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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2006 INSC 205
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 376 of the Penal Code
  • Section 35 of the Evidence Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Sections 363 and 366 of the Penal Code
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2006 INSC 205
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 376 of the Penal Code
  • Section 35 of the Evidence Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Sections 363 and 366 of the Penal Code
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent had been working in the house of the father of the prosecutrix, Sushila Bai (PW 1). According to a school record, her date of birth was 25 December 1970. She was admitted to the village primary school in 1977 and was married in 1985. After the “gauna” ceremony she returned to her parental home.

On the night of 25/26 February 1986 the respondent allegedly induced her to leave the village with him. An FIR was lodged the next day by Jeewan Ram Chandel (PW 6), the prosecutrix’s brother-in-law, alleging abduction. The police required proof of her age, whereupon a school certificate was produced. A case under Sections 366 and 376 of the Indian Penal Code was registered. The prosecutrix and the respondent were later located living together in Nagpur, and she was recovered on 23 March 1987.

The Sessions Court relied on the school register and supporting oral testimony to conclude that the prosecutrix was a minor (under 16) on the date of occurrence. It convicted the respondent of rape under Section 376 IPC and sentenced him to three years’ rigorous imprisonment, while acquitting him of the abduction charges under Sections 363 and 366.

The High Court, without re-examining all the evidence, reversed the conviction on the ground that the school register was not conclusive proof of age and that the father’s testimony was unreliable. The State appealed to the Supreme Court, resulting in the present decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the prosecution proved, through admissible evidence, that the prosecutrix was a minor on 25 February 1986.
  2. Whether, assuming guilt, the proviso to Section 376 IPC justified reduction of the sentence to the period already undergone.

Arguments of the Parties

Prosecution (State)

  • Relied on the school register entry showing the prosecutrix’s date of birth as 25-12-1970, proved through PW 4 (Headmaster) and PW 5 (Assistant Teacher).
  • Offered corroborative oral testimony from the prosecutrix (PW 1) and her father (PW 3) regarding the family’s sequence of births and her age.
  • Contended that because the prosecutrix was a minor, her consent—if any—was legally irrelevant to a charge under Section 376 IPC.

Defence/Respondent

  • Maintained that sexual intercourse occurred with the prosecutrix’s consent.
  • Questioned the reliability of the school register as conclusive proof of age.
  • Highlighted that the prosecutrix was a “mature girl,” already married, and had willingly lived with the respondent in Nagpur.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Justice S.B. Sinha emphasised that a school register is admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence Act because it is maintained in discharge of a public duty. PW 5 testified that the prosecutrix’s mother supplied the date of birth at the time of admission, and PW 4 confirmed the entry. Nothing damaging was elicited in cross-examination.

The Court considered the prosecutrix’s admission that she was the third child and the father’s consistent chronology of his six children, finding these details compatible with the recorded birth date. Merely because the father could not specify dates for all his children did not render his testimony false.

Although a school register is not conclusive, its evidentiary value was strengthened by this oral corroboration. The High Court therefore erred in rejecting the age evidence without substantive critique. The Supreme Court restored the Sessions Court’s finding that the prosecutrix was a minor and, consequently, upheld the conviction for rape.

On sentencing, the Court noted several mitigating factors: the prosecutrix was married and had willingly lived with the respondent; both lower courts treated her as a consenting partner; the incident dated back to 1986; the appeal had remained pending for roughly a decade; and the respondent had already spent about 18 months in custody. Invoking the proviso to Section 376 IPC, the Court found it unnecessary to remand him to prison.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed; conviction under Section 376 IPC restored, but sentence reduced to the period already undergone.

The respondent stands convicted but need not serve further imprisonment. The decision reaffirms that entries in a school register, when supported by credible testimony, constitute reliable evidence of age. No new legal precedent was set beyond the clarification of evidentiary standards for proving minority.

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    State Of Chhattisgarh v. Lekhram .

    S.B Sinha, J.— The respondent herein was working in the house of the father of Sushila Bai (PW 1). She is said to have been born on 25-12-1970. She was admitted in a village school in 1977. She was married in the year 1985. She came back to her parents' place from her in-laws' house after the “gauna” ceremony was performed. The respondent herein is said to have induced her to leave the village along with him in the night intervening between 25-2-1986 and 26-2-1986. A first information report was lodged on 26-2-1986 by Jeewan Ram Chandel (PW 6) who happened to be the brother-in-law of the prosecutrix Sushila Bai. In the said report, the respondent herein was said to have abducted her. The father of the prosecutrix, however, was asked by the officer in charge of the police station to produce proof of her age whereupon certificate as per the school register was filed. A case under Sections 366 and 376 was thereafter initiated against the respondent. The prosecutrix (PW 1) and the respondent thereafter were found to be residing at Nagpur. The first informant was sent there by the father of the prosecutrix with the police party. PW 1 was recovered on 23-3-1987.

    2. PW 1 alleged in her evidence before the court that she was taken out of the house by the respondent stating that he would take her to the Narmada fair.

    3. The prosecution admittedly was proceeding on the hypothesis that the respondent had assured her that he would keep her like his wife. When she denied the said fact, she was declared hostile.

    4. Before the learned trial Judge, evidence was adduced on behalf of the prosecution to show that as on 25-2-1986, she was minor. Apart from the statement of the prosecutrix herself, her father (PW 3) as also the Headmaster (PW 4) and the Assistant Teacher (PW 5) of the Primary Govt. School, Baj Gauda were examined. The entry in the school register showing the date of birth of the prosecutrix to be 25-12-1970 was proved. The learned Sessions Judge on the basis of the said evidence opined that on the date of occurrence she was a minor.

    5. The learned Sessions Judge proceeded on the basis that having regard to the age of the prosecutrix the stand of the defence that the accused had sexual intercourse with her with consent was of little importance. The learned Sessions Judge opined that in view of the fact that the respondent herein had not disputed that he had sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix at Nagpur, the charge of rape must be held to have been proved. It was, however, held that no case has been made out against the respondent under Sections 363 and 366 of the Penal Code. Taking a lenient view of the matter, the respondent was sentenced to undergo 3 years' rigorous imprisonment under Section 376 of the Penal Code.

    6. In the appeal, the High Court did not enter into the evidences brought on record. The judgment of the learned Sessions Judge was reversed on the premise that entries made in a school register is not conclusive evidence as regards the date of birth of PW 1. The evidence of PW 3 the father of the prosecutrix was also disbelieved solely on the ground that he was not in a position to say about the date of birth of his other children.

    7. The sole question which, thus, arises for our consideration is as to whether the State has brought enough materials on record to prove that PW 1 was a minor as on the date of occurrence.

    8. PW 4 Shri Vishnu Prasad Shrivastava was working as a Headmaster in the Primary Government School, Baj Gauda. He stated on oath that while taking admission, her mother disclosed about the date of birth on the basis of which the same was recorded in the school register as 25-12-1970.

    9. PW 5 Shri Jumuk Lal Sahu was an Assistant Teacher in the year 1977-78 when PW 1 was admitted in the said school. He proved the said entries as having been written by him. He further stated that the date of birth of PW 1 was certified by Shakuntala Devi, mother of the prosecutrix.

    10. Nothing, in our opinion, has been elicited in the cross-examination of the said witnesses to show that their statements were not correct. PW 3 is the father of the prosecutrix. According to him, his eldest daughter Uttara was born in the year 1966 and the second daughter Nandni Kumari in 1968. Sushila Bai prosecutrix was born on 25-12-1970. He further stated that the son Santosh was born in the year 1973 and thereafter another son Kamlesh was born in 1976. The last child Mukta was born in 1980.

    11. PW 1 prosecutrix admitted that she was the third child of her parents and two of her sisters are elder to her.

    12. A register maintained in a school is admissible in evidence to prove date of birth of the person concerned in terms of Section 35 of the Evidence Act. Such dates of births are recorded in the school register by the authorities in discharge of their public duty. PW 5, who was an Assistant Teacher in the said school in the year 1977, categorically stated that the mother of the prosecutrix disclosed her date of birth. The father of the prosecutrix also deposed to the said effect.

    13. The prosecutrix took admission in the year 1977. She was, therefore, about 6-7 years old at that time. She was admitted in Class I. Even by the village standard, she took admission in the school a bit late. She was married in the year 1985 when she was evidently a minor. She stayed in her in-laws' place for some time and after the “gauna” ceremony, she came back. The materials on record as regards the age of the prosecutrix were, therefore, required to be considered in the aforementioned backdrop. It may be true that an entry in the school register is not conclusive but it has evidentiary value. Such evidentiary value of a school register is corroborated by oral evidence as the same was recorded on the basis of the statement of the mother of the prosecutrix.

    14. Only because PW 3 the father of the prosecutrix could not state about the date of birth of his other children, the same, by itself, would not mean that he had been deposing falsely. We have noticed hereinbefore, that he, in answer to the queries made by the counsel for the parties, categorically stated about the year in which his other children were born. His statement in this behalf appears to be consistent and if the said statements were corroborative of the entries made in the register in the school, there was no reason as to why the High Court should have disbelieved the same. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the High Court committed a serious error in passing the impugned judgment. It cannot, therefore, be sustained. It is set aside accordingly.

    15. This brings us to the question of quantum of sentence. The question which, thus, arises for consideration is whether a case has been made out to invoke the proviso appended to Section 376 of the Penal Code. The trial court did so.

    16. The prosecutrix was a mature girl. She was married. She spent a few months in her in-laws' place. The respondent was working in her house. They, thus, knew each other for a long time. The prosecution evidently could not prove its case that she was enticed away from the custody of her guardian by the respondent on a false plea that he would marry her. She denied the said suggestion as presumably she was aware that she being married, the question of her marrying the respondent again may not arise. She lived for some time with the respondent in a rented house. Both the courts proceeded on the basis that she was a consenting party. The occurrence took place in the year 1986. The respondent preferred an appeal before the High Court in the year 1987. The same remained pending for about 10 years. The special leave petition was filed by the State 230 days after the prescribed period of limitation for preferring such appeal. The delay in filing the special leave petition, however, was condoned. He is said to have remained in custody for about one-and-a-half years. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case and having regard to the fact that both the courts have arrived at the conclusion that she was a consenting party, in our opinion, it may not be proper to send the appellant back to prison.

    17. For the aforementioned reasons, while setting aside the judgment of the High Court and affirming that of the trial court, we are of the opinion that the interest of justice would be met if the respondent is directed to be sentenced to the period already undergone by him. This appeal is allowed with the aforementioned directions.

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    Comments

    State Of Chhattisgarh v. Lekhram .
    (Apr 5, 2006)