coming variously armed and he also witnessed the assault by them on his brother. The appellants after assaulting his brother went away saying that they had finished Lakshman. When the accused had come, his mother PW 1, had begged of them not to assault her son, yet the appellants murdered his brother. When the incident took place there was light though the sun was not visible. Thereafter, the police had come to his house. At about 8.00 a.m the Inspector also came.

    9. It appears from his deposition that while his mother was washing utensils he was standing in the front yard of the house and he saw the appellants coming to his house and assaulting his brother. He also saw the mother pleading with them not to assault his brother. This witness in his examination-in-chief asserted that he had seen the entire occurrence from the very beginning. In his cross-examination, however, he gave a different version altogether. He stated that when his father left for Muddebihal he did not wake up. He was not even aware as to when his father left, as he was asleep. He stated that on hearing the sound of howling of his mother he woke up and saw the dead body of his brother. However, he denied the suggestion that he did not see the appellants assaulting his brother.

    10. It also appears from the evidence of PW 11, the investigating officer, that PW 2 had not stated before him that his father woke up his elder brother and asked him to accompany him but his brother did not go, and went to sleep, and that the accused came to their house. He also did not state about his mother pleading with the accused not to assault her son.

    11. In this state of the evidence, we entertain a serious doubt as to whether PW 2 is really an eyewitness. In his examination-in-chief he claims to have woken up with his father when he was leaving for Muddebihal. In his cross-examination, his version is to the contrary. He has stated quite clearly that he did not even know when his father left since he was sleeping, and further that when he got up on hearing the cries of his mother, the incident was over and on coming out he had seen the dead body of his brother. The evidence leads us to suspect the assertion of PW 2 that he is an eyewitness. We are, therefore, inclined to accept the finding of the trial court that PW 2 had not witnessed the occurrence. His evidence cannot be relied upon.

    12. We are then left with the evidence of the sole eyewitness, namely, PW 1, the mother of the deceased. As noticed, in the first information report it was clearly stated by PW 1 that there was a motive for the commission of the offence, namely, that the deceased had illicit relations with one Renuka and this had come to the knowledge of her family members who had protested against the conduct of the deceased. They had in fact come to the house of PW 1 and abused the deceased in filthy language, and since then the appellants were heard saying that they will not spare the deceased. From her cross-examination, it appears, that she has gone back on her statements made in the first information report as also in her examination-in-chief. In fact she denied that she knew about her son having any illicit relations with Renuka. On the other hand she stated that the relationship between the two families was cordial till the date of murder. Prior to the murder of her son there had been no quarrel, complaint or dispute between the accused and her son. The members of the two families used to visit each other.

    13. The trial court as well as the High Court have not accepted the evidence regarding existence of motive as alleged by PW 1 in the first information report. In fact she herself in the course of her deposition denied the existence of such a motive. The High Court has agreed with the view of the trial court on this issue. It is well settled that in order to bring home the guilt of an accused, it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove the motive. The existence of motive is only one of the circumstances to be kept in mind while appreciating the evidence adduced by the prosecution. If the evidence of the witnesses appears to be truthful and convincing, failure to prove the motive is not fatal to the case of the prosecution. The law on this aspect is well settled.

    14. However, in the instant case we are left with the evidence of a sole eyewitness and it, therefore, becomes the duty of the Court to critically scrutinise her evidence with a view to assure itself that the witness is stating the truth and that her evidence is so convincing and appears to be so natural and truthful that it is not necessary to look for other evidence to record a conviction. Viewed from this angle, it is established that in the first information report, a false statement had been made by PW 1 as to the existence of motive.

    15. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the evidence on record will establish that PW 1 is not a truthful witness. In fact after her husband arrived at the scene, a false case was concocted and the appellants were named as the assailants. In her cross-examination, PW 1 stated that after recording her complaint the police officer did not read out the same to her but her thumb mark was taken on the complaint. Her thumb mark was taken five times on five white sheets of paper. After she had lodged the report she was never questioned by the police. She, however, denied the suggestion that the police had prepared a false complaint at the behest of her husband.

    16. PW 1 admits that she had been made to sign (thumb mark) five blank sheets of paper and that she was never questioned by the police. This is only one of the suspicious circumstances which appears on record.

    17. In her first information report she had stated that PW 2 had witnessed the occurrence after coming out of the house along with her mother-in-law on hearing her cries. In her evidence, however, she gave a different version. She stated that when the appellants came, her son PW 2 was standing in the front yard of the house. Both she and her son pleaded with the appellants not to assault the deceased but they were both pushed by them and the appellants started assaulting the deceased. An improvement has been made by the witness in an attempt to project the presence of PW 2 from the very beginning of the occurrence which, as we have held earlier, is not true. Another aspect of the matter which deserves notice is the fact that neither her clothes nor that of PW 2 had any bloodstains, though having regard to the nature of injures of the deceased a lot of blood must have come out. She explained by saying that she only touched the body of the deceased to find out whether he was alive. The conduct, to say the least, appears highly unnatural. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the absence of bloodstains on the clothes of PWs 1 and 2 suggests that they had not witnessed the occurrence as they were perhaps inside the house and later when they came out they saw the dead body of the deceased on the “katta” with severe injuries. It was submitted that according to PW 2 when the occurrence took place at about 6.00 a.m the sun had not risen but there was sufficient light to identify the appellants. According to PW 2, his mother PW 1 was washing utensils inside the house. The speed with which the occurrence took place as described by PW 1 is such that she had hardly any time to raise her voice when the accused started assaulting her son. By the time she could raise her voice, the accused had murdered her son and had run away. In the light of these circumstances it was argued before us that while she was inside the house, the murder of her son had taken place outside on the “katta” where he was sleeping and the assailants had disappeared after committing the offence. Her claim, therefore, that she was an eyewitness cannot be accepted.

    18. There are several circumstances which give rise to a serious doubt about the truthfulness of PW 1. It is the case of the prosecution supported by PW 1 that her husband PW 3 slept inside the house while her deceased son slept outside on the “katta”. This assertion of PW 1 is again contradicted by her husband PW 3 who stated that on that night he had not slept inside the house. In fact he had slept with his deceased son on the “katta”. He further stated that he left his son sleeping and washed his face and, untied the cow tethered in front of his house and took the cow for sale to Muddebihal market. There was a pot of water on the “katta” where they had slept and he used that water for washing his face. He did not go inside the house. While leaving, he only awakened his wife. It obviously means that without going inside the house he may have awakened his wife by calling her and asking her to wake up.

    19. The deposition of PW 1 is to the effect that after her husband left for Muddebihal she started sweeping and cleaning the utensils. The evidence of PW 2, her son, Ayyappa, is that after his father left, his mother started rinsing utensils sitting inside the house and that he was standing in the front yard. The first information report is silent where she was washing utensils but in her deposition she clearly asserted that she was washing utensils just about 2 metres by the side of the “katta” on which her son, the deceased, was sleeping in the outer portion of the house by the side of the road. The evidence of PW 1 and PW 2 are, therefore, not consistent on this point.

    20. Apart from these inconsistencies there is one another aspect of the matter which creates a serious doubt about the truthfulness of the prosecution case. As noticed earlier, PW 10, Havaldar Appanna, the Havaldar of Nidagundi Police Outpost was the first person to reach the place of occurrence. He deposed that at about 7.00 a.m he had received a wireless message from the Circle Police Inspector of Basavan Bagewadi informing him that a murder had taken place in Village Areshanker and that he should immediately proceed to the village. The CPI informed him that he would also be reaching there. According to PW 10 he reached Village Areshanker at about 8.00 or 8.30 a.m CPI Bagewadi had already reached the village. They questioned PW 1 and recorded the complaint as stated by her. As per the orders of the CPI he took the original complaint to Kolhar Police Station and handed over to PSI Kolhar to register a crime. He asserted in his examination-in-chief that CPI Bagewadi was present when he wrote the complaint. After a case was registered at Police Station Kolhar a copy of the FIR was given to him and he took it and gave it to the CPI in the village. He denied the suggestion that the information, Ext. P-1 was not written in the village and that it was prepared at 2.00 p.m in the police station.

    21. Shri Saidappa, CPI Bagewadi (PW 11) has a different story to tell. He deposed that after receiving wireless message he immediately rushed to Areshanker village at about 9.30 a.m He does not claim to have instructed PW 10 to reach the village of occurrence. When he went there PW 10 the havaldar was not present. He came to learn that he had already obtained a complaint from PW 1 and had gone to Kolhar PS. He waited till he got the FIR at about 1.30 p.m from PW 10 who came from the police station and handed over a copy of the first information report.

    22. According to PW 1, PW 11 came to the village at about 12 noon and held inquest over the dead body of the accused.

    23. The defence is that PW 1 did not give any information to the police as she was not an eyewitness, and only after her husband PW 3 returned from Muddebihal, a false case was concocted. That explains why there is so much inconsistency between the statements of PW 10, the havaldar and PW 11, the investigating officer. While PW 10 asserts that PW 1 was questioned by both of them and that on the instruction of PW 11 he left for Kolhar PS with the information to get a case registered, PW 11 on the other hand states that when he reached the place of occurrence PW 10 was not there at all and that he had already left with the report for getting the case registered at Kolhar PS. This circumstance does raise a doubt as to whether the FIR was recorded early in the morning at about 8.00 or 8.30 a.m or whether it was recorded later. PW 11 does not state that he had sent a wireless message to PW 10 to reach the village of occurrence. In fact he went to the village of occurrence with another havaldar and a police constable, and there he learnt that PW 10 had already recorded the information given by PW 1, and had gone to the police station to get the case registered. How PW 10 came to know about the occurrence is shrouded in mystery. The inconsistencies in the evidence of PWs 10 and 11 could not be explained and this gives rise to serious suspicion about the recording of the FIR at Village Areshanker at 8.00 a.m If PW 10 is to be believed that the information given by PW 1 was recorded in the presence of PW 11, then it must follow that it was not recorded at about 8.30 or 9.00 a.m as claimed by the prosecution but later at about 10.00 a.m or 12 noon when PW 11 as well as PW 3 came to the place of occurrence. This probabilises the defence case that PW 1 was not an eyewitness and, therefore, only after her husband PW 3 and CPI (PW 11) came to the village, a false report was got scribed in the village or at the police station involving the appellants.

    24. We have undertaken a very close and critical scrutiny of the evidence of PW 1 and the other evidence on record only with a view to assess whether the evidence of PW 1 is of such quality that a conviction for the offence of murder can be safely rested on her sole testimony. This Court has repeatedly observed that on the basis of the testimony of a single eyewitness a conviction may be recorded, but it has also cautioned that while doing so the court must be satisfied that the testimony of the solitary eyewitness is of such sterling quality that the court finds it safe to base a conviction solely on the testimony of that witness. In doing so the court must test the credibility of the witness by reference to the quality of his evidence. The evidence must be free of any blemish or suspicion, must impress the court as wholly truthful, must appear to be natural and so convincing that the court has no hesitation in recording a conviction solely on the basis of the testimony of a single witness.

    25. So tested, we do not find the evidence of PW 1 to be of that quality. In the first instance, she began with inventing a false story about existence of a motive. The narration of events as they took place before the actual murder of her son are also shown to be untrue. There is considerable doubt as to whether the first information was recorded on her saying at about 8.00 or 8.30 in the morning. Her evidence also leaves a lurking suspicion about her being an eyewitness. Having discarded the evidence of PW 2, and the other two alleged eyewitnesses having turned hostile, we find no reliable corroboration of her testimony. We do not find this case to be one in which the judgment of acquittal deserved to be set aside.

    26. We, therefore, feel compelled to give to the appellants the benefit of doubt while allowing their appeal. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed, the appellants are acquitted of the charge levelled against them, and they are directed to be released unless required in connection with any other case.

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    Comments

    Bhimapa Chandappa Hosamani And Others v. State Of Karnataka .
    (Sep 20, 2006)